Reinhold’s Elementary Philosophy is the first system of transcendental philosophy after Kant. Recent scholarship has understood it as a model of Grundsatzphilosophie, as a defense of the concept of freedom, or as a shift from philosophy to history of philosophy. The present book, translated from Italian language, emphasizes another golden thread in Reinhold’s works from 1784–94 and regards his philosophy as a system of transcendental psychology.

This paper aims to show how Th eodor Conrad’s theory of meaning goes beyond that of Husserl. By drawing on an unedited typescript dating from the 1950s in which the Munich phenomenologist outlines the controversy between Husserl and the so-called Munich-Göttingen group, I interpret the Bezeichnung–Kennzeichung opposition that Conrad introduces in an article from 1910 as a realist position opposing Husserl’s act-phenomenological concept of meaning. This position stands in contrast not only to the phansisch or phänologisch theory of meaning in (...) the Logical Investigations, but also to the new definition of meaning as phänomenologische Bedeutung that Husserl proposes in his 1908 lectures. Conrad advocates a Gegenstandsphänomenologie, for which the main point of a phenomenological theory of meaning is not, like for Husserl, the intentional acts of the subject but rather the qualities of the object to which the meaning refers. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the objections of Adolf Reinach to Kant’s transcendental apriorism, shedding light on (1) the speculative distance separating their conceptions of philosophy (namely Reinach’s phenomenology and Kant’s transcendental critique), and (2) the consequential misunderstanding which is at the core of Reinach’s confrontation with Kant. In particular, attention is paid to the issue of the transcendental constitution of objectness, i.e. the question of the givenness of an object with respect to certain functions proper to the subject. In order to (...) illustrate how such a concept is completely absent in Reinach, I will compare his position with those of Husserl, in their relations with Kant’s interpretation of Hume’s philosophy. (shrink)

The aim of my paper is to show how the two concepts of psychology and anthropology are linked in the philosophical reflection of some german authors between the end of 19th and the beginning of the 20th century: I discuss in particular the theories of W. Dilthey, W. Wundt, T. Lipps, W. Windelband and H. Cohen. I find a line of demarcation that divides their theoretical positions and concerns the role that psychology should play in relationship to the investigation on (...) the human nature. In front of statements for which psychology represents the basis for an anthropological proposal there are philosophical assumptions according to which such an idea has to be comprehended as a form of anthropologism or psychologism. Instead of studying facts and connections of facts a well founded anthropological research should be transcendental and start from the Kantian question about the conditions of the possibility of the human nature. (shrink)

The paper shows how the transcendental assumptions of Kant’s Critique of Reason collects together two of the key moments that, in their various relationships, recur throughout the post-Kantian discussion: anti-psycologism respectively psychologism on the one hand, and anthropology on the other hand. Whereas the position of K.L. Reinhold’s Elementary Philosophy is characterized by a proposal for a superior factualism – that of consciousness as condition of possibility of human experience –, the arguments put forward by J.G. Fichte’s Doctrine of science (...) intend to overcome such a transcendental psychology in order to gain back the true meaning of Kant’s critical turning point, without accepting some too formalistic restrictions. (shrink)

Faustino Fabbianelli verfolgt in seinem Beitrag „‚Die Forderung der Gegenstände‘. Theodor Lipps’ Begriff der Gültigkeit“ im Ausgang von Rickert die Absicht, sowohl die metaphysischen als auch transzendentalen Momente aus Lipps’ Verständnis des Gültigkeitsbegriffs herauszuarbeiten und in eins damit Rickerts gegen Lipps gerichteten Vorwurf ontologischen Denkens zu begegnen. Dazu unterscheidet Fabbianelli zunächst die von Lipps aufgeführten unterschiedlichen Typen von Psychologie, wie gegenstandsbezogene empirische Psychologie oder gesetzesbezogene reine Psychologie, die sich hinsichtlich ihrer divergenten Aufgaben und verfolgten Zwecke ergeben, um von dort aus (...) die wichtigsten Charaktere, welche Lipps‘ Forderung der Gegenstände betreffen, herauszustellen und in Hinsicht auf dessen Psychologie zu diskutieren. Darüber hinaus verfolgt Fabbianelli die Absicht, Lipps’ Begriff des Sollens als ein anderes Sollen über ein formales Verständnis hinaus zu entwickeln, in welchem das „Apriorische der Erfahrung“ mit dem des „denkenden Ich“ eben durch die Forderung der Gegenstände vermittelt wird und worin sich gleichsam die zu Beginn eröffnete Kritik Rickerts an Lipps als zu kurz gegriffen erweist. Denn dieses Apriori, so führt Fabbianelli abschließend aus, enthält formale Momente, die dem Gegenstand dennoch als solche angehören und somit ohne weiteres als Material verstanden werden können, Momente, welche Lipps auch als den „Mörtel“ des Geistes bezeichnet. (shrink)

