Throughout the biological and biomedical sciences there is a growing need for, prescriptive ‘minimum information’ (MI) checklists specifying the key information to include when reporting experimental results are beginning to find favor with experimentalists, analysts, publishers and funders alike. Such checklists aim to ensure that methods, data, analyses and results are described to a level sufficient to support the unambiguous interpretation, sophisticated search, reanalysis and experimental corroboration and reuse of data sets, facilitating the extraction of maximum value from data sets (...) them. However, such ‘minimum information’ MI checklists are usually developed independently by groups working within representatives of particular biologically- or technologically-delineated domains. Consequently, an overview of the full range of checklists can be difficult to establish without intensive searching, and even tracking thetheir individual evolution of single checklists may be a non-trivial exercise. Checklists are also inevitably partially redundant when measured one against another, and where they overlap is far from straightforward. Furthermore, conflicts in scope and arbitrary decisions on wording and sub-structuring make integration difficult. This presents inhibit their use in combination. Overall, these issues present significant difficulties for the users of checklists, especially those in areas such as systems biology, who routinely combine information from multiple biological domains and technology platforms. To address all of the above, we present MIBBI (Minimum Information for Biological and Biomedical Investigations); a web-based communal resource for such checklists, designed to act as a ‘one-stop shop’ for those exploring the range of extant checklist projects, and to foster collaborative, integrative development and ultimately promote gradual integration of checklists. (shrink)

This profound metaphysical treatise is carefully and subtly argued. It merits the author recognition as one of the major contemporary philosophers in the United States. Plantinga begins by distinguishing logical necessity from causal necessity, what we will not give up, what is self-evident, and what we can know a priori. In the first chapter he also reviews why classical and contemporary philosophers have distinguished between saying that it is necessary that a proposition is true and saying of an object that (...) it is necessarily such and such. The second and third chapters are primarily a defense of the distinction between de dicto and de re necessity, despite the fact that he shows, to those who claim only to understand de dicto necessity, how assertions of de re necessity can be read as assertions of de dicto necessity. Plantinga mischievously observes in passing that assertions of de dicto necessity can be interpreted as de re assertions of a proposition that it is necessarily true. He defends the legitimacy of asserting necessity de re so that he can say of objects that they have properties essentially. (shrink)

Mutlak ve mukayyet konusu fıkıh usûlünün lafız bahislerinde ele alınıp derinlemesine incelenen başlıklardan biridir. Konu her ne kadar fıkıh usûlü kitaplarında yeterince açıklanmış gözükse de her teorik meselede olduğu üzere farklı değerlendirmelere açık taraflar da ihtiva etmektedir. Bu iki lafız özellikle mutlakın mukayyede hamli etrafında ele alınmıştır. Usûlcülerin bu konuda verdiği örnekler ayrıca önemlidir. Bu örneklerin incelenmesi mutlak ve mukayyet lafızların daha iyi anlaşılmasına da katkı sağlayacaktır. Bu makalede öncelikle mutlak ve mukayyet lafızların tanımı, mahiyeti ve fıkıh usûlünün diğer konuları (...) ile münasebeti verildikten sonra mutlakın mukayyede hamli ele alınacak ve özellikle; “ıtlak ve takyidin sebebi bir olmakla beraber hükümleri farklı olursa mutlak mukayyede haml edilmez, mutlakla ıtlakı mukayyetle de takyidi üzere amel edilir”, kuralı için verilen örneklerin tatmin edici olmadığı tartışılacaktır. Günümüz fıkıh usûlü kitaplarında ele alınan bu konunun klasik eserlerde nasıl açıklandığı değerlendirilecek ve farklı örnekler teklif edilecektir. (shrink)

In recent years there has been an upsurge of research aimed at removing the mystery from insight and creative problem solving. The present special issue reflects this expanding field. Overall the papers gathered here converge on a nuanced view of insight and creative thinking as arising from multiple processes that can yield surprising solutions through a mixture of “special” Type 1 processes and “routine” Type 2 processes.

