Thomas Aquinas and Hervaeus Natalis share a correlational theory of intentionality. When I cognize a thing, I am in a real relation with the thing cognized and at the same time the thing is in a relation of reason with me. Hervaeus coins the term “intentionality” to designate precisely this relation of reason. First and second intentionality express two stages of this relation. First intentionality refers to the relation that a thing has to the mind, while second intentionality indicates the (...) relation that a thing qua cognized has to the mind. Thus, first intentionality involves direct cognition, while second intentionality reflexive cognition. This theory of intentionality has two purposes: first, to de-psychologize the cognitive process and second, to allow the application of Aristotle’s table of categories to the sphere of the mental. Through his detailed analysis of the relation of intentionality, Hervaeus clarifies some of Thomas’s obscurer points, but at the same time he has to solve a delicate problem of circularity entailed by the notion of intentionality as a relation of reason. (shrink)

The chapter provides a response to Patrick Toner, “Critical Study of Fabrizio Amerini’s Aquinas on the Beginning and End of Human Life,” Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy 2, 211–28. The chapter corrects two misrepresentations in Toner’s review. First, it proves that, given Aquinas’ assumptions on substantial form and human soul, Aquinas could not give up his preference for delayed hominization of the embryo even if he were acquainted with contemporary embryology. Aquinas takes as the starting point of his embryology Aristotle’s (...) characterization of the human soul as the act of an organic physical body having life potentially, and this characterization leads him to the conviction that the human soul can enter into the human body only after the principal vital organs are formed. Second, the chapter corrects Toner’s unusual interpretation of the clause “organic” in the Aristotelian characterization of the human soul, by specifying the different senses of potentiality in Aquinas’ embryology. The chapter reaffirms the core idea that establishing when the hominization of the human embryo begins is not decisive for rejecting abortion. The chapter suggests relating the question of abortion to the identity or continuity of the human embryo rather than to the beginning of hominization. (shrink)

In literature Peter Damian has been often presented as an anti-dialectic thinker. Over time this statement has been subjected to careful historiographical revision. Today it is commonly accepted that the distinction between dialectic and anti-dialectic thinkers only partially describes the state of philosophy in the eleventh century. In fact, the relation between faith and reason is complex in Damian. The purpose of this paper is to reconsider this relation in the light of the significance Damian attributes to the notion of (...) contradiction. Reason must respect the principle of non-contradiction not only when it describes the natural world, but also when it explores the dimension of the mysteries of faith. (shrink)

The theology of Pier Damiani († 1072) is still an understudied theme in his scholarship, in particular, for what it concerns his Trinitarian and Christological doctrines. The aim of this study is to reconstruct and discuss especially Damiani’s Christological views as formulated in Letter 81, better known as his De fide catholica. It is argued that Damiani’s approach is mostly exegetical, as he mainly points to and comments on Biblical passages in support of Catholic doctrines. Still, he assumes a peculiar (...) method of investigation, as he devotes the main body of the Letter to the question of the correct understanding (recta intelligentia) of the Catholic interpretation of Christology, and reserves only the final summary to a discussion of Biblical authorities. Eventually, it is argued that despite Damiani’s attempts at clarifying the matter, he acknowledges an inherent difficulty in explaining how it is possible that God became man without truly assuming the person of man, and, if He did so, how this did not give rise to two, however indistinct, persons or hypostases. The concept of ‘co-union’ of human and divine natures, introduced by Damiani, makes the simultaneous unity and distinction of the two natures intuitively clear, but it remains a concept that is not clarified in all its details and implications. (shrink)

Historians of medieval philosophy have always paid attention to the topic of intentionality. This is not surprising. For medieval authors, the analysis of the metaphysics and the mechanisms of human cognition became over time one of the most important instruments for approaching a bundle of basic philosophical and theological questions, such as the nature of universals, the mind-world relation, the explanation of divine knowledge, and the like. For this and other reasons, theories of cognition have been a crucial theme for (...) historians of medieval philosophy and a privileged subject in the literature. The present volume presents a collection of articles devotes to later medieval perspectives on intentionality. Chronologically speaking, they cover the period from Thomas Aquinas to John Buridan. The reason is easy to explain: in this period, historians of medieval philosophy encounter accounts of intentionality of such a structure and sophistication that they can be compared, in a philosophically suitable way, with modern and contemporary explanations of the intentionality of mind. (shrink)

