In order to understand Hegel's gnomic oracle according to which the ‘I’ is a ‘We’, the notion of apersonalsubject is explained by its competence to perform personal roles in a pre-given partition of roles. Explicit divisions of labour by contractual promises are special cases that presuppose the general case of an already established social practice. On the other hand, methodological individualism is right to stress that we actualize joint intentions only via corresponding instantiations. In performing our parts, we (...) class='Hi'>form a plural subject, a we-group. The result of what each of us does is what we do, and the generic ‘We’ turns into the generic ‘I’. (shrink)

We very often grant that a person can gain knowledge on the basis of epistemic artifacts such as telescopes, microscopes and so on. However, this intuition threatens to undermine virtue reliabilism according to which one knows that p if and only if one’s believing the truth that p is the product of a reliable cognitive belief-forming process; in an obvious sense epistemic artifacts are not parts of one’s overall cognitive system. This is so, unless the extended cognition hypothesis (HEC) is (...) true. According to HEC when parts of the environment become properly coupled to the agent’s brain then they too can be considered constitutive parts of the overall cognitive mechanism—i.e. cognition potentially extends to the world surrounding the agent. Interestingly, HEC and the broader framework of virtue reliabilism share some intriguing similarities, which render these two views mutually supportive. Making these similarities explicit provides a principled account of the way in which our knowledge-conducive cognitive characters may extend beyond our natural cognitive capacities by incorporating epistemic artifacts. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to explore forms of metacognition that have rarely been discussed in the extensive psychological and philosophical literatures on the topic. These would comprise explicit instances of meta-representation of some set of mental states or processes in oneself, but without those representations being embedded in anything remotely resembling a theory of mind, and independent of deployment of any sort of concept-like representation of the mental. Following a critique of some extant suggestions made by Nicholas (...) Shea, the paper argues that appraisals of the value of cognitive effort involve the most plausible instances of this kind of metacognition. (shrink)

This paper studies systems of explicit mathematics as introduced by Feferman [9, 11]. In particular, we propose weak explicit type systems with a restricted form of elementary comprehension whose provably terminating operations coincide with the functions on binary words that are computable in polynomial time. The systems considered are natural extensions of the first-order applicative theories introduced in Strahm [19, 20].

The paper discusses the conceptual and methodological challenges of developing measures of stereotypes and prejudice for use in Slovakia. Developing these measures was the first step in a research project aimed at testing the effectiveness of direct and indirect contact interventions to reduce prejudice against stigmatized minorities, particularly the Roma. The first major problem in this kind of research relates to measuring the impact of interventions, as standardized instruments for measuring prejudice have yet to be developed in Slovak. The second (...) problem concerns the risk that the interventions will fail to reduce anti-Roma prejudice, because of the strong stigmatization of the Roma minority in Slovakia. The paper also reviews existing measures of stereotypes and prejudice in social psychology and discusses their applicability for measuring anti-Roma prejudice in Slovakia. It is argued that measures of stereotypes and prejudice should be designed and used in a sensitive manner and that in the process of measuring various forms of social bias we should avoid reproducing its cognitive, emotional and behavioural manifestations. (shrink)

Systems of explicit mathematics provide an axiomatic framework for representing programs and proving properties of them. We introduce such a system with a new form of power types using a monotone power type generator. These power types allow us to model impredicative overloading. This is a very general form of type dependent computation which occurs in the study of object-oriented programming languages. We also present a set-theoretic interpretation for monotone power types. Thus establishing the consistency our system (...) of explicit mathematics. (shrink)

This paper is mainly concerned with proof-theoretic analysis of some second-order systems of explicit mathematics with a non-constructive minimum operator. By introducing axioms for variable types we extend our first-order theory BON to the elementary explicit type theory EET and add several forms of induction as well as axioms for μ. The principal results then state: EET plus set induction is proof-theoretically equivalent to Peano arithmetic PA <0).