İslâm’ın ilk dönemlerinden başlayarak âlimler neshin mahiyeti, delilleri ve Kur’an’da geçen emir ve nehiy ifadeleri yanında haber ifadelerinin neshin konusu olup olmayacağı meseleleri üzerinde yoğunlaşarak bir nesh teorisi meydana getirmişlerdir. Bu bağlamda şer’î hüküm içeren haber ifadelerinin emir ve nehiy manasında oldukları için metninin daha sonra gelen şer’î bir delille nesh edilmesi caiz görülmüştür. Haberin ifade ettiği şeye gelince; Allah’ın sıfatları ve kıyametin kopuşu gibi değişmesi mümkün olmayan şeylerden ise, yalana yol açacağı için, bunun nesh edilmesi caiz görülmemiştir. Bu iki (...) konuda âlimler ittifak etmişlerdir. Geçmişte olanları ve gelecekte olacak hâdiseleri bildiren haberin ifade ettiği şeyin neshin konusu olup olmayacağı konusunda ise ihtilafa düşmüşlerdir. Keza vaad ve vaid bildiren haberler ile ebedîlikle kayıtlanan haber ifadelerini neshin caiz olup olmayacağı da tartışma konusu olmuştur. Burada Kur’an’da geçen haber ifadelerinin hangisinin nesh edilmesinin mümkün, hangisinin mümkün olmadığı meselesinin ana hatlarıyla ortaya konulması amaçlanmıştır. (shrink)

The seven contributors present the reader with a set of perspectives on the subsequent histories of the central ideas of these great thinkers. The essays focus on the ways in which these ideas were caught up in social movements and had been taken up by others who used them to support programs for radical historical changes, thereby subjecting them to distortions and perversions. The whole book reflects the feeling that history itself has purged away the dross which lay within the (...) original ideas, and that what now remains is either pure gold or later perversions illicitly smuggled in under the cover of various "isms."--K. P. F. (shrink)

This provocative, if sketchy, essay develops the theme that, although thought and reality are ultimately distinct, both are elements of one and the same reality--"a communion of living and interacting forces." The presentation recognizes a dialectical character to reality, in the form of opposing thrusts and tendencies, and a plurality of foci of demands to be met, all operating through and partially constituting history. It fails, however, to explicate the movement in the dialectic of reality and to explore the possibility (...) and value of dialectic as a cognitive process.--K. P. F. (shrink)

The title of this and proposed second volume presents the basic idea which unifies the wide variety of topics developed and investigated by the principal authors, major contributing authors, J. M. Dunn and Robert K. Meyer, and eleven other contributors. The other contributors are: J. R. Chidgey, J. A. Coffa, Dorthy L. Grover, Bas van Fraassen, H. Leblanc, Storrs McCall, A. Parks, G. Pottinger, R. Routley, A. Urquhart, and R. G. Wolf. From both the useful analytic table of contents and (...) from the section titles it is clear which contributing author has written each section. Chapter I, "The Pure Calculus of Entailment," suggests how logics of entailment are logics of relevance and necessity. When we explain why a large number of systems are investigated, it will be clear why we write of logics of entailment instead of the logic of entailment. The principal authors build a case in Chapter I, and elsewhere, that a genuinely valid formal inference, viz., a formal entailment, from a formula A to a formula B requires that A be relevant to B in addition to it being impossible that there be an interpretation making A true and B false. So, a claim that A entails B tells us, explicitly or implicitly, that A is relevant to B and that "if A then B" is necessarily true, i.e., A strictly implies B. Consequently since a logic of entailment presents allegedly unfalsifiable claims, i.e., theses, using entailment claims, a logic of entailment presents theses about relevance between antecedents and consequents and necessity. It should be noted that the systems of logic developed are for formal entailments; they may not be logics for material entailments such as: being a cube entails having six surfaces. (shrink)

Ülfet Görgülü, Fıkıhta Cenin Hukuku, M.Ü. İlahiyat fakültesi Vakfı Yayınları, 2018, 180 s.

