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Federico Matías Pailos [13]Federico Pailos [10]Federico Mathías Pailos [1]
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Federico Pailos
Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA)
  1. What is a Paraconsistent Logic?Damian Szmuc, Federico Pailos & Eduardo Barrio - 2018 - In Jacek Malinowski & Walter Carnielli (eds.), Contradictions, from Consistency to Inconsistency. Springer Verlag.
    Paraconsistent logics are logical systems that reject the classical principle, usually dubbed Explosion, that a contradiction implies everything. However, the received view about paraconsistency focuses only the inferential version of Explosion, which is concerned with formulae, thereby overlooking other possible accounts. In this paper, we propose to focus, additionally, on a meta-inferential version of Explosion, i.e. which is concerned with inferences or sequents. In doing so, we will offer a new characterization of paraconsistency by means of which a logic is (...)
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  2.  86
    A Hierarchy of Classical and Paraconsistent Logics.Eduardo Alejandro Barrio, Federico Pailos & Damian Szmuc - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (1):93-120.
    In this article, we will present a number of technical results concerning Classical Logic, ST and related systems. Our main contribution consists in offering a novel identity criterion for logics in general and, therefore, for Classical Logic. In particular, we will firstly generalize the ST phenomenon, thereby obtaining a recursively defined hierarchy of strict-tolerant systems. Secondly, we will prove that the logics in this hierarchy are progressively more classical, although not entirely classical. We will claim that a logic is to (...)
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  3.  39
    A Paraconsistent Route to Semantic Closure.Eduardo Alejandro Barrio, Federico Matias Pailos & Damian Enrique Szmuc - 2017 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 25 (4):387-407.
    In this paper, we present a non-trivial and expressively complete paraconsistent naïve theory of truth, as a step in the route towards semantic closure. We achieve this goal by expressing self-reference with a weak procedure, that uses equivalences between expressions of the language, as opposed to a strong procedure, that uses identities. Finally, we make some remarks regarding the sense in which the theory of truth discussed has a property closely related to functional completeness, and we present a sound and (...)
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  4. (Meta)Inferential Levels of Entailment Beyond the Tarskian Paradigm.Eduardo Alejandro Barrio, Federico Pailos & Damian Szmuc - forthcoming - Synthese:1-25.
    In this paper we discuss the extent to which the very existence of substructural logics puts the Tarskian conception of logical systems in jeopardy. In order to do this, we highlight the importance of the presence of different levels of entailment in a given logic, looking not only at inferences between collections of formulae but also at inferences between collections of inferences—and more. We discuss appropriate refinements or modifications of the usual Tarskian identity criterion for logical systems, and propose an (...)
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  5. A Recovery Operator for Nontransitive Approaches.Eduardo Alejandro Barrio, Federico Pailos & Damian Szmuc - 2020 - Review of Symbolic Logic 13 (1):80-104.
    In some recent articles, Cobreros, Egré, Ripley, & van Rooij have defended the idea that abandoning transitivity may lead to a solution to the trouble caused by semantic paradoxes. For that purpose, they develop the Strict-Tolerant approach, which leads them to entertain a nontransitive theory of truth, where the structural rule of Cut is not generally valid. However, that Cut fails in general in the target theory of truth does not mean that there are not certain safe instances of Cut (...)
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  6. Substructural Logics, Pluralism and Collapse.Eduardo Alejandro Barrio, Federico Pailos & Damian Szmuc - forthcoming - Synthese:1-17.
    When discussing Logical Pluralism several critics argue that such an open-minded position is untenable. The key to this conclusion is that, given a number of widely accepted assumptions, the pluralist view collapses into Logical Monism. In this paper we show that the arguments usually employed to arrive at this conclusion do not work. The main reason for this is the existence of certain substructural logics which have the same set of valid inferences as Classical Logic—although they are, in a clear (...)
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  7.  20
    A Fully Classical Truth Theory Characterized by Substructural Means.Federico Matías Pailos - 2020 - Review of Symbolic Logic 13 (2):249-268.
    We will present a three-valued consequence relation for metainferences, called CM, defined through ST and TS, two well known substructural consequence relations for inferences. While ST recovers every classically valid inference, it invalidates some classically valid metainferences. While CM works as ST at the inferential level, it also recovers every classically valid metainference. Moreover, CM can be safely expanded with a transparent truth predicate. Nevertheless, CM cannot recapture every classically valid meta-metainference. We will afterwards develop a hierarchy of consequence relations (...)
