This paper explores the reasons why the notion of 'evidence-based' practice has gained prominence in educational research. The ascendancy of 'evidence-based' practice is attributed to a crisis of legitimation in educational research. The paper offers a critical exegesis of a systematic review conducted under the auspices of the Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC) subgroup of the Cochrane Collaboration.

Evidence-based practice is often acknowledged as the future state of psychology, yet those graduate students who will soon be applying such practices tend to hold several misconceptions about the major components within this framework. This review highlights implications for graduate education, clinical training, and professional competence in light of the movement toward evidence-based practice in psychology. These implications are discussed in relation to the close parallel between the major components of the evidence-based (...) framework and the current Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct. The evidence-based framework is discussed as an ideology that promotes lifelong learning and best prepares graduate students for ethical clinical practice throughout their careers as psychologists. (shrink)

There is a vast literature on evidence-based practice in education. What function does evidence have in practical deliberations toward decisions about what to do? Most writers on EBP seem to think of evidence largely as quantitative data, serving as a foundation from which practice could and should be directly derived. In this paper I argue that we are better served by according a different and more indirect function to evidence in practical reasoning. To (...) establish this claim I employ Toulmin’s model of argumentation. On this model the evidence-as-foundation view amounts to evidence as data/grounds. The model also offers a different function for evidence, as backing of the warrant, and I argue in this paper that this is a more adequate understanding of the function of evidence in practical reasoning. (shrink)

Everyone, it seems, is talking and arguing about Evidence-Based Practice. Those therapies and assessments designated as EBP increasingly determine what is taught, researched, and reimbursed in health care. But exactly what is it, and how do you do it? The second edition of Clinician's Guide to Evidence-Based Practices is the concise, practitioner-friendly guide to applying EBPs in mental health. Step-by-step it explains how to conduct the entire EBP process-asking the right questions, accessing the best available (...) research, appraising the research, translating that research into practice, integrating that research with clinician expertise and patient characteristics, evaluating the entire enterprise, attending to the ethical considerations, and when done, moving the EBP process forward by teaching and disseminating it. This book will help you:. Formulate useful questions that research can address. Search the research literature efficiently for best practices. Make sense out of the research morass, sifting wheat from chaff. Incorporate patient values and diversity into the selection of EBP. Blend clinician expertise with the research evidence. Translate empirical research into practice. Ensure that your clients receive effective, research-supported services. Infuse the EBP process into your organizational setting and training methods. Identify and integrate ethics in the context of EBP Coauthored by a distinguished quartet of clinicians, researchers, and a health care librarian, the Clinician's Guide has become the classic for graduate students and busy professionals mastering EBP. ". (shrink)

Background The increase in empirical methods of research in bioethics over the last two decades is typically perceived as a welcomed broadening of the discipline, with increased integration of social and life scientists into the field and ethics consultants into the clinical setting, however it also represents a loss of confidence in the typical normative and analytic methods of bioethics. Discussion The recent incipiency of "Evidence-Based Ethics" attests to this phenomenon and should be rejected as a solution to (...) the current ambivalence toward the normative resolution of moral problems in a pluralistic society. While "evidence-based" is typically read in medicine and other life and social sciences as the empirically-adequate standard of reasonable practice and a means for increasing certainty, I propose that the evidence-based movement in fact gains consensus by displacing normative discourse with aggregate or statistically-derived empirical evidence as the "bottom line". Therefore, along with wavering on the fact/value distinction, evidence-based ethics threatens bioethics' normative mandate. The appeal of the evidence-based approach is that it offers a means of negotiating the demands of moral pluralism. Rather than appealing to explicit values that are likely not shared by all, "the evidence" is proposed to adjudicate between competing claims. Quantified measures are notably more "neutral" and democratic than liberal markers like "species normal functioning". Yet the positivist notion that claims stand or fall in light of the evidence is untenable; furthermore, the legacy of positivism entails the quieting of empirically non-verifiable considerations like moral claims and judgments. As a result, evidence-based ethics proposes to operate with the implicit normativity that accompanies the production and presentation of all biomedical and scientific facts unchecked. Summary The "empirical turn" in bioethics signals a need for reconsideration of the methods used for moral evaluation and resolution, however the options should not include obscuring normative content by seemingly neutral technical measure. (shrink)