The current debate regarding the suitability of anencephalics as organ donors is due primarily to misunderstandings. The anatomical and neurophysiological literature shows that the anencephalic lacks a cerebrum because of the failure of neuralplate fusion. However, even the incomplete function of an atrophic brain stem is currently accepted at law in most if not all countries as sufficient for brain life: which is to say, cessation of breathing is currently required in order to make the diagnosis of brain death. Because (...) of the extensive incompleteness of the anencephalic's brain, it is not possible to postpone death significantly by mechanical ventilation and intravenous feeding. It is acceptable to maintain life for a short period of time in order to allow organ transplantation subsequent to the declaration of death at the point of cessation of the capacity for spontaneous respiration. The most important issue is not transplantation, but the issue of brain life raised by the case of anencephalics. Since brain life in any significant sense begins only after the closure of the neural tube on the 30th day after conception, it is reasonable to take this as the point at which brain life begins. Laws should be amended in all countries to allow the abortion of anencephalics at any time, in that they do not at any time possess brain life. (shrink)

The subtitle of this text intended for philosophy students’ 2nd course in logic is in no way misleading. It is a lucid introduction to the philosophic activities of uncovering metaphysical presuppositions of logical techniques and altering logical techniques, and hence assessments of deductive validity, to conform to metaphysical presuppositions. They do not, though, assume that techniques for assessing deductive validity are or should be wholly dependent upon metaphysical presuppositions. They write on p. 213 in their section on intensional discourse: "And (...) logic wherever possible ought not to wait upon philosophy, for logic wherever possible ought to be neutral between different philosophical analyses." In their investigations of metaphysical presuppositions and logical techniques, they consider primarily the consequences of existential presuppositions about the use of singular terms, viz., individual variables, individual names, and definite descriptions. They favor freeing use of singular terms from existential presuppositions. The consideration of allowing non-referring names and definite descriptions makes their text one of the first, if not the first, for teaching Free Logic. The gist of Free Logic is not to allow existential generalization of Fb to unless there is an auxiliary premise asserting the existence of b, because use of the name b has been freed from the presupposition that it names something. It is suitable that these authors have a text on Free Logic since Lambert is the major figure in its origin while van Fraassen has established some of the most significant results about Free Logic systems. They go on to consider alternative logical rules to those of Russell for dealing with nonreferring definite descriptions. These alternatives to standard logic are philosophically motivated. They are not simply dumped upon students as rules for symbol manipulation. For instance, on pp. 152-157 they give a succinct analysis of the Russell-Meinong debate when they agree with Meinong that one can talk of the thing that is such and such without accepting that there is such a thing. The treatment of singular terms leads them to discussions of topics such as: What is it for a logic to be extensional and is Free Logic extensional?, the substitution interpretation of quantifiers, and the notion of presupposition. (shrink)

This technical and sophisticated book has a misleading title. In only 140 pages it has chapters entitled: Truth Functions, Sentence Logic, Model Theory, Predicate Logic, Recursive Functions, Formalized Arithmetic, Free-Variable Arithmetic, and Axiomatic Set Theory. Goodstein says little about, let alone studies, the historical development of any of these topics. The history consists of a few references to some of the individuals who have played a role in the development of the field; but not always to the major figures. For (...) instance, his chapter on model theory contains no discussion of the development of classical model theory. Only Herbrand is noted as a developer of model theory. However, even if these eight studies in mathematical logic do not tell much about the development of the topics, they still have considerable value. The first chapter on truth functions and the seventh on free-variable arithmetic are the most intriguing because they contain more of what is not usually presented in logic books. The first two chapters on sentential logic are not the standard textbook treatment. This really is a book for other working logicians and mathematicians. Quickly, Goodstein moves into treating truth functions for any number of truth values as functions in modulo arithmetic and investigates the topic of finding Sheffer functions, viz., a function from which all others for a given number of truth values can be obtained. In the second chapter, he is soon presenting Intuitionistic sentential logic and has some remarks about sentential logics between Intuitionistic logic and classical logic. He also presents sequent calculi. Since the first two chapters contain only 36 pages, this suggests that the book would be suitable as a text only for advanced and sophisticated students. (shrink)