This article focuses on academics’ conceptions of teaching research ethics and integrity. Seventeen academics from a Finnish research intensive university participated in this qualitative study. The data were collected using a qualitative multi-method approach, including think-aloud and interview data. The material was scrutinized using thematic analysis, with both deductive and inductive approaches. The results revealed variation in academics’ views on the responsibility for teaching research integrity, the methods employed to teach it and the necessity of intervening when misconduct occurs. The (...) academics emphasized the responsibility of the individual teacher and the student to foster integrity as well as the shared responsibility of all members of the academic community. However, many academics felt that they themselves needed pedagogical training. Most shared the view that practices of responsible conduct in research can be explicitly and intentionally taught through demonstration, explanation, and practice. However, the academics also noted that learning research integrity and ethics takes place implicitly. A few questioned the need for and the utility of training in the form of courses or through an explicitly addressed topic included in, for instance, methods courses. Their views on the question of how to deal with alleged cases of misconduct varied. While many academics considered a proactive approach the best way to prevent misconduct, some trusted more in a reactive approach. The results show that, while in general academics agree on the importance of research ethics, their conceptions of teaching it vary. The teaching conception bears consequences for the teaching methods chosen, assignment of responsibility for both teaching and students learning, and for the way in which teachers believe that misconduct should be responded to. (shrink)

We find an explicit basis for all admissible rules of the modal logic S4. Our basis consists of an infinite sequence of rules which have compact and simple, readable form and depend on increasing set of variables. This gives a basis for all quasi-identities valid in the free modal algebra ℱS4 of countable rank.

Although the Phaedo never mentions a Form of Soul explicitly, the dialogue implies this Form’s existence. First, a number of passages in which Socrates describes his views about Forms imply that there are very many Forms; thus, Socrates’ general description of his theory gives no ground for denying that there is a Form of Soul. Second, the final argument for immortality positively requires a Form of Soul.

Different summarized shape indices, like mean shape index (MSI) and area weighted mean shape index (AWMSI) can change over multiple size scales. This variation is important to describe scale heterogeneity of landscapes, but the exact mathematical form of the dependence is rarely known. In this paper, the use of fractal geometry (by the perimeter and area Hausdorff dimensions) made us able to describe the scale dependence of these indices. Moreover, we showed how fractal dimensions can be deducted from existing (...) MSI and AWMSI data. In this way, the equality of a multiscale tabulated MSI and AWMSI dataset and two scale-invariant fractal dimensions has been demonstrated. (shrink)

There is a famous puzzle in Rorty scholarship: Did or did Rorty not subscribe to a form of realism and truth when he made concessions regarding objectivity to Bjørn Ramberg in 2000? Relatedly, why did Rorty agree with Ramberg but nevertheless insist upon disagreeing with Brandom, though large parts of the research community hold their two respective requests for shifts in Rorty’s stance to be congruous? The present article takes up the discussion and tries, for the first time, to (...) make sense of Rorty’s insistence that there is a difference between Brandom’s notion of “made true by facts” and Ramberg’s notion of “getting things right” by showing that Ramberg’s appropriateness-conditions are fully compatible with Rorty’s revised interpretation of Davidson’s concept of “triangulation,” whereas Brandom’s inferential “made-true-by-facts”-language game is not. The reason why Rorty agrees with Ramberg but not with Brandom, I argue, is that Brandom’s contemporary concept of objectivity, as developed in his contribution to the debate and in his Making It Explicit, works with a scheme-content distinction, whereas Ramberg’s Davidson-based version does not. As many of his critics suppose, Rorty’s concession to Ramberg entails a substantive revision of Rorty’s position, not just a clarification. However, this new position is not in conflict with Rorty’s most important commitment, namely his anti-authoritarianism. The revised account still does not bind him to the forms of realism and truth that his critics favor. The article explains to which forms of realism and truth Rorty’s concessions to Ramberg commit him instead. (shrink)

Harry Collins’ Tacit and Explicit Knowledge is engaged to clarify and expand the notions of tacit and explicit. A broader continuum for tacit knowledge and its indirectly or only partially explicable components is provided by complementing Collins’ exposition of tacit knowledge with a discussion of formal systems and Polanyi’s exposition of tacit knowing. Support is provided for Collins’ distinction between strings and language, mechanical modeling as a form of explication, and the notion that machines lack tacit knowledge (...) and language. While Collins emphasizes the inexplicability of cultural fluency as tacit knowledge, Polanyi emphasizes the functional dimension of skillful performances. The conceptual strengths and weaknesses of Collins’ and Polanyi’s approaches are examined. Collins’ emphasis on string transformation and his division of tacit knowing into Relational (RTK), Somatic (STK), and Collective (CTK) are helpful tools, but should not flatten Polanyi’s multiple levels of knowing and being into a dualism that may encourage reductionism. (shrink)

