I develop and defend metaethical experientialism, the thesis that phenomenal facts explain certain kinds of value facts. I argue, for example, that anyone who knows what it’s like to feel extreme pain is in a position to know that that kind of experience is bad. I argue that metaethical experientialism yields genuine counterexamples to the principle that no ethical conclusion can be derived from purely descriptive premises. I also discuss the prospects for a pluralistic metaethics, whereby different metaethical (...) theories hold for different classes of ethical facts. (shrink)

Phenomenalist dogmatist experientialism (PDE) holds the following thesis: if $S$ has a perceptual experience that $p$ , then $S$ has immediate prima facie evidential justification for the belief that $p$ in virtue of the experience’s phenomenology. The benefits of PDE are that it (a) provides an undemanding view of perceptual justification that allows most of our ordinary perceptual beliefs to be justified, and (b) accommodates two important internalist intuitions, viz. the New Evil Demon Intuition and the Blindsight Intuition. However, (...) in the face of a specific version of the Sellarsian dilemma, PDE is ad hoc. PDE needs to explain what is so distinct about perceptual experience that enables it to fulfill its evidential role without being itself in need of justification. I argue that neither an experience’s presentational phenomenology, nor its phenomenal forcefulness can be used to answer this question, and that prospects look dim for any other phenomenalist account. The subjective distinctness of perceptual experience might instead just stem from a higher-order belief that the experience is a perceptual one, but this will only serve to strengthen the case for externalism: externalism is better suited to provide an account of how we attain justified higher-order beliefs and can use this account to accommodate the Blindsight Intuition. (shrink)

Experientialism in aesthetics is the view that the artistic merit or the aesthetic value of something is determined by the final value of certain experiences of it. These are usually specified as experiences of it with understanding and appreciation. Until recently, experientialism was the dominant view. Not anymore. Experientialists are now subject to a barrage of objections, many of which they have not answered. Here I argue that all of these objections fail. I develop a new form of (...) experientialism that is immune to them. It also has an independent rationale. It incorporates an account of the value of art appreciation that is plausible in its own right. And it endorses many of the core insights of anti-experientialists, especially concerning the final value of good art. Those of us unconvinced by experientialism need to take this form of it seriously. I conclude by identifying some genuine problems it faces. Even these aren’t clearly insoluble. (shrink)

Can a person’s degree of wellbeing be affected by things that do not enter her experience? Experientialists deny that it can, extra-experientialists affirm it. The debate between these two positions has focused on an argument against experientialism—the experience machine objection—but few arguments exist for it. I present an argument for experientialism. It builds on the claim that theories of wellbeing should not only state what constitutes wellbeing, but also which entities are welfare subjects. Moreover, the claims it makes (...) about these two issues should have a certain coherence with each other. I argue that if we accept a particular plausible answer to the second question—namely that all and only sentient beings are welfare subjects—extra-experientialist theories face a problem of coherence. While this problem can typically be solved, doing so will involve steps that are unattractive. On experientialist theories, on the other hand, the answer to these questions cohere perfectly. (shrink)

The value of a life for the person living it has been conceptualized in various ways. One might begin by asking what intrinsically matters to a person, and then.

This critical appraisal of Juan Comesaña’s Being Rational and Being Right is divided into three sections: Section I describes the fundamental features of “Experientialism,” the theory of basic rationality developed and defended in the book; Section II briefly indicates how the chapters of the book unfold; and Section III describes and examines one problematic issue concerning how Experientialism interacts with the liberalism/conservatism debate in the theory of justification.

Debates over the relative priority of experience and language have been among some of the most vexed, but also generative, disputes in pragmatist philosophy over the past few decades. These debates have, however, run into the ground such that both positions find themselves at a definitive standstill. I argue for a rejuvenation of pragmatism by way of moving beyond both the experience option (here represented by Dewey) and the linguistic turn in pragmatism (here represented by Brandom). We can move beyond (...) these two categories, I argue, by resuscitating the categorical conception that has always been at the heart of pragmatism all along: action or, as I prefer to put it, conduct. In this paper, I develop an argument for “conduct pragmatism” on the basis of a return to William James’s earliest statements of pragmatism, statements that indeed occur prior to the official announcement of “pragmatism” in 1898. I draw on a dispute with Charles Sanders Peirce over the best interpretation of pragmatism as well as on a number of James’s early psychological writings from the 1880s leading up to the Principles of Psychology of 1890. These texts definitively establish that the early James was what I call a “conduct pragmatist” well before his radical empiricism facilitated what was only a late turn toward the “experience pragmatism” that would come to impress Dewey and later scholars of classicopragmatism. The early James thus represents, I argue, a promising seed for a new third generation of pragmatism that may find its way beyond the endings of both experientialism and lingualism, as well as their impasses with one another. (shrink)

