Applying equity to health care is difficult and it is especially challenging when applied to cases that involve urgent military medicine care under resource scarcity. Part of the difficulty centers on the concept of equity itself. It is not clear what the best concept of equity applicable to medical care would be, or that there should be only one, or the same ones, across all levels of military health care. Despite the fact that equity (...) is a key concern in health care, particularly in the age of the COVID-19 pandemic, it may be that there is no single theory of justice that would be most justified for military physicians to use. This paper examines whether a hybrid position of equity might be both theoretically robust and applicable in practice. After briefly introducing the discussion, we outline four major philosophical definitions of equity – (1) Egalitarianism, (2) Prioritarianism, (3) Desertism, and (4) Sufficientism. We then report empirical findings suggesting that a practice-based hybrid concept of equity is used by physicians within the practice of micro-allocation. Our findings will shed lights on ethical justifications and reasoning which should guide medical rules for military and humanitarian health care providers. (shrink)

The question of how to allocate scarce medical resources has become an important public policy issue in recent decades. Cost-Utility Analysis is the most commonly used method for determining the allocation of these resources, but this book counters the argument that overcoming its inherent imbalances is simply a question of implementing methodological changes. The Economics of Resource-Allocation in Healthcare represents the first comprehensive analysis of equity weighting in health care resource allocation that offers a fundamental critique of its (...) basic framework. It offers a heterodox account of health economics, putting the discourse on economic evaluation into it broader socio-political context. Such an approach broadens the debate on fairness in health economics and ties it in with deeper rooted problems in moral philosophy. Ultimately, this interdisciplinary study calls for the adoption of a fundamentally different paradigm to address the distribution of scarce medical resources. This book will be of interest to policy makers, health care professionals or Post-Graduate students looking to broaden their understanding of the economics of the healthcare system. (shrink)

There has been much discussion about how to obtain legitimacy at macro-level priority setting in health care by use of fair procedures, but how should we consider priority setting by individual clinicians or health workers at the micro-level? Despite the fact that just health care totally hinges upon their decisions, surprisingly little attention seems being paid to the legitimacy of these decisions. This paper addresses the following question: what are the conditions that have to be (...) met in order to ensure that individual claims on health care are well aligned with an overall concept of just health care? Drawing upon a distinction between individual and aggregated needs, I argue that even though we assume the legitimacy of macro-level guidelines, this legitimacy is not directly transferable to decisions at micro-level simply by adherence to the guidelines’ recommendation. Further, I argue that individual claims are subject to the formal principle of equality and the demands of vertical and horizontal equity in a way that gives context- and patient-related equity concerns precedence over equity concerns captured at the macro-level. I conclude that if we aim to achieve just health care, we need to develop a complementary framework for legitimising individual judgment of patients’ claims on health care resources. Moreover, I suggest the basic structure of such a framework. (shrink)

This book is a comprehensive account of what it means to try to quantify health in distributing resources for health care. It examines the concept of QALYs which supposedly makes it more accurate to talk about life in terms of both quality and quantity of years lived when referring to health care policy. It offers an elegant new approach to comparing the costs and benefits of medical interventions. Cost-Utility Analysis is a method designed by economists (...) to aid decision makers distribute scarce resources to areas of health care where they will yield the greatest benefits. Erik Nord questions the feasibility of measuring patients' quality of life meaningfully in numerical terms, as CUA presupposes. He presents an alternative approach called cost-value analysis in which representative samples of the general public express preferences between different health-care programs. In this approach, subjects are allowed to include concerns for fairness that go beyond concerns for efficiency of conventional health economics. (shrink)

The ACA shifted U.S. health policy from centering on principles of actuarial fairness toward social solidarity. Yet four legal fixtures of the health care system have prevented the achievement of social solidarity: federalism, fiscal pluralism, privatization, and individualism. Future reforms must confront these fixtures to realize social solidarity in health care, American-style.

Health care organization is entering a new age. Focus is increasingly shifting from individual health care institutions to interorganizational collaboration and health care networks. Much hope is set on such networks which have been argued to improve economic efficiency and quality of care. However, this does not automatically mean they are always ethically justified. A relevant question that remains is what ethical obligations or duties one can ascribe to these networks especially because networks (...) involve many risks. Due to their often amorphous and complex structure, collective responsibility and accountability may increase while individual responsibility goes down. We argue that a business ethics approach to ethical obligations for health care networks, is problematic and we propose to opt for a patient perspective. Using the classic four principles of biomedical ethics it is possible to identify specific ethical duties. Based on the principle of justice, health care networks have an ethical duty to provide just and fair access for all patients and to be transparent to patients about how access is regulated. The principle of nonmaleficence implies an obligation to guarantee patient safety, whereas the principle of beneficence implies an obligation for health care networks to guarantee continuity of care in all its dimensions. Finally, the principle of autonomy is translated into a specific obligation to promote and respect patient choice. Networks that fail to meet any of these conditions are suspect and cannot be justified ethically. Faced with daunting challenges, the health care system is changing rapidly. Currently many hopes ride on integrated care and broad health care networks. Such networks are the topic of empirical debate, but more attention should be given to the ethical aspects. Health care networks raise new and pressing ethical issues and we are in need of a framework for assessing how and when such networks are justified. (shrink)