Professor Fitch carefully guides the reader through the first and second chapters demonstrating how theorems of a sentential logic are truths about so-called Q-functions. These Q-functions are given by presenting symbols for twelve basic functions, specifying that finite combinations of these basic symbols give Q-functions, and by giving rules for the introduction of basic symbols into, and the elimination of basic symbols from, combinations of these symbols. The combinators are the basic symbols which are not symbols for "and," "or," "not," (...) and "equals." Truths about Q-functions are the basic and derived introduction and elimination rules. To familiarize readers with introduction and elimination rules, he devotes an introductory chapter to a review of his method of subordinate proof which is used throughout the book. This review is also valuable for stressing the differences between his sentential logic and classical logic on one hand and intuitionistic logic on the other. Rejecting the law of excluded middle he nevertheless maintains double negation. (shrink)

Martin presents fifteen previously unpublished essays which he wrote before 1973. Despite several references to his earlier books such as Truth and Denotation, these essays will be intelligible to those who have not yet read anything by R. M. Martin as long as you can master long formulations in the notation of a formal first-order language. Indeed, these essays can serve as an introduction to the work of Martin. The first three essays present Martin's metaphysical system. Essays 4, 5, and (...) 6 amplify his system by showing how a wide variety of sentences can have their logical form represented in the formal language which displays Martin's ontology. In the remaining nine essays he critically evaluates positions of other philosophers such as Hiz, Carnap, Quine, Fitch, Chisholm, Popper, Sellars, Heyting, Lorenzen, and Putnam, from the perspective of his system. Because his systematic approach unifies all of the papers and because he uses technical terms in the development of his system, it is regrettable that the book offers no index. (shrink)

Professor Bartley makes a valuable contribution to the learning of logic, to the study of the history of logic, and to the study of British literature by presenting, in effect, a fifth edition of Lewis Carroll’s Symbolic Logic Part I, together with a critical reconstruction from galley proofs of the hitherto unpublished Part II. In his introduction, William W. Bartley tells of his detective work from 1959-1977 in uncovering and piecing together most of what Lewis Carroll intended to publish as (...) a second part of his 1896 Symbolic Logic. (shrink)

To this day, the Italian Jewish literary postwar canon is undisputedly ruled by Primo Levi, Giorgio Bassani and Carlo Levi. This study of three major Italian Jewish women writers – Natalia Ginzburg, Clara Sereni and Lia Levi – highlights the presence in Italian literature of a subversive Jewish écriture feminine. These writers’ formal independence and subversive redeployment of narrative and thematic strategies not only consolidated a strong female voice in Italian literature but also produced a specific Italian brand of Jewish (...) literature. The following analysis shows how, through their literary ‘life miniatures’, Ginzburg, Sereni and Levi recentre the domestic everydayness of woman’s personal and historical experience, while, simultaneously, challenging the traditional representations of women’s positions within family and within the public space, as well as interrogating their Jewish identity vis-a-vis their country’s Fascist past. In particular, this article focuses on the way in which all three authors portray themselves as women trying to strike a balance between their Jewish identity and history alive only in the domestic space of their family lives, and their gender identity which is repressed by the patriarchal system both in the house and in the public arena. These women respond by moving ‘out’ of their homes, by exploring the city space – thus turning the ‘urban monster’ into a positive locus for women’s self-determination and political action – and by bonding with other women. Through a demasculinization of the city space, these memoirs re-elaborated notions of family, Judaism, private and historical memory, and they reinvented a poetics for the ‘small virtues’ of woman’s everyday existence while also pioneering a new space in literature that radically changed the direction of patriarchal Italian culture in the second half of the twentieth century. (shrink)

