18 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Evan Tiffany [17]Evan C. Tiffany [1]Evan Clark Tiffany [1]
See also
Evan Tiffany
Simon Fraser University
  1. Why Be an Agent?Evan Tiffany - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):223 - 233.
    Constitutivism is the view that it is possible to derive contentful, normatively binding demands of practical reason and morality from the constitutive features of agency. Whereas much of the debate has focused on the constitutivist's ability to derive content, David Enoch has challenged her ability to generate normativity. Even if one can derive content from the constitutive aims of agency, one could simply demur: ?Bah! Agency, shmagency?. The ?Why be moral?? question would be replaced by the ?Why be an agent?? (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  2. Deflationary Normative Pluralism.Evan Tiffany - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 231-262.
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  3.  20
    Deflationary Normative Pluralism.Evan Tiffany - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (Supplement):231-262.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  4. Semantics San Diego Style.Evan Tiffany - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (8):416.
  5.  80
    What is Essential About Indexicals?Evan C. Tiffany - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 100 (1):35-50.
  6.  60
    Alienation and Internal Reasons for Action.Evan Tiffany - 2003 - Social Theory and Practice 29 (3):387-418.
  7.  69
    How Kantian Must Kantian Constructivists Be?Evan Tiffany - 2006 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):524 – 546.
    Kantian constructivists locate the source of normativity in the rational nature of valuing agents. Some further argue that accepting this premise thereby commits one to accepting the intrinsic or unconditioned value of rational nature itself. Whereas much of the critical literature on this “regress on conditions” argument has focused either on the cogency of the inference from the value-conferring capacity of the will to the unconditional value of that capacity itself or on the plausibility of the initial constructivist premise, my (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  8.  39
    Choosing Freedom: Basic Desert and the Standpoint of Blame.Evan Tiffany - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):1-17.
    One can think of the traditional logic of blame as involving three intuitively plausible claims: blame is justified only if one is deserving of blame, one is deserving of blame only if one is relevantly in control of the relevant causal antecedents, and one is relevantly in control only if one has libertarian freedom. While traditional compatibilism has focused on rejecting either or both of the latter two claims, an increasingly common strategy is to deny the link between blame and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  9.  21
    Introduction.Sam Black & Evan Tiffany - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (Supplement):7-40.
  10.  17
    Introduction: Moral Philosophy Does Not Rest on a Mistake: Reasons to Be Moral Revisited.Sam Black & Evan Tiffany - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (Supplement):7-40.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11.  21
    Can Humeans Ask "Why Be Rational?".Evan Tiffany - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2):133 - 145.
  12.  33
    A Functional Account of Moral Motivation.Evan Tiffany - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):601-625.
  13.  19
    Ethics.Cynthia Townley, Evan Tiffany & Hugh Upton - 2005 - Philosophical Books 46 (2):174-178.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14.  3
    Moral Philosophy Does Not Rest on a Mistake: Reasons to Be Moral Revisited.Sam Black & Evan Tiffany - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Reasons to Be Moral Revisted: Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 33.Sam Black & Evan Tiffany (eds.) - 2010 - University of Calgary Press.
    H.A. Prichard argued that the “why should I be moral?” question is the central subject matter of moral theory. Prichard famously claimed to have proved that all efforts to answer that question are doomed. Many contributors to this volume of contemporary papers attempt to reconstruct Prichard’s argument. They claim either explicitly or implicitly that Prichard was mistaken, and philosophy can contribute to meaningful engagement with the ‘why be moral?’ question. A theme to emerge from these papers is that arguments like (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Moral Philosophy Does Not Rest on a Mistake: Reasons to Be Moral Revisited.Sam Black & Evan Tiffany - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1).
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17.  11
    Conceptualizing Coercive Indoctrination in Moral and Legal Philosophy.Evan Tiffany - forthcoming - Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-27.
    This paper argues that there are compelling grounds for thinking that coercive indoctrination can defeat or mitigate moral culpability in virtue of being a form of non-culpable moral ignorance. That is, I defend a two-tier account such that what excuses an agent for a wrongful act is the agent’s ignorance regarding the moral quality of their act; and what excuses the defendant for their ignorance is that coercion or manipulation deprived the defendant of a fair opportunity to avoid that ignorance. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Kantian Freedom.Evan Tiffany & Dai Heide (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark