Results for 'Experiences (Events)'

307 found
Order:
  1. Experiences as Complex Events.Michael Jacovides - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):141-159.
    It is argued that experiences are complex events that befall their subjects. Each experience has a single subject and depends on the state or the event that it is of. The constituents of an experience are its subject, its grounding event or state, and everything that the subject is aware of during that time that's relevant to the telling of the story of how it was to participate in that event or be put in that state. The experience occurs (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  2.  93
    Report on Analysis 'Problem' No. 9 "Does It Make Sense to Suppose That All Events, Including Personal Experiences, Could Occur in Reverse?".J. R. Searle - 1956 - Analysis 16 (6):124-125.
  3.  39
    Report on Analysis 'Problem' No. 9 "Does It Make Sense to Suppose That All Events, Including Personal Experiences, Could Occur in Reverse?".J. E. McGechie - 1956 - Analysis 16 (6):122-123.
  4.  36
    Report on Analysis 'Problem' No. 9 "Does It Make Sense to Suppose That All Events, Including Personal Experiences, Could Occur in Reverse?".J. N. Findlay - 1956 - Analysis 16 (6):121-122.
  5.  44
    Report on Analysis 'Problem' No. 9 "Does It Make Sense to Suppose That All Events, Including Personal Experiences, Could Occur in Reverse?".R. Taylor - 1956 - Analysis 16 (6):125-126.
  6.  1
    Daily Experiences and Well-Being: Do Memories of Events Matter?William Tov - 2012 - Cognition and Emotion 26 (8):1371-1389.
  7. ANALYSIS Problem No. 9 Does it make sense to suppose that all events, including personal experiences, could occur in reverse.J. E. Mcgechie - 1955 - Erkenntnis 16:122.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Analysis Problem No. 9 Does It Make Sense To Suppose That All Events, Including Personal Experiences, Could Occur In Reverse.J. E. Mcgechie & Church Alonso - 1955 - Analysis 16:122.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Report on Does It Make Sense to Suppose That All Events, Including Personal Experiences, Could Occur in Reverse?J. N. Findlay - 1956 - Analysis 16 (June):121.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. ANALYSIS Problem No. 9 Does It Make Sense to Suppose That All Events, Including Personal Experiences, Could Occur in Reverse?Herbert Hochberg - 1955 - Analysis 16:121.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. ANALYSIS Problem No. 9 Does It Make Sense to Suppose That All Events, Including Personal Experiences, Could Occur in Reverse.J. E. Mcgechie - 1955 - Analysis 16:122.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. ANALYSIS Problem No. 9 Does It Make Sense to Suppose That All Events, Including Personal Experiences, Could Occur in Reverse.John R. Searle - 1955 - Analysis 16:124.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. ANALYSIS Problem No. 9 Does it make sense to suppose that all events, including personal experiences, could occur in reverse.John R. Searle - 1955 - Erkenntnis 16:124.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Report on Does It Make Sense to Suppose That All Events, Including Personal Experiences, Could Occur in Reverse?John R. Searle - 1956 - Analysis 16 (June):124.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. ANALYSIS Problem No. 9 Does It Make Sense to Suppose That All Events, Including Personal Experiences, Could Occur in Reverse.Richard Taylor - 1955 - Analysis 16:125.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. ANALYSIS Problem No. 9 Does it make sense to suppose that all events, including personal experiences, could occur in reverse.Taylor Richard - 1955 - Erkenntnis 16:125.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. How Previously Inaccessible Experiences Become Conscious.George Silberschatz - 2005 - In Transformative Relationships: The Control-Mastery Theory of Psychotherapy. Routledge. pp. 25-30.
  18.  1
    Measuring, Manipulating, and Modeling the Unconscious Influences of Prior Experience on Memory for Recent Experiences.Cathy L. McEvoy & Douglas L. Nelson - 2006 - In Reinout W. Wiers & Alan W. Stacy (eds.), Handbook of Implicit Cognition and Addiction. Sage Publications. pp. 59-71.
