El objetivo principal de este artículo es demostrar que Fernando Vallejo, a través de una escritura transgresora y poseída por la violencia, manifiesta su rechazo frente al presente caótico, añorando y construyendo heterotopías que se oponen a la realidad imperante. Para comprobar la hipótesis planteada anteriormente, se estudiarán dos textos autoficcionales del autor: El desbarrancadero y Casablanca la bella. El análisis crítico implicará la aplicación de conceptos teóricos considerados fundamentales en el estudio literario. Además se acudirá a algunos artículos (...) cuyas líneas investigativas se relacionan con la lectura propuesta en este escrito. (shrink)
ABSTRACT The question of human consciousness is a crucial part of Novalis’ aim of construing a self-critique of the I, or critique of human identity, as it is proposed in his “Fichte-Studien”. Namely, this question is an intermediary stage in said critique, serving as proof for Novalis’ theory of the opposites, the fundamental stage, and his position on philosophizing, the final stage of this endeavor, which will be at the basis of his whole philosophical system; and as such, it is (...) a topic of great importance, as it is not only a link in a chain of thought which aims at proving the organicity or living heterogeneity - and not Fichte’s machine-like homogeneity - of the human but is also a key topic towards the resolution of Novalis’problem of philosophy as an existential problem. Given this, the present article intends to situate the question of human consciousness in the framework of Novalis’greater scope of a critique of the I; and from then, to comment on Novalis’own position on the problem of human consciousness, as it is stated in the formula “Consciousness is the Being outside of Being, within Being”; a position which further separates the young poet from Fichte, as it renders him closer and closer to other young idealists, such as Hölderlin or Schelling. RESUMO A questão da consciência humana é uma parte crucial no intento novaliano de construir uma autocrítica do Eu, ou crítica da identidade humana, como ela é proposta nos seus “Fichte-Studien”. Designadamente, esta questão constitui um estado intermédio em tal crítica, servindo como prova da teoria dos contrários de Novalis, o estádio fundamental desta, e a posição de Novalis sobre o filosofar, o estádio final da sua empresa, a qual está na base de todo o seu sistema filosófico; e, como tal, é um tópico de grande importância, visto ser não só um elo em uma linha de pensamento que visa provar a organicidade ou heterogeneidade viva - e não a maquinal homogeneidade de Fichte - do humano, mas também um tópico-chave tendo em vista a resolução da questão novaliana da filosofia enquanto problema existencial. Assim sendo, o presente artigo propõe-se situar a questão da consciência humana no contexto maior da crítica da identidade de Novalis; e, a partir daí, comentar a posição de Novalis sobre o problema da consciência humana, como ele surge exposto na fórmula “A consciência é o Ser fora do Ser, no Ser”; uma posição que decisivamente separa o jovem poeta de Fichte, enquanto o aproxima de outros jovens idealistas, tais como Hölderlin ou Schelling. (shrink)
O presente texto, de que se dá em seguida a tradução portuguesa, consiste numa selecção da correspondência entre F. W. J Schelling, J. C. F. Hölderlin e G. W. F. Hegel, três colegas e amigos do Stift de Tübingen, três vértices de uma das mais interessantes e importantes unidades teóricas do idealismo alemão e, por conseguinte, três elementos cujos anos de aprendizagem filosófica se revelam hoje essenciais para a boa compreensão da génese da sua época.