Experientialist semantics has contributed to a broader notion of linguistic meaning by emphasizing notions such as construal, perspective, metaphor, and embodiment, but has suffered from an individualist concept of meaning and has conflated experiential motivations with conventional semantics. We argue that these problems can be redressed by methods and concepts from phenomenology, on the basis of a case study of sentences of non-actual motion such as “The mountain range goes all the way from Mexico to Canada.” Through a phenomenological reanalysis (...) of proposals of Talmy, Langacker, and Matlock, we show that non-actual motion is both experientially and linguistically non-unitary. At least three different features of human consciousness—enactive perception, visual scanning, and imagination—constitute experiential motivations for non-actual motion sentences, and each of these could be related to phenomenological analyses of human intentionality. The second problem is addressed by proposing that the experiential motivations of non-actual motion sentences can be viewed as sedimented through “passive” processes of acquisition and social transmission and that this implies an interactive loop between experience and language, yielding losses in terms of original experience, but gains in terms of communal signification. Something that is underestimated by phenomenology is that what is sedimented are not only intentional objects such as states of affairs, but aspects of how they are given, i.e., the original, temporal, bodily experiences themselves. Since cognitive semantics has emphasized such aspects of meaning, we suggest that phenomenology can itself benefit from experientialist semantics, especially when it turns its focus from prepredicative to predicative, linguistic intentionality. (shrink)

If consciousness emerges into ontological reality at some point in nature, as system complexity increases, then it also ‘submerges’ at some adjoining point, as structures simplify. This has led some to posit a ‘latent-consciousness’ in what Bohr saw as the consciousness-like spontaneity of quantum phenomena. Yet to move on this basis to Whitehead's ontological pan-experientialism or to direct quantum explanations of consciousness faces serious epistemological limitations -- perhaps being more unwittingly projective than genuinely explanatory. More reasonable would be an (...) epistemological pan- experientialism in the sense of the later James. Consciousness, as the ultimate lens and medium of all knowledge, is inseparable from the physical reality it would know, especially at the very limits of empirical observation in microphysics. ‘Submerged’ consciousness is better understood in Jamesian pragmatic terms than via assumed but unprovable ontologies. (shrink)

Many contemporary scholars defend the position that J. S. Mill was a ‘eudaimonist’, in a sense implying that he was not an ‘experiential’ hedonist. One ‘activist’ argument for this interpretation rests on the claim that Mill’s core axiological uses of ‘pleasure’ in Utilitarianism should be understood to refer to worthy or pleasurable activities rather than mental states. This paper offers a three-stage rebuttal of the activist interpretation. Firstly, in the Analysis, the Examination and the Logic, Mill explicitly identifies pleasures and (...) pains as mental states. Secondly, if we read Mill’s core axiological uses of ‘pleasure’ in Utilitarianism along activist lines, the text’s overall coherence and intelligibility becomes even more questionable than on the traditional experientialist reading. Finally, in his discussions of Plato, Mill seems to distance himself from the axiological view that non-hedonic features of mind or character have intrinsic value in their own right. In consequence, in the small number of cases in Utilitarianism in which Mill clearly speaks of ‘pleasures’ as activities, this is best construed as a derivative usage. (shrink)

이 글의 목적은 ‘예술의 사라짐’에 관한 보드리야르의 비판을 ‘기호의 역전’ 현상으로 검토함으로써, 그 과도성을 ‘탈신체화된 기호화’의 문제로 해명하는데 있다. 보드리야르는 이미지의 조작이 이루어지는 소비사회의 예술이, 미디어 기술로 인해 예술의 일상화 또는 전세계를 미학화함으로써 미적가치를 포화상태로 만들었고 분석한다. 그러한 예술의 ‘평범함’이 부정성과 창조성을 통한 비판적 거리를 상실하게 만들었고, 이제 소비사회의 예술은 ‘초과실재’의 세계만을 순환적으로 재생산함으로써 ‘예술의 공모’에 동참하고 있다는 것이다. 그 결과 현대예술은 이미지 또는 기호들의 과잉증식만을 보여 주는 초과실재의 숙명처럼, 그 스스로 무가치해지며 소멸될 수밖에 없는 ‘초미학’의 운명을 맞이한다. 그러나 필자는 (...) ‘예술의 사라짐’에 관한 보드리야르의 비관적 전망이 예술의 기호를 철저하게 물질화된 형식, 즉 탈신체화된 기호의 관점으로 규정한 결과에서 나온다고 보았고, 그 과도성을 ‘기호의 역전’ 현상으로 검토하려고 한다. 먼저 체험주의 기호이론에서 규명하는 기호의 역전은 추상적인 기호가 물리세계에서 작동하는 현상에 관한 것으로. 기호가 ‘사역자로의 인간’을 필연적으로 매개해야만 하는 물리적 개입의 과정을 의미한다. 그러나 이러한 기호의 역전 현상이 우리의 삶을 왜곡하거나 억압하는 ‘기호적 존재론’의 형태로 변질될 때, 그 사역자는 굴절된 기호체계 안에 갇힌다. 말하자면 자신이 생산한 기호로부터 ‘소외’되는 것이다. 이 문제에 체험주의 기호이론은 기호의 전도된 가치를 회복하기 위한 길이, 기호를 신체화된 경험의 관점에서 이해하는 ‘기호적 경험’의 문제로 전환할 때 비로소 가능하다고 보았다. 기호를 산출하고 사용하며 해석하는 그 모든 과정은 기호의 사역자인 인간의 활동이 매개되어 있기 때문이다. 따라서 이 글은 과도하게 추상화된 기호적 존재론을 평가할 수 있는 토대는 기호적 경험의 연속성에 대한 이해, 즉 ‘신체화된 경험의 귀환’으로부터 출발해야 한다고 제안한다. (shrink)