This paper attempts to provide a general reconstruction of Francis of Marchia's doctrine of accidental being. The paper is divided into two parts. (1) In the first part, I begin by reconstructing the debate on the nature of accidents held before Marchia, showing that such a debate is characterised by a progressive shift concerning the way to understand accidents. While the first Aristotelian interpreters regard accidents especially as inhering modes of being of substances, the majority of theologians and philosophers in (...) the second half of the thirteenth century regard accidents as absolute beings. For them, the problem is no longer to explain if and, if so, how accidents can be distinct from substances, but how accidents and substances can make some one thing. Metaphysically, their primary focus is on explaining what the ontological status of inherence is. Although it is especially the consideration of the Eucharistic case that induces this change, I point out that many philosophers and theologians find in Aristotle's texts the philosophical support for taking this step. (2) In the second part, I focus more closely on Marchia's doctrine, arguing that Marchia's position is a slightly revised version of Scotus's. Unlike Aquinas and Bonaventure, Marchia explains Aristotle's metaphysics of accidents by way of the metaphysics of the Eucharist and not vice versa. So, in order to explain the philosophical consistency of this miraculous case, Marchia maintains that one does not need to modify the notion of inherence by distinguishing actual from potential inherence and including the latter in the accident's essence; rather it is necessary to take the case of the Eucharist seriously and, on this basis, to remove inherence totally from an accident's essence. In conclusion, the Eucharist shows that accidents are absolute beings to which actual inherence pertains contingently, potential inherence necessarily. But like Scotus's, Marchia's doctrine faces some difficulties that remain unresolved. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to illustrate the role played by Augustine’s Commentary on the Genesis in the writings of Thomas Aquinas. This work is of great importance for Aquinas, not only because it is the work where Augustine clarifies his interpretation of creation, but also because creation is, among the theological topics, perhaps the most philosophical, insofar as it gives the opportunity of elaborating on many philosophical issues. In particular, the goal of the study is to rethink the (...) positions of Aquinas and Augustine on one of these issues, that is the relationship between soul and body. I mean to call into question two historiographical theses: first, that Augustine and Aquinas formulate positions that are irreconcilable with each other, and second, that they in no way address that which we today call the Mind-Body Problem. (shrink)

Supposition is a controversial logical theory. Scholars have investigated many points of this doctrine such as its historical origin, its use in theology, the logical function of the theory, or the relationship between supposition and signification. In the article I focus on this latter aspect by discussing how some Italian, and in particular Florentine, Dominican followers of Aquinas—Francis of Prato, Girolamo Savonarola, and Georgius Rovegnatinus —explained the relation between the linguistic terms’ properties of signifying and suppositing, and hence the division (...) of supposition. After sketching out Thomas Aquinas, Hervaeus Natalis, and William of Ockham’s positions on the relationship between signification and supposition, I closely examine Francis’s criticism of Ockham. Francis follows Walter Burley’s account of supposition and considers the statement that a term has simple supposition when it is taken not significatively and stands for an intention of mind as the weak point of Ockham’s explanation of supposition. According to Francis, if this were the case, there would be no semantic basis for differentiating simple from material supposition. Francis is however hesitant about the full subordination of supposition to signification, especially with regards to material supposition, when a term, suppositing for itself, is taken to signify itself besides its meaning. More than one hundred years later, Girolamo Savonarola and Georgius Rovegnatinus have no doubt about the fact that terms may supposit only for what they signify. (shrink)

Few philosophical books have been so influential in the development of Western thought as Aristotle’s Metaphysics. In fourteen substantial essays this volume reconstructs the late medieval reception of this work, by focusing on the main medieval commentators and a common set of metaphysical topics.