RESUMO: Fruto de longa maturação filosófica desde a sua estada em Jena, e instado a isso pelas influências de Karl L. Reinhold e Johann G. Fichte, o poeta Novalis produz, a partir do outono de 1795, um conjunto de anotações fragmentárias sobre a filosofia de Fichte, hoje conhecidas como Fichte-Studien. De entre os importantes temas aí abordados, um revela-se particularmente interessante: o tema do estatuto da Filosofia no seio do problema da autocompreensão do Eu -, e mais concretamente, o necessário (...) pensar da filosofia sobre si própria, as alterações que no processo têm de sobrevir à própria filosofia e a repercussão disto na compreensão de si próprio do Eu. Nesta senda, o seguinte ensaio propõe-se mostrar como, para Novalis, a filosofia é o natural pensar do homem, e como para além disto é a própria filosofia, com o decorrer do seu pensamento sobre si própria, que molda o curso da compreensão de si próprio do Eu: quer tendo com o Eu uma origem comum, nascendo com ele, lançando-o para o mundo e cindindo a união originária em que ele de outro modo sempre estaria, quer, por fim, afirmando-se como carência deste, ou como algo por que o Eu e a própria filosofia têm de passar no seu curso, para que possam experienciar a perda, e almejar à recuperação dessa origem. ABSTRACT: Fruit of a long philosophical maturation that began with his stay in Jena, and encouraged by the influence of Karl L. Reinhold and Johann G. Fichte, the poet Novalis produced, from autumn 1795 on, a set of fragmentary notes on the philosophy of Fichte. These are now known as Fichte-Studien. Among the important issues treated in the notes, one appears particularly interesting: the treatment of the theme of philosophy within the problem of the self-understanding of the "I" - and, more specifically, the need for philosophy to think about itself, about the changes that must come upon philosophy during this process, and about the impact of these on the self-understanding of the "I". The present article aims to show how, for Novalis, philosophy is the natural thought of man. Furthermore, it aims to show how philosophy, in the course of its thought on itself, shapes the course of the self-understanding of the "I", having with the "I" a common origin, being born with it, launching it into the world, cleaving the original union in which it otherwise would always be, and finally asserting itself as a lack of this union, something through which the "I" and philosophy itself must pass in their course so they can experience this loss and aim to recover its source. (shrink)
Between 1795 and 1796 Novalis produces a vast group of fragments on Fichte’s philosophy, the posthumously entitled “Fichte-Studien”. Among the topics therein approached, one of the most important is that of the _original action of the I _, and _the possible or impossible union of the opposites which model human life and thought_, feeling and reflection. The aim of this article is to inquire Novalis’ view of this problem of paramount importance for a philosophy of the I; namely, to investigate (...) the contours of Novalis’ circular conception of the problem, and its differences regarding Fichte; to expound the dilemma of the necessity and yet impossibility of a union between opposites; and to show how the young philosopher considers this problem both in its real and in its ideal prism, thereby proposing, as a solution, a _union in disunion_, an _possible union between opposites_, which Novalis affirms as a new conception of the circular study of the I and as the foundation for a new philosophizing. (shrink)
RESUMO O presente ensaio aborda o período anterior às obras tidas como as diferentes reescrições da Doutrina da Ciência, de J. G. Fichte, e aí tenta não só perceber a origem da necessidade de um princípio da identidade, como ela surge aquando das primeiras ocorrências do mesmo, mas também discernir os primeiros passos de todo o problema da possibilidade de um princípio absoluto de toda a filosofia, que sempre animaria a empresa. O foco em questão é a «Aenesidemus-Rezension», onde Fichte (...) junta a sua voz ao aceso diálogo já anteriormente entabulado por K. L. Reinhold e G. E. Schulze, e, na necessidade de repensar o princípio da consciência do primeiro, e as críticas a este feitas pelo segundo, é trazido à convicção da necessidade de um novo princípio absoluto; mas onde, e é este o fulcro do presente ensaio, Fichte percebe a insuficiência filososófica do sistema reinholdiano como uma insuficiência de linguagem, e portanto todo o problema como um problema que depende intimamente de uma apoditicidade linguística, e daí parte para a proposta de uma nova terminologia nacional, uma linguagem filosófica sistematicamente certa e inequívoca, à altura de um sistema filosófico regido por um princípio absoluto – um problema que viria a ocupar as cogitações de toda a geração de jovens pensadores em torno do professor de Jena. ABSTRACT This essay approaches the period prior to the works considered as the different versions