The article discusses the issue of how to categorize video games—not the medium of video games, but individual video games. As a lead in to this discussion, the article discusses video game specificity and genericity and moves on to genre theory. On the basis of this discussion, a cognitive experientialist genre framework is sketched, which incorporates both general points from genre theory and theories more specific to the video game domain. The framework is illustrated through a brief example. One virtue (...) of the framework is that it offers a way to bridge the gap between game ontology and player experience; a brief conclusion discusses how the breadth of this gap may depend upon player biographies and also outlines how further work may proceed. (shrink)

This paper takes a bottom-up approach to empirically investigate how people construct the meaning of obscenity, and offers an experientialist, cognitive linguistic account to explain why the term appears to defy definition and makes a problematic legal concept. To study the contextual dependence of the term, we examined the extent to which various item characteristics (such as genre, context, and the race or celebrity status of the people portrayed) and individual variables (such as gender, religion, sexual orientation and previous personal (...) and cultural experiences) influence our perception of seemingly obscene materials. We report correlations that have not been previously shown. The data support the thesis that the meaning of obscenity emerges in a cognitive-affective response that arises during a dynamic process of interpretation, and thus allows for extralegal factors to influence judgment. The results challenge the assumption that obscenity is a symbolic representation of objectively existing reality and argue that community standard of obscenity is a legal fiction. (shrink)

Sellars’ argument against The Given has set the scene for much of the discussion of the role of experience in justification. Susan Haack tries to avoid the objection presented by Sellars and to give experience a role in the justification of beliefs. Her approach is to put forward a double aspect theory of justification consisting of a logical/evaluative aspect and a causal aspect. Like other double aspect theories, her approach is led astray by the possibility of deviant causal chains. Her (...) argument’s shortcomings, however, only help to underscore the false assumption behind Sellars’ original argument – that justification is purely logical in character. But, rather than arguing that justification is logical and causal, we are led toward to a view that the character of justification, while essentially normative, is much richer than can be modelled by logic. (shrink)

이 연구의 주된 목적은 체험주의(experientialism)의 은유 분석을 통해 유학에서의 초월적 존재의 ‘탄생’과 그것이 정치적ㆍ사회적 구조를 정당화하는 근거로 ‘변용’되어 가는 경로를 추적하는 것이다. 구체적으로 이 연구는 전국시대 말 이후 새롭게 등장한 유학의 초월 개념 ‘태극’(太極) ‘태일’(太一) ‘하늘’[天]이 어떤 은유적 확장을 통해 ‘만물 생성의 시원’을 유추하는 문제에서 ‘정치적ㆍ사회적 구조를 정당화하는 근거’로 변용되는가를 논증하는 것이다.BR 1)『계사전』의 ‘태극’은 우주 만물의 시원(始原)을 설명하기 위한 새로운 은유적 확장물이다. 『계사전』은 『태극은 만물의 시원』 『태극은 우주 만물 변화의 원인자』 등의 은유를 탄생시킴으로써 우주의 생성론적 물음에 답할 수 있도록 (...) 유학적 단초를 제공했다. 2) 여씨춘추의 통일제국에 대한 지향은 만물의 시원을 넘어 객관성ㆍ보편성ㆍ법칙성의 표상하는 『태일=도(道)=군주』 은유를 탄생시켰다. 그리고 『태일=도=군주』 은유를 중심으로 『태일[도]ㆍ군주/만물ㆍ신하』 『군주는 명령을 제정하는 자/신하는 명령을 따르는 자』 은유들을 조직, ‘수직적 계급 구조’를 구축했다. 3) 동중서는 초월자 ‘하늘’을 ‘왕권 신성화의 표상’으로 해석한다. 그는 『군주=하늘』 은유를 중심으로 『인간은 하늘과 동류』 『군주는 하늘의 아들』 『군주의 권능=하늘의 권능』의 은유 체계를 조직, 군주의 힘과 위상을 신격화한다.BR 무엇을 어떻게 의미화 할 것인가는 특정 개념을 사용하는 우리의 ‘목적’과 ‘의도’에 따라 조정되고 확대, 혹은 축소될 수 있다. 그런 의미에서 모든 개념들은 비고정적이다. 이 연구가 시도하는 초월 개념의 탄생과 변용에 대한 검토는 ‘개념 그 자체’에 대한 탐색이 아니라, 그것에 투영된 사용자들의 ‘목적’과 ‘의도’를 읽는 것이다. 그리고 우리의 삶을 지배하고 있는 개념체계를 되돌아보게 하는 것이다. (shrink)

