We study the class of ω-categorical structures with n-degenerate algebraic closure for some n ε ω, which includes ω-categorical structures with distributive lattice of algebraically closed subsets , and in particular those with degenerate algebraic closure. We focus on the models of ω-categorical universal theories, absolutely ubiquitous structures, and ω-categorical structures generated by an indiscernible set. The assumption of n-degeneracy implies total categoricity for the first class, stability for the second, and ω-stability for the third.
For a supersimple SU-rank 1 theory T we introduce the notion of a generic elementary pair of models of T . We show that the theory T* of all generic T-pairs is complete and supersimple. In the strongly minimal case, T* coincides with the theory of infinite dimensional pairs, which was used in 1184–1194) to study the geometric properties of T. In our SU-rank 1 setting, we use T* for the same purpose. In particular, we obtain a characterization of linearity (...) for SU-rank 1 structures by giving several equivalent conditions on T*, find a “weak” version of local modularity which is equivalent to linearity, show that linearity coincides with 1-basedness, and use the generic pairs to “recover” projective geometries over division rings from non-trivial linear SU-rank 1 structures. (shrink)
The weak non-finite cover property (wnfcp) was introduced in  in connection with "axiomatizability" of lovely pairs of models of a simple theory. We find a combinatorial condition on a simple theory equivalent to the wnfcp, yielding a direct proof that the non-finite cover property implies the wnfcp, and that the wnfcp is preserved under reducts. We also study the question whether the wnfcp is preserved when passing from a simple theory T to the theory TP of lovely pairs of (...) models of T (true in the stable case). While the question remains open, we show, among other things, that if (for a T with the wnfcp) TP is low, then TP has the wnfcp. To study this question, we describe "double lovely pairs", and, along the way, we develop the notion of a "lovely n-tuple" of models of a simple theory, which is an analogue of the notion of a beautiful tuple of models of stable theories . (shrink)
We study the theory of lovely pairs of geometric structures, in particular o-minimal structures. We use the pairs to isolate a class of geometric structures called weakly locally modular which generalizes the class of linear structures in the settings of SU-rank one theories and o-minimal theories. For o-minimal theories, we use the Peterzil–Starchenko trichotomy theorem to characterize for a sufficiently general point, the local geometry around it in terms of the thorn U-rank of its type inside a lovely pair.
We continue the study of the connection between the “geometric” properties of SU -rank 1 structures and the properties of “generic” pairs of such structures, started in . In particular, we show that the SU-rank of the theory of generic pairs of models of an SU -rank 1 theory T can only take values 1 , 2 or ω, generalizing the corresponding results for a strongly minimal T in . We also use pairs to derive the implication from pseudolinearity to (...) linearity for ω -categorical SU -rank 1 structures, established in , from the conjecture that an ω -categorical supersimple theory has finite SU -rank, and find a condition on generic pairs, equivalent to pseudolinearity in the general case. (shrink)
We study the class of weakly locally modular geometric theories introduced in , a common generalization of the classes of linear SU-rank 1 and linear o-minimal theories. We find new conditions equivalent to weak local modularity: "weak one-basedness", absence of type definable "almost quasidesigns", and "generic linearity". Among other things, we show that weak one-basedness is closed under reducts. We also show that the lovely pair expansion of a non-trivial weakly one-based ω-categorical geometric theory interprets an infinite vector space over (...) a finite field. (shrink)
Given a lovely pair P ≺ M of models of a simple theory T, we study the structure whose universe is P and whose relations are the traces on P of definable (in ℒ with parameters from M) sets in M. We give a necessary and sufficient condition on T (which we call weak lowness) for this structure to have quantifier-elimination. We give an example of a non-weakly-low simple theory.
