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Evan Riley
College of Wooster
  1.  25
    What Skill is Not.Evan Riley - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):344-354.
    A dispositional theory of skill, such as that defended by Stanley and Williamson, might seem promising. Such a theory looks to provide a unified intellectualist account of skill reflecting insights from cognitive science and philosophy. I argue that any theory of the kind fails given that skill is broadly answerable to the will. A person may be characteristically disposed both against the exercise of her skill and against any associated intentional forming of knowledge. Clearly she does not cease thereby to (...)
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  2. Against Sen Against Rawls On Justice.Evan Riley - 2011 - Indian Journal of Human Development 5 (1):211-221.
    Amartya Sen has recently leveled a series of what he alleges to be quite serious very general objections against Rawls, Rawlsian fellow travelers, and other social contract accounts of justice. In The Idea of Justice, published in 2009, Sen specifically charges his target philosophical views with what calls transcendentalism, procedural parochialism, and with being mistakenly narrowly focused on institutions. He also thinks there is a basic incoherence—arising from a version of Derek Parfit’s Identity Problem—internal to the Rawslian theoretical apparatus. Sen (...)
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  3.  44
    The Beneficent Nudge Program and Epistemic Injustice.Evan Riley - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (3):597-616.
    Is implementing the beneficent nudge program morally permissible in worlds like ours? I argue that there is reason for serious doubt. I acknowledge that beneficent nudging is highly various, that nudges are in some circumstances morally permissible and even called for, and that nudges may exhibit respect for genuine autonomy. Nonetheless, given the risk of epistemic injustice that nudges typically pose, neither the moral permissibility of beneficent nudging in the abstract, nor its case-by-case vindication, appears sufficient to justify implementing a (...)
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  4.  59
    Libertarian Self-Defeat.Evan Riley - 2010 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2):200-226.
    I show that the standard libertarian conception of justice is vulnerable to a kind of basic collective self-defeat not characteristic of its rivals. All deontological liberals, including the libertarian, ought to be committed to two very general claims regarding the nature of justice. The RSC (Reasonable Stability Criterion) is the requirement that in the just society, human beings will typically exhibit genuine literacy with the relevant conception. The MEC (Moral Education Condition) consists in the thought that a necessary condition for (...)
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  5.  12
    Amartya Sen. The Idea of Justice: Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2009.Evan Riley - 2011 - Human Rights Review 12 (1):139-141.
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