이 글은 초기불교의 무아설(無我說)에 근거하여 갈등 문제의 대처를 위한 소통 담론을 모색하는 데 목적을 둔다. 초기불교의 니까야(Nikāya) 문헌에는 다양한 유형의 무아설이 나타난다. 필자는 그들 중 ‘동일시의 부정(disidentification)’을 내용으로 하는 무아 유형 들이야말로 협력적 삶을 위한 소통의 지침이 될 수 있다고 본다. ‘동일시의 부정’ 방식으로 제시되는 무아란 스스로의 주장과 견해에 대한 반성적 태도를 본질로 한다. 이것은 자신의 경험을 구성하는 물질현상(色, rūpa)이나 느낌(受, vedanā) 따위에 대해 ‘나의 것 (mama)’이 아니며 ‘나의 자아(me attā)’가 아니라고 부정하는 방식으로 이루어진다. 이와 같은 부정은 스스로의 정체성을 이루는 (...) 요인들에 대한 거부로서, 자신의 신념이나 사고에 매몰되는 것을 막아줄 수 있다. 필자는 이와 같은 반성적 태도가 결여된 상태에서는 스스 로의 느낌이나 생각에 대한 과도한 확신과 함께 타인과의 소통 부재 상황이 초래될 수 있 다고 본다. 동일시 부정의 무아는 ‘나’ 혹은 자아에 대한 존재론적 부정으로 볼 수 없으며, 다만 자신을 구성하는 요인들과의 ‘거리두기’로 바꾸어 말할 수 있다. 이러한 ‘거리두기’는 자신에 대해 거리를 두는 정도만큼 타자를 위한 여유 공간의 확보를 가능하게 해줄 수 있 다. 이 점에서 무아란 ‘나’ 혹은 자아에 대한 전면적인 거부가 아니며 타자에 대한 맹목적 인 수용도 아니어야 한다. 무아의 실천에는 자신과 타자 모두에게 얽매이지 않는 유연성과 균형감이 요구된다고 할 수 있다. 이 글은 무아의 실천적 측면을 규명하기 위해 원효의 화 쟁(和諍) 사상과 현대의 체험주의(Experientialism) 담론을 활용한다. 자신의 신념이나 확 신조차도 다른 사람에 의한 검토와 비판에 개방되어야 한다는 화쟁 해석은 무아의 실천적 측면을 이해하는 데 참고가 될 수 있다. 한편 체험주의 담론은 절대주의적 사고방식의 폐해를 지적하는 동시에 몸으로 경험되는 ‘나쁜 것’에 대한 체험적 인식으로부터 공감과 소통 의 실마리를 찾아나갈 것을 제안한다. 체험주의의 시선은 무아설 및 사성제(四聖諦)가 사변 의 산물이 아니며 생생한 삶의 현실에 대처하기 위한 것임을 드러내는 데 유용하다. (shrink)

The phenomenon of cognitive penetration has received a lot of attention in recent epistemology, as it seems to make perceptual justification too easy to come by for experientialist theories of justification. Some have tried to respond to this challenge by arguing that cognitive penetration downgrades the epistemic status of perceptual experience, thereby diminishing its justificatory power. I discuss two examples of this strategy, and argue that they fail on several grounds. Most importantly, they fail to realize that cognitive penetration is (...) just an instance of a larger problem for experientialist theories of perceptual justification. The challenge does not lie in explaining how cognitive penetration is able to downgrade the epistemic status of perceptual experience, the challenge lies in explaining why perceptual experience would have a special epistemic status to begin with. To answer this challenge, experientialists have to solve the distinctiveness problem: they have to explain what is so distinctive about perceptual experience that enables it to provide evidential justification without being in need of justification itself. Unfortunately, an internalist answer to this problem does not appear to be forthcoming, even though it would certainly help with explaining the problem of cognitive penetration. (shrink)

Doxasticism about our awareness of normative (i.e. justifying) reasons – the view that we can recognise reasons for forming attitudes or performing actions only by means of normative judgements or beliefs – is incompatible with the following triad of claims: -/- (1) Being motivated (i.e. forming attitudes or performing actions for a motive) requires responding to and, hence, recognising a relevant reason. -/- (2) Infants are capable of being motivated. -/- (3) Infants are incapable of normative judgement or belief. -/- (...) It should be clear that (3) is true, given that infants lack the required reflective and conceptual capacities. So doxasticists have to reject either (1) or (2) (or both). But this forced choice may be understood as a dilemma for doxasticism. On the hand, doxasticists may adopt a Kantian approach and reject (2), precisely because they think that motivation presupposes the doxastic recognition of reasons, and because infants lack the capacity to doxastically recognise reasons. But this choice seems to wrongly reduce the responses of infants to mere reflexes or instinctive reactions. On the other hand, doxasticists may choose a Humean route and deny (1) by espousing a purely causal or teleological account of motivation. But this would mean detrimentally ignoring the normative nature of (some instances of) motivation. -/- One elegant way of avoiding this dilemma is to give up doxasticism and instead endorse experientialism – the view that we enjoy some experiential access to reasons, which is independent of, and perhaps more fundamental than, our capacity to form normative judgements and beliefs. In this talk, I would like to provide an argument for the existence of such a non-doxastic form of access to reasons. More specifically, I aim to defend the claim that our basic awareness of reasons is phenomenal in nature. What this means is that it forms part of our access from the inside to those of our mental episodes that provide us with access to reasons. In other words, when we introspectively attend to reason-giving mental episodes and what they are about, we have the impression of the presence of a reason for us. My defence of this experientialist alternative to doxasticism will primarily focus on perceptual reasons for first-order beliefs about the external world. (shrink)

In attempting to improve ethical decision-making in business organizations, researchers have developed models of ethical decision-making processes. Most of these models do not include a role for law in ethical decision-making, or if law is mentioned, it is set as a boundary constraint, exogenous to the decision process. However, many decision models in business ethics are based on cognitive moral development theory, in which the law is thought to be the external referent of individuals at the level of cognitive development (...) that most people have achieved. Other theoretical bases of ethical decision models, social learning, and experientialism, also imply a role for law that is rarely made explicit. Law is a more important aspect of ethical decision-process models than it appears to be in the models. This paper will derive explicit roles for the law from the cognition, experientialism, and social learning theories that are used to build ethical decision-making models for business behavior. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Mainstream Philosophy of Mysticism Constructivism Anti‐“experientialism” Feminism Concluding Remarks Works cited.