We introduce the notion of a lovely pair of models of a simple theory T, generalizing Poizat's “belles paires” of models of a stable theory and the third author's “generic pairs” of models of an SU-rank 1 theory. We characterize when a saturated model of the theory TP of lovely pairs is a lovely pair , finding an analog of the nonfinite cover property for simple theories. We show that, under these hypotheses, TP is also simple, and we study forking (...) and canonical bases in TP. We also prove that assuming only that T is low, the existentially universal models of the universal part of a natural expansion TP+ of TP, are lovely pairs, and “simple Robinson universal domains”. (shrink)
We study expansions of an algebraically closed field K or a real closed field R with a linearly independent subgroup G of the multiplicative group of the field or the unit circle group \\), satisfying a density/codensity condition. Since the set G is neither algebraically closed nor algebraically independent, the expansion can be viewed as “intermediate” between the two other types of dense/codense expansions of geometric theories: lovely pairs and H-structures. We show that in both the algebraically closed field and (...) real closed field cases, the resulting theory is near model complete and the expansion preserves many nice model theoretic conditions related to the complexity of definable sets such as stability and NIP. (shrink)
ABSTRACT In this wide-ranging interview Professor Douglas V. Porpora discusses a number of issues. First, how he became a Critical Realist through his early work on the concept of structure. Second, drawing on his Reconstructing Sociology, his take on the current state of American sociology. This leads to discussion of the broader range of his work as part of Margaret Archer’s various Centre for Social Ontology projects, and on moral-macro reasoning and the concept of truth in political discourse.
The article is devoted to the memory of Vyacheslav Semenovich Stepin and Nikita Nikolaevich Moiseev, whose multifaceted work was integrally focused on philosophical, interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research of the key ideas and principles of universal human-dimensional evolutionism. Other remarkable Russian scientists V.I. Vernadsky, S.P. Kurdyumov, S.P. Kapitsa, D.S. Chernavsky worked in the same tradition of universal evolutionism. While V.I. Vernadsky and N.N. Moiseev had been the originators of that scientific approach, V.S. Stepin provided philosophical foundations for the ideas of those (...) remarkable scientists and thinkers. The scientific legacy of V.S. Stepin and N.N. Moiseev maintained the formation of a new quality of research into the philosophy of science and technology as well as into the philosophy of culture. This new quality is multidimensional and it is difficult to define unambiguously, but we presume the formation of those areas of philosophical knowledge as constructively oriented languages of interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary co-participation of philosophy in the convergent-evolutionary development of scientific knowledge in general. In this regard, attention is paid to V.S. Stepin’s affirmations about non-classical nature of modern social and humanitarian knowledge. Quantum mechanics teaches us that the reality revealed through it is a hybrid construct, or symbiosis, of both mean and object of cognition. Therefore, the very act of cognitive observation constructs quantum reality. Thus, it is very close to the process of cognition in modern sociology and psychology. V.S. Stepin insisted that these principles are applicable to all complex selfdeveloping systems, and such are all “human-dimensional” objects of modern humanities. In all the phases of homeostasis changes, or crises, there is necessarily a share of chaos, instability, uncertainty in the selection process of future development scenarios, which is ineliminably affected by our observation. Therefore, a cognitive observer in the humanities should be considered as a concept of post-non-classical rationality, that is as an observer of complexity. (shrink)
This book is a translation of W.V. Quine's Kant Lectures, given as a series at Stanford University in 1980. It provide a short and useful summary of Quine's philosophy. There are four lectures altogether: I. Prolegomena: Mind and its Place in Nature; II. Endolegomena: From Ostension to Quantification; III. Endolegomena loipa: The forked animal; and IV. Epilegomena: What's It all About? The Kant Lectures have been published to date only in Italian and German translation. The present book is filled out (...) with the translator's critical Introduction, "The esoteric Quine?" a bibliography based on Quine's sources, and an Index for the volume. (shrink)
