This volume has 41 chapters written to honor the 100th birthday of Mario Bunge. It celebrates the work of this influential Argentine/Canadian physicist and philosopher. Contributions show the value of Bunge’s science-informed philosophy and his systematic approach to philosophical problems. The chapters explore the exceptionally wide spectrum of Bunge’s contributions to: metaphysics, methodology and philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of physics, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of social science, philosophy of biology, philosophy of technology, moral philosophy, social and political (...) philosophy, medical philosophy, and education. The contributors include scholars from 16 countries. Bunge combines ontological realism with epistemological fallibilism. He believes that science provides the best and most warranted knowledge of the natural and social world, and that such knowledge is the only sound basis for moral decision making and social and political reform. Bunge argues for the unity of knowledge. In his eyes, science and philosophy constitute a fruitful and necessary partnership. Readers will discover the wisdom of this approach and will gain insight into the utility of cross-disciplinary scholarship. This anthology will appeal to researchers, students, and teachers in philosophy of science, social science, and liberal education programmes. 1. Introduction Section I. An Academic Vocation Section II. Philosophy Section III. Physics and Philosophy of Physics Section IV. Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind Section V. Sociology and Social Theory Section VI. Ethics and Political Philosophy Section VII. Biology and Philosophy of Biology Section VIII. Mathematics Section IX. Education Section X. Varia Section XI. Bibliography. (shrink)

Philosophy of Science, understood as a special philosophical discipline, was born only at the beginning of the twentieth century as part of the effort for overcoming the “foundational crisis” that had affected especially mathematics and physics. Therefore, it was conceived as an investigation about the features and reliability of scientific knowledge and for a few decades was deeply marked by the philosophical approach of logical empiricism. This cognitive point of view persisted also when, after Kuhn’s work, the attention focused on (...) the scientific activity in order to understand scientific change and a sociological model replaced the view that empirical adequacy and logical consistency are the factors that determine the change of scientific theories. Ethical, social and political considerations regarding science ware considered inappropriate and potentially dangerous since they violate the alleged “neutrality of science” with respect to values. Nevertheless, the strict intertwining of science and technology in contemporary “technoscience” has produced a wide debate regarding the practical aspect of technoscientific activity that has the intrinsic features of a philosophical debate. Therefore, it is natural and advisable that the entire wealth of the philosophical disciplines be called to contribute to the specific complex discourse of the Philosophy of Science. (shrink)

Perspectivism is often understood as a conception according to which subjective conditions inevitably affect our knowledge and, therefore, we are never confronted with reality and facts but only with interpretations. Hence, subjectivism and anti-realism are usually associated with perspectivism. The thesis of this paper is that, especially in the case of the sciences, perspectivism can be better understood as an appreciation of the cognitive attitude that consists in considering reality only from a certain ‘point of view’, in a way that (...) can avoid subjectivism. Whereas the way of conceiving a notion is strictly subjective, the way of using it is open to intersubjective agreement, based on the practice of operations whose nature is neither mental nor linguistic. Therefore, intersubjectivity is possible within perspectivism. Perspectivism can also help understand the notion of ‘scientific objects’ in a referential sense: they are those ‘things’ that become ‘objects’ of a certain science by being investigated from the ‘point of view’ of that science. They are ‘clipped out’ of things by means of standardized operations which turn out to be the same as those granting intersubjectivity. Therefore this ‘strong’ sense of objectivity, which is clearly realist, coincides with the ‘weak’ one. The notion of truth appears fully legitimate in the case of the sciences, being clearly defined for the regional ontology of each one of them and, since this truth can be extended in an analogical sense to the theories elaborated in each science, it follows that are real also the unobservable entities postulated by those theories. (shrink)

Modern natural science followed Galileo’s proposals regarding ontology, epistemology and methodology, limiting investigation to a few measurable properties of bodies by the adoption of the experimental method. Force appeared as a specialization of the traditional concept of efficient cause within the new science of Mechanics, which was soon able to incorporate practically all branches of physics. The concept of system had been introduced into scientific vocabulary in the seventeenth century and the limitations of the mechanistic approach in physics emerging by (...) the end of the nineteenth century prompted Bertalannfy to deeply re-elaborate it as System Theory. This permitted him to complement the analytic outlook with a rigorous characterization of the notion of organized totalities. This could be applied to life sciences and several other scientific domains, allowing rigorous treatment of traditional concepts such as finality, and new concepts like complexity and interdisciplinarity. (shrink)

Regroupement d'articles et d'essais sous deux grands titres : le monde de la science et de la technique; la rencontre avec la dimension éthique. [SDM].