Experientialist accounts of wellbeing are those accounts of wellbeing that subscribe to the experience requirement. Typically, these accounts are hedonistic. In this article I present the claim that hedonism is not the most plausible experientialist account of wellbeing. The value of experience should not be understood as being limited to pleasure, and as such, the most plausible experientialist account of wellbeing is pluralistic, not hedonistic. In support of this claim, I argue first that pleasure should not be understood as a (...) broad term to describe valuable experiences generally. I then analyze responses to the main argument against a monistic view on the value of experience: the philosophy of swine objection. I argue that such responses deviate from the central hedonistic view that only pleasure and pain matter for wellbeing. I then argue that the argument can be avoided on a pluralistic account, and formulate a plausible candidate for an account of pluralistic experientialism, in which, besides pleasure, non-hedonic aspects of experience like novelty, compassion, and aesthetic value also contribute to wellbeing. (shrink)

Experientialism about the sense of bodily ownership is the view that there is something it is like to feel a body as one’s own. In this paper I argue for a particular experientialist thesis. I first present a puzzle about the relation between bodily awareness and self-consciousness, and introduce a somewhat underappreciated view on the sense of bodily ownership, Implicit Reflexivity, that points us in the right direction as to how to address this puzzle. I argue that Implicit Reflexivity, (...) however, does not provide a full solution to the puzzle. I then introduce a novel view on the sense of bodily ownership that inherits a central tenet, Reflexivity, from the above view, without having its flaws. According to Reflexivity, the sense of bodily ownership consists in the reflexive character of bodily sensations, namely in the fact that bodily sensations have experience-dependent properties as part of their content. Cashed out this way, Reflexivity is an attractive way of explicating the notion that bodily sensations are experiences of the body as subject. Reflexivity also highlights a central, but so far neglected, connection between the sense of bodily ownership and the sense of experience ownership. (shrink)

I argue that interesting experiences are experientially valuable in the same fashion as pleasant experiences, yet that the interesting is nonetheless a distinct value from the pleasant. Insofar as it challenges the hedonist’s assumption that pleasure and pain are the only evaluative dimensions of our phenomenological experiences, my argument here serves both as a defense of the value of the interesting and as an important critique of hedonism.

In this paper I first examine two important assumptions underlying the argument that physicalism entails panpsychism. These need unearthing because opponents in the literature distinguish themselves from Strawson in the main by rejecting one or the other. Once they have been stated, and something has been said about the positions that reject them, the onus of argument becomes clear: the assumptions require careful defence. I believe they are true, in fact, but their defence is a large project that cannot begin (...) here. So, in the final section I comment on what follows if they are granted. I agree with Strawson that --broadly -- 'panpsychism' is the direction in which philosophy of mind should be heading; nevertheless, there are certain difficulties in the detail of his position. In light of these I argue for changes to the doctrine, bringing it into line with the slightly. (shrink)

According to the experience requirement on well-being, differences in subjects’ levels of welfare or well-being require differences in the phenomenology of their experiences. I explain why the two existing arguments for this requirement are not successful. Then, I introduce a more promising argument for it: that unless we accept the requirement, we cannot plausibly explain why only sentient beings are welfare subjects. I argue, however, that because the right kind of theory of well-being can plausibly account for that apparent fact (...) about welfare subjects even if the requirement is false, this argument does not succeed. I tentatively conclude that no compelling case can be made for the requirement. (shrink)

Different explanations of color vision favor different philosophical positions: Computational vision is more compatible with objectivism (the color is in the object), psychophysics and neurophysiology with subjectivism (the color is in the head). Comparative research suggests that an explanation of color must be both experientialist (unlike objectivism) and ecological (unlike subjectivism). Computational vision's emphasis on optimally prespecified features of the environment (i.e., distal properties, independent of the sensory-motor capacities of the animal) is unsatisfactory. Conceiving of visual perception instead as the (...) visual guidance of activity in an environment that is determined largely by that very activity suggests new directions for research. (shrink)

In this article I explore various facets of Nozick’s famous thought experiment involving the experience machine. Nozick’s original target is hedonism—the view that the only intrinsic prudential value is pleasure. But the argument, if successful, undermines any experientialist theory, i.e. any theory that limits intrinsic prudential value to mental states. I first highlight problems arising from the way Nozick sets up the thought experiment. He asks us to imagine choosing whether or not to enter the machine and uses our choice (...) (or rather the choice he assumes most people will have) as evidence against experientialist theories. But for this strategy to succeed it must be possible to distinguish between self-interested and non-self-interested reasons for declining to enter the machine, and there is no obvious way to do this without begging the question against the hedonist. In successive sections I then (a) consider a common misconception of Nozick’s conclusion (that he thinks machine life is the worst life), (b) consider different intuitions about what is important to well-being but missing from machine life, and finally (c) explain what “the experience requirement” is, and describe its relationship to debates about experientialist theories. (shrink)

