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Eva Schmidt
TU Dortmund
  1. Where Reasons and Reasoning Come Apart.Eva Schmidt - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Proponents of the reasoning view analyze normative reasons as premises of good reasoning and explain the normativity of reasons by appeal to their role as premises of good reasoning. The aim of this paper is to cast doubt on the reasoning view by providing counterexamples to the proposed analysis of reasons, counterexamples in which premises of good reasoning towards φ‐ing are not reasons to φ.
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  2.  76
    Modest Nonconceptualism: Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - Springer.
    The author defends nonconceptualism, the claim that perceptual experience is nonconceptual and has nonconceptual content. Continuing the heated and complex debate surrounding this topic over the past two decades, she offers a sustained defense of a novel version of the view, Modest Nonconceptualism, and provides a systematic overview of some of the central controversies in the debate. -/- An explication of the notion of nonconceptual content and a distinction between nonconceptualist views of different strengths starts off the volume, then the (...)
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  3.  59
    The Explanatory Merits of Reasons-First Epistemology.Eva Schmidt - 2020 - In Christoph Demmerling & Dirk Schröder (eds.), Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion: New Essays. New York: pp. 75-91.
    I present an explanatory argument for the reasons-first view: It is superior to knowledge-first views in particular in that it can both explain the specific epistemic role of perception and account for the shape and extent of epistemic justification.
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  4. Possessing Epistemic Reasons: The Role of Rational Capacities.Eva Schmidt - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):483-501.
    In this paper, I defend a reasons-first view of epistemic justification, according to which the justification of our beliefs arises entirely in virtue of the epistemic reasons we possess. I remove three obstacles for this view, which result from its presupposition that epistemic reasons have to be possessed by the subject: the problem that reasons-first accounts of justification are necessarily circular; the problem that they cannot give special epistemic significance to perceptual experience; the problem that they have to say that (...)
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  5.  62
    New Trouble for “Reasons as Evidence”: Means That Don’T Justify the Ends.Eva Schmidt - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):708-718.
    In this article, I argue against Kearns and Star’s reasons-as-evidence view, which identifies normative reasons to ɸ with evidence that one ought to ɸ. I provide a new counterexample to their view, the student case, which involves an inference to the best explanation from means to end or, more generally, from a derivative to a more foundational “ought” proposition. It shows that evidence that one ought to act a certain way is not in all cases a reason so to act. (...)
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  6.  9
    Objectivism and Causalism About Reasons for Action.Eva Schmidt & Hans-Johann Glock - 2019 - In Gunnar Schumann (ed.), Explanation in Action Theory and Historiography: Causal and Teleological Approaches. New York: Routledge. pp. 124-145.
    This chapter explores whether a version of causalism about reasons for action can be saved by giving up Davidsonian psychologism and endorsing objectivism, so that the reasons for which we act are the normative reasons that cause our corresponding actions. We address two problems for ‘objecto-causalism’, actions for merely apparent normative reasons and actions performed in response to future normative reasons—in neither of these cases can the reason for which the agent acts cause her action. To resolve these problems, we (...)
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  7.  10
    Introduction.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism. Springer Verlag.
    This chapter provides an overview of the structure and purpose of the book. It introduces the philosophical context and motivations of the debate between conceptualism and nonconceptualism. The book is a defense of the nonconceptualist claim that experience is nonconceptual and has nonconceptual content. In particular, it defends what I call ‘Modest Nonconceptualism,’ which is briefly introduced in this chapter. On this view, all perceptual experiences are at least partly nonconceptual, i.e., involve the exercise of at least some concepts. It (...)
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  8. What Do We Want From Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)? – A Stakeholder Perspective on XAI and a Conceptual Model Guiding Interdisciplinary XAI Research.Markus Langer, Daniel Oster, Timo Speith, Lena Kästner, Kevin Baum, Holger Hermanns, Eva Schmidt & Andreas Sesing - 2021 - Artificial Intelligence 296:103473.
