One recently discovered aspect of Reinhold’s early Elementarphilosophie is that it constitutes the last historical step of a teleological activity of reason that ends the history of philosophy. The historical emergence of Reinhold’s system first enables the recognition of the ever-existing laws of the human spirit, and hence, the definitive grounding of philosophy on an unquestionable Grundsatz. According to Reinhold, this also meant that all pre-critical or non-enlightened, partisan assertions, including those of skepticism, lose their raison-d’être. One failure of Reinhold’s (...) approach is its inability to provide a justification of reason’s historical ability to make teleological progress. A Schulzean skeptic might argue that this reveals the inexhaustive character of Reinhold’s Grundsatz, its inability to determine a constitutive aspect of his concept of historical reason. A critical re-articulation of the early Elementarphilosophie after Schulze’s objections required that this issue be reworked. This was one of the tasks that August L. Hülsen, one of Reinhold’s former students who embraced Fichte’s system in 1795 addressed in Preisschrift, his virtually neglected book of 1796. This paper outlines Reinhold’s approach, and shows how Hülsen’s normative reading of the Wissenschaftslehre allowed Fichte’s concept of self-positing activity to become a historical mechanism of teleological striving capable of providing an enlightened or skeptically ›immune‹ alternative to Reinhold’s concept. (shrink)

In the last few years, biologists and computer scientists have claimed that the introduction of data science techniques in molecular biology has changed the characteristics and the aims of typical outputs (i.e. models) of such a discipline. In this paper we will critically examine this claim. First, we identify the received view on models and their aims in molecular biology. Models in molecular biology are mechanistic and explanatory. Next, we identify the scope and aims of data science (machine learning in (...) particular). These lie mainly in the creation of predictive models which performances increase as data set increases. Next, we will identify a tradeoff between predictive and explanatory performances by comparing the features of mechanistic and predictive models. Finally, we show how this a priori analysis of machine learning and mechanistic research applies to actual biological practice. This will be done by analyzing the publications of a consortium—The Cancer Genome Atlas—which stands at the forefront in integrating data science and molecular biology. The result will be that biologists have to deal with the tradeoff between explaining and predicting that we have identified, and hence the explanatory force of the ‘new’ biology is substantially diminished if compared to the ‘old’ biology. However, this aspect also emphasizes the existence of other research goals which make predictive force independent from explanation. -/- . (shrink)

Deep learning is a kind of machine learning which happens in a certain type of artificial neural networks called deep networks. Artificial deep networks, which exhibit many similarities with biological ones, have consistently shown human-like performance in many intelligent tasks. This poses the question whether this performance is caused by such similarities. After reviewing the structure and learning processes of artificial and biological neural networks, we outline two important reasons for the success of deep learning, namely the extraction of successively (...) higher level features and the multiple layer structure, which are closely related to each other. Then some indications about the framing of this heated debate are given. After that, an assessment of the value of artificial deep networks as models of the human brain is given from the similarity perspective of model representation. Finally, a new version of computational functionalism is proposed which addresses the specificity of deep neural computation better than classic, program based computational functionalism. (shrink)

Climate change is a threat to food system stability, with small islands particularly vulnerable to extreme weather events. In Puerto Rico, a diminished agricultural sector and resulting food import dependence have been implicated in reduced diet quality, rural impoverishment, and periodic food insecurity during natural disasters. In contrast, smallholder farmers in Puerto Rico serve as cultural emblems of self-sufficient food production, providing fresh foods to local communities in an informal economy and leveraging traditional knowledge systems to manage varying ecological and (...) climatic constraints. The current mixed methods study sought to document this expertise and employed a questionnaire and narrative interviewing in a purposeful sample of 30 smallholder farmers after Hurricane María to identify experiences in post-disaster food access and agricultural recovery and reveal underlying socioecological knowledge that may contribute to a more climate resilient food system in Puerto Rico. Although the hurricane resulted in significant damages, farmers contributed to post-disaster food access by sharing a variety of surviving fruits, vegetables, and root crops among community members. Practices such as crop diversification, seed banking, and soil conservation were identified as climate resilient farm management strategies, and smallholder farmer networks were discussed as a promising solution to amass resources and bolster agricultural productivity. These recommendations were shared in a narrative highlighting socioecological identity, self-sufficiency, community and cultural heritage, and collaborative agency as integral to agricultural resilience. Efforts to promote climate resilience in Puerto Rico must leverage smallholder farmers’ socioecological expertise to reclaim a more equitable, sustainable, and community-owned food system. (shrink)