This chapter makes the case for a relational version of an experientialist view of joint attention. On an experientialist view of joint attention, shifting from solitary attention to joint attention involves a shift in the nature of your perceptual experience of the object attended to. A relational analysis of such a view explains the latter shift in terms of the idea that, in joint attention, it is a constituent of your experience that the other person is, with you, jointly attending (...) to the object. We need such an analysis of joint attention to explain the possibility of success in tasks such as coordinated attack. (shrink)

Adequate theories of well-being must also explain ill-being. While it is formally possible to explain ill-being without postulating robust bads, certain experiential states do qualify as robust bads and thus require theoretical recognition. Experiential bads are recognized by some hedonists, experientialists, and pluralists, but these theories face well-known difficulties. This paper considers whether perfectionist and value-fulfillment accounts of well-being can accommodate such bads. Perfectionists might propose that we all have the avoidance of negative experiential states as a standing end, so (...) that failure to avoid them is robustly bad. This view is unacceptable. A version of the value-fulfillment theory can instead say that such experiential states are intrinsically aversive, so that enduring them represents diminished agential functioning. After explaining this version of the value-fulfillment theory, this paper considers possible objections to it relating to “hurts so good” experiences, appropriate negative emotions, and the aggregative value of experiential goods. (shrink)

이 글의 목적은 부르디외의 ‘하비투스’ 개념에 제기되는 결정론의 의혹을 ‘기호적 창발’의 구조로 완화함으로써, 상징권력의 구조에 관한 자연주의적 탐구의 가능성을 제안하는 데 있다. 부르디외의 상징권력에는 하비투스의 이중성 즉, ‘구조화하는 구조’와 ‘구조화된 구조’의 논리가 내재되어 있는데, 그 이중성은 증여와 언어교환의 경험을 통해 확인될 수 있다. 그러나 하비투스의 이중적인 실천 논리가 함축하는 구조적 제약성과 그 작용 과정의 불투명성으로 인해, 아처나 킹과 같은 사회학자들은 부르디외의 사회학이 여전히 결정론 또는 유물론의 시각을 보여 준다고 분석한다. 이 문제에 필자는 하비투스의 제약성은 ‘몸’을 가진 유기체가 세계와 상호작용함으로써 반복적으로 (...) 경험하는 패턴들을 구조화하는 과정에서 드러나는 유연한 도식이라고 밝힌다. 이 글은 그 해명의 과정을 체험주의의 ‘영상도식’과 ‘기호적 창발’의 구조로 밝혀, 부르디외의 하비투스 개념에 제기되는 결정론에 대한 의혹을 완화하고, 상징권력에 관한 자연주의적인 탐구의 가능성을 보인다. (shrink)

The metaphor “ARGUMENT IS WAR” looms large in the conceptualist and experientialist approach of CitationLakoff and Johnson (1980). Despite extensive discussion of this metaphor by critics and supporters of Lakoff and Johnson, it has so far escaped serious scrutiny on several key points. English-speakers can identify verbal exchanges as arguments without resort to metaphorical comparisons or transfers, and speakers' use of war metaphors to characterize verbal dispute depends on conventional understandings rather than personal experience of war or of other kinds (...) of physical struggle. Much of the evidence for Lakoff and Johnson's claims—a culture that metaphorizes argument as dance; the historical and personal priority of force over verbal dispute; the influence of metaphor on action; even the experience supposedly shaping source domains—depends on supposition and ungrounded assertion. In making sense of how people use this metaphor, the discourse-based program elaborated by Naomi CitationQuinn (1991, Citation1997) carries analysis further than a purely conceptualist approach. (shrink)

Two views on the nature and location of pain are usually contrasted. According to the first, experientialism, pain is essentially an experience, and its bodily location is illusory. According to the second, perceptualism or representationalism, pain is a perceptual or representational state, and its location is to be traced to the part of the body in which pain is felt. Against this second view, the cases of phantom, referred and chronic pain have been marshalled: all these cases apparently show (...) that one can be in pain while not having anything wrong in her body. Pain bodily location, then, would be illusory. I this paper I shall defend the representational thesis by presenting an argument against experientialism while conceding that the appearance / reality distinction collapses. A crucial role in such identification is played by deictics. In reporting that we feel pain here, the deictic directly refers to the bodily part as coinciding with the part as represented. So, pain location is not illusory. The upshot is that the body location is part and parcel of the representational content of pain states, a representation built up from the body map. (shrink)