BackgroundThe increase in empirical methods of research in bioethics over the last two decades is typically perceived as a welcomed broadening of the discipline, with increased integration of social and life scientists into the field and ethics consultants into the clinical setting, however it also represents a loss of confidence in the typical normative and analytic methods of bioethics.DiscussionThe recent incipiency of "Evidence-Based Ethics" attests to this phenomenon and should be rejected as a solution to the current ambivalence (...) toward the normative resolution of moral problems in a pluralistic society. While "evidence-based" is typically read in medicine and other life and social sciences as the empirically-adequate standard of reasonable practice and a means for increasing certainty, I propose that the evidence-based movement in fact gains consensus by displacing normative discourse with aggregate or statistically-derived empirical evidence as the "bottom line". Therefore, along with wavering on the fact/value distinction, evidence-based ethics threatens bioethics' normative mandate. The appeal of the evidence-based approach is that it offers a means of negotiating the demands of moral pluralism. Rather than appealing to explicit values that are likely not shared by all, "the evidence" is proposed to adjudicate between competing claims. Quantified measures are notably more "neutral" and democratic than liberal markers like "species normal functioning". Yet the positivist notion that claims stand or fall in light of the evidence is untenable; furthermore, the legacy of positivism entails the quieting of empirically non-verifiable considerations like moral claims and judgments. As a result, evidence-based ethics proposes to operate with the implicit normativity that accompanies the production and presentation of all biomedical and scientific facts unchecked.SummaryThe "empirical turn" in bioethics signals a need for reconsideration of the methods used for moral evaluation and resolution, however the options should not include obscuring normative content by seemingly neutral technical measure. (shrink)

ABSTRACTEvidence-based practice in psychology is ordinarily understood to demarcate between legitimate and illegitimate psychotherapy practice, based upon the epistemic demarcation distingui...

Evidence-based medicine, with its evidence hierarchies and emphasis on RCTs, meta-analyses and systematic reviews, sets the model for evidence-based policy almost everywhere, policing no exception. But how closely should policing follow this model? We argue that RCTs can tell you little about what you need to know for real-world practice: will this policy work where and when you implement it? Defending that it will do so takes good theory. For RCTs to play a role (...) in theory development, they must be set into a larger body of knowledge, including local knowledge about the sites of implementation. Unfortunately the standard EBM model generally ignores the other kinds of knowledge needed. An alternative model for evidence-based policing, similar to that of the new movement for ‘EBM+’ and immanent in the practice of realist synthesis, focuses on the arguments that proposed policing policies will work where and when they are implemented and looks for the evidence needed to support those arguments. (shrink)

In this essay, Gert Biesta provides a critical analysis of the idea of evidence‐based practice and the ways in which it has been promoted and implemented in the field of education, focusing on the tension between scientific and democratic control over educational practice and research. Biesta examines three key assumptions of evidence‐based education: first, the extent to which educational practice can be compared to the practice of medicine, the field in which (...) class='Hi'>evidence‐based practice was first developed; second, the role of knowledge in professional actions, with special attention to what kind of epistemology is appropriate for professional practices that wish to be informed by the outcomes of research; and third, the expectations about the practical role of research implicit in the idea of evidence‐based education. Biesta concludes that evidence‐based practice provides a framework for understanding the role of research in educational practice that not only restricts the scope of decision making to questions about effectivity and effectiveness, but that also restricts the opportunities for participation in educational decision making. He argues that we must expand our views about the interrelations among research, policy, and practice to keep in view education as a thoroughly moral and political practice that requires continuous democratic contestation and deliberation. (shrink)

The authoritarian standpoint in medicine has been under challenge by various groups and researchers since the 1980s. The challenges have been ethical, political and medical, with patient movements at the forefront. Over the past decade, however, a deep challenge has been posed by evidence-based medicine (EBM), which has challenged the entire strategy of medical treatment from the point of view of a self-critical, anti-authoritarian and hereby also (it has been claimed) a more democratic medical practice. Previously, the (...) challenges arose out of the patient rights perspective. EBM, by contrast, was taken to challenge the way doctors consider their medical practice as a whole. The present paper puts this claim of democratization into a historical context. Two dimensions of the democratization hypothesis are discussed and it is argued that they are insufficient to capture the substantial changes going on in the intersection between medical practice, biomedical science and citizens. (shrink)

Kerry et al. criticize our discussion of causal knowledge in evidence-based medicine (EBM) and our assessment of the relevance of their dispositionalist ontology for EBM. Three issues need to be addressed in response: (1) problems concerning transfer of causal knowledge across heterogeneous contexts; (2) how predictions about the effects of individual treatments based on population-level evidence from RCTs are fallible; and (3) the relevance of ontological theories like dispositionalism for EBM.

Evidence-based practice (EBP) is a relatively recent incarnation in social work's long history of valuing evidence as a basis for practice. Few argue with the ethics and usefulness of grounding practice in empirically tested interventions. Critics of EBP instead focus on how it is defined and implemented. Critiques include what counts as evidence, who makes decisions regarding research agendas and processes, and the lack of attention to context. This essay reflects on such critiques (...) and suggests that social work, as a profession that values human diversity, equality, and self-determination, is well situated to shed light on such debates about EBP. As a profession that supports a person-in-environment perspective, we must examine not only the theory but the practice of EPB in academic, institutional, and societal settings. It is also argued that, owing to our professional mission, it is not enough to acknowledge the risk of oppression and harm; we are obligated to take them seriously and include such potential for harm in our assessment of so-called best practices. (shrink)