As philosophers of mind we seem to hold in common no very clear view about the relevance that work in psychology or the neurosciences may or may not have to our own favourite questions—even if we call the subject ‘philosophical psychology’. For example, in the literature we find articles on pain some of which do, some of which don't, rely more or less heavily on, for example, the work of Melzack and Wall; the puzzle cases used so extensively in discussions (...) of personal identity are drawn sometimes from the pleasant exercise of scientific fantasy, at times from surprising reports of scientific fact; and there are those who deny, as well as those who affirm, the importance of the discovery of rapid-eye-movement sleep to the philosophical treatment of dreaming. A general account of the relation between scientific, and philosophical, psychology is long overdue and of the first importance. Here I shall limit myself to just one area where the two seem to connect, discussing one type of neuropsychological research and its relevance to questions in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of psychology. (shrink)
Abstract In this chapter, we challenge the presupposed concept of innovation in the responsible innovation literature. As a first step, we raise several questions with regard to the possibility of ‘responsible’ innovation and point at several difficulties which undermine the supposedly responsible character of innovation processes, based on an analysis of the input, throughput and output of innovation processes. It becomes clear that the practical applicability of the concept of responsible innovation is highly problematic and that a more thorough inquiry (...) of the concept is required. As a second step, we analyze the concept of innovation which is self-evidently presupposed in current literature on responsible innovation. It becomes clear that innovation is self-evidently seen as (1) technological innovation, (2) is primarily perceived from an economic perspective, (3) is inherently good and (4) presupposes a symmetry between moral agents and moral addressees. By challenging this narrow and uncritical concept of innovation, we contribute to a second round of theorizing about the concept and provide a research agenda for future research in order to enhance a less naïve concept of responsible innovation. (shrink)
In this chapter, we challenge the presupposed concept of innovation in the responsible innovation literature. As a first step, we raise several questions with regard to the possibility of ‘responsible’ innovation and point at several difficulties which undermine the supposedly responsible character of innovation processes, based on an analysis of the input, throughput and output of innovation processes. It becomes clear that the practical applicability of the concept of responsible innovation is highly problematic and that a more thorough inquiry of (...) the concept is required. As a second step, we analyze the concept of innovation which is self-evidently presupposed in current literature on responsible innovation. It becomes clear that innovation is self-evidently seen as technological innovation, is primarily perceived from an economic perspective, is inherently good and presupposes a symmetry between moral agents and moral addressees. By challenging this narrow and uncritical concept of innovation, we contribute to a second round of theorizing about the concept and provide a research agenda for future research in order to enhance a less naïve concept of responsible innovation. (shrink)
Wittgenstein's later philosophy and the doctrines of Mahayana Buddhism integral to Zen coincide in a fundamental aspect: for Wittgenstein language has, one might say, a mystical base; and this base is exactly the Buddhist ideal of acting with a mind empty of thought. My aim is to establish and explore this phenomenon. The result should be both a deeper understanding of Wittgenstein and the removal of a philosophical objection to Zen that has troubled some people.
Throughout Christianity, its activities are in one way or another connected to the historical reality of its time. Usually, for different epochs, the strength of these bonds was different, but during the Middle Ages, they were significantly stronger than before and after. It is here that perhaps the most important moment was the rise of Christianity, which spread over a relatively short period of time almost throughout Europe. It was then - and never again in all its history - that (...) the Church was able to participate in the formation of all aspects of its contemporary life, in accordance with its spirit. When solving this task, it inevitably came in close contact with the "world" and the various forms in which it was represented. (shrink)
