Schönberg ha sido uno de los compositores más decisivos del pasado siglo. Su propuesta musical, su intento de buscar nuevos lenguajes para expresarla, su diagnóstico de la muerte de la música tonal, puede ser equiparado con la constatación nietzscheana de la ¿muerte de Dios¿, con la pérdida de todos los axiomas últimos e inamovibles que suministran valor al mundo y sentido a la existencia. Ambos desarrollaron una visión trágico-musical del mundo, que no pesimista; ambos se acercaron a la realidad desde (...) la afirmación y la inocencia propias del artista, experimentando sus aspectos más disonantes con desconocida alegría y serenidad. (shrink)
How do we know our current states of mind--what we want, and believe in? Jordi Fernández proposes a new theory of self-knowledge, challenging the traditional view that it is a matter of introspection. He argues that we know what we believe and desire by 'looking outward', towards the states of affairs which those beliefs and desires are about.
En esta investigación se analiza la titulación de los periódicos venezolanos El Nacional y Panorama sobre la guerra en Irak, para conocer la recontextualización de ese conflicto en la prensa de ese país. Se sigue el modelo teórico-metodológico de Fernández que integra el análisis lingüístico con la acción comunicativa y las funciones estratégicas del discurso periodístico. Los resultados permiten caracterizar la conceptualización, el léxico, las construcciones sintácticas y las metáforas. Se concluye que en los titulares el periodista deja marcas (...) lingüísticas de su subjetividad, que se privilegian los actantes principales de los hechos y no se exploran las causas y las posibles consecuencias de los acontecimientos, lo cual no contribuye con el entendimiento de procesos complejos como los que involucra la guerra. (shrink)
The inner semiotic core of biology Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-3 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9547-z Authors Eliseo Fernández, Linda Hall Library of Science and Technology, Kansas City, MO 64110, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
Ce texte a déjà paru dans la Revue du MAUSS, 2011/2, n° 38, p. 339-348. Nous remercions Benjamin Fernandez et Alain Caillé de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. « Ce que nous vendons à Coca-cola, c'est du temps de cerveau disponible. » Patrick LELAY, ancien président de la chaîne privée française TF1 (2004). La pensée moderne, héritière des Lumières, avait accouché de la figure du sujet libre : une conscience de soi, substance stable et indivisible (Descartes), actrice du (...) langage et d'un (...) - 1. Comment penser le pouvoir dans le monde contemporain ? – Nouvel article. (shrink)
"Tough, smart, superbly engaging, The Material Ghost is a terrific book." -- Edward W. Said In The Material Ghost , Gilberto Perez draws on his lifelong love of the movies as well as his work as a film scholar to write a lively, wide-ranging, penetrating study of films and filmmakers and the nature of the art form. For Perez, film is complex and richly contradictory, lifelike and dreamlike at once, a peculiar mix of reality and imagination. "The images on the (...) screen," he writes, "carry in them something of the world itself, something material, and yet something transposed, transformed into another world: the material ghost." "Dazzling... The sheer intelligence at work in these lucid pages is exhilarating." -- Alfred Guzzetti, Boston Book Review "A pleasure. Gilberto Perez is one of the smartest film critics writing anywhere." -- Jonathan Rosenbaum "Strikes an ideal balance between insightful analysis and graceful writing... A model of thoughtful criticism." -- David Sterritt, Christian Science Monitor "Brilliantly polemical in his critique of cynical reason ('the official philosophy of late capitalism'), no less passionate in defending the truth-value of cinema, Perez seems to be the clearest heir to the great humanist critic André Bazin." -- Sight & amp Sound "The chapters on Keaton and Renoir are stunning, full of perceptive remarks the chapter on Godard is a persuasive rehabilitation none of the chapters is without memorable insights." -- Michael Wood, London Review of Books "Gilberto Perez's ambitious, abundant, and cultivated book--the fruit of decades of thinking and teaching -- accompanies readers on a journey of discovery into the wonder of film." -- Stanley Cavell "Few books of film criticism in the past twenty-five years have been so enjoyable or instructive... [Perez] has excellent things to say about authorship, about documentaries, about popular genres, about cinematic point of view and narrative technique, about actors, and above all about camera style... He makes us want to look once more at the remarkable pictures he discusses." -- James Naremore, Cineaste. (shrink)
This introduction to the Journal of Business Research special issue on anti-consumption briefly defines and highlights the importance of anticonsumption research, provides an overview of the latest studies in the area, and suggests an agenda for future research on anti-consumption.
