To make the case for non-conceptualism, Heck draws on an apparent dichotomy between linguistic and iconic representations. According to Heck, whereas linguistic representations have conceptual content, the content of iconic representations is non-conceptual. Based on the case of cartographic systems, the authors criticize Heck’s dichotomous distinction. They argue that maps are composed of semantically arbitrary elements that play different syntactic roles. Based on this, they claim that maps have a predicative structure and convey conceptual content. Finally, the authors argue that, (...) despite their differences, maps and sentences can logically interact with each other through heterogeneous inferences. These considerations not only challenge the view that conceptual content and inferential processes necessarily involve linguistic representations; furthermore, they provide a new perspective for thinking about maps, their semantics and syntax, and their interaction with linguistic systems. (shrink)

In “Study of Concepts”, Peacocke puts forward an argument for non-conceptualism derived from the possession conditions of observational concepts. In this paper, I raise two objections to this argument. First, I argue that if non-conceptual perceptual contents are scenario contents, then perceptual experiences cannot present perceivers with the circumstances specified by the application conditions of observational concepts and, therefore, they cannot play the semantic and epistemic roles Peacocke wants them to play in the possession conditions of these concepts. Second, I (...) argue that if non-conceptual perceptual contents are protopropositions, then Peacocke’s account of the possession conditions of observational concepts falls into the Myth of the Given. (shrink)

Intellectualism is the philosophical view that thinking involves the activity of reason-giving. In this paper I argue that the intellectualist point of view is incompatible with any form of empiricism. First, I show that Traditional Empiricism collapses because it brings together two conflicting theses: the intellectualist thesis according to which the normative properties of thoughts depend upon the activity of reason-giving, and the intuitive empiricist thesis according to which the normative properties of empirical thoughts derive from perceptual experience. Second, I (...) argue that McDowell's Minimal Empiricism collapses as well because of his attempt to make sense of an over-intellectualized and contradictory variety of empiricism : one that preserves both an intellectualist approach to thought and a conceptual but passive approach to perceptual experience. (shrink)

Philosophers have always tried to explain what concepts are. Currently, most neo- Fregean philosophers identify concepts with abilities peculiar to cognitive agents. Philosophers who defend a psychological view, in contrast, identify concepts with representations located in the mind. In this paper, I argue that concepts should be understood neither in terms of mental representations nor in terms of abilities. Concepts, I argue, are rules for sorting an inferring. To support this, I follow Ginsborg’s Kantian conception of concepts. Nevertheless, unlike Ginsborg, (...) I provide an explanation of the cognitive relationship between concepts and thinkers that presupposes no linguistic awareness of any normative concept. In doing so, a dispositional approach to the normativity of concepts is proposed. (shrink)