Coherence plays an important role in psychology. In this article, I suggest that coherence takes two main forms in humans’ cognitive system. The first belong to ‘system 1’. It relies on the degree of coherence between different representations to regulate them, without coherence being represented. By contrast other mechanisms, belonging to system 2, allow humans to represent the degree of coherence between different representations and to draw inferences from it. It is suggested that the mechanisms of explicit coherence evaluation (...) have social functions. They are used as means of epistemic vigilance—to evaluate what other people tell us. They can also be turned inwards to examine the coherence of our own beliefs. Their function is then to minimize the chances that we are perceived as being incoherent. Evidence from different domains of psychology is briefly reviewed in support of these hypotheses. (shrink)

Three forms of implicit knowledge are presented (functional, structural, and procedural). These forms differ in the way they are made explicit and hence in how they are represented by the individual. We suggest that the framework presented by Dienes & Perner does not account for these differences.

According to a grand narrative that long ago ceased to be told, there was a seventeenth century Scientific Revolution, during which a few heroes conquered nature thanks to mathematics. This grand narrative began with the exhibition of quantitative laws that these heroes, Galileo and Newton for example, had disclosed: the law of falling bodies, according to which the speed of a falling body is proportional to the square of the time that has elapsed since the beginning of its fall; the (...) law of gravitation, according to which two bodies are attracted to one another in proportion to the sum of their masses and in inverse proportion to the square of the distance separating them -- according to his own preferences, each narrator added one or two quantitative laws of this kind. The essential feature was not so much the examples that were chosen, but, rather, the more or less explicit theses that accompanied them. First, mathematization would be taken as the criterion for distinguishing between a qualitative Aristotelian philosophy and the new quantitative physics. Secondly, mathematization was founded on the metaphysical conviction that the world was created pondere, numero et mensura, or that the ultimate components of natural things are triangles, circles, and other geometrical objects. This metaphysical conviction had two immediate consequences: that all the phenomena of nature can be in principle submitted to mathematics and that mathematical language is transparent; it is the language of nature itself and has simply to be picked up at the surface of phenomena. Finally, it goes without saying that, from a social point of view, the evolution of the sciences was apprehended through what has been aptly called the "relay runner model," according to which science progresses as a result of individual discoveries. Grand narratives such as this are perhaps simply fictions doomed to ruin as soon as they are clearly expressed. In any case, the very assumption on which this grand narrative relies can be brought into question: even in the canonical domain of mechanics, the relevant epistemological units crucial to understanding the dynamics of the Scientific Revolution are perhaps not a few laws of motion, but a complex set of problems embodied in mundane objects. Moreover, each of the theses just mentioned was actually challenged during the long period of historiographical reappraisal, out of which we have probably not yet stepped. Against the sharp distinction between a qualitative Aristotelian philosophy and the new quantitative physics, numerous studies insist that Rome wasn't built in a day, so to speak. Since Antiquity, there have always been mixed sciences; the emergence of pre-classical mechanics depends on both medieval treatises and the practical challenges met by Renaissance engineers. It is indeed true that, for Aristotle, mathematics merely captures the superficial properties of things, but the Aristotelianisms were many during the Renaissance and the Early Modern period, with some of them being compatible with the introduction of mathematics in natural philosophy. In addition, the gap between the alleged program of mathematizing nature and its effective realization was underlined as most natural phenomena actually escaped mathematization; at best they were enrolled in what Thomas Kuhn began to rehabilitate under the appellation of the "Baconian sciences," i.e., empirical investigations aiming at establishing isolated facts, without relating them to any overarching theory. Hence, mathematization of nature cannot pretend to capture a historical fact: at most, it expresses an indeterminate task for generations to come. On top of these first two considerations, and against the thesis of the neutrality of the mathematical language, it was urged that mathematics is not "only a language" and that, exactly as other symbolic means or cognitive tools, it has its own constraints. For example, it has been thoroughly explained that the Euclidean theory of proportions both guides and frustrates the Galilean analysis of motion; its shortages were particularly clear with respect to the expression of continuity, which is crucial in the case of motion. Consequently, when calculus was invented and applied to the analysis of motion, it was not a transposition that left things as they stood. Even more clearly than in the case of a translation from one natural language to another, the shift from one symbolic language to another entails that certain possibilities are opened while others are closed. The cognitive constraints imposed by established mathematical theories, as seen in the theory of proportions or calculus, were not the only ones to be studied in relation to mathematization. Certain schemes dependent on the grammar of natural languages, e.g., the scheme of contrariety, or certain symbolic means of representation, e.g. geometrical diagrams and numerical tables, were also subject to such scrutiny. Lastly, it was insisted that, even if we concede the existence of scientific geniuses, mathematics is largely produced by intellectual communities and embedded within social practices. More attention was consequently paid to the forms of communication in given mathematical networks, or to the teaching of the discipline in, for example, Jesuit colleges and universities. The set of mathematical practices specific to specialized craftsmen, highly-qualified experts and engineers began to be studied in its own right. All these reflections may have helped us change our perspectives on the question of mathematization. It seems, however, that they were instead set aside, both because of a general distrust towards sweeping narratives that are always subject to the suspicion that they overlook the unyielding complexity of real history, and because of a shift in our interests. The more obscure and idiosyncratic they are, an alchemist, a patron of the sciences or a lunatic collector is nowadays honored in journals of the history of sciences. As for the general issues involved in the question of mathematization, they are rejected as obsolete, or reserved for specialized journals in the history of mathematics. Consequently, before presenting the essays of this fascicle, I would like to say a few words in favor of a renewed study of the forms of mathematization in the history of the early sciences. (shrink)