    Previous research in Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) suggests that a main aim of explainability approaches is to satisfy specific interests, goals, expectations, needs, and demands regarding artificial systems (we call these “stakeholders' desiderata”) in a variety of contexts. However, the literature on XAI is vast, spreads out across multiple largely disconnected disciplines, and it often remains unclear how explainability approaches are supposed to achieve the goal of satisfying stakeholders' desiderata. This paper discusses the main classes of stakeholders calling for explainability (...)
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  9.  22
    Arguments from Concept Possession.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism. Springer Verlag.
    In this chapter, I discuss arguments for the claim that a subject can both have an experience with a certain content and not be in possession of all the concepts needed to specify this content. If she does not possess all the relevant concepts, then she cannot exercise them. So, she can undergo such an experience without being required to exercise all the concepts needed to specify its content. The argument from memory experience goes back to Martin (Philos Rev 101:745763, (...)
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  10.  18
    Analytische feministische Erkenntnistheorie und implizite Einstellungen.Eva Schmidt - 2014 - In Astrid M. Fellner, Anne Conrad & Jennifer J.* Moos (eds.), Gender Überall!? Beiträge zur interdisziplinären Geschlechterforschung. Röhrig Universiätsverlag. pp. 97-117.
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  11.  15
    Arguments from Phenomenology.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism. Springer Verlag.
    I examine two arguments for nonconceptualism from the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. The idea is that only the assumption that experience content is nonconceptual does justice to the phenomenology of experience. In particular, if experience content is conceptual, we cannot account for its finely grained representational content. The problem is that visual color experience makes differences between shades of a color that are much more fine-grained than our conceptual repertoire allows. Further, conceptualism is incompatible with the situation-dependence of perceptual (...)
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  12.  57
    Content, Concepts, Concept Possession.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism. Springer Verlag.
    In this chapter, I clarify the notions of mental content and of concept. I present competing views on these notions and indicate my own position. I introduce content in terms of correctness conditions and distinguish several kinds of propositions, as well as non-propositional scenario content, with which perceptual content might be identified. I relate this discussion to a wide-spread commitment in philosophy of perception to respect the subject’s perceptual perspective in ascriptions of perceptual content. Then I compare views of concepts (...)
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  13.  11
    Comments on David McGraw, "Against the Combination of Materialism and Direct Realism".Eva Schmidt - 2018 - In John R. Smythies & Robert French (eds.), Direct versus Indirect Realism: A Neurophilosophical Debate on Consciousness. Elsevier. pp. 190-192.
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  14.  15
    Comments on French, “A Defence of Representational Realism”.Eva Schmidt - 2018 - In John R. Smythies & Robert French (eds.), Direct versus Indirect Realism: A Neurophilosophical Debate on Consciousness. Elsevier. pp. 181-185.
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  15.  15
    Comment on John Smythies, “The Metaphysical Foundations of Contemporary Neuroscience: A House Built on Sand”.Eva Schmidt - 2018 - In John R. Smythies & Robert French (eds.), Direct versus Indirect Realism: A Neurophilosophical Debate on Consciousness. Elsevier. pp. 181-190.
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  16.  23
    Correction To: Possessing Epistemic Reasons: The Role of Rational Capacities.Eva Schmidt - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):503-503.
    In the original publication of the article, the last sentence in footnote 16 was incorrectly published as “Thanks to—for raising this issue.” The corrected sentence should read as “Thanks to Daniel Star for raising this issue.”.
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  17.  1
    Die Eigenart religiöser Erfahrung.Eva Schmidt - 2019 - In Klaus Viertbauer & Georg Gasser (eds.), Handbuch Analytische Religionsphilosophie. Akteure – Diskurse – Perspektiven. Metzler. pp. 173-184.