This book is a comprehensive account of what it means to try to quantify health in distributing resources for health care. It examines the concept of QALYs which supposedly makes it more accurate to talk about life in terms of both quality and quantity of years lived when referring to health care policy. It offers an elegant new approach to comparing the costs and benefits of medical interventions. Cost-Utility Analysis is a method designed by economists (...) to aid decision makers distribute scarce resources to areas of health care where they will yield the greatest benefits. Erik Nord questions the feasibility of measuring patients' quality of life meaningfully in numerical terms, as CUA presupposes. He presents an alternative approach called cost-value analysis in which representative samples of the general public express preferences between different health-care programs. In this approach, subjects are allowed to include concerns for fairness that go beyond concerns for efficiency of conventional health economics. (shrink)

It is argued that the primary aim of institutional management is to protect the moral integrity of health professionals without significantly compromising other important values and interests. Institutional policies are recommended as a means to promote fair, consistent, and transparent management of conscience-based refusals. It is further recommended that those policies include the following four requirements: (1) Conscience-based refusals will be accommodated only if a requested accommodation will not impede a patient’s/surrogate’s timely access to information, counseling, and referral. (2) (...) Conscience-based refusals will be accommodated only if a requested accommodation will not impede a patient’s timely access to health care services offered within the institution. (3) Conscience-based refusals will be accommodated only if the accommodation will not impose excessive burdens on colleagues, supervisors, department heads, other administrators, or the institution. (4) Whenever feasible, health professionals should provide advance notification to department heads or supervisors. Formal review may not be required in all cases, but when it is appropriate, several recommendations are offered about standards and the review process. A key recommendation is that when reviewing an objector’s reasons, contrary to what some have proposed, it is not appropriate to adopt an adversarial approach modelled on military review boards’ assessments of requests for conscientious objector status. According to the approach recommended, the primary function of reviews of objectors’ reasons is to engage them in a process of reflecting on the nature and depth of their objections, with the objective of facilitating moral clarity on the part of objectors rather than enabling department heads, supervisors, or ethics committees to determine whether conscientious objections are sufficiently genuine. (shrink)

First, the author argues that Daniels and Sabin’s way of setting priorities in healthcare is implausible. Daniels and Sanin think there is a lack of consensus on comprehensive principle(s) of justice that can resolve the issue of priority-setting in healthcare. Nevertheless, their argument appeals to the deliberative democracy-based idea of accountability for reasonableness that involve the conception of justice construed naturally as comprehensive. The author then proposes a comprehensive conception of justice, an equal opportunity-based principle of justice, with which the (...) issue of priority-setting can be resolved. Although Daniels addresses two critical issues on the equal opportunity-based principle of justice, the author contends that it can be defended in ways that overcome these issues while being applicable to priority-setting conditions. (shrink)

Throughout the post-World War II decades, the United States has wrestled in its own unique style with a problem that is shared by all modern societies: how to achieve a reasonably equitable distribution of health care, without losing control of total spending on health care, and without suffocating the delivery system with controls and regulations that inhibit technical progress.Because an equitable distribution of health care inevitably requires at least some government regulation, and because government (...) regulations tend to impose rigidity on any system, it is widely believed in the United States that a trade-off actually exists between fairness in the distribution of care and the health system’s ability to innovate. This troublesome trade-off bedevils American policy makers to this day. (shrink)

Throughout the post-World War II decades, the United States has wrestled in its own unique style with a problem that is shared by all modern societies: how to achieve a reasonably equitable distribution of health care, without losing control of total spending on health care, and without suffocating the delivery system with controls and regulations that inhibit technical progress.Because an equitable distribution of health care inevitably requires at least some government regulation, and because government (...) regulations tend to impose rigidity on any system, it is widely believed in the United States that a trade-off actually exists between fairness in the distribution of care and the health system’s ability to innovate. This troublesome trade-off bedevils American policy makers to this day. (shrink)

By describing societal value judgements in health care in numerical terms one may in theory increase the precision of guidelines for priority setting and allow decision makers to judge more accurately the degree to which different health care programs provide societal value for money. However, valuing health programs in terms of QALYs disregards salient societal concerns for fairness in resource allocation. A different kind of numerical valuation of medical interventions, that incorporates concerns for (...) class='Hi'>fairness, is described. The usefulness to decision makers of such numerical information remains to be tested. (shrink)