Intellective intuitive cognition plays a key role in William of Ockham’s philosophy. On many occasions, Walter Chatton argues that this kind of cognition is unnecessary. Chatton has two main arguments for his point. First, he raises doubts about the possibility of distinguishing intellective intuitive cognition from sensory intuitive cognition. The former always arises with the latter, and whatever we can explain through the former, we can explain equally well through the latter. Second, he argues that we cannot separate the intellective (...) intuitive cognition of a singular thing from the cognition of the species of that thing. We cannot intuitively and intellectively cognize a thing without recognizing that thing as a thing of a certain kind. Chatton’s conclusion is that since we can never experience an act of intellective intuitive cognition in itself, it is superfluous to posit this act of cognition. We can explain the singular cognition of an extramental singular simply by making the cognition of its species and the sensory intuitive cognition of it interact with each other. (shrink)

Lo studio si concentra sul modo in cui i commenti alla Metafisica di Paolo di Venezia e Alessandro di Alessandria evidenziano il grado di modificazione della comprensione della dottrina aristotelica sull'essenza, dovuta alla ricezione della dottrina di Tommaso d'Aquino e di Averroè al riguardo. Dopo un'introduzione di inquadramento storico dottrinale dei due commenti, la seconda parte è centrata sulle dottrine dei due maestri relative all'essenza, e l'A. articola la sua ricognizione attorno ai temi del rapporto fra essenza e sostanza, essenza (...) e predicazione, e sulla rispettiva ricezione della dottrina tomista sull'essenza, fondata a sua volta sulla dottrina avicenniana . La terza parte verte su una puntuale ricostruzione della dottrina dell'essenza in Paolo, mentre la quarta evidenzia come Alessandro sia la fonte primaria di Paolo. L'A., infine, esamina il commento di Alessandro in relazione al tema dell'essenza. Nella conclusione ribadisce come Alessandro e Paolo tentino di riconciliare la dottrina averroista con Aristotele, adottando l'interpretazione di Tommaso. Tra i testi dell'Aquinate utilizzati si ricordano il De ente et essentia, il commento alla Metaphysica e quello alle Sentenze, la Summa theologiae. (shrink)

Identity-Over-Time has been a favorite subject in the literature concerning Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas addresses this issue in many discussions, including especially the identity of material things and artifacts, the identity of the human soul after the corruption of body, the identity of the body of Christ in the three days from his death to his resurrection and the identity of the resurrected human body at the end of time. All these discussions have a point in common: they lead Aquinas to (...) raise the question of Identity-Over-Time with respect to things that fully exist in act, i.e., things that possess an identity of their own and change some of their parts or properties over time while continuing to be what they are. In this article, I investigate this topic from a different angle, considering the case of the trans-temporal identity of things that do not yet have an identity of their own or fully exist in act. The case at stake is that of the identity of the human embryo through the process of human generation. It is a puzzle that Aquinas seems to have some difficulties to solving, given his account of human embryogenesis as a process that alternates generations and corruptions of the subject. At the same time, though, Aquinas does not want to renounce the idea that the subject of generation must be numerically one and the same throughout all the process. In order to solve this puzzle, Aquinas seems to suggest distinguishing the identity of the subject from the identity of its matter and/or form. At given conditions, a thing can even change its matter and form while continuing to be the same thing in number. Specifically, the numerical identity of the subject of generation is justified by the identity entailed by the metaphysical notions of potency and act. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas's account of the semantics of names is based on two fundamental distinctions: the distinction between a name's mode of signifying and the signified object, and that between the cause and the goal of a name's signification, i.e. that from which a name was instituted to signify and that which a name actually signifies. Thomas endows names with a two-layer signification: names are introduced into language to designate primarily conceptions of extramental things and secondarily the particular extramental things referred (...) to by such conceptions. On such a `conceptualistic' account of names' signification, Thomas recognizes that a generic acquaintance with external things is a sufficient condition for imposing names to signify things. Following this intuition, Thomas at times dwells on the role that pragmatic factors such as the common usage of names by a linguistic community ( usus loquendi ) and the speakers' intention ( intentio loquentium ) play in explaining both the formation and semantic function of conventional language. This paper will focus on what Thomas had to say about such factors. (shrink)

Ricostruzione del pensiero di Tommaso e Averroè sulla dottrina dell'essenza, alla luce del moderno dibattito sul tema. Nell'ultima sezione dello studio, l'A. si chiede come i commentatori medievali della Metafisica aristotelica , abbiano concepito l'essenza di un ente naturale. La critica elaborata da Tommaso alla posizione sostenuta da Averroè, e la sua adesione finale alla soluzione proposta da Avicenna sono indagate e giustificate nell'ultima parte dello studio.