We argue that mechanistic models elaborated by machine learning cannot be explanatory by discussing the relation between mechanistic models, explanation and the notion of intelligibility of models. We show that the ability of biologists to understand the model that they work with severely constrains their capacity of turning the model into an explanatory model. The more a mechanistic model is complex, the less explanatory it will be. Since machine learning increases its performances when more components are added, then it generates (...) models which are not intelligible, and hence not explanatory. (shrink)

Classic conceptions of model simplicity for machine learning are mainly based on the analysis of the structure of the model. Bayesian, Frequentist, information theoretic and expressive power concepts are the best known of them, which are reviewed in this work, along with their underlying assumptions and weaknesses. These approaches were developed before the advent of the Big Data deluge, which has overturned the importance of structural simplicity. The computational simplicity concept is presented, and it is argued that it is more (...) encompassing and closer to actual machine learning practices than the classic ones. In order to process the huge datasets which are commonplace nowadays, the computational complexity of the learning algorithm is the decisive factor to assess the viability of a machine learning strategy, while the classic accounts of simplicity play a surrogate role. Some of the desirable features of computational simplicity derive from its reliance on the learning system concept, which integrates key aspects of machine learning that are ignored by the classic concepts. Moreover, computational simplicity is directly associated with energy efficiency. In particular, the question of whether the maximum possibly achievable predictive accuracy should be attained, no matter the economic cost of the associated energy consumption pattern, is considered. (shrink)

One of the best known arguments against the connectionist approach to artificial intelligence and cognitive science is that neural networks are black boxes, i.e., there is no understandable account of their operation. This difficulty has impeded efforts to explain how categories arise from raw sensory data. Moreover, it has complicated investigation about the role of symbols and language in cognition. This state of things has been radically changed by recent experimental findings in artificial deep learning research. Two kinds of artificial (...) deep learning networks, namely the convolutional neural network and the generative adversarial network have been found to possess the capability to build internal states that are interpreted by humans as complex visual categories, without any specific hints or any grammatical processing. This emergent ability suggests that those categories do not depend on human knowledge or the syntactic structure of language, while they do rely on their visual context. This supports a mild form of empiricism, while it does not assume that computational functionalism is true. Some consequences are extracted regarding the debate about amodal and grounded representations in the human brain. Furthermore, new avenues for research on cognitive science are open. (shrink)

Nowadays is necessary to understand Life in a global way and that means to consider several dimensions of the topic at the same time: the ecological and the biological ones, but also the technical and symbolic ones, because we are just living –as it is well known– in a great “net-world”. The interdependence is the key, above all when Nature and Culture interact and integrate the new ecosystem of the planet Earth as never they did before, and all that includes (...) many challenges and risks too. (shrink)

August Ludwig Hülsen’s virtually forgotten “Prüfung der von der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin aufgestellten Preisfrage: Was hat die Metaphysik seit Leibniz und Wolf für Progressen gemacht?” is the first German post-Kantian system in which reason is conceived as developing in history according to speculative rule based on the logical resolving of contradictions. Notwithstanding, Hülsen’s system is up to this day almost entirely unknown to most scholars in the field. This paper outlines the fundamental aspects of Hülsen’s system and discusses (...) two of its main innovations: the deduction of the transcendental possibility of rational historicity, and the systematic historization of Fichte’s concept of judging activity; the constitutive equivalent of consciousness’s logical-temporal substrate. (shrink)

The Kiki-Bouba effect comprises a relation between two abstract figures and two non-words: the star-shaped figure is called 'Kiki' and the rounded figure 'Bouba'. The effect is explained by a sound-vision synaesthesia: certain sounds are associated with certain shapes in a non-arbitrary manner.When we asked the participants to decide which of the two figures, the star-shaped or the rounded one, to call yin and which yang, some 85% choose the star-shaped figure as yin. There are previous cases of synaesthesia where (...) personality is attributed to numbers or letters. In our results, the word Kiki is overall happy, clever, small, thin, young, unpleasant, and nervous. The starshaped figure is overall clever, tall, small, slim, nervous, unpleasant, and upper-class. That is, the correspondence above all concerns the qualifying adjectives clever, unpleasant, and nervous, as well as the physical appearance small and thin. This brings us to the fat-thin effect. Cinema, literature, comics, and children's programmes are full of contrasting figures: Don Quixote and Sancho Panza, Laurel and Hardy , Asterix and Obelix, Tintin and Captain Haddock, Bert and Ernie , or the Spanish comic about very naughty twin boys called Zipi and Zape . Our main conclusion is that first names and last names are not entirely arbitrary. There is a correspondence between names and physical characteristics and concepts . The Kiki-Bouba effect is a semantic one. (shrink)