Man kann die wissenschaftliche Tätigkeit so betrachten, daß sie von einem "wissenschaftlichen System" ausgeführt wird, welches zugleich offen und adaptiv ist und dessen allgemeines Ziel darin besteht, objektives Wissen zu produzieren und zu verbreiten. WS nimmt aus seiner Umgebung Eingaben von "Nachfrage", "Unterstützung", "Ablehnung" entgegen und reagiert auf kreative Art und Weise darauf. Sein Funktionieren ist bedingt durch die Verträglichkeit seines Ziels mit denjenigen aller andern sozialen Subsysteme, die eine Maximierung der internen Variablen von WS ausschließen mögen, um das gesamte (...) soziale System zu optimieren. Dies ist nichts anderes als ein systemtheoretischer Ausdruck für den Begriff der Verantwortung der Wissenschaft: er ist nicht streng ethisch, aber schließt die Erwägung ethischer Normen des ganzen sozialen Systems mit ein. (shrink)

Modern cosmology, though a confluence of relativity theory and elementary particle physics, and with the help of very sophisticated mathematical models, tries to encompass the Universe as a whole, and to propose theories regarding its origin and evolution. But this cannot work without the evolution of several philosophical issues, concerning the epistemological status of this enterprise, its implicit or explicit extra-scientific presuppositions, as well as the real sense and interpretation of the theories and principles involved. This book provides a survey (...) of these different aspects, for it gives some essential elements of the scientific background necessary for understanding the main issues of modern cosmology, and at the same time offer a discussion of the problems arising in it; problems which are never purely scientific, nor purely philosophical. Science and philosophy are therefore again deeply interrelated, at the moment where man tries to understand the Universe and his place in it. And this not only because the legitimacy of calling cosmology a science implies the acceptance of intellectual approaches which overstep the usual criteria of physical science and have a deep philosophical connotation, but also because the evolutionary way of thinking, strongly backed by cosmology, reinforces the role of this approach in the philosophy of science and in philosophy in general. (shrink)

Contents: Evandro AGAZZI: Introduction. Part One: PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS. Paul HORWICH: Realism and Truth. Evandro AGAZZI: On the Criteria for Establishing the Ontological Status of Different Entities. Aristides BALTAS; Con-straints and Resistance: Stating a Case for Negative Realism. Michel PATY: Predicate of Existence and Predictability for a Theoretical Object in Physics. Part Two: OBSERVABILITY AND HIDDEN ENTITIES. François BONSACK: Atoms: Lessons of a History. Alberto CORDERO: Arguing for Hidden Realities. Bernard d'ESPAGNAT: On the Difficulties that Attributing Existence to «Hidden» Quantities May (...) Rise. Massimo PAURI: The Quantum, Space-Time and Observation. Part Three: APPLICATIONS TO QUANTUM PHYSICS. David ALBERT: On the Phenomenology of Quantum-Mechanical Superpositions. Gian Carlo GHIRARDI: Realism and Quantum Mechanics. Michel CROZON: Experimental Evidence of Quark Structure Inside Hadrons. (shrink)

Modern philosophy of science was, initially, an epistemology of science based on the logical analysis of the language of science. It was superseded by a “sociological epistemology,” according to which the acceptance of scientific statements and theories depends on conditioningscoming from the social context and powers, and this view has fueled anti-scientific attitudes.This happened because the sociological turn still expressed an epistemology of science. Science, however, is not only a system of knowledge, but also a complex human activity. Hence, ethical, (...) political, social, religious issues appear legitimate if they concern “doing science.”Therefore, we must “rethink” philosophy of science, accepting in it also an axiology of science that could enable us to retain the cognitive value of science and at the same time to make techno-scientific activity compatible with the satisfaction of a great variety of values that inspire our societies. (shrink)

When it is spoken of scientific representations it is often understood that science can offer "only" representations but does not enable us to know reality. This tenet is the inheritance of a gratuitous and inconsistent presupposition that affected modern philosophy during almost two centuries, according to which we know our representations and not things, and we have to find warranties in order to believe that such representations correspond to reality. The present paper analyzes this presupposition, shows its inconsistency and, through (...) a discourse regarding the relations between thought and ontology, between sense and reference of the intellectual constructions, between abstract encoding of properties and concrete exemplification of the same by means of operational criteria of reference, justifies the cognitive purport of scientific representations, including the mathematical representations of physical phenomena. (shrink)

[First paragraph] According to a widely accepted opinion, the most typical characteristic and even the constitutive element of science is measurement, i.e., those processes of measuring upon which science is based. For a long time this has caused a general orientation of disciplines seeking to call themselves "science"; toward a certain form of quantification; in order to achieve the prestigious title of "science"; some form of measurement, of whatever kind, had to be introduced into the area of study.

