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Eva Schmidt [49]Eva Https://Orcidorg Schmidt [1]
  1. What do we want from Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)? – A stakeholder perspective on XAI and a conceptual model guiding interdisciplinary XAI research.Markus Langer, Daniel Oster, Timo Speith, Lena Kästner, Kevin Baum, Holger Hermanns, Eva Schmidt & Andreas Sesing - 2021 - Artificial Intelligence 296 (C):103473.
    Previous research in Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) suggests that a main aim of explainability approaches is to satisfy specific interests, goals, expectations, needs, and demands regarding artificial systems (we call these “stakeholders' desiderata”) in a variety of contexts. However, the literature on XAI is vast, spreads out across multiple largely disconnected disciplines, and it often remains unclear how explainability approaches are supposed to achieve the goal of satisfying stakeholders' desiderata. This paper discusses the main classes of stakeholders calling for explainability (...)
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  2. From Responsibility to Reason-Giving Explainable Artificial Intelligence.Kevin Baum, Susanne Mantel, Timo Speith & Eva Schmidt - 2022 - Philosophy and Technology 35 (1):1-30.
    We argue that explainable artificial intelligence (XAI), specifically reason-giving XAI, often constitutes the most suitable way of ensuring that someone can properly be held responsible for decisions that are based on the outputs of artificial intelligent (AI) systems. We first show that, to close moral responsibility gaps (Matthias 2004), often a human in the loop is needed who is directly responsible for particular AI-supported decisions. Second, we appeal to the epistemic condition on moral responsibility to argue that, in order to (...)
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  3.  69
    Facts about incoherence as non-evidential epistemic reasons.Eva Schmidt - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-22.
    This paper presents a counterexample to the principle that all epistemic reasons for doxastic attitudes towards p are provided by evidence concerning p. I begin by motivating and clarifying the principle and the associated picture of epistemic reasons, including the notion of evidence concerning a proposition, which comprises both first- and second-order evidence. I then introduce the counterexample from incoherent doxastic attitudes by presenting three example cases. In each case, the fact that the subject’s doxastic attitudes are incoherent is an (...)
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  4. Where Reasons and Reasoning Come Apart.Eva Schmidt - 2020 - Noûs 55 (4):762-781.
    Proponents of the reasoning view analyze normative reasons as premises of good reasoning and explain the normativity of reasons by appeal to their role as premises of good reasoning. The aim of this paper is to cast doubt on the reasoning view by providing counterexamples to the proposed analysis of reasons, counterexamples in which premises of good reasoning towards φ‐ing are not reasons to φ.
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  5. Modest Nonconceptualism: Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - Cham: Springer.
    The author defends nonconceptualism, the claim that perceptual experience is nonconceptual and has nonconceptual content. Continuing the heated and complex debate surrounding this topic over the past two decades, she offers a sustained defense of a novel version of the view, Modest Nonconceptualism, and provides a systematic overview of some of the central controversies in the debate. -/- An explication of the notion of nonconceptual content and a distinction between nonconceptualist views of different strengths starts off the volume, then the (...)
  6.  89
    Reasons, attenuators, and virtue: A novel account of pragmatic encroachment.Eva Schmidt - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy:1-22.
    In this paper, I explicate pragmatic encroachment by appealing to pragmatic considerations attenuating, or weakening, epistemic reasons to believe. I call this the ‘Attenuators View’. I will show that this proposal is better than spelling out pragmatic encroachment in terms of reasons against believing – what I call the ‘Reasons View’. While both views do equally well when it comes to providing a plausible mechanism of how pragmatic encroachment works, the Attenuators View does a better job distinguishing practical and epistemic (...)
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  7. Possessing epistemic reasons: the role of rational capacities.Eva Https://Orcidorg Schmidt - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):483-501.
    In this paper, I defend a reasons-first view of epistemic justification, according to which the justification of our beliefs arises entirely in virtue of the epistemic reasons we possess. I remove three obstacles for this view, which result from its presupposition that epistemic reasons have to be possessed by the subject: the problem that reasons-first accounts of justification are necessarily circular; the problem that they cannot give special epistemic significance to perceptual experience; the problem that they have to say that (...)
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  8. The Explanatory Merits of Reasons-First Epistemology.Eva Schmidt - 2020 - In Christoph Demmerling & Dirk Schroder (eds.), Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion: New Essays. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 75-91.
    I present an explanatory argument for the reasons-first view: It is superior to knowledge-first views in particular in that it can both explain the specific epistemic role of perception and account for the shape and extent of epistemic justification.