This paper presents a skill learning model CLARION. Different from existing models of mostly high-level skill learning that use a top-down approach (that is, turning declarative knowledge into procedural knowledge through practice), we adopt a bottom-up approach toward low-level skill learning, where procedural knowledge develops first and declarative knowledge develops later. Our model is formed by integrating connectionist, reinforcement, and symbolic learning methods to perform on-line reactive learning. It adopts a two-level dual-representation framework (Sun, 1995), with a combination of localist (...) and distributed representation. We compare the model with human data in a minefield navigation task, demonstrating some match between the model and human data in several respects. (shrink)

While separate pieces of research found parents offer toddlers cues to express that they are joking and pretending, and that toddlers and preschoolers understand intentions to joke and pretend, it is not yet clear whether parents and toddlers consider joking and pretending to be distinct concepts. This is important as distinguishing these two forms of non-literal acts could open a gateway to understanding the complexities of the non-literal world, as well as the complexities of intentions in general. Two studies found (...) parents offer explicit cues to help 16- to 24-month-olds distinguish pretending and joking. Across an action play study and a verbal play study parents showed more disbelief and less belief through their actions and language when joking versus pretending. Similarly, toddlers showed less belief through their actions, and older toddlers showed less belief through their language. Toddlers' disbelief could be accounted for by their response to parents' language and actions. Thus, these studies reveal a mechanism by which toddlers learn to distinguish joking and pretending. Parents offer explicit cues to distinguish these intentions, and toddlers use these cues to guide their own behaviors, which in turn allows toddlers to distinguish these intentional contexts. (shrink)

The term ‘logical form’ has been called on to serve a wide range of purposes in philosophy, and it would be too ambitious to try to survey all of them in a single essay. Instead, I will focus on just one conception of logical form that has occupied a central place in the philosophy of language, and in particular in the philosophical study of linguistic meaning. This is what I will call the classical conception of logical form. (...) The classical conception, as I will present it in section 1, has (either explicitly or implicitly) shaped a great deal of important philosophical work in semantic theory. But it has come under fire in recent decades, and in sections 2 and 3 I will discuss two of the recent challenges that I take to be most interesting and significant. (shrink)

In Making It Explicit, Robert Brandom has suggested an "inferentialist" alternative to the dominant "representationalist" paradigm within modern philosophy, an alternative based upon a form of pragmatism that he describes as both rationalist and linguistic.1 Representationalists typically think of awareness in terms of mental contents which somehow represent or picture worldly things, events, or states of affairs. Linguistic, rationalist pragmatists, in contrast, shift the focus from conscious experience to human linguistic practices, and specifically to the norms of rationality (...) implicit within these practices — a shift from sentience to sapience — and approach the meanings of our linguistic claims entirely in terms of the normative inferential relations between them. (shrink)