of the Doctrine of Science, by J. G. Fichte, and aims not only at discerning the origin of the need for a principle of identity, but also at retracing the first steps of the whole problem of the possibility of an absolute principle of all philosophy. The focus shall be the «Aenesidemus-Rezension», where Fichte joins his voice to the heated argument previously struck by K. L. Reinhold and G. E. Schulze, and, urged to rethink Reinhold's principle of consciousness and the criticism raised by Schulze, is brought to believe the necessity for a new absolute principle; but where, and this is the fundamental idea of this essay, Fichte realizes the philosophical insufficiency of Reinhold's system as a language-related insufficiency, and therefore the whole problem as one intimately dependent on a linguistic apodicticity, and moves on to propose a new national terminology, a systematically certain and unequivocal philosophical language, which might meet the demands of a philosophical system ruled by an absolute principle – a problem which would soon be in the agenda of a whole generation of young idealists around the Professor of Jena. (shrink)
Resumo: O presente ensaio visa debruçar-se sobre o conjunto de anotações coligidas por Immanuel Kant, tendo em vista a arguição da dissertação do seu colega J. G. Kreutzfeld. Mais concretamente, pretende-se analisar a visão kantiana do tópico da ilusão poética, e o vínculo que esta forja entre as inferiores e as superiores faculdades do ânimo, a sensibilidade e o entendimento. Almeja-se ainda demonstrar como, para Kant, o engano apenas suscita o fastídio do espírito e, portanto, nenhum conhecimento ou prazer, ao (...) passo que a ilusão poética promove a ficcionação dos dados da sensibilidade e respectiva promoção da tarefa do entendimento na apreciação destes, e concluir como isso mesmo é para o filósofo um jogo que a ilusão enceta com o espírito, e do qual este extrai não só prazer, como também o avanço no seu conhecimento de si e do mundo. Por fim, esse mesmo jogo será apresentado por Kant como o sustentáculo principal para uma muito singular, mas sobretudo muito profícua cooperação entre poesia e filosofia.: The following essay discusses Immanuel Kant’s “Entwurf zu einer Opponenten-Rede”, which treats of his colleague J. G. Kreutzfeld’s dissertation. More specifically, my aim is to analyze Kant’s view of poetical illusion, and the bond it forges between the inferior and the superior faculties of the spirit, that is, the sensibility and the understanding. I also aim at demonstrating how, for Kant, deceit only arouses aversion, and therefore no knowledge or pleasure whatsoever; poetical illusion, on the other hand, promotes the fictionalization of the data of sensibility and enhances the role of the understanding in judging them. For Kant this is a game which the illusion plays with the spirit, and from whence the latter derives not only pleasure but also an advancement in its cognition of itself and the world. Finally, this very game is presented by Kant as the main foundation of a very singular, but above all very fertile, cooperation between poetry and philosophy. (shrink)
Partindo da inequívoca assumpção de que há um espírito comum entre Platão e o período do idealismo alemão, o presente ensaio propõe-se comprovar esta mesma tese analisando o conjunto de anotações intitulado “Über den Geist der Platonischen Philosophie”, coligido por Schelling ainda na fase pré-filosófica da sua evolução espiritual, em 1793. Da análise deste, e dos dois mitos aí contidos, esperase por sua vez que estes nos possam fornecer fortes indícios não só do quadro histórico-mitológico que está por detrás de (...) toda a filosofia idealista, mas também da possibilidade de que destes mitos nasçam os primeiros frémitos da primeiríssima filosofia de Schelling. (shrink)
RESUMO A história do estatuto, bem como da posição da memória entre semelhantes forças, desde a formação do conceito moderno da antropologia, durante toda a tradição leibniz-wolffinana, e até Kant, é uma história de mudança ascendente, de cristalização de ambos os predicados desta faculdade, e também uma de grande influência sobre a história do próprio pensamento antropológico. O presente ensaio propõe-se analisar como Kant receberia essa evolução, e como ele sobre ela actuaria. Isto é, centrando-nos nas “Lições de Antropologia”, e (...) sobre a “Antropologia num Enfoque Pragmático”, queremos indagar até que ponto Kant daria continuidade à referida tradição, mas, sobretudo, a partir de onde este com ela rompe, talhando ele próprio um novo capítulo nessa história, e também na história da antropologia; mais concretamente, importa conhecer a posição de Kant em relação a Platner ou Hume e suas concepções de memória, sua cisão em relação a estes, e sua proposta de todo um reposicionamento, e também revalorização do estatuto da memória entre faculdades da alma; e, por fim, perceber como Kant traz estes propósitos a bom porto, a saber, por meio da memória judiciosa, a única que