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Bibliography: Evidentialism in Epistemology
  1. Guy Axtell (2011). From Internalist Evidentialism to Virtue Responsibilism. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Evidentialism as its leading proponents describe it has two distinct senses, these being evidentialism as a conceptual analysis of epistemic justification, and as a prescriptive ethics of belief—an account of what one ‘ought to believe’ under different epistemic circumstances. These two senses of evidentialism are related, but in the work of leading evidentialist philosophers, in ways that I think are deeply problematic. Although focusing on Richard Feldman’s ethics of belief, this chapter is critical of evidentialism in (...)
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  2. Anthony Robert Booth (2007). The Two Faces of Evidentialism. Erkenntnis 67 (3):401-417.
    In this paper I hope to demonstrate two different ways of interpreting the tenets of evidentialism and show why it is important to distinguish between them. These two ways correspond to those proposed by Feldman and Adler. Feldman’s way of interpreting evidentialism makes evidentialism a principle about epistemic justification, about what we ought to believe. Adler’s, on the other hand, makes evidentialism a principle about how we come to believe, what it is, broadly speaking, rational for (...)
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  3. Bob Beddor (2015). Evidentialism, Circularity, and Grounding. Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1847-1868.
    This paper explores what happens if we construe evidentialism as a thesis about the metaphysical grounds of justification. According to grounding evidentialism, facts about what a subject is justified in believing are grounded in facts about that subject’s evidence. At first blush, grounding evidentialism appears to enjoy advantages over a more traditional construal of evidentialism as a piece of conceptual analysis. However, appearances are deceiving. I argue that grounding evidentialists are unable to provide a satisfactory story (...)
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  4. Chris Tucker (2011). Phenomenal Conservatism and Evidentialism in Religious Epistemology. In Kelly James Clark & Raymond J. VanArragon (eds.), Evidence and Religious Belief. Oxford University Press. pp. 52--73.
    Phenomenal conservatism holds, roughly, that if it seems to S that P, then S has evidence for P. I argue for two main conclusions. The first is that phenomenal conservatism is better suited than is proper functionalism to explain how a particular type of religious belief formation can lead to non-inferentially justified religious beliefs. The second is that phenomenal conservatism makes evidence so easy to obtain that the truth of evidentialism would not be a significant obstacle to justified religious (...)
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  5. Andrew E. Reisner (2014). A Short Refutation of Strict Normative Evidentialism. Inquiry (5):1-9.
    This paper shows that strict evidentialism about normative reasons for belief is inconsistent with taking truth to be the source of normative reasons for belief. It does so by showing that there are circumstances in which one can know what truth requires one to believe, yet still lack evidence for the contents of that belief.
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  6. Dorit Ganson (2008). Evidentialism and Pragmatic Constraints on Outright Belief. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):441 - 458.
    Evidentialism is the view that facts about whether or not an agent is justified in having a particular belief are entirely determined by facts about the agent’s evidence; the agent’s practical needs and interests are irrelevant. I examine an array of arguments against evidentialism (by Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath, David Owens, and others), and demonstrate how their force is affected when we take into account the relation between degrees of belief and outright belief. Once we are sensitive to (...)
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  7.  73
    Jonathan Way (forthcoming). Two Arguments for Evidentialism. Philosophical Quarterly.
    Evidentialism is the thesis that all reasons to believe p are evidence for p. Pragmatists hold that pragmatic considerations – incentives for believing – can also be reasons to believe. Nishi Shah, Thomas Kelly and others have argued for evidentialism on the grounds that incentives for belief fail a ‘reasoning constraint’ on reasons: roughly, reasons must be considerations we can reason from, but we cannot reason from incentives to belief. In the first half of the paper, I show (...)
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  8.  25
    Luis R. G. Oliveira (2017). Deontological Evidentialism, Wide-Scope, and Privileged Values. Philosophical Studies 174 (2):485-506.
    Deontological evidentialism is the claim that we ought to form and maintain our beliefs in accordance with our evidence. In this paper, I criticize two arguments in its defense. I begin by discussing Berit Broogard’s use of the distinction between narrow-scope and wide-scope requirements against W.K. Clifford’s moral defense of. I then use this very distinction against a defense of inspired by Stephen Grimm’s more recent claims about the moral source of epistemic normativity. I use this distinction once again (...)
