Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) was concerned that early Islamic philosophers were leaning too heavily and uncritically on Aristotelian and Neoplatonic ideas in developing their models of God and His relation to the world. He argued that their views were not only irreligious, but philosophically problematic, and he defended an alternative view aimed at staying closer to the Qur’an and the beliefs of the ordinary Muslim. Ibn Rushd (1126-1198) responded to al-Ghazali’s critique and developed a sophisticated Aristotelian view. The present chapter explores their (...) views in light of a problem facing any philosophical model of God in Islam or classical theism more generally, the problem of conceiving of God’s nature and relation to the world in a way that places an appropriate distance between God and humans. On the one hand, we want a notion of God that is not overly anthropomorphic, or that does not make him to be too much like us. On the other hand, we want to be able to say something positive and substantive about God. And we want to do this while preserving the harmony of reason and revelation, of philosophy and religion, as much as possible. (shrink)
This examination of the mythification of al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī shows how the transformation of his historical person into a complete myth was accomplished, along with the groups responsible for making him say and do what legitimizes their own views and practices.
This book offers an account of the life and thought of al-Ḥasan ar-Raṣṣāṣ , who was among the most influential theologians of Yemeni Zaydism. Dieses Buch untersucht Leben und Denken von al-Ḥasan ar-Raṣṣāṣ , einem der einflussreichsten Theologen der jemenitischen Zaydiyya.
This paper deals with Abū Bakr Ibn al-‘Arabī’s Ash‘arite theological perspective. He chose to adopt Ash‘arism because he believes that God chose certain figures to safeguard religion and the most important one among them is Abu al-Hasan al-Ash‘arī from whom correct theology spread from one generation of disciples to another. His education at Nidhamiyya College and Abu Hamid al-Ghazali’s tutorship might also be responsible for his preference for Ash‘arism. However, even though he was al-Ghazali’s student, he was not attracted (...) by Sufism, instead keeping his focus on theology. He objected to Sufism for two defects he perceived it to possess. First is Sufis’ references to fake Hadiths and second the Sufi practice of self-mortification. As a devoted Ash‘arite, he consistently opposes the anthropomorphic interpretation of God’s nature espoused by the Hanbalites and the Dhahirite. (shrink)
El texto anónimo del 'Kitab mafajir al-barbar' y la guerra contra Hasan b. Qannun se analizan para mostrar la extensión de la autoridad de los Banu Marwan en al-Magrib. Esta se basa en la distribución de presentes de honor - jil'a - y monedas entre los jefes Imazigen y los miembros de la estirpe idrisí.
: Skepticism as doubts about religious knowledge played a significant role in the intellectual reflection of the fourth and fifth Islamic centuries, a period of considerable plurality within Islam on many levels. Such skepticism was directed at revealed knowledge that spelled out the customs and norms particular to the Islamic way of life. Doubts were pushed by theologians who, themselves caught within a web of "parity of evidence" between the various schools of Islam, saw little hope of verifying the superiority (...) of Muslim ways over those of other communities, and Muslim intellectuals who viewed the particular religio-moral practices of Islam as shamefully atavistic and primitive, seeking instead to table "visible" religion for an esoterically conceived one. Against such detractors, a significant scholar of the period, Abū l-Hasan al-'Āmirī, constructed a philosophical defense of exoteric Islam, arguing in Aristotelian terms for the superiority of religio-moral knowledge over philosophical knowledge in light of the greater benefit of the former to the welfare of society and the superiority of Islamic religio-moral knowledge, since, he claims, it squares with logic more than any other communal way of life. The argument, one of many seeking to come to terms with the intellectual vagaries of the day, demonstrates how skepticism pushed scholars to explore more profoundly the nature of religion. In al-'Āmirī's case, his argument, metaphysically based with mystical inclinations, set the stage for later articulations of Islamic religiosity that integrated the human mind into the arena of Islam's revealed way of life. (shrink)
Three divine attributes discussed in the classical ages of Islamic theology were established as a doctrine in time, and the other doctrines of divine attributes were removed from the Sunnī theology. Divine knowledge is an attribute whose activity is generally to know all possible options about the universe, while the divine will is another attribute whose activity is to choose only one of the similar or dissimilar options. But they are seen incompatible when considered in the frame of God’s relationship (...) to the universe: if it is obviously known which option will happen, it is not really chosen at the moment of choice, and if it is uncertain which option will be chosen, it cannot be known which option will happen until preference. What is problematic here is that you attempt to design the divine attributes and actions according to two-valued logic: His all activities must happen one after another. Then, which solution is proposed for the issue by al-Ghazālī, who claims that knowledge and the will are the mutually compatible and complementary attributes for God’s relationship to the universe? I discuss whether al-Ghazālī supports his claim with adequate arguments or not. (shrink)