One of the most difficult and perplexing tenets of classical theism is the doctrine of divine simplicity. Broadly put, this is generally understood to be the thesis that God is altogether without any proper parts, composition, or metaphysical complexity whatsoever. For a good deal more than a millennium, veritable armies of philosophical theologians – Jewish, Christian and Islamic – proclaimed the truth and importance of divine simplicity. Yet in our own time, the doctrine has enjoyed no such support. Among many (...) otherwise orthodox theists, those who do not just disregard it completely explicitly deny it. However, in a couple of recent articles, William E. Mann has attempted to expound the idea of divine simplicity anew and to defend it against a number of criticisms. He even has gone so far as to hint at reaffirming its importance, suggesting that the doctrine may have a significant amount of explanatory power and other theoretical virtue as part of an overall account of the nature of God, by either entailing or in other ways providing for much else that traditional theists have wanted to say about God. In this paper, I want to take a close look at Mann's formulation of the doctrine and at a general supporting theory he adumbrates in his attempt to render more plausible, or at least more defensible, various of its elements and implications. As Mann has made what is arguably the best attempt to defend the doctrine in recent years, I think that such an examination is important and will repay our efforts. (shrink)
In early 1864, disappointed by the response to his previous work, the young Manchester academic W. Stanley Jevons announced that he was undertaking a study of the so-called coal question: ‘A good publication on the subject would draw a good deal of attention … it is necessary for the present at any rate to write on popular subjects’. When Jevons's The Coal Question was published in April 1865, however, it received comparatively little attention and sales were slow. Jevons and his (...) publisher, Alexander Macmillan, then began sending complimentary copies to luminaries such as Sir John Herschel and Alfred Tennyson. In February 1866 the marketing campaign produced its first substantial return. Macmillan had sent CQ to William Gladstone who responded with letters to both Macmillan and Jevons, noting that the book had strengthened his ‘conviction’ on the necessity for reducing the National Debt. In April, John Stuart Mill praised CQ in the House of Commons, calling for action on the Debt and, three weeks later, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gladstone introduced the budget using half his speech to examine the Debt situation and referring to CQ in support for a proposed measure of Debt reduction. With the extensive publicity given to CQ following Mill's speech and the budget, Jevons had achieved his objective in writing the text which went into a second edition in 1866. On the face of it, CQ 's success was due to its effect of introducing a change in budget policy and this is the impression given by some accounts of the episode. (shrink)
Cet ouvrage de Victor Goldschmidt, pour la première fois en édition de poche, est le seul consacré à une notion centrale de la philosophie platonicienne, le paradigme, à la fois exemple, comparaison et modèle.En prenant comme fil conducteur la définition donnée dans le Politique, l’auteur commence par étudier le rôle joué par « ce procédé privilégié » dans la méthode dialectique des derniers Dialogues. S’exercer sur une réalité banale permet de découvrir la structure d’un « grand sujet », plus difficile (...) à définir, comme le sophiste ou l’art politique. Cependant la réussite d’une démarche en saurait en fonder la légitimité. En s’interrogeant sur son fondement, Victor Goldschmidt montre que l’usage d’un paradigme « obéit à un mouvement profond de la pensée platonicienne, il nous mène du visible à l’invisible ». (shrink)
The answer to the title question which I want to defend in this paper is ‘none’. That is: I doubt strongly that the notion of ‘a self’ has any use whatsoever as part of an explanans for the explanandum ‘person’.Put another way: I shall argue that the question itself is misguided, pointing the inquirer in quite the wrong direction by suggesting that the term ‘self’ points to something which can sustain a philosophically interesting or important degree of reification.
On the traditional view, Butler maintains that forgiveness involves a kind of “conversion experience” in which we must forswear or let go of our resentment against wrongdoers. Against this reading, I argue that Butler never demands that we forswear resentment but only that we be resentful in the right kind of way. That is, he insists that we should be virtuously resentful, avoiding both too much resentment exhibited by the vices of malice and revenge and too little resentment where we (...) merely condone the wrongdoer and leave ourselves open to future injury. I argue that this Butlerian approach offers us a more attractive account of forgiveness as a “virtue” than many recent discussions. In the final section, I address Butler’s challenging thesis that forgiveness is an unconditional moral duty. I argue against those who claim that forgiveness is supererogatory (Kolnai/Calhoun) or else merely morally conditional and even morally blameworthy in some cases (Murphy/Hampton/Novitz/Richards). By contrast, I defend a context-sensitive account of forgiveness which recognizes that it takes place on many different levels. I conclude by taking up the difficult issue of whether anybody can be ultimately “unforgivable”, offering some Butlerian and Strawsonian reflections that might help mitigate our judgments about such matters. (shrink)
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