4 found
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  1.  12
    Ethnicity in Nigeria.Fasiku Gbenga - 2008 - Philosophia Africana 11 (2):141-156.
  2.  36
    Phenomenal Characters of Mental States and Emerging Issues in African Philosophy of Mind.Fasiku Gbenga & Oyelakin Richard Taye - 2011 - Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya 3 (1):131-143.
    There is a prevalent assumption that the phenomenal character of a mental experience is an ontological property existing as part of the fabric of the world. This implies that the problem of explaining the phenomenal property of a mental experience is a metaphysical one. Contrary to this assumption, the present paper argues that phenomenal properties of mental experiences are the results of our epistemological perspectives of the world. Consequently, the paper contends that in developing issues for African Philosophy of Mind, (...)
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  3.  20
    Thinking as a Dialogue: Phenomenality and Embodied Cognition in Yorùbá Thought System.Fasiku Gbenga - 2020 - Culture and Dialogue 8 (1):116-128.
    A thought is a mental state with a phenomenal aspect; it is essentially subjective. However, in Yorùbá thought system, a thought involves third persons or objective perspectival aspects. This is contrary to the nature of thoughts, hence the need to explain how the distinct properties of subjectivity and objectivity are found in Yorùbá thoughts system. The paper is divided into three parts. The first explores the nature of phenomenality in human mental states. The second explains that the Yorùbá thoughts system (...)
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  4.  4
    Towards a Neuroidentity Theory of Qualia.Fasiku Gbenga - 2014 - Philosophia: International Journal of Philosophy (Philippine e-journal) 15 (1):40-49.
    Arguments against the plausibility of a scientific theory of consciousness are hinged on the ground that attached to mental consciousness are phenomenal properties, also known as qualia, which are not amenable to any scientific theory. This paper develops and defends a neuroidentity hypothesis that purports to show that qualia, which are identified as neuroqualia, are the same as some neurochemical interactions in the central nervous system. The neuroidentity hypothesis is offered as a possible way of moving closer to a probable (...)
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