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  8. Theories of Truth Based on Four-Valued Infectious Logics.Damian Szmuc, Bruno Da Re & Federico Pailos - forthcoming - Logic Journal of the IGPL.
    Infectious logics are systems which have a truth-value that is assigned to a compound formula whenever it is assigned to one of its components. This paper studies four-valued infectious logics as the basis of transparent theories of truth. This take is motivated (i) as a way to treat different pathological sentences (like the Liar and the Truth-Teller) differently, namely, by allowing some of them to be truth-value gluts and some others to be truth-value gaps, and (ii) as a way to (...)
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  9.  20
    A Family of Metainferential Logics.Federico Matias Pailos - 2019 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 29 (1):97-120.
    ABSTRACTWe will present 12 different mixed metainferential consequence relations. Each one of them is specified using two different inferential Tarskian or non-Tarskian consequence relations: or. We will show that it is possible to obtain a Tarskian logic with non-Tarskian inferential logics, but also a non-Tarskian logic with Tarskian inferential logics. Moreover, we will show how some of these metainferential logics work better than the corresponding inferential rivals. Finally, we will show how these logics prove that it is not enough to (...)
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  10.  58
    Solving Multimodal Paradoxes.Federico Pailos & Lucas Rosenblatt - 2015 - Theoria 81 (3):192-210.
    Recently, it has been observed that the usual type-theoretic restrictions are not enough to block certain paradoxes involving two or more predicates. In particular, when we have a self-referential language containing modal predicates, new paradoxes might appear even if there are type restrictions for the principles governing those predicates. In this article we consider two type-theoretic solutions to multimodal paradoxes. The first one adds types for each of the modal predicates. We argue that there are a number of problems with (...)
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  11. About Two Objections to Cook's Proposal.Federico Matías Pailos - 2012 - Análisis Filosófico 32 (1):37-43.
    The main thesis of this work is as follows: there are versions of Yablo’s paradox that, if Cook is right about the non-circular character of his version of it, are truly paradoxical and genuinely non-circular, and Cook’s version of Yablo’s paradox is one of them. Here I will not evaluate the"circular" or"non-circular" side to Cook’s proposal. In fact, I think that he is right about it, and that his version of Yablo’s list is non-circular. But is it paradoxical? In order (...)
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  12.  21
    Non-Deterministic Conditionals and Transparent Truth.Federico Pailos & Lucas Rosenblatt - 2015 - Studia Logica 103 (3):579-598.
    Theories where truth is a naive concept fall under the following dilemma: either the theory is subject to Curry’s Paradox, which engenders triviality, or the theory is not trivial but the resulting conditional is too weak. In this paper we explore a number of theories which arguably do not fall under this dilemma. In these theories the conditional is characterized in terms of non-deterministic matrices. These non-deterministic theories are similar to infinitely-valued Łukasiewicz logic in that they are consistent and their (...)
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  13.  21
    El papel de los aspectos prácticos en una teoría acerca de las atribuciones de conocimiento.Federico Matías Pailos - 2009 - Critica 41 (122):43-67.
    En conjunción con la tesis de que sólo se debe actuar sobre la base de lo que se sabe, el Invariantismo Relativo al Interés que propone Stanley permite explicar la mayoría de nuestras intuiciones en torno a ciertos ejemplos relevantes. Pero si se relativiza el valor de verdad de las atribuciones de conocimiento a la situación práctica de todo individuo relevante, se pueden rescatar todas estas intuiciones, y no sólo la mayoría de ellas. Esta posición también explica la extrañeza generada (...)
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  14.  28
    Validity, Dialetheism and Self-Reference.Federico Matias Pailos - 2020 - Synthese 197 (2):773-792.
    It has been argued recently that dialetheist theories are unable to express the concept of naive validity. In this paper, we will show that LP\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathbf {LP}$$\end{document} can be non-trivially expanded with a naive validity predicate. The resulting theory, LPVal\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathbf {LP}^{\mathbf {Val}}$$\end{document} reaches this goal by adopting a weak self-referential procedure. We show that LPVal\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathbf (...)
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  15.  24
    Acerca de Algunas Intuiciones Relativistas.Federico Matías Pailos - 2009 - Análisis Filosófico 29 (1):105-122.
    El relativismo acerca de las atribuciones de conocimiento de John MarFarlane pretende ser una teoría que explica la corrección de las intuiciones centrales que tenemos acerca de ellas. Sin embargo, el relativismo es incompatible con la corrección de algunas intuiciones que tenemos con respecto a casos de Stanley, a conjunciones de estos casos y a casos en los que la situación práctica del evaluador es menos apremiante que la del sujeto o la del emisor de la atribución. Esto, no obstante, (...)