There is a growing feeling in many Western countries that every human being has a right to health, or a right to health care. This feeling is reflected in a declaration of the World Health Organization (WHO) from 1976, which states: The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition. Our intention in the following (...) is to use the WHO declaration as a basis for considering the allocation of resources in health care. We shall first argue that most of the criteria suggested as grounds for fair allocation of scarce medical resources have their difficulties if one tries to apply them one by one to medical practices. We shall then go on to claim that, if we take the right of all human beings to health or health care even moderately seriously, increasing the resources would in most cases be more ethical than attempting to allocate them ‘fairly’. (shrink)

Nurses and other medical practitioners often experience moral distress: they feel an anguished sense of responsibility for what they take to be their own moral failures, even when those failures were unavoidable. However, in such cases other people do not tend to think it is right to hold them responsible. This is an interesting mismatch of reactions. It might seem that the mismatch should be remedied by assuring the practitioner that they are not responsible, but I argue that this denies (...) something important that the phenomenon of moral distress tells us. In fact, both the practitioners’ tendencies to hold themselves responsible and other people’s reluctance to hold the practitioners responsible get something right. The practitioners may be right that they are responsible in the sense of having failed to meet a binding moral requirement, even when the requirement was impossible to meet. This makes moral distress a fitting response because it correctly represents their own action as a wrongdoing. However, others may meanwhile be right that the practitioners are not responsible in the sense of being culpable and blameworthy. To blame others, or oneself, for certain failures, including those that are unavoidable, would be unfair. My claim depends on distinguishing between the fittingness and the fairness of holding someone (including oneself) responsible for moral failure. Having drawn the distinction, I suggest that moral distress should be addressed in a way that both recognizes it as a fitting response and avoids the unfairness of blame. (shrink)

Social health disparities are increasing in most countries around the world. During the past two decades, a large amount of evidence has emerged about the health consequences of social inequalities. Despite such evidence, the concept of medical fairness, as traditionally defined by the World Medical Association, has remained unchallenged and even reinforced by some scholars who emphasize that doctors should remain neutral to the socioeconomic status of their patients when providing clinical care. The inconsistency between public (...) health and clinical care perspectives raises tension between a narrow interpretation of the ethics of justice, which stresses the importance of equality and impartiality, and the ethics of care, which highlights the importance of particularity and individuality in clinical practice. This article analyzes the concept of medical fairness using the emerging evidence that demonstrates the impact of social health disparities on clinical care. It proposes a new approach of medical fairness based on equity rather than on equality and provides a consistent ethical framework based on Paul Ricoeur’s three levels of medical judgments. This integrative framework provides a better balance between public health and clinical care in medical practice. (shrink)

Explicit forms of rationing have already been implemented in some countries, and many of these prioritization systems resort to Norman Daniels’ “accountability for reasonableness” methodology. However, a question still remains: is “accountability for reasonableness” not only legitimate but also fair? The objective of this paper is to try to adjust “accountability for reasonableness” to the World Health Organization’s holistic view of health and propose an evolutionary perspective in relation to the “normal” functioning standard proposed by Norman Daniels. To (...) accomplish this purpose the authors depart from the “normal” functioning standard to a model that promotes effective opportunity for everyone in health care access, because even within the “normal” functioning criteria some treatments and medical interventions should have priority upon others. Equal opportunity function is a mathematical function that helps to hierarchize moral relevant necessities in health care according to this point of view. It is concluded, first, that accountability for reasonableness is an extremely valuable tool to address the issue of setting limits in health care; second, that what is called in this paper “equal opportunity function” might reflect how accountability for reasonableness results in fair limit-setting decisions; and third, that this methodology must be further specified to best achieve fair limit-setting decisions. Indeed, when resources are especially scarce the methodology suggested in this paper might allow not only prioritizing in an “all or nothing” basis but can contribute to a hierarchy system of priorities in health care. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn The Netherlands, the public funding of a number of health care services is controversial. What can we learn from this about the moral concerns that underlie these judgements? And, if there is anything to learn, can we use this improved understanding to scrutinise the adequacy of particular decisions concerning the public funding of health care services? In the present paper, I will analyse three cases: corrective surgey, In Vitro Fertilisation and liver transplantation. I will summarise (...) the arguments that have been used to support or to challenge the public funding of these services. I will then assess the merits of Daniels’fair equality of opportunity account of justice in health care. Can this account improve our understanding of the moral concerns underlying our judgements about the public funding of these services? Can it serve to scrutinise the adequacy of particular decisions that are made concerning the public funding of health care services? My answer to both questions will be a qualified yes. Daniels’account can provide guidance, but not because we can deductively infer from it what is right and what is wrong. Instead, I will argue for a more casuistic use of the concept of fair equality of opportunity. (shrink)