This anthology consists of forty-nine of Geach’s previously published papers on logic. He opens his Preface by writing: "I bring together here almost all my English articles that I have previously published and have not already collected or cannibalized in other books." It contains his first published paper "Designation and Truth" from Analysis 1947-48 as well as his elegant sketch of a decidable entailment system in the 1970 Philosophical Review. For the most part he has made only stylistic changes and (...) added some notes. So, he claims: "all articles appear without substantial change." However, he admits that he divided his "Quantification Theory and the Problem of Identifying Objects of Reference" from the now classic 1963 volume of Acta Philosophica Fennica. He divided it because he wanted to separate his strong advocacy of a substitution interpretation of the quantifiers from some views on quotation marks, about which he is less than certain. The papers are not in mere chronological order. They are organized by topic within chapters entitled: Historical Essays, Traditional Logic, Theory of Reference and Syntax, Intentionality, Quotation and Semantics, Set Theory, Identity Theory, Assertion, Imperatives and Practical Reasoning, and Logic in Metaphysics and Theology. The chapter titles are a fair guide to content. But note the following. Two lucid papers defending von Wright’s notion of entailment are in the Intentionality chapter. The essay "Ascriptivism" in the Assertion chapter is relevant to discussions of free will because he argues: "to ascribe an act to agent is a causal description of the act" and he urges a search for a non-Humean analysis of causality. The essays in the last chapter are: "Nominalism," "Some problems about time," and "God’s relation to the world.". (shrink)

This ninth volume in the Library of Exact Philosophy series is a development of the author’s 1971 McGill University dissertation written under the guidance of Mario Bunge. The thesis of the book is that the objectivity of mathematics does not require that there be any mathematical objects. The objectivity of mathematics is the widespread agreement among working mathematicians on what is provable, i.e., on what entailments hold between mathematical constructs. Castonguay gives precise definitions of several terms; but, unfortunately, "construct" is (...) not one of them. He has set himself the task of arguing that we can account for community recognition and acceptance of proofs without assuming that working mathematicians have had to inspect some special mathematical objects to verify that things are in the mathematical realm as they are said to be in the proved propositions. He does concede that many mathematicians, for heuristic reasons, may need to speak as if there were a mind-independent mathematical realm. (shrink)

In his Introduction, Hochberg writes: "Since this book is an attempt to resolve some problems about thought, truth, and reference within the tradition of Logical Atomism, readers of Bergmann and Sellars will find, not surprisingly, familiar themes." He continues a bit later: "What is attempted is the resolution of some issues that preoccupied Russell, Wittgenstein, Moore and their successors, as well as an explication of some links between Logical Atomism and Moore's early assault on idealism. The book is thus a (...) partial study of the ontology and the history of Logical Atomism." Hochberg accomplishes what he attempts. Note that he did not promise an introduction to the ontology and history of Logical Atomism. The book is intended for people who have read early Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, are familiar with some Fregean themes, who have read some secondary literature on Logical Atomism such as Urmson's or Pear's books, and who have read some of G. Bergmann's developments of Logical Atomism. Because the metaphysical analyses of several contemporary philosophers such as Quine, W. Sellars, D. Davidson, and D. Kaplan are criticized, familiarity with such writers, especially Quine, would be very helpful. Nevertheless, although the themes are familiar ones such as: realism vs. phenomenalism; realism vs. nominalism; theories of definite descriptions; coping with Bradley's regress; analyses of objects; analyses of thoughts; and although no sophisticated logic is needed to handle his formalizations, Hochberg demands almost too much concentration from even his intended readers. It is easy to get lost in the numerous alternative analyses and theories Hochberg considers. He seems unable to resist temptations to explore alternative analyses suggested to him by the one he is considering. Consequently, it is difficult to determine what are the analyses actually held by philosophers discussed, what are Hochberg's own analyses and theories, and what are serious alternatives. Because so many subtle and complicated alternatives are juggled it is difficult to uncover the main premisses of Hochberg's arguments for his resolutions. The combined insights and discipline of a seminar or reading group would be helpful in the effort to recognize the main themes and to stay with the work. (shrink)