L’articolo esamina il rapporto fra individuo e comunità nel pensiero politico di Tommaso d’Aquino. In particolare, il problema filosofico qui discusso può es­sere presentato nel modo seguente: secondo Tommaso, l’essere di un singolo in­­dividuo è determinato dalla sua appartenenza a una data comunità politica o, vice­versa, l’essere di una comunità dipende da quello di ciascuno dei suoi mem­bri? L’articolo argomenta che Tommaso ha alcune ragioni filosofiche per an­teporre la comunità all’individuo, ma anche alcune ragioni teologiche per porre al centro l’individuo. (...) Alla fine, l’interpretazione è che, nonostante al­cu­ne possibili oscillazioni, Tommaso assuma che essere parte di una comunità po­litica, o essere cittadini, sia una proprietà necessaria ma non essenziale per definire l’essere uomo.This paper aims to reconstruct the relationship between individual and com­munity in Thomas Aquinas’s political thought. The philosophical problem I discuss is the following: On Aquinas’s writings, is the metaphysical value of an individual man finally expressed by its belonging to a certain political com­munity or, vice versa, the value of a community ensue from that of its mem­berships? I show that Aquinas has some philosophical arguments to put the community before the individual, but also some theological reasons to prefer the individual. At the end of the day, my interpretation is that, except for some hesitations that can be found in his writings, Aquinas subscribes to the view that the property of being a member of a political community, namely being a citizen, is a necessary but not an essential property for being a man. (shrink)

L'A. si occupa della ricezione della logica occamista, soprattutto in Stefano da Reate , dedicata in grande parte alla confutazione della nova loyca, rappresentata soprattutto dalla Summa logicae di Ockham. Stefano informa anche sulla grande presenza presso i Domenicani del commento di Pietro d'Alvernia all'Isagoge di Porfirio oltre allo Scriptum super Artem veterem di Graziadei da Ascoli. Accanto a questi testi sono utilizzati anche il Tractatus de sencundis intentionibus e i Quodlibeta di Erveo Natale. L'A. esamina un caso esemplare del (...) dibattito tra Ockham e i Domenicani italiani riguardante la natura del genere. Esiste solo un altro caso di rifiuto del pensiero occamista, quello della Loyca di Francesco da Prato. Francesco e Stefano mostrano di essere soprattutto interessati alla confutazione del programma riduzionista di Ockham. L'A. prende in esame l'interpretazione di Francesco e Stefano sull'Isagoge di Porfirio. (shrink)

Per trovare un'utilizzazione del problema posto in Z6 da Aristotele l'A. considera i testi di autori medievali relativi ai problemi dell'identità tra una realtà accidentale e la propria essenza. Anzitutto è ricostruito il testo aristotelico, poi sono sviluppate considerazioni sui modelli dell'interpretazione del tema nei secoli XIII e XIV. L'A. intende mostrare come le letture che in epoca moderna sono date del problema posto da Aristotele già si trovano in autori medievali e come tali soluzioni siano deducibili da un testo (...) aperto a diverse soluzioni interpretative. Infine, l'A. si interroga sulla rilevanza della problematica nella messa a punto del problema dello statuto ontologico degli accidenti. I testi esaminati sono cinque expositiones alla Metafisica, di Alberto, Tommaso d'Aquino, Antonio d'Andrea, Alessandro d'Alessandria e Paolo Veneto, oltre che questiones di Agostino Trionfo d'Ancona, Galfredo di Aspal, Pietro d'Alvernia e testi anonimi: Anonymus domus Petri, Anonymus Zimmermanni. (shrink)

Raccolta di saggi dedicati al Prof. Franco De Capitani.

Raccolta di saggi dedicati al Prof. Franco De Capitani.