That the maximization of quality-adjusted life years violates concerns for fairness is well known. One approach to face this issue is to elicit fairness preferences of the public empirically and to incorporate the corresponding equity weights into cost-utility analysis (CUA). It is thereby sought to encounter the objections by means of an axiological modification while leaving the value-maximizing framework of CUA intact. Based on the work of Lübbe (2005, 2009a, 2009b, 2010, forthcoming), this paper questions this strategy and (...) scrutinizes the concomitant assumptions concerning the nature of prioritization decisions. Empirical studies indicate that these premises are in fact unwarranted. People chose a certain resource allocation because they perceive it as a fair way to treat the persons concerned, not because it maximizes something valuable, and it is questionable if prioritization decision can be represented as value-maximizing choices at all. This reflection on the fundamental distinction between deontological and consequentialist reasoning bears general implications for the scope of ‘economic imperialism.’. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In The Netherlands, the public funding of a number of health care services is controversial. What can we learn from this about the moral concerns that underlie these judgements? And, if there is anything to learn, can we use this improved understanding to scrutinise the adequacy of particular decisions concerning the public funding of health care services? In the present paper, I will analyse three cases: corrective surgey, In Vitro Fertilisation and liver transplantation. I will (...) summarise the arguments that have been used to support or to challenge the public funding of these services. I will then assess the merits of Daniels’fair equality of opportunity account of justice in health care. Can this account improve our understanding of the moral concerns underlying our judgements about the public funding of these services? Can it serve to scrutinise the adequacy of particular decisions that are made concerning the public funding of health care services? My answer to both questions will be a qualified yes. Daniels’account can provide guidance, but not because we can deductively infer from it what is right and what is wrong. Instead, I will argue for a more casuistic use of the concept of fair equality of opportunity. (shrink)

As the only nation in the western world without a national health insurance program, the United States faces ongoing issues of access and fairness in health care coverage. The Clinton administration tried and failed to address the problem of universal coverage. Since then we have focused on the narrower, but nonetheless real, issues of fairness and equity in the benefits package provided in insurance plans. The LORAN Commission spent two years trying to devise agreed-upon principles (...) to govern such issues. The lesson learned was the same as that of the Ethics Force study: there was no possibility of getting agreement, let alone consensus, among the participants on how to decide what should be a covered benefit. There were, however, two generally agreed upon principles that emerged regarding health care: “Every individual should be treated alike,” and “When it comes to health, cost cannot be a consideration.” That formula translated into providing everyone with everything. The only certain outcome from such a policy would be fiscal insolvency and ultimately bankruptcy. (shrink)

Proposals for health care cost containment emphasize high-value care as a way to control spending without compromising quality. When used in this context, ‘value’ refers to outcomes in relation to cost. To determine where health spending yields the most value, it is necessary to compare the benefits provided by different treatments. While many studies focus narrowly on health gains in assessing value, the notion of benefit is sometimes broadened to include overall quality of life. This (...) paper explores the implications of using subjective quality of life measures for value assessment. This approach is claimed to be more respectful of patients and better capture the perspectival nature of quality of life. Even if this is correct, though, subjective measurement also raises challenging issues of interpersonal comparability when used to study health outcomes. Because such measures do not readily distinguish benefits due to medical interventions from benefits due to personal or other factors, they are not easily applied to the assessment of treatment value. I argue that when the outcome of interest in value assessment is broadened to include quality of life, the cost side of these measures should also be broadened. I show how one philosophical theory of well-being, Jason Raibley’s “agential flourishing” theory, can be adapted for use in quality of life research to better fit the needs and aims of value assessment in health care. Finally, I briefly note some implications of this argument for debates about fairness in health care allocations. (shrink)

Recent disputes over whether older people should pay more for health insurance, or receive lower priority for transplantable organs, highlight broader disagreements regarding the legality of using age-based criteria in health care. These debates will likely intensify given the changing age structure of the American population and the turmoil surrounding the financing of American health care. This Article provides a comprehensive examination of the legality and normative desirability of age-based criteria. I defend a distributive justice (...) approach to age-based criteria and contrast it with two prevailing theoretical approaches to age-based criteria, nondiscrimination and discretion. I propose a detailed normative framework for the use of age-based criteria in health care, the lifetime justice approach, that considers the future life patients can gain from treatment and the past years of life they already have experienced. -/- This paper is available by open access from the Boston College Law School Digital Commons. (shrink)

An incisive examination of bioethics and American healthcare, and their profound affects on American culture over the last sixty years, from two eminent scholars. An eye-opening look at the inevitable moral choices that come along with tremendous medical progress, Everybody Wants to Go to Heaven but Nobody Wants to Die is a primer for all Americans to talk more honestly about health care. Beginning in the 1950s when doctors still paid house calls but regularly withheld the truth from (...) their patients, Amy Gutmann and Jonathan D. Moreno explore an unprecedented revolution in health care and explain the problem with America’s wanting everything that medical science has to offer without debating its merits and its limits. The result: Americans today pay far more for health care while having among the lowest life expectancies and highest infant mortality of any affluent nation. Gutmann and Moreno—“incisive, influential, and pragmatic thinkers” (Arthur Caplan)—demonstrate that the stakes have never been higher for prolonging and improving life. From health care reform and death-with-dignity to child vaccinations and gene editing, they explain how bioethics came to dominate the national spotlight, leading and responding to a revolution in doctor-patient relations, a burgeoning world of organ transplants, and new reproductive technologies that benefit millions but create a host of legal and ethical challenges. With striking examples, the authors show how breakthroughs in cancer research, infectious disease, and drug development provide Americans with exciting new alternatives, yet often painful choices. They address head-on the most fundamental challenges in American health care: Why do we pay so much for health care while still lacking universal coverage? How can medical studies adequately protect individuals who volunteer for them? What’s fair when it comes to allocating organs for transplants in truly life-and-death situations? A lucid and provocative blend of history and public policy, this urgent work exposes the American paradox of wanting to have it all without paying the price. (shrink)

