For (S, Σ) a measurable space, let ${\cal C}_1$ and ${\cal C}_2$ be convex, weak* closed sets of probability measures on Σ. We show that if ${\cal C}_1$ ∪ ${\cal C}_2$ satisfies the Lyapunov property , then there exists a set A ∈ Σ such that minμ1∈ ${\cal C}_1$ μ1(A) > maxμ2 ∈ ${\cal C}_2$ (A). We give applications to Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) and to the core of a lower probability.

This paper provides a general framework for analyzing self-confirming policies. We study self-confirming equilibria in recurrent decision problems with incomplete information about the true stochastic model. We characterize stationary monetary policies in a linear-quadratic setting.

We consider random choice rules that, by satisfying a weak form of Luce’s choice axiom, embody a form probabilistic rationality. We show that for this important class of stochastic choices, the law of demand for normal goods—arguably the main result of traditional consumer theory—continues to hold on average when strictly dominated alternatives are dismissed.

We establish a simple condition, based on the willingness to bet on events, under which two biseparable preferences have cardinally equivalent utilities.