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  9. Andrew Reisner (2007). Evidentialism and the Numbers Game. Theoria 73 (4):304-316.
    In this paper I introduce an objection to normative evidentialism about reasons for belief. The objection arises from difficulties that evidentialism has with explaining our reasons for belief in unstable belief contexts with a single fixed point. I consider what other kinds of reasons for belief are relevant in such cases.
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  10.  83
    David Henderson, Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2007). Transglobal Evidentialism-Reliabilism. Acta Analytica 22 (4):281-300.
    We propose an approach to epistemic justification that incorporates elements of both reliabilism and evidentialism, while also transforming these elements in significant ways. After briefly describing and motivating the non-standard version of reliabilism that Henderson and Horgan call “transglobal” reliabilism, we harness some of Henderson and Horgan’s conceptual machinery to provide a non-reliabilist account of propositional justification (i.e., evidential support). We then invoke this account, together with the notion of a transglobally reliable belief-forming process, to give an account of (...)
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  11.  95
    Masahiro Yamada (2010). A New Argument for Evidentialism? Philosophia 38 (2):399-404.
    In his “A new argument for evidentialism” (Shah, Philos Q 56(225): 481–498, 2006 ), Nishi Shah argues that the best explanation of a feature of deliberation whether to believe that p which he calls transparency entails that only evidence can be reason to believe that p. I show that his argument fails because a crucial lemma that his argument appeals to cannot be supported without assuming evidentialism to be true in the first place.
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  12. Tommaso Piazza (2009). Evidentialism and the Problem of Stored Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):311 - 324.
    Many stored beliefs, like beliefs in one’s personal data or beliefs in one’s area of expertise, intuitively amount to knowledge, and so are justified. This uncontroversial datum arguably tells against evidentialism, the position according to which a belief is justified if it fits the available evidence: stored beliefs are normally not sustained by one’s available evidence. Conee and Feldman have tried to meet this potential objection by relaxing the notion of available evidence. According to their proposal, stored beliefs are (...)
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  13.  59
    Christopher Michael Cloos (2015). Responsibilist Evidentialism. Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2999-3016.
    When is a person justified in believing a proposition? In this paper, I defend a view according to which a person is justified in believing a proposition just in case the person’s evidence sufficiently supports the proposition and the person responsibly acquired and sustained the evidence that supports the proposition. This view overcomes a deficiency in a prominent theory of epistemic justification. As championed by Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, Evidentialism is a theory subject to counterexamples at the hands (...)
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  14.  47
    Trevor Hedberg (2015). Evidentialism and the Will to Believe, by Scott Aikin. Teaching Philosophy 38 (2):246-250.
    This paper is a book review of Scott Aikin's (2014) Evidentialism and the Will to Believe. Beyond a brief summary of the text, the review focuses on the book's pedagogical merits. I conclude that the book would be worth adopting for graduate and upper-level undergraduate courses that cover the ethics of belief in detail, though the hardcover edition of the book is rather pricey.
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  15. Dylan Dodd (2012). Evidentialism and Skeptical Arguments. Synthese 189 (2):337-352.
    Cartesian skepticism about epistemic justification (‘skepticism’) is the view that many of our beliefs about the external world – e.g., my current belief that I have hands – aren’t justified. I examine the two most influential arguments for skepticism – the Closure Argument and the Underdetermination Argument – from an evidentialist perspective. For both arguments it is clear which premise the anti-skeptic must deny. The Closure Argument, I argue, is the better argument in that its key premise is weaker than (...)
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  16. Richard Amesbury (2008). The Virtues of Belief: Toward a Non-Evidentialist Ethics of Belief-Formation. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 63 (1/3):25 - 37.
    William Kingdon Clifford famously argued that "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." His ethics of belief can be construed as involving two distinct theses—a moral claim (that it is wrong to hold beliefs to which one is not entitled) and an epistemological claim (that entitlement is always a function of evidential support). Although I reject the (universality of the) epistemological claim, I argue that something deserving of the name "ethics of belief" can (...)
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  17.  10
    Karyn L. Freedman (forthcoming). Quasi-Evidentialism: Interests, Justification and Epistemic Virtue. Episteme:1-14.
    In this paper I argue against what I call ‘strict evidentialism’, the view that evidence is the sole factor for determining the normative status of beliefs. I argue that strict evidentialism fails to capture the uniquely subjective standpoint of believers and as a result it fails to provide us with the tools necessary to apply its own epistemic norms. In its place I develop an interest-relative theory of justification which I call quasi-evidentialism, according to which S has (...)