The purpose of this essay is to account for privileged access or, more precisely, the special kind of epistemic right that we have to some beliefs about our own mental states. My account will have the following two main virtues. First of all, it will only appeal to those conceptual elements that, arguably, we already use in order to account for perceptual knowledge. Secondly, it will constitute a naturalizing account of privileged access in that it does not posit any mysterious (...) faculty of introspection or "inner perception" mechanism. (shrink)
The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories or, in other words, to determine what the intentional objects of memory are.1 The issue that will concern us is, then, analogous to the traditional philosophical question of whether perception directly puts us in cognitive contact with entities in the world or with entities in our own minds. As we shall see, there are some interesting aspects of the phenomenology and the epistemology of memory, (...) and I shall aim at a specification of the content of memories that is in accordance with those aspects of them. (shrink)
We present evidence indicating new individual differences with people's intuitions about the relation of determinism to freedom and moral responsibility. We analysed participants' written explanations of why a person acted. Participants offered one of either 'decision' or 'causal' based explanations of behaviours in some paradigmatic cases. Those who gave causal explanations tended to have more incompatibilist intuitions than those who gave decision explanations. Importantly, the affective content of a scenario influenced the type of explanation given. Scenarios containing highly affective actions (...) (e.g. murder) tended to generate more decision explanations than scenarios with low affective content (e.g. cheating on taxes). These results give important clues about the proximal processes generating some intuitions about free will and moral responsibility. (shrink)
I offer an account of thought insertion based on a certain model of self-knowledge. I propose that subjects with thought insertion do not experience being committed to some of their own beliefs. A hypothesis about self-knowledge explains why. According to it, we form beliefs about our own beliefs on the basis of our evidence for them. First, I will argue that this hypothesis explains the fact that we feel committed to those beliefs which we are aware of. Then, I will (...) point to one feature of schizophrenia that suggests that subjects with thought insertion may not be able to know their own beliefs in that way. (shrink)
In this paper, I propose an account of self-knowledge for desires. According to this account, we form beliefs about our own desires on the basis of our grounds for those desires. First, I distinguish several types of desires and their corresponding grounds. Next, I make the case that we usually believe that we have a certain desire on the basis of our grounds for it. Then, I argue that a belief formed thus is epistemically privileged. Finally, I compare this account (...) to two other similar accounts of self-knowledge. (shrink)
The study here is a qualitative research based on multiple case studies of banking service providers to analyze the role of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the definition of the corporate identity of these kinds of organizations. The results show that, although companies increasingly integrate CSR into their business strategies, there are some aspects of its management such as its communication or the measurement of its results that detract from its success. These results have important implications for those managers pursuing (...) an effective management of CSR policies and strategies in their organizations, especially as the information comes from 6 of the biggest and most important banking institutions in a European country, with a declared assets (loans) volume which represents 62.75% of the total assets in the national banking industry, and thus largely representing the possible heterogeneity of the market in terms of company size, location, legal status, and management styles. (shrink)
I offer a model of self-knowledge that provides a solution to Moore’s paradox. First, I distinguish two versions of the paradox and I discuss two approaches to it, neither of which solves both versions of the paradox. Next, I propose a model of self-knowledge according to which, when I have a certain belief, I form the higher-order belief that I have it on the basis of the very evidence that grounds my first-order belief. Then, I argue that the model in (...) question can account for both versions of Moore’s paradox. Moore’s paradox, I conclude, tells us something about our conceptions of rationality and self-knowledge. For it teaches us that we take it to be constitutive of being rational that one can have privileged access to one’s own mind and it reveals that having privileged access to one’s own mind is a matter of forming first-order beliefs and corresponding second-order beliefs on the same basis. (shrink)
In two experiments, we demonstrate that intentional action intuitions vary as a function of whether one brings about or observes an event. In experiment 1a (N?=?38), participants were less likely to judge that they intended (M?=?2.53, 7 point scale) or intentionally (M?=?2.67) brought about a harmful event compared to intention (M?=?4.16) and intentionality (M?=?4.11) judgments made about somebody else. Experiments 1b and 1c confirmed and extended this pattern of actor-observer differences. Experiment 2 suggested that these actor-observer differences are not likely (...) to occur when participants are asked to ?imagine? being an actor. We argue that these results challenge the substantial philosophical and empirical reliance on hypothetical thought examples about intentional action. Our data offer new and necessary methodological avenues for understanding folk intentional action intuitions. (shrink)
The purpose of this essay is to clarify the notion of mnemonic content. Memories have content. However, it is not clear whether memories are about past events in the world, past states of our own minds, or some combination of those two elements. I suggest that any proposal about mnemonic content should help us understand why events are presented to us in memory as being in the past. I discuss three proposals about mnemonic content and, eventually, I put forward a (...) positive view. According to this view, when a subject seems to remember a certain event, that event is presented to her as making true a perceptual experience that caused the very memory experience that she is having. (shrink)