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  9.  55
    Bare statistical evidence and the legitimacy of software-based judicial decisions.Eva Schmidt, Maximilian Köhl & Andreas Sesing-Wagenpfeil - 2023 - Synthese 201 (4):1-27.
    Can the evidence provided by software systems meet the standard of proof for civil or criminal cases, and is it individualized evidence? Or, to the contrary, do software systems exclusively provide bare statistical evidence? In this paper, we argue that there are cases in which evidence in the form of probabilities computed by software systems is not bare statistical evidence, and is thus able to meet the standard of proof. First, based on the case of State v. Loomis, we investigate (...)
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  10. Hume and the Unity of Reasons.Eva Schmidt - 2025 - In Scott Stapleford & Verena Wagner (eds.), Hume and contemporary epistemology. New York, NY: Routledge.
    Current debates about reasons and reasoning often draw comparisons between epistemic and practical reasons and reasoning and presuppose substantial unity between the practical and epistemic domains. This stance seems to conflict with a stark Humean contrast between the two domains: With respect to practical reasons and reasoning, Hume highlights the role of impressions, especially the passions, in motivating and rationalizing action, while apparently downplaying the potential relevance of beliefs, reason, or reasons. With respect to epistemic reasons and theoretical reasoning, he (...)
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  11. Pluralism About Practical Reasons and Reason Explanations.Eva Schmidt & Hans-Johann Glock - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations (2):1-18.
    This paper maintains that objectivism about practical reasons should be combined with pluralism both about the nature of practical reasons and about action explanations. We argue for an ‘expanding circle of practical reasons’, starting out from an open-minded monist objectivism. On this view, practical reasons are not limited to actual facts, but consist in states of affairs, possible facts that may or may not obtain. Going beyond such ‘that-ish’ reasons, we argue that goals are also bona fide practical reasons. This (...)
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  12.  86
    New Trouble for “Reasons as Evidence”: Means That Don’t Justify the Ends.Eva Schmidt - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):708-718.
    In this article, I argue against Kearns and Star’s reasons-as-evidence view, which identifies normative reasons to ɸ with evidence that one ought to ɸ. I provide a new counterexample to their view, the student case, which involves an inference to the best explanation from means to end or, more generally, from a derivative to a more foundational “ought” proposition. It shows that evidence that one ought to act a certain way is not in all cases a reason so to act. (...)
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  13.  23
    (1 other version)Normative Reasons for Mentalism.Eva Schmidt - 2018 - In Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna (eds.), Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 97-120.
    The aim of this paper is to connect the traditional epistemological issue of justification with what one might call the “new reasons paradigm” coming from the philosophy of action and metaethics. More specifically, I will show that Conee and Feldman’s mentalism, a version of internalism about justification, can profitably be spelled out in terms of subjective normative reasons. On the way to achieving this aim, I will argue that it is important to ask not just the oft-discussed ontological question about (...)
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  14.  23
    Replies to critics.Eva Schmidt - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-16.
    In these replies, I react to comments on my paper “Facts about Incoherence as Non-Evidential Epistemic Reasons”, provided by Aleks Knoks, Sebastian Schmidt, Keshav Singh, and Conor McHugh. I discuss potential counterexamples to my claim that the fact that the subject’s doxastic attitudes are incoherent is an epistemic reason for her to suspend; whether such incoherence-based reasons bear on individual attitudes or only on combinations of attitudes; the prospects of restricting evidentialism about epistemic reasons to reasons to believe; whether incoherence-based (...)
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  15.  25
    Introduction.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism: Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content. Cham: Springer.
    This chapter provides an overview of the structure and purpose of the book. It introduces the philosophical context and motivations of the debate between conceptualism and nonconceptualism. The book is a defense of the nonconceptualist claim that experience is nonconceptual and has nonconceptual content. In particular, it defends what I call ‘Modest Nonconceptualism,’ which is briefly introduced in this chapter. On this view, all perceptual experiences are at least partly nonconceptual, i.e., involve the exercise of at least some concepts. It (...)
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  16.  53
    Objectivism and Causalism About Reasons for Action.Eva Schmidt & Hans-Johann Glock - 2019 - In Gunnar Schumann (ed.), Explanation in Action Theory and Historiography: Causal and Teleological Approaches. New York: Routledge. pp. 124-145.
    This chapter explores whether a version of causalism about reasons for action can be saved by giving up Davidsonian psychologism and endorsing objectivism, so that the reasons for which we act are the normative reasons that cause our corresponding actions. We address two problems for ‘objecto-causalism’, actions for merely apparent normative reasons and actions performed in response to future normative reasons—in neither of these cases can the reason for which the agent acts cause her action. To resolve these problems, we (...)