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  18.  60
    Benjamin Bayer, A Positive Evidentialist Account of Epistemic Possibility.
    This paper observes that in the midst of a thickening debate over the concept of “epistemic possibility,” nearly every philosopher assumes that the concept is equivalent to a mere absence of epistemic impossibility, that a proposition is epistemically possible if and only if our knowledge does not entail that it is false. I suggest that it is high time that we challenge this deeply entrenched assumption. I assemble an array of data that singles out the distinctive meaning and function of (...)
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  19.  1
    James Andow (2017). A Partial Defence of Descriptive Evidentialism About Intuitions: A Reply to Molyneux. Metaphilosophy 48 (1-2):183-195.
    Bernard Molyneux presents some new arguments against descriptive evidentialism about intuitions. Descriptive evidentialism is the thesis that philosophers use intuitions as evidence. Molyneux's arguments are that: the propositions that intuition putatively supports are treated as having a degree and kind of certainty and justification that they could not have got from being intuited; intuitions influence us in ways we cannot explain by supposing we treat them as evidence; and certain strong intuitions that persuade us of their contents are (...)
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  20.  1
    Sharon Ryan (2015). In Defense of Moral Evidentialism. Logos and Episteme 6 (4):405-427.
    This paper is a defense of moral evidentialism, the view that we have a moral obligation to form the doxastic attitude that is best supported by our evidence. I will argue that two popular arguments against moral evidentialism are weak. I will also argue that our commitments to the moral evaluation of actions require us to take doxastic obligations seriously.
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  21.  50
    Todd Long (2012). Mentalist Evidentialism Vindicated (and a Super-Blooper Epistemic Design Problem for Proper Function Justification). Philosophical Studies 157 (2):251-266.
    Michael Bergmann seeks to motivate his externalist, proper function theory of epistemic justification by providing three objections to the mentalism and mentalist evidentialism characteristic of nonexternalists such as Richard Feldman and Earl Conee. Bergmann argues that (i) mentalism is committed to the false thesis that justification depends on mental states; (ii) mentalism is committed to the false thesis that the epistemic fittingness of an epistemic input to a belief-forming process must be due to an essential feature of that input, (...)
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  22. T. Ryan Byerly (2014). A Dispositional, Internalist, Evidentialist Virtue Epistemology. Logos and Episteme 5 (4):399-424.
    This paper articulates and defends a novel version of internalist evidentialism which employs dispositions to account for the relation of evidentialsupport. In section one, I explain internalist evidentialist views generally, highlighting the way in which the relation of evidential support stands at the heart of these views. I then discuss two leading ways in which evidential support has been understood by evidentialists, and argue that an account of support which employs what I call epistemic dispositions remedies difficulties arguably faced (...)
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  23. Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (2004). Evidentialism. Oxford University Press.
    Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This is the traditional view ofjustification.
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  24. Earl Brink Conee (2004). Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    Evidentialism is a view about the conditions under which a person is epistemically justified in having a particular doxastic attitude toward a proposition. Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This is the traditional view of justification. It is now widely opposed. The essays included in this volume develop and defend the tradition. Evidentialism has many assets. In addition to providing an intuitively plausible account of epistemic justification, it helps to resolve (...)
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  25.  48
    Kevin McCain (2013). Explanationist Evidentialism. Episteme 10 (3):299-315.
    In their most recent co-authored work, Conee and Feldman (2008) suggest that epistemic support should be understood in terms of best explanations. Although this suggestion is plausible, Conee and Feldman admit that they have not provided the necessary details for a complete account of epistemic support. This article offers an explanationist account of epistemic support of the kind that Conee and Feldman suggest. It is argued that this account of epistemic support yields the intuitively correct results in a wide variety (...)
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  26. L. Leydon-Hardy (2012). Evidentialism and its Discontents * Edited by Trent Dougherty. Analysis 72 (4):852-854.
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  27.  74
    Daniel M. Mittag (2004). Evidentialism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  28. Nishi Shah (2006). A New Argument for Evidentialism. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.