RESUMENLa idea del progreso de la humanidad se ha basado, en los últimos dos siglos, en el progreso científico-técnico. Por otra parte, se ha considerado a la ciencia como el paradigma de la racionalidad. Las consecuencias negativas producidas por el progreso científico-técnico están provocando un rechazo radical, en diversas capas sociales, de la ciencia y de la racionalidad; y la idea de progreso se ha invertido en la añoranza del pasado. Superando esta imagen neopositivista de la ciencia, el trabajo intenta (...) recuperar para el futuro del ser humano tanto la racionalidad, como la ciencia y la posibilidad del progreso. La racionalidad debe fundarse en valores positivos para el futuro de la humanidad. Por su parte, el progreso debe ser entendido como una tarea por hacer en cada momento, como el compromiso en la realización de aquellos ideales, utilizando la ciencia y la técnica como sus instrumentos más valiosos. PALABRAS CLAVEPROGRESO-CIENCIA-TECNICA-VALORESABSTRACTOver the last two centuries, the idea of human progress has relied upon scientific-technological progress. Meanwhile, science has been considered the paradigm of rationality. however, the negative consequences of scientific-technological progres are causing a radical rejection, at differents social levels, of science and racionality; and the idea of prgress has become a longing for the past. Going beyond this neopositivist image of science, the paper tries to recover rationality, science and the possibility of progress for the future of humanity. Rationality should be based on positive values evisaged to advace it. Progress should be conceived as an open, permanent task using science and technology as its most valued instruments. KEYWORDSPROGRESS- SCIENCE-TECHNOLOGY-VALUES. (shrink)

Foreword DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2011v15n2p223.

These are some of the topics discussed in this book, both theoretically and with reference to concrete cases.

A sociological study of science is not very recent and has never been seen as particularly problematic since science, and especially modern science, constitutes an impressive and extremely ramified "social system" of activities, institutions, relations and interferences with other social systems. Less favourable, however, has been the consideration of a more recent trend in the philosophy of science known as the "sociological" philosophy of science, whose most debatable point consists in directly challenging the traditional epistemology of science and, in particular, (...) in stripping scientific knowledge of its most appreciated characteristics of objectivity and rigour . A vicious circle seems to lie at the root of this sociological epistemology because, on the one hand, criticism of the traditional concept of scientific knowledge is developed by relying upon sociology, but this, on the other hand is reasonable only if sociology is credited with the status of a reliable instrument, that is, because it has been recognized as a science through an epistemological debate . In this paper it is shown that not all circles are vicious: in particular, feedback loops, positive and negative, are normally considered in cybernetic models of various processes. Negative feedback loops are fundamental in self-regulating processes and have already occurred from time to time in readjusting the concept of science itself. Therefore, a sociological epistemology of science can contribute to a more careful analysis of the real meaning and purport of the cognitive aspect of science, provided that it is not pushed to the self-defeating extreme of challenging the legitimacy of considering objectivity and rigour as the characteristic features of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

The issue whether science can be correctly submitted to ethical judgment has been widely debated especially in the 1960s. Those who denied the legitimacy of such a judgment stressed that this would entail an undue limitation of the freedom of science; those who defended such a limitation laid stress on the great dangers that an uncontrolled growth of scientific knowledge has already produced and would continue to produce against humankind. This sterile debate can be settled by recognizing that scientific knowledge (...) can and must be evaluated, as far as its validity is concerned, exclusively through the methodological criteria admitted by the professionals of the single scientific disciplines concerned, and no ethical judgment is pertinent from this point of view. Nevertheless, if we consider science as a particular system of social activities, entailing concrete procedures, conditions and applications, the ethical evaluation of these actions is pertinent and correct. A second question is whether or not the inclusion of these ethical investigations in the specific domain of philosophy of science is correct. If one conceives philosophy of science simply as an epistemology of science consisting in a logical-methodological investigation about the language of scientific theories, this broadening would appear spurious. This view, however, is too narrow and dated: a fully fledged philosophical investigation on the complex phenomenon of science cannot prevent important outlooks and instruments of the philosophical inqujiry from legitimately pertaining to the philosophy of science. (shrink)

Epistemology had to come to terms with “the social” on two different occasions. The first was represented by the dispute about the epistemological status of the “social” sciences, and in this case the already well established epistemology of the natural sciences seemed to have the right to dictate the conditions for a discipline to be a science. But the social sciences could successfully vindicate the legitimacy of their specific criteria for scientificity. More recently, the impact of social factors on the (...) construction of our knowledge has reversed, in a certain sense, the old position and promoted social inquiry to the role of a criterion for evaluating the purport of cognitive statements. But this has undermined the traditional characteristics of objectivity and rigor that seem constitutive of science. Moreover, in order to establish the real extent to which social conditionings have an impact on scientific knowledge one must credit sociology with a sound ground of reliability, and this is not possible without a preliminary “epistemological” assessment. These are some of the topics discussed in this book, both theoretically and with reference to concrete cases. (shrink)