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  17.  7
    Comment on Logins – On the Connection between Normative Explanatory Reasons and Normative Reasoning Reasons.Eva Schmidt - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-9.
    The comment starts with a brief exposition of the Eroteric View put forth by Artūrs Logins. I then provide one friendly comment on the exact form of the normative question which is central to the view, and suggest that in addition to the question, ‘Why ought S to φ?’, Logins should take the question, ‘Why is S permitted to φ?’ as definitive of normative reasons. In a more critical comment, I reflect on how normative explanatory reasons and normative reasoning reasons (...)
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  18.  28
    Religious Belief, Occurrent Thought, and Reasonable Disagreement: A Response to Tim Crane.Eva Schmidt - 2023 - Neue Zeitschrift für Systematicsche Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 65 (4):438-446.
    This comment raises two worries for Crane’s view of religious beliefs and their contents. First, I argue that his appeal to inferentialism about the contents of dispositional beliefs cannot fully avoid the problem of inconsistent beliefs. For the same problem can be raised for occurrent thought, and the inferentialist solution is not available there. Second, I argue that religious beliefs differ from ordinary beliefs with respect to their justification in cases of peer disagreements. This suggests that noncognitivism about religious beliefs, (...)
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  19. The Argument from Animal and Infant Perception.Eva Schmidt - 2010 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):97-110.
    I discuss an argument for non-conceptualism based on animal and infant per- ception. Crudely put, some animals and infants who possess no concepts nonetheless have perceptual states with non-conceptual content. Perceptual experiences of adult humans have the same kind of content as the experiences of animals and infants, so the content of the perceptual experiences of adult humans is also non-conceptual. I defend this argument against potential attacks from the conceptualist. I argue that there are indeed creatures which possess no (...)
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  20. How to Make Norms Clash.Eva Schmidt - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):46-55.
    In this comment on Katherine Dormandy's paper «True Faith», I point out that the clash she describes between epistemic norms and faith-based norms of belief needs to be supplemented with a clear understanding of the pertinent norms of belief. I argue that conceiving of them as evaluative fails to explain the clash, and that understanding them as prescriptive is no better. I suggest an understanding of these norms along the lines of Ross’s (1930) prima facie duties, and show how this (...)
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  21. Two challenges for CI trustworthiness and how to address them.Kevin Baum, Eva Schmidt & A. Köhl Maximilian - 2017
    We argue that, to be trustworthy, Computa- tional Intelligence (CI) has to do what it is entrusted to do for permissible reasons and to be able to give rationalizing explanations of its behavior which are accurate and gras- pable. We support this claim by drawing par- allels with trustworthy human persons, and we show what difference this makes in a hypo- thetical CI hiring system. Finally, we point out two challenges for trustworthy CI and sketch a mechanism which could be (...)
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  22. Teleology first: Goals before knowledge and belief.Tobias Schlicht, Johannes L. Brandl, Frank Esken, Hans-Johann Glock, Albert Newen, Josef Perner, Franziska Poprawe, Eva Schmidt, Anna Strasser & Julia Wolf - 2021 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 44:e169.
    Comparing knowledge with belief can go wrong in two dimensions: If the authors employ a wider notion of knowledge, then they do not compare like with like because they assume a narrow notion of belief. If they employ only a narrow notion of knowledge, then their claim is not supported by the evidence. Finally, we sketch a superior teleological view.
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  23.  27
    Introduction - Wittgenstein and Beyond.Christoph C. Pfisterer, Nicole Rathgeb & Eva Schmidt - 2022 - In Christoph C. Pfisterer, Nicole Rathgeb & Eva Schmidt (eds.), Wittgenstein and Beyond: Essays in Honour of Hans-Johann Glock. New York: Routledge. pp. 1-12.
    The introduction charts Hans-Johann Glock’s academic career, introduces some of his core philosophical views, and provides an overview of the chapters included in the festschrift.
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  24.  43
    Religiöse Erfahrung: Inhalt, epistemische Signifikanz und Expertise.Eva Schmidt - 2022 - In Martin Breul & Klaus Viertbauer (eds.), Der Glaube und seine Gründe: Beiträge zur Religiösen Epistemologie. pp. 11-30.
    This article investigates whether religious experience can be conceived in such a way that the perceiver's religious expertise (via cognitive penetration or perceptual learning) contributes to the justificatory power of the experience. It also considers what kind of content religious experience would have to have to be able to justify standard types of religious beliefs. It argues that, against first impressions, religious expertise cannot supplement perceptual justification. At the same time, to the extent that religious experience has singular contents or (...)