  19. Subjective Experience is Probably Not Limited to Humans: The Evidence From Neurobiology and Behavior.Bernard J. Baars - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):7-21.
    In humans, conscious perception and cognition depends upon the thalamocortical complex, which supports perception, explicit cognition, memory, language, planning, and strategic control. When parts of the T-C system are damaged or stimulated, corresponding effects are found on conscious contents and state, as assessed by reliable reports. In contrast, large regions like cerebellum and basal ganglia can be damaged without affecting conscious cognition directly. Functional brain recordings also show robust activity differences in cortex between experimentally matched conscious and unconscious events. This (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  20. Realism and Anti-Realism About Experiences of Understanding.Jordan Dodd - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):745-767.
    Strawson (1994) and Peacocke (1992) introduced thought experiments that show that it seems intuitive that there is, in some way, an experiential character to mental events of understanding. Some (e.g., Siewert 1998, 2011; Pitt 2004) try to explain these intuitions by saying that just as we have, say, headache experiences and visual experiences of blueness, so too we have experiences of understanding. Others (e.g., Prinz 2006, 2011; Tye 1996) propose that these intuitions can be explained without positing (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  21. Phenomenology and Delusions: Who Put the 'Alien' in Alien Control?Elisabeth Pacherie, Melissa Green & Timothy J. Bayne - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):566-577.
    Current models of delusion converge in proposing that delusional beliefs are based on unusual experiences of various kinds. For example, it is argued that the Capgras delusion (the belief that a known person has been replaced by an impostor) is triggered by an abnormal affective experience in response to seeing a known person; loss of the affective response to a familiar person’s face may lead to the belief that the person has been replaced by an impostor (Ellis & Young, (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  22.  28
    Exploring "Fringe" Consciousness: The Subjective Experience of Perceptual Fluency and its Objective Bases.Rolf Reber, P. Wurtz & Thomas E. Zimmermann - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):47-60.
    Perceptual fluency is the subjective experience of ease with which an incoming stimulus is processed. Although perceptual fluency is assessed by speed of processing, it remains unclear how objective speed is related to subjective experiences of fluency. We present evidence that speed at different stages of the perceptual process contributes to perceptual fluency. In an experiment, figure-ground contrast influenced detection of briefly presented words, but not their identification at longer exposure durations. Conversely, font in which the word was written (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  23.  7
    Experiences of Activity and Causality in Schizophrenia: When Predictive Deficits Lead to a Retrospective Over-Binding.Martin Jean-Rémy - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1361-1374.
    In this paper I discuss an intriguing and relatively little studied symptomatic expression of schizophrenia known as experiences of activity in which patients form the delusion that they can control some external events by the sole means of their mind. I argue that experiences of activity result from patients being prone to aberrantly infer causal relations between unrelated events in a retrospective way owing to widespread predictive deficits. Moreover, I suggest that such deficits may, in addition, lead to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  24. What is the Unity of Consciousness?Timothy J. Bayne & David J. Chalmers - 2003 - In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    At any given time, a subject has a multiplicity of conscious experiences. A subject might simultaneously have visual experiences of a red book and a green tree, auditory experiences of birds singing, bodily sensations of a faint hunger and a sharp pain in the shoulder, the emotional experience of a certain melancholy, while having a stream of conscious thoughts about the nature of reality. These experiences are distinct from each other: a subject could experience the red (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  25.  96
    The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, and Dissociation.Axel Cleeremans (ed.) - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    Consciousness has many elements, from sensory experiences such as vision and bodily sensation, to nonsensory aspects such as memory and thought. All are presented as experiences of a single subject, and all seem to be contained within a unified field of experience. This unity raises many questions: How do diverse systems in the brain co-operate to produce a unified experience? Are there conditions under which this unity breaks down? Is conscious experience really unified at all? Such questions are (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  26.  58
    The Physical Condition for Consciousness: A Comment on R. Shaw and J. Kinsella-Shaw.Wolfgang Baer - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (8):93-104.