    When we deliberate whether to believe some proposition, we feel immediately compelled to look for evidence of its truth. Philosophers have labelled this feature of doxastic deliberation 'transparency'. I argue that resolving the disagreement in the ethics of belief between evidentialists and pragmatists turns on the correct explanation of transparency. My hypothesis is that it reflects a conceptual truth about belief: a belief that p is correct if and only if p. This normative truth entails that only evidence can be (...)
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  29. Richard Feldman & Earl Conee (1985). Evidentialism. Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.
    Evidentialism is a view about the conditions under which a person is epistemically justified in having a particular doxastic attitude toward a proposition. Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This is the traditional view of justification. It is now widely opposed. The essays included in this volume develop and defend the tradition.Evidentialism has many assets. In addition to providing an intuitively plausible account of epistemic justification, it helps to resolve the (...)
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  30. Richard Feldman (2009). Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement. Episteme 6 (3):294-312.
    Evidentialism is the thesis that a person is justified in believing a proposition iff the person's evidence on balance supports that proposition. In discussing epistemological issues associated with disagreements among epistemic peers, some philosophers have endorsed principles that seem to run contrary to evidentialism, specifying how one should revise one's beliefs in light of disagreement. In this paper, I examine the connection between evidentialism and these principles. I argue that the puzzles about disagreement provide no reason to (...)
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  31. Juan Comesaña (2010). Evidentialist Reliabilism. Noûs 44 (4):571-600.
    I argue for a theory that combines elements of reliabilism and evidentialism.
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  32.  39
    Duncan Pritchard (2011). Evidentialism, Internalism, Disjunctivism. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
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  33.  84
    Trent Dougherty (ed.) (2011). Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Few concepts have been considered as essential to the theory of knowledge and rational belief as that of evidence. The simplest theory which accounts for this is evidentialism, the view that epistemic justification for belief--the kind of justification typically taken to be required for knowledge--is determined solely by considerations pertaining to one's evidence. In this ground-breaking book, leading epistemologists from across the spectrum challenge and refine evidentialism, sometimes suggesting that it needs to be expanded in quite surprising directions. (...)
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  34.  18
    Alvin I. Goldman (2011). And Evidentialism? Or: Evidentialism's Troubles, Reliabilism's Rescue Package. In T. Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press. pp. 254.
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  35. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2008). Does Doxastic Transparency Support Evidentialism? Dialectica 62 (4):541-547.
    Nishi Shah has recently argued that transparency in doxastic deliberation supports a strict version of evidentialism about epistemic reasons. I argue that Shah's argument relies on a principle that is incompatible with the strict version of evidentialism Shah wishes to advocate.
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  36. Anthony Brueckner (2013). Bootstrapping, Evidentialist Internalism, and Rule Circularity. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):591-597.
    Bootstrapping, evidentialist internalism, and rule circularity Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-7 DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9876-9 Authors Anthony Brueckner, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  37.  9
    Tommaso Piazza (2016). Problems for Mainstream Evidentialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):148-165.
    Evidentialism says that a subject S’s justification is entirely determined by S’s evidence. The plausibility of evidentialism depends on what kind of entities constitute a subject S’s evidence and what one takes the support relation to consist in. Conee and Feldman’s mainstream evidentialism incorporates a psychologist answer to and an explanationist answer to. ME naturally accommodates perceptual justification. However, it does not accommodate intuitive cases of inferential justification. In the second part of the paper, I consider and (...)
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  38. Alvin I. Goldman (2011). Toward a Synthesis of Reliabilism and Evidentialism? Or: Evidentialism's Troubles, Reliabilism's Rescue Package. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
  39. Jason Baehr (2009). Evidentialism, Vice, and Virtue. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):545-567.
    Evidentialists maintain that epistemic justification is strictly a function of the evidence one has at the moment of belief. I argue here, on the basis of two kinds of cases, that the possession of good evidence is an insuflicient basis for justification. I go on to propose a modification of evidentialism according to which justification sometimes requires intellectually virtuous agency. The discussion thereby underscores an important point of contact between evidentialism and the more recent enterprise of virtue epistemology.
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  40.  14
    Matthias Steup (forthcoming). Destructive Defeat and Justificational Force: The Dialectic of Dogmatism, Conservatism, and Meta-Evidentialism. Synthese:1-27.
    Defeaters can prevent a perceptual belief from being justified. For example, when you know that red light is shining at the table before you, you would typically not be justified in believing that the table is red. However, can defeaters also destroy a perceptual experience as a source of justification? If the answer is ‘no’, the red light defeater blocks doxastic justification without destroying propositional justification. You have some-things-considered, but not all-things-considered, justification for believing that the table is red. If (...)