    Über Zeiten und Kulturen hinweg finden sich Berichte von religiösen Erfahrungen wie der von Ruge geschilderten. Menschen meinen etwas Göttlichem, Heiligem, Übernatürlichem begegnet zu sein oder dieses erlebt zu haben. Es gibt eine große Bandbreite solcher religiöser Erfahrungen, über die dieser Beitrag einen ersten Überblick geben soll. Das zweite Thema des Beitrags betrifft die epistemische Relevanz religiöser Erfahrungen: Diese können vielleicht dazu genutzt werden, religiösen Glauben zu begründen oder zu rechtfertigen.
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  18.  32
    Does Perceptual Content Have to Be Objective? A Defence of Nonconceptualism.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1):201-214.
    In this paper, I discuss the conceptualist claim that we cannot speak of perceptual content unless we assume it is objective content. The conceptualist argues that only conceptual content can meet the requirement of being objective, so that the view that perceptual experience has nonconceptual content is not tenable. I start out by presenting the argument from objectivity as it can be found in McDowell. I then present the following objections: First, perceptual objectivity cannot be due to the perceiver’s conception (...)
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  19.  11
    Does Perceptual Content Have to Be Objective? A Defence of Nonconceptualism.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - .
    In this paper, I discuss the conceptualist claim that we cannot speak of perceptual content unless we assume it is objective content. The conceptualist argues that only conceptual content can meet the requirement of being objective, so that the view that perceptual experience has nonconceptual content is not tenable. I start out by presenting the argument from objectivity as it can be found in McDowell. I then present the following objections: First, perceptual objectivity cannot be due to the perceiver’s conception (...)
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  20. Jan G. Michel: Der qualitative Charakter bewusster Erlebnisse. Physikalismus und phanomenale Eigenschaften in der Philosophie des Geistes. [REVIEW]Eva Schmidt - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):279-283.
  21.  21
    How to Make Norms Clash.Eva Schmidt - forthcoming - Australasian Philosophical Review.
    In this comment on Katherine Dormandy's paper «True Faith», I point out that the clash she describes between epistemic norms and faith-based norms of belief needs to be supplemented with a clear understanding of the pertinent norms of belief. I argue that conceiving of them as evaluative fails to explain the clash, and that understanding them as prescriptive is no better. I suggest an understanding of these norms along the lines of Ross’s (1930) prima facie duties, and show how this (...)
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  22. How We Know Our Senses.Eva Schmidt - 2013 - Was Dürfen Wir Glauben? Was Sollen Wir Tun? Sektionsbeiträge des Achten Internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft Für Analytische Philosophie E.V.
     
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  23. Kiesewetter, Benjamin: The Normativity of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017. 314 Seiten. [978-0-19-875428-2]. [REVIEW]Eva Schmidt - 2019 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Literatur 7 (2):53-59.
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  24.  8
    Modest Nonconceptualism Vindicated.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism. Springer Verlag.
    This chapter contains the results of my discussion in the book. I first review the success of the respective arguments for nonconceptualism and defenses against conceptualist objections. Five of the six arguments presented in favor of nonconceptualism are successful, and three of them are strong enough to support the claim endorsed by Modest Nonconceptualism that every perceptual experience has at least some nonconceptual content. On the other hand, none of the conceptualist objections to nonconceptualism is fatal. So, nonconceptualism is victorious (...)
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  25.  26
    Nonconceptual Content.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism. Springer Verlag.
    I defend both conceptualists and nonconceptualists against an attack which has been leveled at them by critics such as Byrne (Perception and conceptual content In: Steup M, Sosa E (eds) Contemporary debates in epistemology. Blackwell, Malden, pp 231-250, 2005), Speaks (Philos Rev 114:359–398, 2005), and Crowther (Erkenntnis 65:5–276, 2006). They distinguish a ‘state’ reading and a ‘content’ reading of ‘(non)conceptual’ and argue that many arguments on either side support only the respective state views, not the respective content views. To prepare (...)
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  26. Normative Reasons for Mentalism.Eva Schmidt - 2018 - In Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna (eds.), Metaepistemology: Realism and Anti-Realism. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 97-120.