El text d’Ian Ground la traducció del qual transcrivim a continuació va ser llegit a l’acte de presentación del seu llibre ¿Arte o chorrada? (València, Publicacions de la Universitat de València / Col•lecció Estètica & Crítica, 2008) el dia 9 de juny de 2008 a l’Aula Magna de l’edifici del Carrer La Nau de la Universitat de València, amb la presència, a més d’Ian Ground, de Romà de la Calle (en qualitat de Director de la col•lecció Estètica & Crítica) i (...) de mi mateix, Salvador Rubio (en qualitat de traductor, editor i autor de la introducció del llibre). El text va ser llegit en anglés pel seu autor, alternat, paràgraf per paràgraf, amb la lectura de la traducció castellana. Hem preferit que el text traduit aparega ací en castellà, exactament igual al que va ser llegit a l’esmentat acte de presentació. La reflexió que ens proposa Ian Ground, en cara que específicament concebuda per a aquest acte, no necessita cap presentació i pot ser llegida perfectament com un text autònom. Tanmateix, em permet precedir-la amb unes quantes observacions que no pretenen sustituir les meues paraules a l’acte (on, naturalment, els agraïments eren els protagonistes) ni tampoc la introducció del llibre ja publicada, i a la qual es pot remetre directament el lector d’aquest article. (shrink)

In this work, we present a new approach to solve the location management problem by using the reporting cells strategy. Location management is a very important and complex problem in mobile computing which aims to minimize the costs involved. In the reporting cells location management scheme, some cells in the network are designated as reporting cells . The choice of these cells is not trivial because they affect directly to the cost of the mobile network. This article is focused on (...) the use of high performance computing to execute a parallel heuristic that places optimally the RCs in a mobile network, minimizing its total cost. The main goal of this work is to demonstrate that the collaborative work of different evolutionary algorithms can obtain very good results. For this reason, we have implemented a parallel heuristic and six evolutionary algorithms that works in a parallel way on a cluster to solve the RCs problem. (shrink)

Tradicionalmente el discurso narrativo, poético o mítico ha servido de vehículo para trasmitir contenidos de orden teológico y metafísico. Es decir, el concepto necesita de la representación para un mejor y más profundo desarrollo temático. Un caso ejemplar de este fenómeno lo encontramos en el llamado swedenborgismo literario, esto es, en la utilización de la figura de Emanuel Swedenborg como motivo y argumento en poetas y novelistas. La pregunta es si el swerdenborgismo literario es tan solo un pretexto estilístico o (...) bien obedece a razones de mayor calado filosófico o religioso. J. L. Borges se nos presenta como modelo de este planteamiento. (shrink)

This w ork ana l yses the response that the Spanish State as a Nation-State, is g i ving to int e g ration of the immi g rant as citizen. Contra r y to those w ho consider that residence has to be the access w a y to citizenship in the f ace of the crisis of the Nation-State and the ge o g raphical mobility that the global econ o m y imposes on people, here the political (...) rel e v ance of nationality is defende d , as an und i vided ind i vidual share of belonging to the constituent p ow er in a harmonious relation with the fl e xi b le concept of residence. This research is d i vided into f i v e sections, in w hich nationality and the constituent p ow e r , the w a ys of access to Spanish nationali t y , the conflict of Nation or State, the characteristics of original nationality and f inal l y , the criteria used b y States to select the potential immi g rant. Th e critical ana l ysis of the Spanish l e gislation on nationality and citizenship t o gether with the theoretical debates, h a v e ena b led us to conclude with a proposal of l e g e fe r enda focussed on a radical refo r m of the concept of nationali t y. (shrink)

Ce livre résume une recherche que l'auteur a menée pendant de très longues années, et qu'il a voulu exposer comme élargissement de l'œuvre de William James, fondateur de la philosophie et de la psychologie américaines.

