This paper sets out to establish that dialogue defines truth in a world of divergent cultures and worldviews. It argues that culture has enormous influence on truth for which truth through monologue has inherent strong potentials that limit intellectual union and discusses how philosophy in its western tradition has served topromote this trend with its hegemony on different world cultures; the effect of which is the quest for difference by other world cultures through cultural philosophies that attempt to infuse reason (...) and logic on their cultural achievement. The result then is an unending ambition for difference which promotes conflict of values in our world. The paper contends that truths realized in such a world is inherently deficient. It recommends dialogue as the basis for truth. Truth in a multi-cultural world would then not be the correspondence to, coherence with and pragmatic to reality but the ability to defy difference to promote the equality of difference. Bylooking at the several ways a thing could not have been for which it is an item, idea or value can then be considered to be true. (shrink)
Colin Turnbull's book The Mountain People has aroused much non-academic as well as much academic interest. The success of The Ik , Peter Brook's recent stage adaptation of the book, shows how widespread this interest is. The interest centres on Turnbull's anthropological descriptions of his life with the Ik people. The Ik society is one in which the weak, the old and the children are left to fend for themselves and die. Help proffered to the needy is frowned upon. Food (...) is snatched from the mouths of the old, medicine stolen from the sick, and children left to feed and house themselves at about the age of three. Sexual codes no longer exist, cruelty is thought amusing, and the weak and dying are exploited. Turnbull believes that he has discovered a people without morality; a society that previously possessed a moral code, but which lost it. (shrink)
Culture has been identified as a significant determinant of ethical attitudes of business managers. This research studies the impact of culture on the ethical attitudes of business managers in India, Korea and the United States using multivariate statistical analysis. Employing Geert Hofstede's cultural typology, this study examines the relationship between his five cultural dimensions and business managers' ethical attitudes. The study uses primary data collected from 345 business manager participants of Executive MBA programs in selected business schools in India, Korea (...) and the United States using Hofstede's Value Survey Module and an instrument designed by the researchers to measure respondents' ethical attitudes. Results indicate that national culture has a strong influence on business managers' ethical attitudes. In addition to national culture, respondents' general attitudes toward business ethics are related to their personal integrity; their attitudes toward questionable business practices are related to the external environment and gender, as well as to their personal integrity. A strong relationship exists between cultural dimensions of individualism and power distance and respondents' ethical attitudes toward certain questionable practices. The analysis of the relationship between cultural dimensions of masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation and respondents' ethical attitudes toward questionable practices produced mixed results, likely due to the lack of notable differences in cultural dimension scores among the countries surveyed. (shrink)
1835 yılında Manastır’da dünyaya gelen Sâlih Fâik Bey, Encümen-i Şuarâ şâirlerindendir. Memuriyeti nedeniyle İstanbul, Burdur, Gümüşhane gibi çeşitli illerde bulunmuştur. Biri matbû, üçü yazma olmak üzere dört eseri mevcuttur. Bunlar; Arûz-i Türkî, Elfiyye-i Seniyye fi’l-Âdâbi’l-Ahmediyye, Peymâne ve Dîvân’dır. Fâik Bey 1899 yıllında İstanbul’da vefat etmiştir. Eserleri yaşadığı dönemin dînî, siyâsî, edebî ve toplumsal özelliklerini yansıtması bakımından önemlidir. Bu çalışmada Manastırlı Sâlih Fâik Bey’in hayatı ve eserleri hakkında bilgi verildikten sonra, dîvânında rastladığımız dikkate değer hususlar ile devrinin mühim dergilerinden biri olan (...) Hazîne-i Fünûn Dergisi’nde şairin yayımlanan şiirlerine yer verilecektir. (shrink)
How fat is the I? Neuroscience and the elusive selfThis article explores the concept of self in relation to neuroscience. Four options are discussed on the basis of a key representative. The first is the dualist position where the non-material self controls its brain, as defended by Eccles. Next comes the option of the self as a relatively or completely powerless entity within the brain, as exemplified by Libet’s experiments on free will. The third option is the identity of self (...) and brain, as argued by Dennett. The last option is the identity of self and body, and here Gallagher is the representative. It is shown that no monist position is completely consistently defended. In the conclusion, four factors are identified that hinder a simple and consistent monist conceptualisation of the self in the context of neuroscience. (shrink)