    The aim of this paper is to connect the traditional epistemological issue of justification with what one might call the “new reasons paradigm” coming from the philosophy of action and metaethics. More specifically, I will show that Conee and Feldman’s mentalism, a version of internalism about justification, can profitably be spelled out in terms of subjective normative reasons. On the way to achieving this aim, I will argue that it is important to ask not just the oft-discussed ontological question about (...)
     
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  27.  68
    Pluralism About Practical Reasons and Reason Explanations.Eva Schmidt & Hans-Johann Glock - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations (2):1-18.
    This paper maintains that objectivism about practical reasons should be combined with pluralism both about the nature of practical reasons and about action explanations. We argue for an ‘expanding circle of practical reasons’, starting out from an open-minded monist objectivism. On this view, practical reasons are not limited to actual facts, but consist in states of affairs, possible facts that may or may not obtain. Going beyond such ‘that-ish’ reasons, we argue that goals are also bona fide practical reasons. This (...)
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  28. Quellen des Wissens.Eva Schmidt - 2019 - In Martin Grajner & Guido Melchior (eds.), Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie. Metzler. pp. 122-128.
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  29.  12
    Responses to McGraw and French.Eva Schmidt - 2018 - In John R. Smythies & Robert French (eds.), Direct versus Indirect Realism: A Neurophilosophical Debate on Consciousness. Elsevier. pp. 255-258.
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  30.  14
    The Argument from Contradictory Contents.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism. Springer Verlag.
    The argument from contradictory contents presented here is based directly on observations about the content of experience. It claims that experience content, if conceptual, allows for contradictions within one and the same content. There are at least two examples of this, the waterfall illusion and the visual experiences of some grapheme-color synesthetes. However, due to a Fregean principle of content individuation, no conceptual contents are contradictory. So experience content is nonconceptual. I motivate a particular version of the argument and defend (...)
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  31.  59
    The Argument From Animal and Infant Perception.Eva Schmidt - 2010 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):97-110.
    I discuss an argument for non-conceptualism based on animal and infant per- ception. Crudely put, some animals and infants who possess no concepts nonetheless have perceptual states with non-conceptual content. Perceptual experiences of adult humans have the same kind of content as the experiences of animals and infants, so the content of the perceptual experiences of adult humans is also non-conceptual. I defend this argument against potential attacks from the conceptualist. I argue that there are indeed creatures which possess no (...)
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  32.  88
    Two Challenges for CI Trustworthiness and How to Address Them.Kevin Baum, Eva Schmidt & A. Köhl Maximilian - 2017
    We argue that, to be trustworthy, Computa- tional Intelligence (CI) has to do what it is entrusted to do for permissible reasons and to be able to give rationalizing explanations of its behavior which are accurate and gras- pable. We support this claim by drawing par- allels with trustworthy human persons, and we show what difference this makes in a hypo- thetical CI hiring system. Finally, we point out two challenges for trustworthy CI and sketch a mechanism which could be (...)
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  33.  26
    The Epistemological Objection.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism. Springer Verlag.
    In this chapter, I rebut three incarnations of the epistemological objection put forth by McDowell (Mind and World, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1994a) and Brewer (Perception and Reason, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999). According to them, only the assumption that perceptual experiences have conceptual content can account for the fact that perception plays a crucial role in justifying belief about the external world. I begin by providing some context to the objections, viz. by presenting the myth of the given that (...)
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  34.  15
    The Objection from Objectivity.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism. Springer Verlag.
    In this chapter, I turn to the claim that we cannot speak of perceptual content unless we assume it is objective content. The conceptualist argues that only conceptual content can meet the requirement of being objective. I start out by presenting the objection from objectivity as it can be found in McDowell (Mind and world, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1994a). I then discuss the following replies: First, even if objective perceptual experience requires the perceiver to have an objective world-view, the (...)
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