The question of the unity of the soul is posed in the Midle Ages, at the crossing point of the Aristotelician theory, which distinguishes several potencies, even several parts in the soul, and the Augustinian doctrine, which underlines the unity of the mind using corporeal powers. John Buridan, when commenting the Treatise on the Soul of Aristotle, emphasizes the unity, probably in reaction against John of Jandun's position. From the middle of 14th century till the end of 17th, this problem (...) goes on being debated through the two questions of the substantial unity of the soul and of the the relation between the soul and its potencies. This article studies some stages of this development, some of them immediately after Buridan, in Nicole Oresme's and Peter of Ailly's positions, another more distant, in Antoine Rubio's work. It suggests that we find still the same problematics, reelaborated and transformed, in Descartes. (shrink)

The sensorimotor approach to perception addresses various aspects of perceptual experience, but not the subjectivity of intentional action. Conversely, the problem that current accounts of the sense of agency deal with is primarily one of subjectivity. But the proposed models, based on internal signal comparisons, arguably fail to make the transition from subpersonal computations to personal experience. In this paper we suggest an alternative direction towards explaining the sense of agency by braiding three theoretical strands: a world-involving, dynamical interpretation of (...) the sensorimotor approach, an enactive description of sensorimotor agency as contrasted with organic agency in general, and a dynamical theory of equilibration within and between sensorimotor schemes. On this new account, the sense of oneself as the author of one’s own actions corresponds to what we experience during the ongoing adventure of establishing, losing, and re-establishing meaningful interactions with the world. The meaningful relation between agent and world is given by the precarious constitution of sensorimotor agency as a self-asserting network of schemes and dispositions. Acts are owned as they adaptively assert the constitution of the agent. Thus, awareness for different aspects of agency experience, such as the initiation of action, the effort exerted in controlling it, or the achievement of the desired effect, can be accounted for by processes involved in maintaining the sensorimotor organization that enables these interactions with the world. We discuss these processes in detail from a non-representational, dynamical perspective and show how they cohere with the personal experience of agency. (shrink)

Passive frame theory attempts to illuminate what consciousness is, in mechanistic and functional terms; it does not address the “implementation” level of analysis (how neurons instantiate conscious states), an enigma for various disciplines. However, in response to the commentaries, we discuss how our framework provides clues regarding this enigma. In the framework, consciousness is passive albeit essential. Without consciousness, there would not be adaptive skeletomotor action.

What is the primary function of consciousness in the nervous system? The answer to this question remains enigmatic, not so much because of a lack of relevant data, but because of the lack of a conceptual framework with which to interpret the data. To this end, we have developed Passive Frame Theory, an internally coherent framework that, from an action-based perspective, synthesizes empirically supported hypotheses from diverse fields of investigation. The theory proposes that the primary function of consciousness is well-circumscribed, (...) serving the 'somatic nervous system[. For this system, consciousness serves as a frame that constrains and directs skeletal muscle output, thereby yielding adaptive behavior. The mechanism by which consciousness achieves this is more counterintuitive, passive, and “low level” than the kinds of functions that theorists have previously attributed to consciousness. Passive frame theory begins to illuminate (a) what consciousness contributes to nervous function, (b) how consciousness achieves this function, and (c) the neuroanatomical substrates of conscious processes. Our untraditional, action-based perspective focuses on olfaction instead of on vision and is 'descriptive' (describing the products of nature as they evolved to be) rather than 'normative' (construing processes in terms of how they should function). Passive frame theory begins to isolate the neuroanatomical, cognitive-mechanistic, and representational (e.g., conscious contents) processes associated with consciousness. (shrink)

The autho r , after pointing out the reasons w h y the debate in the EU and in Spain continue to ignore w hat he calls the radical l y political meaning of the phenomenon of mig ration, tries to a r gue that the conditions and the consequences of the re c o gnition of immigration are a political question ( e v en the political question). He focuses in pa r ticular on the pro b lem of (...) immi g rants ' access to citizenship, to propose, li k e Rubio or Carens, a g radual g ranting (in time and space) but mere l y temporary -based on sta b le residence- of citizenship to immi g rants that is understood as pa r t of a plural multiple and inclus i v e concept of citizenship. (shrink)

Embodied approaches in cognitive science hold that the body is crucial for cognition. What this claim amounts to, however, still remains unclear. This paper contributes to its clarification by confronting three ways of understanding embodiment—the sensorimotor approach, extended cognition and enactivism—with Locked-in syndrome. LIS is a case of severe global paralysis in which patients are unable to move and yet largely remain cognitively intact. We propose that LIS poses a challenge to embodied approaches to cognition requiring them to make explicit (...) the notion of embodiment they defend and its role for cognition. We argue that the sensorimotor and the extended functionalist approaches either fall short of accounting for cognition in LIS from an embodied perspective or do it too broadly by relegating the body only to a historical role. Enactivism conceives of the body as autonomous system and of cognition as sense-making. From this perspective embodiment is not equated with bodily movement but with forms of agency that do not disappear with body paralysis. Enactivism offers a clarifying perspective on embodiment and thus currently appears to be the framework in embodied cognition best suited to address the challenge posed by LIS. (shrink)