In this essay, I intend to show the evolution that the thought of Merleau-Ponty undergoes from the Phenomenology of Perception to The Visible and the Invisible. I do so by employing the Merleau-Pontyian notions of “radical reflection” and “hyper-reflection,” which I will consider as expressions of two alternative ways of resolving the task of philosophy: to highlight, in the first case, the immediate relation between the subject and the world, in the second case, the chiasm between the thinking and the (...) Being of the world. There are three main stages to my reasoning: 1) to show the conceptual differences that obtain between the first Merleau-Pontyian phenomenology and the Hegelian philosophy; 2) to illustrate the insufficiency, recognized ex post by Merleau-Ponty himself, of the existential analyses contained in the Phenomenology of Perception; 3) to identify the concept that allows him to formulate a new ontology, and to go beyond the Hegelian dialectic, in the “nature” which is spoken of in the positive philosophy of the late Schelling. (shrink)

The paper has two aims: firstly, to present Fichte’s transcendental ontology as a theory of the analogia entis. This allows to comprehend in which sense his Doctrine of science is different from Kant’s or Hegel’s thought. Secondly, i aim to outline the twofold nature of Fichte’s analogical ontology, depending on whether the intellectual concept or the concept of love is in the foreground. i distinguish these two approaches and evaluate them both with regard to the relation between the Absolute and (...) his manifestations and to the immanent connections among the creatures. (shrink)

Le propos s'intéresse à la limitation des créatures, plus précisément à la relation entre l'homme et Dieu au sein d'un univers voulu par ce dernier. Il expose les différentes tentatives réalisées par Leibniz, Budde puis Wolff pour concilier la liberté humaine et la nature divine. Plusieurs axes d'analyse doivent être mis en place afin de parcourir successivement les modèles respectifs de ces trois auteurs : celui qui, classiquement, oppose le volontarisme au rationalisme, et qui doit être contrasté, ainsi que celui (...) qui oppose l'anthropologie et la théologie. The paper deals with the limitations of creatures, namely, more precisely the relationship between man and God amid a universe wanted by the latter. It studies the several attempts by Leibniz, Budde and then Wolff to reconcile human freedom and divine nature. Several axes of analysis are to be set in order to wander along the several patterns of those three authors, i.e. the one which traditionally opposed voluntarism to rationalism and should be contrasted as well as the one which opposes anthropology and theology. (shrink)

Le propos s'intéresse à la limitation des créatures, plus précisément à la relation entre l'homme et Dieu au sein d'un univers voulu par ce dernier. Il expose les différentes tentatives réalisées par Leibniz, Budde puis Wolff pour concilier la liberté humaine et la nature divine. Plusieurs axes d'analyse doivent être mis en place afin de parcourir successivement les modèles respectifs de ces trois auteurs : celui qui, classiquement, oppose le volontarisme au rationalisme, et qui doit être contrasté, ainsi que celui (...) qui oppose l'anthropologie et la théologie. The paper deals with the limitations of creatures, namely, more precisely the relationship between man and God amid a universe wanted by the latter. It studies the several attempts by Leibniz, Budde and then Wolff to reconcile human freedom and divine nature. Several axes of analysis are to be set in order to wander along the several patterns of those three authors, i.e. the one which traditionally opposed voluntarism to rationalism and should be contrasted as well as the one which opposes anthropology and theology. (shrink)

The paper aims to explicate on the basis of the concept of psychologism the debate between Fichte and Schelling on the first philosophy. It moves from some statements of the year 1801–1806 that Schelling makes in the context of his philosophy of nature as well as of her relationship to Fichte’s doctrine of science. Because of his various meanings, of them the two philosophers do not seem to be always conscious, the category of psychologism is not as clear as it (...) instantly could appear. It comes for different reasons along with concepts like anthropologism, philosophy of reflection, life as well as knowledge.Ziel des vorliegenden Beitrags ist, die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Fichte und Schelling um die erste Philosophie anhand des Begriffs von „Psychologismus“ nochmals zu erläutern. Ausgangspunkt stellen einige Äußerungen dar, die Schelling in verschiedenen Schriften aus den Jahren 1801–1806 im Zusammenhang mit der Naturphilosophie sowie deren Verhältnis zur Wissenschaftslehre macht. Man wird sehen, dass die Kategorie des Psychologismus gar nicht so eindeutig ist, wie es auf den ersten Blick aussehen könnte; in sie fallen nämlich unterschiedliche Bedeutungen, die innerhalb der Debatte zwischen Fichte und Schelling im Spiel sind und derer die Disputanten selbst sich nicht unbedingt bewusst zu sein scheinen. Mit der Kategorie des Psychologismus gehen aus unterschiedlichen Gründen Begriffe wie Anthropologismus, Reflexionsphilosophie, Leben bzw. Wissen einher. (shrink)

Ce volume est consacré à la notion d'homme entier, telle qu'elle a été définie et diffusée par quelques-uns des principaux philosophes de l'âge moderne et de l'époque contemporaine. Le but poursuivi par cette publication est double. Sur le plan historiographique, elle enregistre les étapes les plus importantes d'un débat, trace les lignes de fond d'une discussion vive, quoique fragmentée dans le temps, au cours de laquelle les auteurs tantôt se rencontrèrent tacitement, tantôt s'apostrophèrent l'un l'autre explicitement. D'un autre côté, elle (...) propose à l'attention du lecteur différents modèles anthropologiques passés qui, en fournissant une image holistique de l'homme, contribuent à dépasser certaines formes de réduction théorique implicite avancées par des recherches de type naturaliste, scientiste, ou par des modèles d'enquête analytico-linguistiques. (shrink)