Age-old battle lines over the puzzling nature of mental experience are shaping a modern resurgence in the study of consciousness. On one side are the long-dominant "physicalists" who view consciousness as an emergent property of the brain's neural networks. On the alternative, rebellious side are those who see a necessary added ingredient: proto-conscious experience intrinsic to reality, perhaps understandable through modern physics (panpsychists, pan-experientialists, "funda-mentalists"). It is argued here that the physicalist premise alone is unable to solve completely the difficult (...) issues of consciousness and that to do so will require supplemental panpsychist/pan-experiential philosophy expressed in modern physics. In one scheme proto-conscious experience is a basic property of physical reality accessible to a quantum process associated with brain activity. The proposed process is Roger Penrose's "objective reduction" (OR), a self-organizing "collapse" of the quantum wave function related to instability at the most basic level of space-time geometry. In the Penrose- Hameroff model of "orchestrated objective reduction" (Orch OR), OR quantum computation occurs in cytoskeletal microtubules within the brain's neurons. The basic thesis is that consciousness involves brain activities coupled to a self-organizing ripples in fundamental reality. (shrink)

The Neo-Confucian writings of Bangye Yu Hyeong-won, the pioneer of Shilhak, did not remain, and he himself confessed his conversion from a ‘Qi centered view’ to 'Shilli theory', resulting in a variety of interpretations, making the whole aspect of his Neo-Confucian philosophy difficult to figure out. From that time on, as interpreted in his conversion from ‘anti Zhuzi Studies’ to ‘Zhuzi Studies’, he has been recognized as a Juri-theorist with a Li-centered thinking. Nevertheless, many scholars who paid attention to Yu's (...) 'The Theory of Governing Society' evaluated him as a reality-oriented Qi-theorist and experientialist. In this article, through analyzing the content and character of his Shilli theory expressed by Yu himself, and exploring the content, inclination degree, motive and purpose of the conversion he confessed at the age of 37, I examine whether his confession really meant a turn to Juri. I point out that even if he recognized Li's substance and developed Shilli theory, which emphasized Li’s independence and Superintendence Character, he still did not give up 'Qiwaiwuli' and 'Qizhili' and maintained a reality-oriented perspective that focuses on things and practice. I also point out that his Shilli theory has a light inclination that just adds reinforcement of the essential nature to the existence that is already firmly established in his philosophy. The trigger or purpose of the turn to Shilli theory was to secure absolute moral standards that could not be solved by Qi-centered theory, and to lay the cornerstone of his lifelong work, Bangyesurok, on the absolute principle of Tianli. Through this, I develop the argument that his Shilli theory was not a conversion to Juri. (shrink)

In this fresh and powerfully argued book, Mark Bernstein identifies the qualities that make an entity deserving of moral consideration. It is frequently assumed that only (normal) human beings count. Bernstein argues instead for "experientialism"--the view that having conscious experiences is necessary and sufficient for moral standing. He demonstrates that this position requires us to include many non-human animals in our moral realm, but not to the extent that many deep ecologists champion.

: The Emotional Perception Model of moral judgment intends to account for experientialism about morality and moral reasoning. In explaining how moral beliefs are formed and applied in practical reasoning, the model attempts to overcome the mismatch between reason and action/desire: morality isn’t about reason for actions, yet moral beliefs, if caused by desires, may play a motivational role in agency. The account allows for two kinds of moral beliefs: genuine moral beliefs, which enjoy a relation to desire, and (...) motivationally inert moral beliefs acquired in ways other than experience. Such etiology-based dichotomy of concepts, I will argue, leads to the undesirable view of cognition as a non-homogeneous phenomenon. Moreover, the distinction between moral beliefs and moral beliefs would entail a further dichotomy encompassing the domain of moral agency: one and the same action might possibly be either genuine moral, or not moral, if acted by individuals lacking the capacity for moral feelings, such as psychopaths. Keywords : Moral Beliefs; Cognitive Homogeneity; Moral Agency; Motivation; Psychopathy Credenze morali e omogeneità cognitiva Riassunto : L’ Emotional Perception Model del giudizio morale offre un approccio esperienzialista alla moralità e al ragionamento morale. Il modello, che propone una spiegazione di come le credenze morali vengano prima formate e poi applicate, intende superare il disallineamento tra ragione e azione/desiderio: la moralità non riguarda le ragioni per agire, tuttavia le credenze morali, se causate dal desiderio o in relazione con esso, svolgono un ruolo motivazionale nell’azione. Questo approccio consente di identificare due tipi di credenza morale: le credenze morali genuine, che trattengono una relazione con il desiderio, e le credenze morali senza relazione alcuna con il desiderio e dunque caratterizzate da inerzia motivazionale. Tale tassonomia, la cui origine è da rintracciare nell’eziologia dei concetti, porta alla sgradita visione della cognizione come fenomeno disomogeneo. Inoltre la distinzione tra credenze morali e credenze morali introdurrebbe una ulteriore possibile dicotomia interna al dominio dell’azione morale: una medesima azione può essere al contempo genuinamente morale oppure no, a seconda che venga agita da un individuo con la capacità di esperire sentimenti morali o da uno che ne sia privo, come nel caso di soggetti psicopatici. Parole chiave : Credenze morali; Omogeneità cognitiva; Agentività morale; Motivazione; Psicopatia. (shrink)

Samuel Scheffler has recently defended what he calls the ‘afterlife conjecture’, the claim that many of our evaluative attitudes and practices rest on the assumption that human beings will continue to exist after we die. Scheffler contends that our endorsement of this claim reveals that our evaluative orientation has four features: non-experientialism, non-consequentialism, ‘conservatism,’ and future orientation. Here I argue that the connection between the afterlife conjecture and these four features is not as tight as Scheffler seems to suppose. (...) In fact, those with an evaluative orientation that rejects these four features have equally strong moral reasons to endorse the existence of the collective afterlife. (shrink)