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  25. Introduction - Wittgenstein and Beyond.Christoph Caspar Https://Orcidorg Pfisterer, Eva Schmidt & Nicole Https://Orcidorg Rathgeb - 2022 - In .
    The introduction charts Hans-Johann Glock’s academic career, introduces some of his core philosophical views, and provides an overview of the chapters included in the festschrift.
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  26.  84
    Wittgenstein and Beyond: Essays in Honour of Hans-Johann Glock.Christoph C. Pfisterer, Nicole Rathgeb & Eva Schmidt (eds.) - 2022 - New York: Routledge.
    This volume celebrates the work of Hans-Johann Glock, a philosopher renowned for both his exegesis of Wittgenstein and his many contributions to debates in contemporary philosophy. It brings together 16 new essays by up-and-coming and distinguished philosophers engaging with Glock’s work, and it concludes with a "Reflections and Replies" chapter in which Glock responds to his interlocutors. -/- Glock’s distinctive philosophical voice features a rare combination of a Wittgenstein-inspired approach with a willingness to break away from Wittgenstein to tackle problems (...)
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  27.  48
    Arguments from Concept Possession.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism: Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content. Cham: Springer.
    In this chapter, I discuss arguments for the claim that a subject can both have an experience with a certain content and not be in possession of all the concepts needed to specify this content. If she does not possess all the relevant concepts, then she cannot exercise them. So, she can undergo such an experience without being required to exercise all the concepts needed to specify its content. The argument from memory experience goes back to Martin (Philos Rev 101:745763, (...)
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  28.  26
    Analytische feministische Erkenntnistheorie und implizite Einstellungen.Eva Schmidt - 2014 - In Astrid M. Fellner, Anne Conrad & Jennifer J.* Moos (eds.), Gender Überall!? Beiträge zur interdisziplinären Geschlechterforschung. Röhrig Universiätsverlag. pp. 97-117.
  29.  29
    Arguments from Phenomenology.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism: Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content. Cham: Springer.
    I examine two arguments for nonconceptualism from the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. The idea is that only the assumption that experience content is nonconceptual does justice to the phenomenology of experience. In particular, if experience content is conceptual, we cannot account for its finely grained representational content. The problem is that visual color experience makes differences between shades of a color that are much more fine-grained than our conceptual repertoire allows. Further, conceptualism is incompatible with the situation-dependence of perceptual (...)
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  30.  25
    Comments on David McGraw, "against the combination of materialism and direct realism".Eva Schmidt - 2018 - In . pp. 190-192.
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  31.  26
    Comments on French, “A Defence of Representational Realism”.Eva Schmidt - 2018 - In . pp. 181-185.
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  32.  31
    Comment on John Smythies, “The Metaphysical Foundations of Contemporary Neuroscience: A House Built on Sand”.Eva Schmidt - 2018 - In . pp. 181-190.
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  33.  44
    Correction to: Possessing epistemic reasons: the role of rational capacities.Eva Schmidt - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):503-503.
    In the original publication of the article, the last sentence in footnote 16 was incorrectly published as “Thanks to—for raising this issue.” The corrected sentence should read as “Thanks to Daniel Star for raising this issue.”.
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  34.  14
    Die Eigenart religiöser Erfahrung.Eva Schmidt - 2019 - In Klaus Viertbauer & Georg Gasser (eds.), Handbuch Analytische Religionsphilosophie. Akteure – Diskurse – Perspektiven. Stuttgart: Metzler. pp. 173-184.
    Über Zeiten und Kulturen hinweg finden sich Berichte von religiösen Erfahrungen wie der von Ruge geschilderten. Menschen meinen etwas Göttlichem, Heiligem, Übernatürlichem begegnet zu sein oder dieses erlebt zu haben. Es gibt eine große Bandbreite solcher religiöser Erfahrungen, über die dieser Beitrag einen ersten Überblick geben soll. Das zweite Thema des Beitrags betrifft die epistemische Relevanz religiöser Erfahrungen: Diese können vielleicht dazu genutzt werden, religiösen Glauben zu begründen oder zu rechtfertigen.
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  35.  64
    Does Perceptual Content Have to Be Objective? A Defence of Nonconceptualism.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1):201-214.
    In this paper, I discuss the conceptualist claim that we cannot speak of perceptual content unless we assume it is objective content. The conceptualist argues that only conceptual content can meet the requirement of being objective, so that the view that perceptual experience has nonconceptual content is not tenable. I start out by presenting the argument from objectivity as it can be found in McDowell. I then present the following objections: First, perceptual objectivity cannot be due to the perceiver’s conception (...)