Il pensatore domenicano Francesco da Prato, attivo nel secondo quarto del XIV sec. tra Perugia, Siena e Firenze, rappresenta una delle prime testimonianze in Italia della ricezione di Ockham e di reazione tomista alla sua logica. Lo studio si articola in due sezioni: nella prima l'A. esamina la dottrina della significazione nelle fonti principali degli scritti di logica di Francesco: Tommaso d'Aquino, Herveus Natalis e Guglielmo di Ockham; nella seconda analizza la posizione di Francesco in scritti trasmessi nei seguenti mss: (...) Firenze, BNC., Conv. Soppr. J.5.31 ; Conv. Soppr. B.3.173 e Roma, Bibl. Angelica 1053. (shrink)

Raccolta di saggi sulla storia della filosofia rinascimentale e moderna.

Aristotle begins the third chapter of book VIII of the Metaphysics by claiming that sometimes it is not clear whether a name refers to the composite substance or to the actuality and the form, for instance whether «animal» refers to the soul in a body or simply to the soul. In solving this problem, Aristotle states that the name «animal» can refer to both, not, however, in one and the same sense but rather by expressing two different senses which are (...) nonetheless related to each other. Nevertheless, Aristotle does not say anything concerning which of these two senses the name «animal» primarily expresses. This text of the Metaphysics gives to the medieval Latin commentators the occasion to deal with the topic of the signification of substantial names and, more particularly, to assess Averroes’s interpretation of Aristotle’s semantics. In the paper I attempt to reconstruct some important patterns of argument elaborated by thirteenth- and fourteenth-century commentators on the Metaphysics in their endeavor to solve the problem and to explain Averroes’s interpretation. (shrink)

Scholars paid scant attention to Giles of Rome’s Quaestiones methaphisicales. This is due to many reasons. The Quaestiones are likely the first of the Aristotelian commentaries written by Giles and all XVI-century printed editions conserve but a reportatio of the course on Metaphysics that Giles probably gave in Paris between 1268/1269 and 1271. Since Giles never edited the text of his lectures, we cannot be sure that Giles approved the list and the contents of the questions we may read today. (...) Moreover, the current list is also incomplete because a study of cross-references in Giles’ Aristotelian commentaries showed that Giles wrote other questions, not included in the list we have today. Despite of these features, Giles’ Quaestiones are import both historically and philosophically. They contribute to fixing the chronology of Giles’ first works and to illustrating the metaphysics of the early Giles. In particular, a close examination of the questions on Books VII and VIII of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, devoted to substance and accidents, shows various things. For example, the influence exerted by Averroes’s Commentary on Giles’s teaching and, accordingly, the pivotal role played by the notion of definition in the explanation of the essence of substance and accidents. More generally, such an examination permits us bringing to light the exegetical devices Giles used in order to reconcile Thomas Aquinas’s view of the primacy and unicity of substantial form with his idiomatic position that indeterminate dimensions must precede in some way substantial form. If this were not the case, Giles argues, we could not explain the process of particularization and multiplication of a form that is in itself ‘unparticular’. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:I. William of Ockham and Mental SynonymyIn recent years an important point of discussion among the scholars of William of Ockham has been the possibility of accounting for a reductionist interpretation of Ockham's mental language. Especially, the debate focused on the legitimacy of eliminating connotative simple terms from mental language by reducing them to their nominal definition. The distinction between absolute and connotative terms plays an important role in (...) Ockham's philosophy of language. Ockham introduces it as a subdivision of the class of categorematic terms, i.e. of the terms provided with signification, and such a distinction overlaps that between concrete and abstract terms. In the Summa Logicae, Part I, chap. 10, devoted to the explanation of such a distinction, Ockham makes three major claims concerning connotative terms.First, unlike absolute simple terms, connotative simple terms signify something primarily and something else secondarily. Paradigmatic examples of connotative simple terms are 'white' and 'father,' while instances of absolute terms are 'animal,' 'man,' and 'whiteness.' The term 'white' is connotative for it signifies something primarily while co-signifying something else secondarily .Second, unlike absolute simple terms, connotative simple terms do not have a real definition but only a nominal one. While a real definition is intended to capture the real essence of the defined thing, a nominal definition is none other than a linguistic explication of a name's signification. Only concrete and abstract terms of the category of substance, and abstract terms of the category of quality, can have a real definition. The reason is that, for Ockham, only individual substances and qualities can exist outside the mind, therefore only such entities can be grasped immediately and directly, by means of acts of intelligible intuitive cognition. Any other term can have only a nominal definition, for each of them can make reference to nothing but to fictive or only putatively existent entities. A nominal definition, in particular, is made in such a way that something is expressed in recto and something else in obliquo . Ockham indicates 'something having whiteness' as the nominal definition of 'white': in it, 'something' is expressed in recto, while 'whiteness' in obliquo.Third and finally, Ockham says that a connotative term has only one nominal definition, while an absolute term can have several real definitions.According to these claims, the problem of the existence of connotative terms in mental language might be reconstructed as follows. Ockham holds to two fundamental tenets about mental language and connotation: first, synonymous terms cannot be found in mental language and second, each connotative simple term can have only one nominal definition, as was said. Ockham is unequivocal about these principles in his works. But if an interpreter also supposes Ockham subscribing to the view that connotative simple terms are synonymous with their nominal definitions, the interpreter must conclude that, for Ockham, connotative simple terms and their nominal definitions cannot both be present in mental language. Nonetheless, since Ockham seems to admit the existence of both connotative simple terms and their nominal definitions in mental language, one of the previous sentences needs to be revised.Up to this day many proposals of revision have been put on the table, but it seems to me that they can be reduced to three principal ones.The first proposal suggests reconsidering claim , while preserving the reasoning -, since - are claims Ockham indisputably states. As is known, this was Paul V. Spade's initial position. The gist of Spade's influential argument was that connotative simple terms cannot exist in mental language for if they did, they would be synonymous with their fully expanded nominal definitions. According to , though, synonymy cannot be found in mental language. But Ockham grants the.. (shrink)