abre não só para as ciências, mas também para a faculdade de imaginação produtiva, e para a poesia, e portanto também a única capaz de unir inferiores e superiores faculdades da alma, e instaurar harmonia entre estas. ABSTRACT The history of the status, as well as the position of memory among similar forces, since the genesis of the modern concept of anthropology, during the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition, and until Kant, is a history of ascending transformation, a crystallization of both this faculty’s attributes, and also one of great influence on the history of anthropological thought itself. The present essay aims at analyzing how Kant would receive that evolution, and how he would act upon it. That is, by focusing on the “Lectures on Anthropology”, and on “Anthropology on a Pragmatic Point of View”, we wish to inquire to what extent Kant would resume the aforementioned tradition, but, above all, from which point he breaks with it, thus carving he himself a new chapter in that history, and also in the history of anthropology; namely, it is our objective to ascertain Kant’s position regarding Platner or Hume and their conceptions of memory, his scission from the latter two, and his proposition of a whole repositioning, and also revaluation of the status of memory among faculties of the soul; and finally, understanding how Kant succeeds in these purposes, namely, through the concept of judicious memory, the only one which enables not only sciences, but also the productive faculty of imagination, and hence poetry, and therefore the only one able to unite both inferior and superior faculties of the soul and to sow harmony between the latter. (shrink)
RESUMO Seguindo a elevação de outros dons naturais do espírito humano a categorias ou princípios estéticos, o que ocorreria gradualmente durante o século XVIII, o génio e as suas várias problemáticas tornam-se uma das mais prementes questões na agenda filosófica da época. Entre outros, a questão assume particular relevância na filosofia de Immanuel Kant, e isso não apenas na sua obra publicada, mas também na sua actividade como Professor. O presente texto propõe-se abordar a questão do génio nas lições de (...) antropologia do filósofo, e, tomando isto como ensejo, cumprir dois objectivos centrais: em primeiro lugar, traçar uma brevíssima história do conceito desde o século XVII até Kant, a fim de perceber que emprego desta faria o filósofo, e como ele próprio se associa ou dissocia desta. Segundo, compreender o modo como, dada a sua percepção histórica do termo, a teoria do génio em Kant trilha um curso singular, distinto em relação ao dos seus contemporâneos, e que faz com que o génio ostente uma posição central no seio da sua própria teoria; pois, na visão de Kant, o génio não só desempenha um importante papel como mediador das faculdades do ânimo humano, como é ainda peça indispensável na boa proporção entre estes e na insuspeitada produção de conhecimento por isto gerada. ABSTRACT Following the ascension of other natural gifts of the human spirit to the condition of categories or aesthetic principles, which would occur gradually during the 18th century, the topic of genius and its various issues becomes one of the most important questions in the philosophical agenda of the time. Among others, the question assumes particular relevance in Immanuel Kant's philosophy, not only in his published work, but also in his activity as a professor. The following text intends to approach the question of genius in the philosopher's Lectures on Anthropology, and taking the latter into account, to fulfil two central objectives: first, to etch a brief history of the concept from the 17th century until Kant, so as to realize what use Kant would make of this evolution, and how he himself associates or dissociates from it. Secondly, we intend to understand how Kant's theory of genius describes its own singular course, different from the ones of his contemporaries, and renders the genius a central piece within his own theory; for, in Kant's view, the genius not only plays an important role as mediator of the faculties of the spirit, but it is also an indispensable factor in the proportion between the latter, and in the unsuspected production of knowledge thus generated. (shrink)
Os governos de Fernando Henrique Cardoso são considerados responsáveis por uma forte redução do Estado através de políticas de contenção dos gastos públicos, as quais atingiram também as Forças Armadas. Inversamente, os governos de Lula da Silva apresentaram um discurso desenvolvimentista, que, supostamente, favoreceu o investimento nas Forças Armadas, invertendo as tendências das gestões anteriores. O artigo faz, a partir da leitura de dois textos do cientista político João Roberto Martins Filho e de dados estatísticos da SEORI, a (...) análise crítica e comparativa entre os governos citados em relação aos investimentos – e somente em relação aos investimentos – em Defesa Nacional, na manutenção e modernização das Forças Armadas. (shrink)