The project begins by drawing two basic distinctions. The first distinction is between forms of ideological discourse in general, which may not be critical in their orientation, and those forms of critical discourse which are historically self-conscious in their method. The formal antitype of all critical discourse is, in this view, the discourse of interpretation. The second distinction separates forms of critical thought from forms of critical discourse. Unlike the latter, forms of thought do not require for their existence the (...) operation of an explicit set of signs or system of objective articulation.One further introductory point is in order. I believe that the elementary forms of critical discourse should be divided into two large categories: the narrative forms, on the one hand, and the nonnarrative forms, on the other. Furthermore, I suggest that the nonnarrative forms—which are my chief concern in this paper—comprise four elementary types: the hypothetical ; the practical or injunctive ; the array; and the dialectic. I shall concentrate on the nonnarrative forms, and in particular on the array and the dialectic, for two reasons: first, one of these, the array, is not normally recognized as a form of critical discourse; and, second, both the array and the dialectic offer especially clear contrasts with narrative forms of discourse, both critical and noncritical.1 1. Some brief comments on the other two nonnarrative forms may be useful. Perhaps the best examples of a practical or injunctive form are furnished in a book like Euclid’s Elements, or any cookbook. The hypothetical form may be illustrated out of any number of classic works such as Sir Humphry Davy’s “On Some New Phenomena of Chemical Changes Produced by Electricity” and Michael Faraday’s “Electricity from Magnetism” . Jerome J. McGann is the Doris and Henry Dreyfuss Professor of Humanities at the California Institute of Technology. A new book, The Beauty of Inflections: Literary Investigations in Historical Method and Theory , continues the critical projects of his recent books The Romantic Ideology: A Critical Investigation and A Critique of Modern Textual Criticism . His most recent contribution to Critical Inquiry is “The Religious Poetry of Christina Rossetti”. (shrink)

One main goal of argumentation theory is to evaluate arguments and to determine whether they should be accepted or rejected. When there is no clear answer, a third option, being undecided, has to be taken into account. Indecision is often not considered explicitly, but rather taken to be a collection of all unclear or troubling cases. However, current philosophy makes a strong point for taking indecision itself to be a proper object of consideration. This paper aims at revealing parallels between (...) the findings concerning indecision in philosophy and the treatment of indecision in argumentation theory. By investigating what philosophical forms and norms of indecision are involved in argumentation theory, we can improve our understanding of the different uncertain evidential situations in argumentation theory. (shrink)

The question of what Wittgenstein meant by "forms of life" has attracted a great deal of attention in the literature, yet it is an expression that Wittgenstein himself employs on only a relatively small number of occasions, and that he does not explicitly define. This Element gives a description of this concept that also explains Wittgenstein's reluctance to say much about it. A short historical introduction examines the origins and uses of the term in Wittgenstein's time. The Element then presents (...) a survey of Wittgenstein's employment of it, and an overview of the literature. Finally, the Element offers a methodological reading of this notion, interpreting it as a conceptual tool in Wittgenstein's wider inquiries into the workings of our language. (shrink)

Metacognition is either direct, as when information is recalled before making a confidence judgment, or indirect, as when the probability of successful future retrieval is determined inferentially. Direct metacognition may require an explicit mental representation as its object and can only be demonstrated under specific experimental circumstances. Other forms of metacognition can be based on publicly observable stimuli rather than introspection.

This article describes the development and validation of a diagnostic test of German and its integration in a programme of formative assessment during a one-year initial teacher-training course. The test focuses on linguistic aspects that cause difficulty for trainee teachers of German as a foreign language and assesses implicit and explicit grammatical knowledge as well as students' confidence in this knowledge. Administration of the test to 57 German speakers in four groups (first-year undergraduates, fourth-year undergraduates, postgraduate trainees, and native (...) speakers) provided evidence of its reliability and validity. (shrink)

The logical problem of artificial intelligence—the question of whether the notion sometimes referred to as ‘strong’ AI is self-contradictory—is, essentially, the question of whether an artificial form of life is possible. This question has an immediately paradoxical character, which can be made explicit if we recast it (in terms that would ordinarily seem to be implied by it) as the question of whether an unnatural form of nature is possible. The present paper seeks to explain this paradoxical (...) kind of possibility by arguing that machines can share the human form of life and thus acquire human mindedness, which is to say they can be intelligent, conscious, sentient, etc. in precisely the way that a human being typically is. (shrink)

Discrimination of forms defined solely by color and discrimination of hue are dissociated in cerebral achromatopsia. Both must be based on potentially explicit information derived from differentially color-sensitive photoreceptors, yet only one gives rise to phenomenal experience of color. By analogy, visual information may be used to form explicit representations for action without giving rise to any phenomenal experience other than that of making the action.