Talking of “medieval aesthetics” is historiographically disputable. During the Middle Ages, in fact, there is no discipline comparable with the aesthetics as from the eighteenth century we know it. In the medieval period, aesthetic considerations mostly occur in spurious contexts, and are all, so to say, pre-theoretical. They refer to different insights on what is the beautiful and what relationship holds between the beauty and its artistic expression. In the Middle Ages, that is, one can frequently encounters forms we would (...) nowadays call of descriptive aesthetics, occasionally forms of normative aesthetics, rather sporadically meta-aesthetic considerations. Not even a privileged attention is reserved to aesthetics understood as the description of the conditions of pleasure that follow from the perception of the beautiful, despite the theme of dilectum is important in the aesthetic meditations of medieval masters. Aesthetic discussions predominantly concern the relationships between the artist, an object and its representation. In this essay, I reconsider these relationships by discussing a key point of Thomas Aquinas’s reflection on the beauty: the role played by of the notion of representation in the explanation of the artistic process. (shrink)

When Ockham's logic arrives in Italy, some Dominican philosophers bring into question Ockham's ontological reductionist program. Among them, Franciscus de Prato and Stephanus de Reate pay a great attention to refute Ockham's claim that no universal exists in the extra-mental world. In order to reject Ockham's program, they start by reconsidering the notion of 'real', then the range of application of the rational and the real distinction. Generally, their strategy consists in re-addressing against Ockham some arguments extracted from Hervaeus Natalis's (...) works. Franciscus's and Stephanus's basic idea is that some universals are not acts of cognition, but extra-mental, predicable things. Such things are not separable from singulars, nonetheless they are not the same as those singulars. Consequently, it is not necessary to allow, as Ockham does, that if two things are not really identical, they are really different and hence really separable. According to them, it is possible to hold that two things are not really identical without holding that they are also really non-identical and hence really different. Basically, their reply relies on a different notion of the relation of identity. Identity is regarded as an intersection of classes of things, so that it is possible to say that two things are really identical without saying that they also are the same thing. Franciscus and Stephanus, however, do not seem to achieve completely their aim. (shrink)

