The main theme is that theorizing serves empirical prediction. This is used as the core of a counter to contemporary anti-realist arguments. Different versions of the thesis that data underdetermines theory are identified and it is shown that none which are acceptable differentiates between theory selection and prediction. Criteria sufficient for the former are included amongst those necessary for the latter; and obviously go beyond mere compatibility with data.Special attention is given to causal process theories. It is argued that the (...) only empirically equivalent alternatives which can be constructed to any theory of this kind must be parasitic on that theory; so a choice for the original theory can not be avoided. Once this is established, a positive case for taking a realist position can be developed. (shrink)
This paper is an attempt at a vindication of induction. The point of departure is that induction requires a justification and that the only kind of justification possible is a vindication. However traditional vindications of induction have rested on unjustified assumptions about the aim of induction. This vindication takes the end pursued in induction simply to be correct prediction. It is argued that induction is the only reasonable way of pursuing this end because induction is the only objective method of (...) predicting. While objectivity is not a necessary condition for successful predicting, it is a sufficient condition for the possession of a property that is, in turn, a necessary condition for correct predicting; and further there could be no reason to expect any non-objective method to possess this necessary condition for success. Induction is the only objective method of predicting for it alone uses facts which must be identified by any predicting method based on rules; and it alone uses these facts according to a relationship that must hold between facts and any meaningful empirical statement. Any alternative to induction must assume that the factual regularities that have been detected will alter in the future and the way they are expected to alter must be arbitrary. It is further claimed that this vindication is proof against the criticisms that have been advanced against practicalist justifications of induction. (shrink)
Reichenbach held that all scientific inference reduces, via probability calculus, to induction, and he held that induction can be justified. He sees scientific knowledge in a practical context and insists that any rational assessment of actions requires a justification of induction. Gaps remain in his justifying argument; for we can not hope to prove that induction will succeed if success is possible. However, there are good prospects for completing a justification of essentially the kind he sought by showing that while (...) induction may succeed, no alternative is a rational way of trying.Reichenbach's claim that probability calculus, especially via Bayes' Theorem, can help to exhibit the structure of inference to theories is a valuable insight. However, his thesis that the weighting of all hypotheses rests only on frequency data is too restrictive, especially given his scientific realism. Other empirical factors are relevant. Any satisfactory account of scientific inference must be deeply indebted to Reichenbach's foundation work. (shrink)
Frank Jackson's criticisms have helped me recognize some of the weaknesses in my proposed vindication of induction. The core of the argument I offered was that induction is the only method of predicting which is based in a nonarbitrary way on the facts. I still believe that this is so and that because of this property induction is the only reasonable way of predicting. However I now recognize defects in the argument by which I attempted to establish that the uniqueness (...) of this property to induction constitutes its justification. (shrink)
The paper proposes an explication of causation in terms of laws and their explanatory systematization. A basic notion is "nomic dependence". The definition given by David Lewis is suitable for deterministic laws, and a general definition drawing on Wesley Salmon's statistical-relevance model of explanation is proposed. A test is offered for establishing that one chain of nomically dependent events is more direct than another that ends with the same event by considering the relationship between the two chains when an explanation (...) in terms of more basic laws is sought. The chain to an event can be defined as causal if it is the most direct nomically linked chain leading up to that event. (shrink)
J. J. Katz in “The Problem of Induction and its Solution” argues that not only a validation but also a vindication of induction is impossible. In the course of his argument a number of interesting issues arise about what is actually required for a satisfactory vindication. The aim of those who have sought to provide a vindication for induction has been to show that it is the most satisfactory means for forming expectations about the future; they have accepted the impossibility (...) of showing that induction must, or will probably, lead to true predictions. Feigl gives a general characterisation of vindication as an “argument concerning means with respect to ends” and contrasts it to validation which is a justification of a knowledge claim by establishing it as true or probably true. We cannot validate the rules of induction but we can give a vindication of the adoption of these rules. Katz accepts Feigl's distinction in general terms but proposes some modifications to meet certain defects which he believes to be present in the latter's account. Katz distinguishes two senses of vindication, an “expediency vindication” which “establishes a justificandum as a suitable means,” while a “preferability vindication” “establishes the justificandum as the preferable means for achieving the end.” An expediency vindication shows that the proposed means is a sufficient condition for achieving the end in view, but it need not establish this means as necessary to achieve this end. A preferability vindication will establish the means as necessary to achieve this end in the best way. He then proceeds as follows: “an argument which demonstrates that a justificandum is a necessary condition—but only a necessary condition—for achieving the relevant end is not a real vindication.” He holds that the vindication of a certain means must show at least that it will achieve the end sought, and preferably that it is the best way of achieving this end. (shrink)
The normative nature of scientific rationality is sometimes accounted for by the thesis that having theories which meet the criteria we apply is valuable to us in itself rather than as a means to an end. But given the experiential input to our beliefs and their practical role, it is apparent that we must evaluate the criteria to be used as rational means of pursuing predictive success. So we must seek a practical justification, in spite of the threat of circularity. (...) There is hope of achieving this via an exploration of options which may show that there is no reasonable alternative to the principles we use. (shrink)