In developing the concept of assemblages, Gilles Deleuze draws at least some inspiration from Gilbert Simondon’s concept of information. While his acknowledgement of Simondon’s influence is almost entirely positive, Deleuze explicitly distances himself from the concept of information in order to avoid its link to the field of cybernetics. However, a Deleuzian informational ontology could instead be leveraged as an alternative to cybernetics. Drawing on the Spinozan link between the work of Deleuze and Simondon, it is possible to develop a (...) hybrid informational ontology. This system can not only offer a different approach to information, data and technology than the essentialist concept of information embraced by cybernetics, but also aligns well with recent research in the biological sciences that has disrupted a long-held concept of individuals as entirely separate and autonomous. Shifting away from the Platonic Form to a Deleuzian/simondonian in-formation furthers the post-human project aimed at understanding processes of subjectivation at multiple scales, including the micro and macro. (shrink)

In his classic discussion of liberal education and the nature of knowledge, Professor Hirst argues for a liberal education which is “directly concerned with the development of mind and rational knowledge.”1He sets out clear conditions which any activity must satisfy if it is to be a form of knowledge and suggests that there are seven distinct forms which satisfy these conditions:“mathematics, physical sciences, human sciences, history, religion, literature and the fine arts, philosophy”2The first argument of this paper is that (...) literary criticism exhibits all the features which Hirst demands of a form of knowledge. Second, it is argued that ‘literature’ does not exhibit the characteristics of a form of knowledge. The third argument is that Hirst's acceptance of ‘literature and the fine arts’ as a ‘form of knowledge’ reflects a fundamental deficiency in his list of the distinguishing features of a ‘form of knowledge’, which is that he omits any explicit reference to the necessity for a form of knowledge to exhibit criteria for distinguishing truth from falsity within its domain. (shrink)

This paper addresses the relation between explicitation and translation expertise in the rendition of nominalisation and participles in the legal Qurʾānic verses specific to purification and prayer. It uses a corpus-based method: _The Qurʾānic Arabic Corpus_. The paper argues that most of the expert Qurʾān translators explicitate in rendering nominalisation and participles in the legal verses specific to purification and prayer into English in the said corpus. They explicitate in the form of both addition and specification with varying degrees (...) as the former is adopted twice as much as the latter. The paper claims that most explicitations specific to the rendition of nominalisation and participles in the legal Qurʾānic verses peculiar to purification and prayer in the corpus have been superfluous, albeit justifiable. This may confirm the relation between explicitation and translation expertise in _The Qurʾānic Arabic Corpus_ in the sense that although the meaning of nominalisation and/or participles is wholly translated into English, the Qurʾān translators still explicitate through addition or specification to further facilitate the comprehension process. This paper offers a baseline for examining explicitation exercised on nominalisation and participles in the legal Qurʾānic verses particular to purification and prayer, which may have implications for future studies conducted on the same topic in other similar legal contexts. (shrink)

We deal with ontological problems concerning basic systems of explicit mathematics, as formalized in Jäger's language of types and names. We prove a generalized inseparability lemma, which implies a form of Rice's theorem for types and a refutation of the strong power type axiom POW + . Next, we show that POW + can already be refuted on the basis of a weak uniform comprehension without complementation, and we present suitable optimal refinements of the remaining results within the (...) weaker theory. (shrink)

In Dienes & Perner's analysis, implicitly represented knowledge differs from explicitly represented knowledge only in the attribution of properties to specific events and to self-awareness of the knower. This commentary questions whether implicit knowledge should be thought of as being represented in the same conceptual vocabulary; rather, it may involve a quite different form of representation.