    If the universe is a machine, consciousness is not possible. If the universe is more than a machine, then physics is incomplete. Since we are both part of the universe and conscious, physics must be incomplete and the understanding required to construct conscious mechanisms must be sought through the advancement of physics not the continued application of inadequate concepts. In this paper I will show that an impediment to this advancement is the confusion arising through the use of terms such (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  40
    Autobiographical and Theoretical Reflections on the "Ontological Unconscious".Robert D. Stolorow - 2006 - Contemporary Psychoanalysis 42 (2):233-241.
    In this article I draw on some personal experiences of my own as a springboard for a theoretical discussion of the contextuality of the several varieties of unconsciousness and, in particular, of a form of unconsciousness that I propose to call the ontological unconscious.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  30
    The Birth of Political Subjects: Individuals, Foucault, and Boundary Experiences.Charles E. Scott - 2010 - Research in Phenomenology 40 (1):19-33.
    In a context of experiences in which events become apparent that encroach upon mainstream and reasonable good sense, this paper gives an account of the emergence of political subjects into public domains that make possible new knowledge and personal and institutional transformations. A statement by Simone de Beauvoir and engagement with Michel Foucault's interpretation of “limit experiences” help to orient the paper. The essay ends with a discussion of certain types of power and the birth of political subjects.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  94
    Re-Representing Consciousness: Dissociations Between Experience and Meta-Consciousness.Jonathan W. Schooler - 2002 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (8):339-344.
  30.  25
    Subjective Experience and the Attentional Lapse: Task Engagement and Disengagement During Sustained Attention.J. Smallwood, J. B. Davies, D. Heim, F. Finnigan, M. Sudberry & Obonsawin M. O'Connor R. - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (4):657-90.
    Three experiments investigated the relationship between subjective experience and attentional lapses during sustained attention. These experiments employed two measures of subjective experience to examine how differences in awareness correspond to variations in both task performance and psycho-physiological measures . This series of experiments examine these phenomena during the Sustained Attention to Response Task . The results suggest we can dissociate between two components of subjective experience during sustained attention: task unrelated thought which corresponds to an absent minded disengagement from the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   29 citations  
  31. There is No Stream of Consciousness.Susan J. Blackmore - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5):17-28.
    Throughout history there have been people who say it is all illusion. I think they may be right. But if they are right what could this mean? If you just say "It's all an illusion" this gets you nowhere - except that a whole lot of other questions appear. Why should we all be victims of an illusion, instead of seeing things the way they really are? What sort of illusion is it anyway? Why is it like that and not (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  32. The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience: A Representationist Analysis of the First-Person Perspective.Thomas Metzinger - 2000 - In Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 285--306.
    This is a brief and accessible English summary of the "Self-model Theory of Subjectivity" (SMT), which is only available as German book in this archive. It introduces two new theoretical entities, the "phenomenal self-model" (PSM) and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality-relation" PMIR. A representationalist analysis of the phenomenal first-person persepctive is offered. This is a revised version, including two pictures.
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  33.  44
    Beyond the Body Schema: Visual, Prosthetic, and Technological Contributions to Bodily Perception and Awareness.Nicholas P. Holmes & Charles Spence - 2006 - In Günther Knoblich, Ian M. Thornton, Marc Grosjean & Maggie Shiffrar (eds.), Human Body Perception From the Inside Out. Oxford University Press. pp. 15-64.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  34. The Philosophy of Dreaming and Self-Consciousness: What Happens to the Experiential Subject During the Dream State?Jennifer Michelle Windt & Thomas Metzinger - 2007 - In Deirdre Barrett & Patrick McNamara (eds.), The New Science of Dreaming Vol 3: Cultural and Theoretical Perspectives. Praeger Publishers/Greenwood Publishing Group. pp. 193-247.
  35. Consciousness and Perceptual Binding.Anne Treisman - 2003 - In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 95--113.
  36.  29
    The Integrating Self and Conscious Experience.Holley S. Hodgins & C. Raymond Knee - 2002 - In Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan (eds.), Handbook of Self-Determination Research. University of Rochester Press. pp. 87-100.