Priority setting (also known as resource allocation or rationing) occurs at every level of every health system and is one of the most significant health care policy questions of the 21st century. Because it is so prevalent and context specific, improving priority setting in a health system entails improving it in the institutions that constitute the system. But, how should this be done? Normative approaches are necessary because they help identify key values that clarify policy choices, (...) but insufficient because different approaches lead to different conclusions and there is no consensus about which ones are correct, and they are too abstract to be directly used in actual decision making. Empirical approaches are necessary because they help to identify what is being done and what can be done, but are insufficient because they cannot identify what should be done. Moreover, to be really helpful, an improvement strategy must utilize rigorous research methods that are able to analyze and capture experience so that past problems are corrected and lessons can be shared with others. Therefore, a constructive, practical and accessible improvement strategy must be research-based and combine both normative and empirical methods. In this paper we propose a research-based improvement strategy that involves combining three linked methods: case study research to describe priority setting; interdisciplinary research to evaluate the description using an ethical framework; and action research to improve priority setting. This describe-evaluate-improve strategy is a generalizable method that can be used in different health care institutions to improve priority setting in that context. (shrink)

Modern health care rhetoric promotes choice and individual patient rights as dominant values. Yet we also accept that in any regime constrained by finite resources, difficult choices between patients are inevitable. How can we balance rights to liberty, on the one hand, with equity in the allocation of scarce resources on the other? For example, the duty of health authorities to allocate resources is a duty owed to the community as a whole, rather than to specific individuals. (...) Macro-duties of this nature are founded on the notion of equity and fairness amongst individuals rather than personal liberty. They presume that if hard choices have to be made, they will be resolved according to fair and consistent principles which treat equal cases equally, and unequal cases unequally.In this paper, we argue for greater clarity and candour in the health care rights debate. With this in mind, we discuss (1) private and public rights, (2) negative and positive rights, (3) procedural and substantive rights, (4) sustainable health care rights and (5) the New Zealand booking system for prioritising access to elective services. This system aims to consider: individual need and ability to benefit alongside the resources made available to elective health services in an attempt to give the principles of equity practical effect. We describe a continuum on which the merits of those, sometimes competing, values—liberty and equity—can be evaluated and assessed. (shrink)

The Ethics Working Group of Clinton's Health Care Task Force developed a list of principles and values that should govern health care reform. These principles and values are compatible with central moral and political traditions, as well as with more rigorous theoretical accounts of justice and health care, but they are "freestanding" points of agreement, not presupposing any particular theoretical background. Though imprecise and not ranked by priorities, the principles guide thinking about the (...) class='Hi'>fairness of alternative reform proposals. Their use is illustrated by comparing alternatives on universality of access, phase-in period, the creation of unequal tiers, and the provision for wise allocation and rationing. Keywords: principles, health care reform, rationing, universal access CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Distributive justice on the income and on the service aspects is the most vexing modern day problem for the creation and maintenance of an all inclusive health care system. A pervasive problem of all current schemes is the lack of effective cost control, which continues to result in increasing burdens for all public and private stakeholders. This proposal posits that the responsibility and financial obligation to achieve an ideal outcome of equal and affordable access and benefits for all (...) citizens is misplaced. The Good Samaritan demonstrated basic ethical principles, which are revisited, elaborated and integrated into a new approach to health care. The participants are limited to individual contributors and beneficiaries and organized as a citizen carried, closed, independent, and self-sufficient self-governing cooperative for their own and the benefit of a minority of disadvantaged health care consumers. The government assumes oversight, provides arbitration, enforces democratic decision making, a scheme of progressive taxation, a separate and transparent accounting system, and a balance between income and reinvestment in health care. The results are a fair distribution of cost, its effective control, and increased individual motivation to take on responsibility for personal health as a private good and a sharpened focus towards community health. At the sociopolitical level the government as well as employers are released from the inappropriate burden of catering to individual health. (shrink)

