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Francesco Marchi [8]F. Marchi [1]Federico De Marchi [1]
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Francesco Marchi
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
  1.  12
    Cognitive Penetrability and Emotion Recognition in Human Facial Expressions.Francesco Marchi & Albert Newen - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  2.  6
    Attention and Cognitive Penetrability: The Epistemic Consequences of Attention as a Form of Metacognitive Regulation.Francesco Marchi - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 47:48-62.
  3.  6
    The Intermediate Scope of Consciousness in the Predictive Mind.Francesco Marchi & Jakob Hohwy - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.
    There is a view on consciousness that has strong intuitive appeal and empirical support: the intermediate-level theory of consciousness, proposed mainly by Ray Jackendoff and by Jesse Prinz. This theory identifies a specific “intermediate” level of representation as the basis of human phenomenal consciousness, which sits between high-level non-perspectival thought processes and low-level disjointed feature-detection processes in the perceptual and cognitive processing hierarchy. In this article, we show that the claim that consciousness arises at an intermediate-level is true of some (...)
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    Seeing Entities without Seeing N-Entities.G. Ferretti & F. Marchi - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (1-2):57-70.
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    Introduction – Cognitive Penetration and Predictive Coding. Pushing the Debate Forward with the Recent Achievements of Cognitive Science.Albert Newen, Francesco Marchi & Peter Brössel - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 47:1-5.
  6.  30
    Cognitive Penetrability of Social Perception: A Case for Emotion Recognition.Francesco Marchi - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):617-620.
    Adams & Kveraga argue that social visual perception is cognitively penetrable by extending a top-down model for visual object recognition to visual perception of social cues. Here I suggest that, in their view, a clear link between the top-down contextual influences that modulate social visual perception and the perceptual experience of a subject is missing. Without such a link their proposal is consistent with explanations that need not involve cognitive penetration of perceptual experience but only modifications of perceptual judgments formed (...)
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  7.  29
    The Cognitive Foundations of Visual Consciousness: Why Should We Favour a Processing Approach?Francesco Marchi & Albert Newen - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):247-264.
    How can we investigate the foundations of consciousness? In addressing this question, we will focus on the two main strategies that authors have adopted so far. On the one hand, there is research aimed at characterizing a specific content, which should account for conscious states. We may call this the content approach. On the other hand, one finds the processing approach, which proposes to look for a particular way of processing to account for consciousness.. Our aim, in this paper, is (...)
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  8. Book Review of J.J. Prinz, The Conscious Brain. How Attention Engenders Experience. [REVIEW]Francesco Marchi - 2013 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 4 (1):100-102.
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  9. Syntactic Structures and the Conscious Awareness of Language Experience. An Intermediate Level Hypothesis.Francesco Marchi & Giacomo Ettore Tullio Romano - 2014 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 5 (2):169-183.
    In this article we review the basic idea of the “intermediate level” hypothesis about consciousness as proposed by Ray Jackendoff, then developed by Crick and Koch and finally by Prinz. According to this hypothesis, consciousness arises only at an intermediate-level, which lies between rough sensory inputs and the more abstract representations used, e.g., in object recognition. We aim at formulating a more specific hypothesis about a suitable conception of consciousness relative to the experience of language. We claim that “linguistic consciousness”, (...)
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