In this paper a distinction is made between two conceptions of the ego in freudian metapsychology. According to the first conception, a conception which Freud never gave up, the ego is conceived as a specific function on the surface of the living organism ; it is the result of a progressive differentiation of the Id ('Es') under the driving power of internal stimuli and external reality. Fitted with specific neutral, i.e. non-conflictual functions as perception, memory, control of the bodily motions (...) and consciousness, the ego has to defend the individual as a biological living organism against the threats from without and within. In this conception the ego is treated as an instance that doesn't take part in the different psychic conflicts. We analyse the philosophical presuppositions and show the metapsychological disadvantages of this hypothesis that has been worked out especially in the American ego-psychology. According to the second conception, that takes into account important clinical pheno mena as identification, idealisation, narcissism, ideal of the ego, the ego is conceived as a metaphorical effect of a specific psychic act. With Lacan, we try to analyse and to interpret this specific act as an act that causes an infinite splitting in the ego : the ego is constituted as a subject that from its origin is separated from itself. Instead of being a biological function that lives in the immediate metonymical prolongiation of the living organism, it rather has to defend a certain representation of himself. This point of view doesn't exclude a purely functional description of the ego ; but the different functions have now to be interpreted differently because the ego is the effect of conflicts in which it takes part (consciousness is interlaced with unconsciousness, perception with denying...). In the last part of our study we show how Freud makes the philosophically important distinction between the ego as an object of the Id and the ego as a subject that has to speak in the first person ('I'). We try to give a Lacanian interpretation of the subject as act on the basis of the well-known Freudian formula 'Wo Es war soll Ich werden'. (shrink)
Ethics of any kind basically assume that all human beings by nature aim at happiness. However, this general starting point has to be made concrete in order to be relevant for action, and hence suitable for moral appreciation. What does my happiness consist in? Contrary to what has often been taken for granted, the concrete aim is not instrumental or subsidiary to the overall aim of happiness. To me, my particular aim is rather identical with happiness. The choice I make (...) — if choice it is — indeed constitutes my happiness, i.e. the overall aim that directs my existential choices. This article is focused on the way Aristotelian ethics envisages the concreteness of this overall aim. This is not the concreteness of the means leading to the aim, which has often been discussed in Aristotelian scholarship, but happiness itself, taken as the specific but nevertheless universal aim that I seek to accomplish in my life. The main arguments are taken from Nicomachean Ethics VI and III. These texts, central to any discussion of Aristotle's views on the role of choice and deliberation in acquiring happiness, are re-interpreted, avoiding the deadlock of a debate between intellectualists and non-intellectualists. (shrink)
Although the contributions of John Locke's memory-theory and David Hume's bundle-theory to the construction of the contemporary empiricist theory of personal identity are explicitly acknowledged, empiricist philosophers relatively neglect another important source of inspiration in their debate on personal identity in analytical philosophy, namely Bertrand Russell's philosophy of logical atomism. However, Derek Parfit's radically empiricist and impersonal view on personal identity implicitly is a direct heir of Russell's view on personal identity. In this article, I try to make explicit the (...) Russellian heritage in the contemporary empiricist theory of personal identity by reconstructing Russell's view on the existence and the nature of the 'I' and the identity of the self. For the purpose of explaining Russell's view that 'I' really is the abbreviation for the description 'the subject of the present experience' or 'the subject of «this»', the technical concepts of knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description as well as the notion of a proper name in the logical sense are introduced. And, in order to explain Russell's view on self-identity as constituted by the synchronic relation of 'compresence' and the diachronic R-relation of 'co-personality', the technique of logical construction is appealed to. (shrink)
In Het kapitaal beschreef Karl Marx in uiterst schrille kleuren de voorgeschiedenis van de kapitalistische productiewijze. Het was een langdurig proces dat zich over eeuwen uitstrekte en waarbij kleine boeren op gewelddadige wijze van hun primaire productiemiddel, de grond, werden gescheiden en aldus in 'vrije' loonarbeiders veranderd. De kern van dit proces was de privatisering van de meent of commons, de traditioneel voor gemeenschappelijk gebruik bestemde grond.
In dit essay keert Forster zich tegen geloof met een grote G: het fundamentalistisch geloof in een religie als de enige bron van waarheid, maar ook het geloof in de macht en het geweld van grote mannen en ideologieën. Hij stelt er zijn eigen geloof met een ‘heel kleine g’ tegenover, een geloof in vrijheid, democratie en individualisme, in de adel van de geest.