We deal with ontological problems concerning basic systems of explicit mathematics, as formalized in Jager's language of types and names. We prove a generalized inseparability lemma, which implies a form of Rice's theorem for types and a refutation of the strong power type axiom POW$^+$. Next, we show that POW$^+$ can already be refuted on the basis of a weak uniform comprehension without complementation, and we present suitable optimal refinements of the remaining results within the weaker theory.

Diogène de Sinope et Calliclès affirment tirer leurs éthiques de l'observation de la nature. En cela, ils s'opposent explicitement à Socrate. Mais leur position est-elle une véritable forme de naturalisme ou un simple usage métaphorique? Ce texte défend la première option, après avoir montré que malgré leur ressemblance métaéthique, ces deux éthiques normatives sont radicalement opposées.

Studies of implicit learning have shown that individuals exposed to a rule-governed environment often learn to exploit 'rules' which describe the structural relationship between environmental events. While some authors have interpreted such demonstrations as evidence for functionally separate implicit learning systems, others have argued that the observed changes in performance result from explicit knowledge which has been inadequately assessed. In this paper we illustrate this issue by considering one commonly used implicit learning task, the Serial reaction time task, and (...) outline what we see as an important problem associated with each of the commonly used methods used to assess explicit knowledge. This is that each measure requires a form of response which is dependent on the subjects having some knowledge of the serial-order of the sequence. We argue that such methods, or more specifically their analyses, seriously underestimate other sources of knowledge, which may be available to subjects during their performance of the SRT task. In support of this argument we demonstrate that subjects' serial-order knowledge can, in principle, be independent of subjects' knowledge of the statistical structure of the sequence, and we propose an alternative method for analysing performance on the Generate task which avoids this problem. (shrink)

Dienes & Perner's target article contains numerous but unsystematic references to the implicit or explicit knowledge of the temporal context of a known state of affairs such as may constitute the content of a propositional attitude. In this commentary, the forms of cognition that, according to D&P, require only implicit knowledge of time are contrasted with those for which explicit temporal knowledge is needed. It is suggested that the explicit representation of time may have been important in (...) human evolution and that certain developmental disorders including autism may be (partly) caused by defective ability to represent time. (shrink)

Il s’agit dans cet article de proposer une interprétation du projet logique à travers une discussion entre Hegel et Frege. Au-delà des divergences bien connues concernant, entre autres, la formalisation du langage et le rapport aux mathématiques, et après avoir souligné quelques points de convergences parfois remarqués, notamment la critique du psychologisme, nous voulons montrer ici comment la logique se construit, et comment cette construction implique une certaine productivité de la forme logique. Le fait que la forme logique ne puisse (...) pas être abordée de manière immédiate, dans une évidence, conduit à une conception de celle-ci comme développement. Derrière cette présentation « organique » de la logique se joue en réalité une certaine compréhension de la forme dans laquelle celle-ci se produit elle-même dans son explicitation. Cette exigence d’autonomie est comprise à partir d’une analyse, chez Frege, de l’autonomie du nombre. Mais la réponse hégélienne sur le statut de celui-ci nous permet de souligner la contradiction que le nombre abrite. C’est à ce titre que nous pouvons rendre compte, de manière plus détaillée, non seulement du processus d’élaboration de la logique, mais également de la production des contenus : en comprenant le rapport réflexif de la forme comme instauration de la contradiction. (shrink)

Some of the topics presented in this volume of original essays on contemporary approaches to belief include the problem of misrepresentation and false belief, conscious versus unconscious belief, explicit versus tacit belief, and the durable versus ephemeral question of the nature of belief. The contributors, Fred Dretske, Keith Lehrer, William Lycan, Stephen Schiffer, Stephen P. Stich, and the editor, Radu Bogdan, focus on the mental realization of belief, its cognitive and behavioral aspects, and the semantic aspects of its content. (...) This interdisciplinary study takes advantage of many new theories in what has become an important area of research. (shrink)