  37.  48
    Consciousness, Self, and Attention.Jason Ford & David Woodruff Smith - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 353-377.
  38.  18
    Bridging Eastern and Western Perspectives on Consciousness: Comment.K. Ramakrishna Rao - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (11):63-68.
  39.  11
    Feeling is Perceiving: Core Affect and Conceptualization in the Experience of Emotion.Lisa Feldman Barrett - 2005 - In Lisa Feldman Barrett, Paula M. Niedenthal & Piotr Winkielman (eds.), Emotion and Consciousness. Guilford Press. pp. 255-284.
  40. Action, the Unity of Consciousness, and Vehicle Externalism.Susan L. Hurley - 2003 - In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 78--91.
  41.  18
    Can 12 Large Clowns Fit in a Mini Cooper? Or When Are Beliefs and Reasoning Explicit and Conscious?Renée Baillargeon - 2004 - Developmental Science 7 (4):422-424.
  42.  60
    Is the Unconscious Really All That Unconscious? The Role of Being and Experience in the Psychoanalytic Encounter.M. Guy Thompson - 2001 - Contemporary Psychoanalysis 37 (4):571-612.
    This paper explores the psychoanalytic conception of the unconscious and critiques it from a phenomenlogical perspective, especially Sartre and Heidegger, with a view to conceptualizing the unconscious from an ontological rather than psychological mindset.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  60
    Is the Unconscious Really All That Unconscious?M. Guy Thompson - 2004 - In Paul Gordon & Rosalind Mayo (eds.), Between Psychotherapy and Philosophy: Essays From the Philadelphia Association. pp. 141-178.
    This paper explores the psychoanalytic conception of the unconscious and critiques it from a phenomenlogical perspective, especially Sartre and Heidegger, with a view to conceptualizing the unconscious from an ontological rather than psychological mindset.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  55
    Being Ourselves and Knowing Ourselves: An Adverbial Account of Mental Representations.Monica Meijsing - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):605-619.
    This paper takes an evolutionary approach to what we are, namely autopoietic systems with a first person perspective on our surroundings and ourselves. This in contrast with Thomas Metzinger.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. The Stream of Consciousness: XXVIII. Does Consciousness Exist? (First Part).Thomas Natsoulas - 2003 - Imagination, Cognition and Personality 23 (2):121-141.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  39
    Feeling as Knowing--Part II: Emotion, Consciousness and Brain Activity.Timo Järvilehto - 2001 - Consciousness and Emotion. Special Issue 2 (1):75-102.
    In the latter part of this two-article sequence, the concept of emotion as reorganization of the organism-environment system is developed further in relation to consciousness, subjective experience and brain activity. It is argued that conscious emotions have their origin in reorganizational changes in primitive co-operative organizations, in which they get a more local character with the advent of personal consciousness and individuality, being expressed in conscious emotions. However, the conscious emotion is not confined to the individual only, but it gets (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47.  18
    Investigating Conscious Experience Through the Beeper Project.Vincent A. Punzo & Emily Miller - 2002 - Teaching of Psychology 29 (4):295-297.
  48.  10
    Level and Contents of Consciousness in Connection with Partial Epileptic Seizures.Mirja Johanson, Antii Revonsuo, John Chaplin & Jan-Eric Wedlund - 2003 - Epilepsy and Behavior 4 (3):279-285.
  49. Pain Perception, Affective Mechanisms, and Conscious Experience.C. Richard Chapman - 2004 - In Thomas Hadjistavropoulos & Kenneth D. Craig (eds.), Pain: Psychological Perspectives. pp. 59-85.
  50. Emotion, Memory, and Conscious Awareness in Schizophrenia.Jean-Marie Danion, Caroline Huron, Lydia Rizzo & Pierre Vidailhet - 2004 - In Daniel Reisberg & Paula Hertel (eds.), Memory and Emotion. Oxford University Press. pp. 217-241.
1 — 50 / 307