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  16.  24
    Richard Rorty y la Superación Pragmatista de la Epistemología.Federico Matías Pailos - 2005 - Análisis Filosófico 25 (2):203-205.
    En A Letter Concerning Toleration John Locke argumenta en favor de la tolerancia religiosa afirmando que el Estado no puede mejorar la vida de las personas forzándolas a vivir de acuerdo con creencias que ellas no suscriben. Más recientemente, Ronald Dworkin y Will Kymlicka han desarrollado argumentos similares. En el caso del primero, contra ciertas políticas paternalistas; en el del segundo, en apoyo de la tesis liberal de la neutralidad estatal. Mi propósito en el presente artículo es analizar la plausibilidad (...)
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  17.  5
    Foreword: Consistency, Contradiction, and Consequence.Abílio Rodrigues & Federico Matías Pailos - 2018 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 22 (1):01-05.
    Foreword : Consistency, Contradiction, and Consequence.
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  18.  19
    Intuition as Philosophical Evidence.Federico Mathías Pailos - 2012 - Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):17.
    Earlenbaugh and Molyneux’s argument against considering intuitions as evidence has an uncharitable consequence — a substantial part of philosophical practice is not justified. A possible solution to this problem is to defend that philosophy must be descriptive metaphysics. But if this statement is rejected, one can only argue that experts’ intuition does constitute evidence, and that philosophical practice is justified by the overall growth of philosophical knowledge it generates.
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  19.  13
    El comportamiento de la verdad y la justificación, y su relación con la práctica asertiva.Federico Matías Pailos - 2014 - Revista de filosofía (Chile) 70:119-131.
    Crispin Wright afirma que tanto la norma que insta a afirmar lo verdadero como la que exhorta a afirmar lo justificado son distintivas de la práctica asertórica. A pesar de que ellas no son diferentes en la práctica, son distintas. Pero Richard Rorty argumenta que las razones ofrecidas obligarían a Wright a aceptar demasiadas reglas como propias de dicha práctica. Wright admitiría que las normas pueden ser ilimitadas, pero no que son ilimitadas las normas correctas. Para defender esta posición, basta (...)
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  20.  9
    Sobre la justificación de las proposiciones ante los desafíos escépticos.Federico Matías Pailós - 2014 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 47:249-258.
    Los desafíos escépticos cuestionan la justificación de las proposiciones que aceptamos. Pero es posible justificar en términos probabilísticos cada una de las proposiciones empíricas aceptadas. Para eso, su probabilidad condicional al resto de las proposiciones aceptadas, deberá ser mayor que su probabilidad absoluta. Esta justificación es circular, pero virtuosa. Sin embargo, carece de eficacia dialéctica frente al escéptico.
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  21.  8
    Relativismo, desacuerdos y lafactividad del conocimiento.Federico Pailos - 2008 - Manuscrito 31 (2):635-670.
    Las teorías relativistas acerca de las atribuciones de conocimiento sostienen que el valor de verdad de una atribución de conocimiento está determinado por el contexto de evaluación de la atribución. Me ocuparé de dos de las principales críticas que se le han formulado al relativismo. Por un lado, Jason Stanley niega que el relativismo pueda dar cuenta de la factividad del conocimiento. Por otra parte, Manuel García Carpintero sostiene que el relativismo se compromete con una inaceptable imagen sobre las normas (...)
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  22.  4
    Desacuerdos, Paridad Epistémica E Incoherencia.Federico Matías Pailos & Pablo Di Paolo - 2013 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 17 (1):01.
    Conciliatory views on disagreement claim that one should “split the difference” between the epistemic peers’ opinions. Nevertheless, when they apply to the disagreement on conciliatory positions themselves, they give incoherent instructions. A semi-conciliatory position is one that accepts that the peers’ opinions are part of the whole body of evidence relevant in these situations. If one adopts this kind of view, all cases that seems to favor conciliatory views can be explained, and without compromising with the anti–intuitive consequences conciliatory positions (...)
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  23. Atribuciones de conocimientos, aspectos prácticos y nuevos casos de Stanley.Federico Matías Pailos - 2010 - Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 36 (2):239-264.
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  24. Justificación y consenso global.Federico Pailos - 2003 - Dianoia 48 (51):175-179.
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