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  36. How We Know Our Senses.Eva Schmidt - 2013 - Was Dürfen Wir Glauben? Was Sollen Wir Tun? Sektionsbeiträge des Achten Internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft Für Analytische Philosophie E.V.
     
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  37.  19
    Modest Nonconceptualism Vindicated.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism: Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content. Cham: Springer.
    This chapter contains the results of my discussion in the book. I first review the success of the respective arguments for nonconceptualism and defenses against conceptualist objections. Five of the six arguments presented in favor of nonconceptualism are successful, and three of them are strong enough to support the claim endorsed by Modest Nonconceptualism that every perceptual experience has at least some nonconceptual content. On the other hand, none of the conceptualist objections to nonconceptualism is fatal. So, nonconceptualism is victorious (...)
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  38.  65
    Nonconceptual Content.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism: Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content. Cham: Springer.
    I defend both conceptualists and nonconceptualists against an attack which has been leveled at them by critics such as Byrne (Perception and conceptual content In: Steup M, Sosa E (eds) Contemporary debates in epistemology. Blackwell, Malden, pp 231-250, 2005), Speaks (Philos Rev 114:359–398, 2005), and Crowther (Erkenntnis 65:5–276, 2006). They distinguish a ‘state’ reading and a ‘content’ reading of ‘(non)conceptual’ and argue that many arguments on either side support only the respective state views, not the respective content views. To prepare (...)
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  39. Quellen des Wissens.Eva Schmidt - 2019 - In Martin Grajner & Guido Melchior (eds.), Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie. Stuttgart: Metzler. pp. 122-128.
     
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  40.  26
    Responses to McGraw and French.Eva Schmidt - 2018 - In . pp. 255-258.
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  41.  34
    The Argument from Contradictory Contents.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism: Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content. Cham: Springer.
    The argument from contradictory contents presented here is based directly on observations about the content of experience. It claims that experience content, if conceptual, allows for contradictions within one and the same content. There are at least two examples of this, the waterfall illusion and the visual experiences of some grapheme-color synesthetes. However, due to a Fregean principle of content individuation, no conceptual contents are contradictory. So experience content is nonconceptual. I motivate a particular version of the argument and defend (...)
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  42.  13
    The case of Mesut Özil: A symbol of (non-) integration? An analysis of German print media discourses on integration.Eva Schmidt & Martina Möllering - 2022 - Discourse and Communication 16 (3):326-345.
    This paper examines how German media discourses reflect debates around integration, based on a newspaper corpus spanning the period 2008–2018. Considering these discourses, our research interest is focussed on how integration is constructed as a responsibility of those who are expected to integrate into society. To analyze how media might play a role in reproducing essentialist constructions of difference, we present a case study that combines methodologies of corpus linguistics and critical discourse analysis, and that examines discursive practices and strategies (...)
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  43.  35
    The Epistemological Objection.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism: Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content. Cham: Springer.
    In this chapter, I rebut three incarnations of the epistemological objection put forth by McDowell (Mind and World, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1994a) and Brewer (Perception and Reason, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999). According to them, only the assumption that perceptual experiences have conceptual content can account for the fact that perception plays a crucial role in justifying belief about the external world. I begin by providing some context to the objections, viz. by presenting the myth of the given that (...)
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  44.  33
    The Objection from Objectivity.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism: Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content. Cham: Springer.
    In this chapter, I turn to the claim that we cannot speak of perceptual content unless we assume it is objective content. The conceptualist argues that only conceptual content can meet the requirement of being objective. I start out by presenting the objection from objectivity as it can be found in McDowell (Mind and world, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1994a). I then discuss the following replies: First, even if objective perceptual experience requires the perceiver to have an objective world-view, the (...)
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  45.  46
    Reasons First[REVIEW]Eva Schmidt - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (3):515-519.
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  46.  27
    Bayesianische Erkenntnistheorie für Normalos: Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality. [REVIEW]Eva Schmidt - 2022 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 70 (2):350-356.
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  47.  27
    Kiesewetter, Benjamin: The Normativity of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017. 314 Seiten. [978-0-19-875428-2]. [REVIEW]Eva Schmidt - 2019 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Literatur 7 (2):53-59.
  48. Jan G. Michel: Der qualitative Charakter bewusster Erlebnisse. Physikalismus und phanomenale Eigenschaften in der Philosophie des Geistes. [REVIEW]Eva Schmidt - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):279-283.