Robert Nozick argued that we would not plug into his machine that could give us any experiences we chose. More recently Richard Kraut has argued that it would be prudentially rational to plug into the machine, since only experiences count for personal welfare. I argue that both are wrong, that either choice can be rational or not, depending on the central desires of the subjects choosing. This claim is supported by the empirical evidence, which shows an almost even split between (...) those who would enter and those who would not. If we interpret those on both sides as making rational choices to maximize their personal well-being, and if such rational choice tends to enhance well-being, then the experience machine thought experiment supports neither experientialism nor its denial, but instead a rational desire satisfaction account of personal well-being. Unlike objective list and perfectionist accounts, the desire satisfaction account of well-being easily accommodates rational choices on both sides, depending on the motivational sets of the choosers. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to examine and defend videogame cognitivism (VC). According to VC, videogames can be a source of cognitive successes (such as true beliefs, knowledge or understanding) for their players. While the possibility of videogame-based learning has been an extensive topic of discussion in the last decades, the epistemological underpinnings of these debates often remain unclear. I propose that VC is a domain- specific brand of aesthetic cognitivism, which should be carefully distinguished from other views that (...) also insist on the cognitive or educational potential of videogames. After these clarifications, I discuss and assess different broad strategies to motivate VC: propositionalism, experientialism, and neocognitivism. These map the different ways in which videogames can prove epistemically valuable, showing them to be, respectively, sources of propositional knowledge, experiential knowledge, and understanding. I eventually argue that neocognitivism is a particularly promising and yet underexplored way to defend VC. (shrink)

I argue that we can achieve certainty about some empirical propositions. When someone is having a migraine and attending to it, she can be certain that she is in pain. I show that examples intended to undermine claims of certainty or to raise doubts about the reliability of introspection do not touch such cases. Traditional foundationalists have held that epistemically certain beliefs can serve as the basis for all one’s other justified beliefs. This is not so, because those beliefs that (...) are certain are spread too thinly to serve as broad justificatory foundations. Certainty has a different role. The best explanation for the existence of epistemically certain empirical beliefs is experientialism, the view that nondoxastic sensory experiences can justify beliefs. Experientialism then offers a framework for showing how the stream of sensory experiences can provide an adequate basis for the justification of our ordinary beliefs about the external world. (shrink)

I shall be concerned in this paper with the consideration of panpsychism and of materialism in new forms as alternatives. Extended reference will be made to C. S. Peirce's view of perception as realistic in intention and yet not quite clear as to its mechanism and how it attains objective import. I shall say little about Whitehead as a representative of panpsychism as I have just finished a detailed criticism of his epistemological framework. I shall, however, make comments on William (...) James's radical empiricism as tied in with his view of perception as direct and immediate--roughly speaking, the alternative to Locke's representation of "unperceived things" --and bring in my own theory of sensations as guiding perceiving. Russell's neutral monism, connected historically with James's radical empiricism, will be touched on here in connection with his rejection of materialism. Phenomenalism and materialism exclude each other. Materialism, as an ontology, requires a realistic epistemology. I shall also make some comments on Dewey's biological experientialism. One can often best explain a perspective by means of contrasts. (shrink)

Religious experience can acquire plausibility within a religious tradition not only because of its "immediate giveness" but also through its objective validity and relevance. In medieval theology the doctrine of spiritual senses (sensus spiritualesj was an important locus for discussing the veracity of religious experience. The following paper examines the discourse of mystic experience in Fourteenth Century England and its historical background on the basis of the doctrine of spiritual senses - with the voices of Bonaventure, Richard Rolle, Margery Kempe, (...) Walter Hilton, Thomas Basset and the author of the Cloud of Unknowing. The theological position of the anonymous Cloud-author is of particular interest. This article suggests that the Cloud-author diagnoses a naive "mysticism experienced" as the underlying principle of some works of religious instruction. Hence the anonymous author antagonizes this experientialism with a critical epistemology, limiting the "sensational field" of mystic experience to a rather naked "cognitive nucleus". /// A experiência religiosa pode adquirir plausibilidade dentro de uma tradição religiosa não apenas por causa da sua facticidade imediata, mas também através da sua validade objectiva e relevância. Na teologia medieval, a doutrina dos sentidos espirituais (sensus spirituales) constituía um lugar importante para a discussão da veracidade da experiência religiosa. O presente artigo analisa o discurso acerca da experiência mística na Inglaterra do século XIV bem como o seu contexto histórico com base na doutrina dos sentidos espirituais, dando espaço às vozes de S. Boaventura, Richard Rolle, Margery Kempe, Walter Hilton, Thomas Basset e o autor da obra Cloud of Unknowing. Mostra-se por que razão a posição teológica do autor anónimo da Cloud of Unknowing é particularmente interessante. O artigo sugere que o autor desta importante obra diagnostica como naive o experiencialismo místico considerado como basilar a algumas obras de instrução religiosa. Daí que o autor anónimo antagonize este experiencialismo com base numa epistemologia crítica, limitando o "campo sensacional" da experiência mística a um simples "núcleo cognitivo". (shrink)