Tragic choices arise during the COVID-19 pandemic when the limited resources made available in acute medical settings cannot be accessed by all patients who need them. In these circumstances, healthcare rationing is unavoidable. It is important in any healthcare rationing process that the interests of the community are recognised, and that decision-making upholds these interests through a fair and consistent process of decision-making. Responding to recent calls to safeguard individuals’ legal rights in decision-making in intensive care, and for new (...) authoritative national guidance for decision-making, this paper seeks to clarify what consistency and fairness demand in healthcare rationing during the COVID-19 pandemic, from both a legal and ethical standpoint. The paper begins with a brief review of UK law concerning healthcare resource allocation, considering how community interests and individual rights have been marshalled in judicial deliberation about the use of limited health resources within the National Health Service. It is then argued that an important distinction needs to be drawn between procedural and outcome consistency, and that a procedurally consistent decision-making process ought to be favoured. Congruent with the position that UK courts have adopted for resource allocation decision-making in the NHS more generally, specific requirements for a procedural framework and substantive triage criteria to be applied within that framework during the COVID-19 pandemic are considered in detail. (shrink)

The commentary brings up two topics. The first concerns whether and how a patient’s socioeconomic status should count in clinical care. We provide a brief summary of Puschel and colleagues’ view and discuss it in relation to other accounts. We share their conclusion; considering SES in clinical care can be justified from a fairness perspective. Yet, we question the claim that this is a new perspective, and argue that the reason for the claim of novelty is an (...) insufficient use of references. This leads to the second topic, which is a discussion of citation practices in philosophical/ethics papers. We describe common deviations from academic standards, and suggest how unfortunate practices can be reduced. (shrink)

Distribution of sufficient health care resources to the maximum number of people in LIC is the central theme of the book. Bangladesh is taken as a representative of low income countries (LIe. In LIC, there is scarcity of health care resources like other resources but the deserving persons are numerous. Therefore, it requires an efficient distribution of resources. Considering 'Inequality to get access to health care' as the basic problem in LIC, John Rawls' principle (...) of fair equality of opportunity is proposed to apply to give people access to health care resources. In this book it is critically analyzed how the principle fails to return a good result in LIC. Instead the principle of maximizing utility is proposed for the purpose. It is argued that maximum number of people can be provided sufficient health care by applying the principle. The principle has also been justified theoretically in concerned low income country and a fruitful result has been achieved from the test. It is claimed that applying principle of utility to provide sufficient health care to the maximum number of people is the most efficient way of health care resources distribution in LIC. (shrink)

Hastings Center Report, Volume 52, Issue 3, Page 34-36, May–June 2022.

I agree with Professor ter Meulen that there is no need to make a forced choice between “justice” and “solidarity” when it comes to determining what should count as fair access to needed health care. But he also asserts that solidarity is more fundamental than justice. That claim needs critical assessment. Ter Meulen recognizes that the concept of solidarity has been criticized for being excessively vague. He addresses this criticism by introducing the more precise notion of “humanitarian solidarity.” (...) However, I argue that these notions are still not precise enough and are in need of behavioral translation, especially in relation to the problem of fair health care rationing. More specifically, I argue that translation ought to take the form of a well-ordered process of rational democratic deliberation, which I describe and defend in this essay. Such a process is what is required to construct a working model of just solidarity as opposed to a merely abstract idealization of just solidarity. (shrink)

A complex interaction of ideological, financial, social, and moral factors makes the financial sustainability of health care systems a challenge across the world. One difficulty is that some of the moral commitments of some health care systems collide with reality. In particular, commitments to equality in access to health care and to fair equality of opportunity undergird an unachievable promise, namely, to provide all with the best of basic health care. In addition, (...) commitments to fair equality of opportunity are in tension with the existence of families, because families are aimed at advantaging their own members in preference to others. Because the social-democratic state is committed to fair equality of opportunity, it offers a web of publicly funded entitlements that make it easier for persons to exit the family and to have children outside of marriage. In the United States, in 2008, 41% of children were born outside of wedlock, whereas, in 1940, the percentage was only 3.8%, and in 1960, 5%, with the further consequence that the social and financial capital generated through families, which aids in supporting health care in families, is diminished. In order to explore the challenge of creating a sustainable health care system that also supports the traditional family, the claims made for fair equality of opportunity in health care are critically reconsidered. This is done by engaging the expository device of John Rawls’s original position, but with a thin theory of the good that is substantively different from that of Rawls, one that supports a health care system built around significant copayments, financial counseling, and compulsory savings, with a special focus on enhancing the financial and social capital of the family. This radical recasting of Rawls, which draws inspiration from Singapore, is undertaken as a heuristic to aid in articulating an approach to health care allocation that can lead past the difficulties of social-democratic policy. (shrink)

The health care systems are fairly similar in theScandinavian countries. The exact details vary, but inall three countries the system is almost exclusivelypublicly funded through taxation, and most (or all)hospitals are also publicly owned and managed. Thecountries also have a fairly strong primary caresector (even though it varies between the countries),with family physicians to various degrees acting asgatekeepers to specialist services. In Denmark most ofthe GP services are free. For the patient in Norwayand Sweden there are out-of-pocket co-payments (...) for GPconsultations, with upper limits, but consultations forchildren are free. Hospital treatment is free inDenmark while the other countries use a system without-of-pocket co-payment. There is a very strongpublic commitment to access to high quality healthcare for all. Solidarity and equality form theideological basis for the Scandinavian welfare state.Means testing, for instance, has been widely rejectedin the Scandinavian countries on the grounds thatpublic services should not stigmatise any particulargroup. Solidarity also means devoting specialconsideration to the needs of those who have lesschance than others of making their voices heard orexercising their rights. Issues of limited access arenow, however, challenging the thinking about a healthcare system based on solidarity. (shrink)