This dissertation is concerned with normativity both as an explanatory device in the philosophy of language, logic and epistemology and as a philosophical issue in its own right. Following later Wittgenstein and Sellars, it is argued that language is normative, in the first instance because of the fact that speech acts take place within a structure of social norms and institutions. This fact is then utilized to show that important features of semantic content can be explained in terms of such (...) norms. ;This Sellarsian conception of linguistic usage as the performance of acts within a linguistic game of giving and asking for reasons, leads us to focus on inferential proprieties as central to semantic content. It is, then, natural to look at logical vocabulary, paradigmatically 'entails', as expressing the very normative relations definitive of this content. An idea of Brandom's is developed in providing a formal theory of the inferential content of logical vocabulary. Such normative-inferentialist semantic analyses are developed for a wide range of logical systems. ;A certain conception of justification also falls naturally out of this general theory of language. If asserting is an act performed within a linguistic game, then justification can be thought of as a matter of winning such a game, a successfully defending one's assertion in the face of licensed challenges to it. This account is developed, drawing consequences for the theory of rationality and knowledge. ;The second major issue of the dissertation is the theory of the normative itself and much of the constructive work in the philosophy of language, philosophy of logic and epistemology forms a case study for a particular theory of the normative. On the basis of Wittgensteinian considerations, it is argued that normativity must be understood as resting ultimately on social practice. ;We solve problems of earlier accounts of norms by introducing a novel normative relation between assertions of normative propriety and social practices. Normative assertions do not describe existing social standards, but do nonetheless derive their semantic content from those standards. This argument carried through in detail for cases of logical and epistemic vocabulary in the dissertation. (shrink)

Internationally, the prevalence of clinical ethics support (CES) in health care has increased over the years. Previous research on CES focused primarily on ethics committees and ethics consultation, mostly within the context of hospital care. The purpose of this article is to investigate the prevalence of different kinds of CES in various Dutch health care domains, including hospital care, mental health care, elderly care and care for people with an intellectual disability. A mixed methods design was used including two survey (...) questionnaires, sent to all health care institutions, two focus groups and 17 interviews with managing directors or ethics support staff. The findings demonstrate that the presence of ethics committees is relatively high, especially in hospitals. Moral case deliberation (MCD) is available in about half of all Dutch health care institutions, and in two-thirds of the mental health care institutions. Ethics consultants are not very prominent. A distinction is made between explicit CES forms, in which the ethical dimension of care is structurally and professionally addressed and implicit CES forms, in which ethical issues are handled indirectly and in an organic way. Explicit CES forms often go together with implicit forms of CES. MCD might function as a bridge between the two. We conclude that explicit and implicit CES are both relevant for clinical ethics in health care. We recommend research regarding how to combine them in an appropriate way. (shrink)

A serial reaction time experiment tested the hypothesis that there are two independent forms of implicit learning: learning that is linked to making judgments about stimuli, and learning that is linked to motor processing. Participants performed 2, 6, or 12 blocks of single task SRT, dual task SRT, or observation with one of five sequences; each sequence had the same underlying structure. Participants then performed two implicit tests, SRT and pattern judgment, as well as a generation test and an (...) class='Hi'>explicit knowledge test. There was a double dissociation of the effect of sequence surface structure on SRT and pattern judgment. SRT and pattern judgment competence developed independently of each other across length of acquisition task. Performance on both implicit tasks did not depend on explicit knowledge. These results indicate that the SRT and pattern judgment measures tap independent forms of implicit learning, which is consistent with the modular nature of memory and cognition. (shrink)

Social relationships are essential for humans; neglecting our social needs can reduce wellbeing or even lead to the development of more severe issues such as depression or substance dependency. Although essential, some individuals face major challenges in forming and maintaining social relationships due to the experience of social anxiety. The burden of social anxiety can be reduced through accessible assessment that leads to treatment. However, socially anxious individuals who seek help face many barriers stemming from geography, fear, or disparities in (...) access to systems of care. But recent research suggested digital behavioral markers as a way to deliver cheap and easily accessible digital assessment for social anxiety: As earlier work shows, players with social anxiety show similar behaviors in virtual worlds as in the physical world, including tending to walk farther around other avatars and standing farther away from other avatars. The characteristics of the movement behavior in-game can be harnessed for the development of digital behavioral markers for the assessment of social anxiety. In this paper, we investigate whether implicit as well as explicit digital behavioral markers, proposed by prior work, for social anxiety can be used for predicting the level of social anxiety. We show that both, explicit and implicit digital behavioral markers can be harnessed for the assessment. Our findings provide further insights about how game-based digital behavioral markers can be used for the assessment of social anxiety. (shrink)