Scholars paid scant attention to Giles of Rome’s Quaestiones methaphisicales. This is due to many reasons. The Quaestiones are likely the first of the Aristotelian commentaries written by Giles and all XVI-century printed editions conserve but a reportatio of the course on Metaphysics that Giles probably gave in Paris between 1268/1269 and 1271. Since Giles never edited the text of his lectures, we cannot be sure that Giles approved the list and the contents of the questions we may read today. (...) Moreover, the current list is also incomplete because a study of cross-references in Giles’ Aristotelian commentaries showed that Giles wrote other questions, not included in the list we have today. Despite of these features, Giles’ Quaestiones are import both historically and philosophically. They contribute to fixing the chronology of Giles’ first works and to illustrating the metaphysics of the early Giles. In particular, a close examination of the questions on Books VII and VIII of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, devoted to substance and accidents, shows various things. For example, the influence exerted by Averroes’s Commentary on Giles’s teaching and, accordingly, the pivotal role played by the notion of definition in the explanation of the essence of substance and accidents. More generally, such an examination permits us bringing to light the exegetical devices Giles used in order to reconcile Thomas Aquinas’s view of the primacy and unicity of substantial form with his idiomatic position that indeterminate dimensions must precede in some way substantial form. If this were not the case, Giles argues, we could not explain the process of particularization and multiplication of a form that is in itself ‘unparticular’. (shrink)

L’article présente l’édition critique du Traité sur l’être de raison de François de Prato, précédée d’une introduction historico-philosophique. Ce traité est une des premières réactions italiennes à la diffusion de la philosophie du langage et de la logique de Guillaume d’Occam. François y argumente contre la réduction occamiste de l’être de raison aux actes de connaissance, entendus comme des entités existant ‘subjectivement’ dans l’intellect. En suivant Thomas d’Aquin et Hervé de Nédellec, il développe au contraire une théorie relationnelle et ‘objective’ (...) de l’être de raison. (shrink)

Aristotle’s definitions of truth and falsity, on the one hand, and the relational and cognitive account of truth entailed from its transcendental nature, on the other hand, naturally lead later medieval philosophers towards correspondence theories of truth. Nonetheless in the later Middles Ages at least three versions of the correspondence theory can be found. Thomas Aquinas, in particular, proposed a mixed interpretation, bringing together metaphysical and semantical considerations.

In this study I aim at providing a new assessment of Ockham’s proof for God’s existence. After reconstructing Ockham’s views of the relationship between philosophy and theology , I move to examining Ockham’s criticism to some traditional arguments , before to scrutinizing closely Ockham’s argument. My main conclusion is that Ockham did not want to elaborate a new proof but to qualify the proof stemming from efficient causality, which he considers the only available way of demonstrating God’s existence.

In this essay, we reconsider two themes particularly discussed by the interpreters of Ockham: that of divine omnipotence and the hypothesis of the intuitive cognition of non-existent things. The purpose is to show that the hypothetical case considered by Ockham was subjected to opposite interpretations. For theological reasons, Ockham attributes not only to God but also to human beings the possibility of having acts of intuitive cognition of things that do not exist; nonetheless, he holds that it is contradictory for (...) God to give us the evident cognition of things that appear to be present when they are actually absent. Walter Chatton opposes this conclusion, arguing that no contradiction ensues from that hypothesis. Instead, he believes that it is impossible for God to give us the intuition of things that absolutely do not exist or are in no way present to us. Ockham’s arguments include some difficulties that Chatton acutely sees and discusses. In particular, Chatton calls into question Ockham’s missed distinction between the existence and the presence of the intuited thing. (shrink)

Truth is a key notion in Ockham’s philosophical reductionist program, a notion that has been the object of contrasting interpretations in scholarship. My interpretation is that, for Ockham, ‘being true’ expresses an epistemological relation, namely the one through which our mind reflects on a proposition of language, compares it with an extra-mental state of affairs, and thus ascertains their correspondence. Placing truth at a point of intersection of language with mind and reality, Ockham’s interpretation of Aristotle’s characterization of philosophy as (...) the science of truth comes to be innovative. For Ockham, philosophy is a meticulous training of interpretation of language in order to account correctly for the truth-value of propositions. (shrink)