Americans' appetite for life-prolonging therapies has led to unsustainable growth in health care costs. It is tempting to target older people for health care rationing based on their disproportionate use of health care resources and lifespan already lived, but aged-based rationing is unacceptable to many. Systems reforms can improve the efficiency of health care and may lessen pressure to ration services, but difficult choices still must be made to limit expensive, marginally beneficial (...) interventions. In the absence of agreement on principles to govern health care resource allocation, a fair, open priority-setting process should be created to allow for reasonable disagreement on principles while being seen as legitimate by all stakeholders. At the patient-care level, careful discussions about the benefits and burdens of medical intervention and support for slow medicine — a gentle, family-centered care approach for frail elders — can do much to avoid harming these patients with aggressive yet unwanted medical care while reducing wasteful spending. (shrink)

A complex interaction of ideological, financial, social, and moral factors makes the financial sustainability of health care systems a challenge across the world. One difficulty is that some of the moral commitments of some health care systems collide with reality. In particular, commitments to equality in access to health care and to fair equality of opportunity undergird an unachievable promise, namely, to provide all with the best of basic health care. In addition, (...) commitments to fair equality of opportunity are in tension with the existence of families, because families are aimed at advantaging their own members in preference to others. Because the social-democratic state is committed to fair equality of opportunity, it offers a web of publicly funded entitlements that make it easier for persons to exit the family and to have children outside of marriage. In the United States, in 2008, 41% of children were born outside of wedlock, whereas, in 1940, the percentage was only 3.8%, and in 1960, 5%, with the further consequence that the social and financial capital generated through families, which aids in supporting health care in families, is diminished. In order to explore the challenge of creating a sustainable health care system that also supports the traditional family, the claims made for fair equality of opportunity in health care are critically reconsidered. This is done by engaging the expository device of John Rawls's original position, but with a thin theory of the good that is substantively different from that of Rawls, one that supports a health care system built around significant copayments, financial counseling, and compulsory savings, with a special focus on enhancing the financial and social capital of the family. This radical recasting of Rawls, which draws inspiration from Singapore, is undertaken as a heuristic to aid in articulating an approach to health care allocation that can lead past the difficulties of social-democratic policy. (shrink)

: Bioethical discussion of justice in health care has been much enlivened in recent years by new developments in the theory of rationing and by the emergence of a strong communitarian voice. Unfortunately, these developments have not enjoyed much in the way of close engagement with feminist-inspired reflections on power, privilege, and justice. I hope here to promote interchange between "mainstream" treatments of justice in health care and feminist thought.

Is it possible to use the courts - or rights instruments - to advance fair access to health care? This article examines this question within the context of the Norwegian public health care system - one special example of the Scandinavian welfare system. In particular, it asks four basic questions: What are the normative justifications for rights to health care? What were the political processes and concerns leading up to the current Patients Rights Act (...) in Norway? What kind of legal status do these rights have? How can rights to access be implemented?Patient rights do not only concern the right to access to health care; they also include the right to information, the right to participate in decision-making, and informed consent. This article examines only the former aspect, the use of the legal system to secure access to prioritized specialized health care services. (shrink)

Is it possible to use the courts - or rights instruments - to advance fair access to health care? This article examines this question within the context of the Norwegian public health care system - one special example of the Scandinavian welfare system. In particular, it asks four basic questions: What are the normative justifications for rights to health care? What were the political processes and concerns leading up to the current Patients Rights Act (...) in Norway? What kind of legal status do these rights have? How can rights to access be implemented?Patient rights do not only concern the right to access to health care; they also include the right to information, the right to participate in decision-making, and informed consent. This article examines only the former aspect, the use of the legal system to secure access to prioritized specialized health care services. (shrink)

Digital health includes applications for smartphones and smart speakers as well as more traditional ways to access health information electronically, such as through your health care provider's online web‐based patient portal. As the number of digital health offerings—such as smartphone health trackers and web‐based patient portals—grows, what benefit do ethics, or bioethics, perspectives bring to digital health product development? For starters, the field of bioethics is concerned about issues of social justice, including equitable (...) benefit and minimization and fair distribution of the burden of harms. Researchers who employ user‐centered design methods should consider what digital health applications and products would look like if issues like equity and accessibility were foregrounded throughout design and development. One group whose needs are often neglected in the design of digital health products is older adults. Many people anticipate that the digital divide among older adults will close as the current generation of tech‐savvy consumers ages up. But since technology is constantly evolving, this divide may be constantly recreated. As bioethics moves ever further into the technology era, I want it to be mindful of the creation of digital health care disparities. (shrink)