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  41. Rob Lovering (2010). The Problem of the Theistic Evidentialist Philosophers. Philo 13 (2):185-200.
    That theistic evidentialist philosophers have failed to make the evidential case for theism to atheistic evidentialist philosophers raises a problem—a question to be answered. I argue here that—of the most plausible possible solutions to this problem—each is either inadequate or, when adequate, in conflict with the theistic evidentialist philosophers’ defining beliefs. I conclude that the problem of the theistic evidentialist philosophers—the question of why theistic evidentialist philosophers have failed to make their case to atheistic evidentialist philosophers—is a problem for theistic (...)
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  42. Keith DeRose (2011). Questioning Evidentialism. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
     
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  43.  88
    Inga Nayding (2011). Conceptual Evidentialism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):39-65.
    Two recent arguments purport to find a new and firmer foundation for evidentialism in the very nature of the concept of belief. Evidentialism is claimed to be a conceptual truth about belief, and pragmatism to be ruled out, conceptually. But can the conclusion of such conceptual arguments be regarded as the denial of pragmatism? The pragmatist traditionally conceived belief through its motivational role. Therefore, when confronted with conceptual evidentialism, the pragmatist should cede the term ‘belief,’ but insist (...)
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  44.  22
    Kevin McCain (2015). Is Forgotten Evidence a Problem for Evidentialism? Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (4):471-480.
    The “problem of forgotten evidence” is a common objection to evidentialist theories of epistemic justification. This objection is motivated by cases where someone forms a belief on the basis of supporting evidence and then later forgets this evidence while retaining the belief. Critics of evidentialist theories argue that in some of these cases the person's belief remains justified. So, these critics claim that one can have a justified belief that is not supported by any evidence the subject possesses. I argue (...)
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  45.  22
    Cornelis de Waal (2015). Evidentialism and the Will to Believe by Scott F. Aikin. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 51 (2):266-271.
    Scott Aikin’s Evidentialism and the Will to Believe is the first book-length discussion of W.K. Clifford’s 1877 “The Ethics of Belief ” and William James’s 1896 “The Will to Believe.” Except for twenty pages, the book splits evenly between a detailed discussion of the two essays. A good book demands some good criticism, and I am hoping that the comments I make are read in that light. Evidentialism and the Will to Believe appears in the Bloomsbury Research in (...)
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  46.  69
    Scott F. Aikin (2006). Modest Evidentialism. International Philosophical Quarterly 46 (3):327-343.
    Evidentialism is the view that subjects should believe neither more than nor contrary to what their current evidence supports. I will critically present two arguments for the view. A common source of resistance to evidentialism is that there are intuitive cases where subjects should believe contrary to their evidence. I will present modest evidentialism as the view that subjects should believe in accord with what their evidence supports, but that this norm may be overridden under certain conditions. (...)
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  47. Alvin I. Goldman, Or: Evidentialism's Troubles, Reliabilism's Rescue Package.
    For most of their respective existences, reliabilism and evidentialism (that is, process reliabilism and mentalist evidentialism) have been rivals. They are generally viewed as incompatible, even antithetical, theories of justification.1 But a few people are beginning to re-think this notion. Perhaps an ideal theory would be a hybrid of the two, combining the best elements of each theory. Juan Comesana (forthcoming) takes this point of view and constructs a position called “Evidentialist Reliabilism.” He tries to show how each (...)
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  48.  47
    Richard Feldman & Earl Conee (2005). Some Virtues of Evidentialism. Veritas: Revista de Filosofia da PUCRS 50 (4):95-108.
    O evidencialismo é, primordialmente, uma tese sobre a justificação epistêmica e, secundariamente, uma tese sobre o conhecimento. Sustenta que a justificação epistêmica é superveniente da evidência. As versões do evidencialismo diferem quanto ao que conta como evidência, quanto ao que seja possuir algo como evidência e quanto ao que um dado corpo de evidência apóia. A tese secundária é a de que o apoio evidencial é necessário ao conhecimento. O evidencialismo ajuda a formular as questões epistemológicas de uma forma que (...)
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  49. Richard Fumerton (2011). Evidentialism and Truth. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
     
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  50. John Greco (2011). Evidentialism About Knowledge. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
     
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