In his Introduction, Hochberg writes: "Since this book is an attempt to resolve some problems about thought, truth, and reference within the tradition of Logical Atomism, readers of Bergmann and Sellars will find, not surprisingly, familiar themes." He continues a bit later: "What is attempted is the resolution of some issues that preoccupied Russell, Wittgenstein, Moore and their successors, as well as an explication of some links between Logical Atomism and Moore's early assault on idealism. The book is thus a (...) partial study of the ontology and the history of Logical Atomism." Hochberg accomplishes what he attempts. Note that he did not promise an introduction to the ontology and history of Logical Atomism. The book is intended for people who have read early Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, are familiar with some Fregean themes, who have read some secondary literature on Logical Atomism such as Urmson's or Pear's books, and who have read some of G. Bergmann's developments of Logical Atomism. Because the metaphysical analyses of several contemporary philosophers such as Quine, W. Sellars, D. Davidson, and D. Kaplan are criticized, familiarity with such writers, especially Quine, would be very helpful. Nevertheless, although the themes are familiar ones such as: realism vs. phenomenalism; realism vs. nominalism; theories of definite descriptions; coping with Bradley's regress; analyses of objects; analyses of thoughts; and although no sophisticated logic is needed to handle his formalizations, Hochberg demands almost too much concentration from even his intended readers. It is easy to get lost in the numerous alternative analyses and theories Hochberg considers. He seems unable to resist temptations to explore alternative analyses suggested to him by the one he is considering. Consequently, it is difficult to determine what are the analyses actually held by philosophers discussed, what are Hochberg's own analyses and theories, and what are serious alternatives. Because so many subtle and complicated alternatives are juggled it is difficult to uncover the main premisses of Hochberg's arguments for his resolutions. The combined insights and discipline of a seminar or reading group would be helpful in the effort to recognize the main themes and to stay with the work. (shrink)

Despite its brevity, McArthur’s monograph offers a helpful introduction to tense logic to readers who have already been introduced to the syntactical and semantical metatheory of classical logic. Familiarity with substitutional quantification, free-logic, and modal logic will help readers appreciate techniques used and the directions in which topics are developed.

These sixteen essays were written in honor of Frederick B. Fitch. Each part of the volume treats an area of the logical enterprise which had special interest for Fitch. The four parts are entitled, respectively, "Metaphysics and Language," "Basic and Combinatorial Logic," "Implication and Consistency," and "Deontic, Epistemic, and Erotetic Logic.".

Eastern philosophy and western science have convergent and divergent viewpoints for their explanation of consciousness. Convergence is found for the practice of meditation allowing besides a time dependent consciousness, the experience of a timeless consciousness and its beneficial effect on psychological wellbeing and medical improvements, which are confirmed by multiple scientific publications. Theories of quantum mechanics with non-locality and timelessness also show astonishing correlation to eastern philosophy, such as the theory of Penrose-Hameroff (ORC-OR), which explains consciousness by reduction of quantum (...) superposition in the brain. Divergence appears in the interpretation of the subjective experience of timeless consciousness. In eastern philosophy, meditation at a higher level of awareness allows the personal experience of timeless and non-dual consciousness, considered as an empirical proof for the existence of pure consciousness or spirituality existing before the material world and creating it by design. Western science acknowledges the subjective, non-dual experience, and its multiple beneficial effects, however, the interpretation of spirituality designing the material universe is in disagreement with the Darwinian Theory of mutation and selection. A design should create an ideal universe without the injustice of 3% congenital birth defects and later genetic health problems. The western viewpoint of selection is more adapted to explain congenital errors. The gap between subjectivity and objectivity, the mind-body problem, is in eastern philosophy reduced to the dominance of subjectivity over objectivity, whereas western science attributes equal values to both. Nevertheless, there remains an astonishing complementarity between eastern and western practices. (shrink)