The Government in the UK is encouraging consumerism within health care and is requiring Health Authorities to consult with the public on prioritisation of resources. Public consultation within the National Health Service (NHS) has had limited success in the past. Many of the techniques used are flawed. Despite the limited scope of the public surveys conducted so far, a number of themes have emerged: — a willingness to pay for experimental, ‘high‐tech’ life‐saving treatments rather than more (...) cost‐effective treatments which will improve quality of life, which are more likely to maximise utility from the scarce resources available; — preference for treating the young rather than the old; — preference for treating patients with dependants (e.g. spouse, children) rather than those who have none; — a willingness to discriminate against those patients who were partially responsible for their illness due to choice of `unhealthy' lifestyle (e.g. smoking cigarettes, drinking excess alcohol). These public preferences raise ethical problems. For example, is it just to spend more on heroic treatments which are likely to fail? Is there a right to health care irrespective of whether you have had ‘a fair innings’ or whether a patient is in part responsible for their illness due to an unhealthy lifestyle? If there are ethical concerns about these preferences, should health authorities consult with the public at all? Is human life and suffering incommensurable, and hence is it impossible to prioritise anyway? Some of the ethical consequences of using empirical data on public preferences are discussed. (shrink)

In this book by the award-winning author of Just Healthcare, Norman Daniels develops a comprehensive theory of justice for health that answers three key questions: what is the special moral importance of health? When are health inequalities unjust? How can we meet health needs fairly when we cannot meet them all? Daniels' theory has implications for national and global health policy: can we meet health needs fairly in ageing societies? Or protect health in (...) the workplace while respecting individual liberty? Or meet professional obligations and obligations of justice without conflict? When is an effort to reduce health disparities, or to set priorities in realising a human right to health, fair? What do richer, healthier societies owe poorer, sicker societies? Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly explores the many ways that social justice is good for the health of populations in developed and developing countries. (shrink)

Patients and physicians often perceive the current health care system to be unfair, in part because of the ways in which coverage decisions appear to be made. To address this problem the Ethical Force Program, a collaborative effort to create quality improvement tools for ethics in health care, has developed five content areas specifying ethical criteria for fair health care benefits design and administration. Each content area includes concrete recommendations and measurable expectations for performance (...) improvement, which can be used by those organizations involved in the design and administration of health benefits packages, such as purchasers, health plans, benefits consultants, and practitioner groups. (shrink)

In health care systems where access to resources is limited, priorities must be set. The Canadian health care system relies on physicians as clinical or micro-level gatekeepers to health care access. Several studies have indicated that physicians do not tend to consider distributive justice concerns when making clinical-level resource allocation decisions. This is concerning, given that the normative literature on micro-level rationing has featured justice considerations as a necessary condition for fair decision-making. I will (...) first discuss the basics of bedside rationing and some studies which identify a possible justice “value deficit.” I will then analyze the relevant normative frameworks in the rationing literature to identify if and where decision-making may be falling short. Finally, I will use Beauchamp and Childress’ fifth and sixth editions of Principles of Biomedical Ethics to examine whether justice in micro-level rationing is best conceptualized as a principle or a virtue. (shrink)

Most of us have two strong intuitions (or sets of intuitions) in relation to fairness in health care systems that are funded by public money, whether through taxation or compulsory insurance. The first intuition is that such a system has to treat patients (and other users) fairly, equitably, impartially, justly and without discrimination. The second intuition is that doctors, nurses and other health care professionals are allowed to, and may even in some cases be obligated (...) to give preference to the interests of their particular patients or clients over the interests of other patients or clients of the system. These two intuitions are in potential conflict. One of the most obvious ways in which to ensure impartiality in a health care system is to require impartiality of all actors in the system, i.e. to give health care professionals a duty to treat everyone impartially and to deny them the ‘right’ to give their patients preferential treatment. And one of the possible side-effects of allowing individual health care professionals to give preference to ‘their clients’ is to create inequality in health care. This paper explores the conflict and proposes that it can be right to give preference to ‘your’ patients in certain circumstances. (shrink)

Many health care professionals (HCPs) are understandably reluctant to treat patients in environments infested with bedbugs, in part due to the risk of themselves becoming bedbug vectors to their own homes and workplaces. However, bedbugs are increasingly widespread in care settings, such as nursing homes, as well as in private homes visited by HCPs, leading to increased questions of how health care organizations and their staff ought to respond. This situation is associated with a range (...) of ethical considerations including the duty of care, stigmatization, vulnerability, confidentiality, risks for third parties, and professional autonomy. In this article, we analyze these issues using a case study approach. We consider how patients whose living environments are infested with bedbugs can receive care in the community setting in a manner that supports their well-being, is consistent with fairness in care provision, and takes into account risks for HCPs and third parties. We also discuss limits and obstacles to the provision of care in these situations. (shrink)