Este ensaio pretende levantar as seguintes questões: 1. de que modo é possível reconstituir o sentido de moral segundo um amor-próprio cujo conteúdo é dado menos por um isolamento ou negaçáo do outro do que por um trabalho pessoal sobre si mesmo, em vista de um êthos , de uma ética? 2. em que medida o valor da moral hoje em dia pode ser deslocado da lei universal para uma atitude de diferença, da normalidade do comportamento para o cultivo de (...) si e, por fim, da verdade sobre o sujeito para uma subjetivaçáo ascética que náo exige a prerrogativa de uma identidade, mas a transformaçáo de si na relaçáo consigo e com os outros? Tais questões sáo levantadas a partir de Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault e Fernando Savater. Palavras-chave: Amor-próprio, Estética da existência, Ética, Identidade. (shrink)
Una dificultad frecuente en los trabajos sobre desarrollo sintáctico infantil es la de explicar usos cuya configuración no responde a una forma canónica aunque cumplan esa función. En el caso de las Cláusulas Relativas la tipología de lenguas propone el concepto de “Estrategia de relativización” para comprender las diferentes formas con las que las lenguas articulan modificadores complejos posnominales. Este trabajo presenta los resultados de una investigación que analizó la producción espontánea y la recuperación de Cláusulas Relativas en 32 niños (...) y niñas, hablantes de español de 5 años, de Nivel Socioeconómico Medio y Bajo. Se consideró el desempeño sintáctico según variables poblacionales, pues existe una extensa tradición en la literatura sobre desarrollo sintáctico que atiende a esta incidencia. Se relevaron, describieron y clasificaron las CR siguiendo a Givón y Silva . Los objetivos de la investigación son, por un lado, considerar las ER y comparar su forma y frecuencia y, por otro lado, indagar cuáles son los factores que inciden en las diferencias. Los resultados muestran que las formas son comparables a usos de Estrategias de relativización descriptos previamente en población infantil y adulta para el español. Se releva una variación sintáctica novedosa, aducible al contexto particular de renarración. El análisis de diferencias de desempeño, según variables poblacionales, no reporta diferencias significativas, aunque sí se reportan al considerar tareas y Cláusulas Relativas Recuperadas ). El análisis de incidencia de variables poblacionales según tareas reporta diferencias significativas entre NSE Medio y Bajo para las CRREP. Los resultados permiten inferir que el uso infantil de CR no es una condición unicausal, ni completamente acreditable a la incidencia de factores poblacionales sino que es el resultado de la interacción entre condiciones poblacionales, lingüísticas, pragmáticointeraccionales y cognitivas. (shrink)
Two continents. Three countries. Mountains, archipelago, a little red dot & more to come. BERIT SOLI-HOLT (Editor): When I think of introductory material, I think of that Derrida documentary when he is asked about what he would like to know about other philosophers. He simply states: their love life. APRIL VANNINI (Editor): And as far as introductions go, I think Derrida brought forth a fruitful discussion on philosophy and thinking with this statement. First, he allows philosophy to open up the (...) personal and second, the ability to conjure the notion of thinking in relation. After all, love lives are spawned from relations, and such are philosophical encounters—the co-emergence of thought and affect. This brings us to discuss the concept of the special issue of continent. called drift . From the Statement of Intent : The discussion that has become drift , a special issue of continent. began in the glow of a bonfire beside a lake near the Thousand Islands of Ontario when co-founders April and Berit came across a conception of a journal that would decline to follow traditional models of invitation and editorship, instead following a generated discourse through relational means. Shedding preemptive articulation of expected outcome and cohesion, we hope to light a fuse of chain interactions with each contributor active in authorial, editorial, and curatorial roles. drift seeks to allow the framing mechanism to choose itself, to find where something can flow or emerge in relation to a series of participants. By setting out a thread of thought to work its own way through writers and artists of various locations, drift operates through links, breaks, pauses, new directions, unintended consequences, twists, holes, bridges. We are attempting to give the scene for an emergence and what can become conceivable when given the opportunity to create chains of thought—linking, welding, fusing, looping, stitching. We hope to explore what is attainable when scholarly/artistic relationships transverse on their own terms instead of articulated by an institutional environment. JEREMY FERNANDO (Guest Editor): I think he was actually more interested in their sex lives. Though at the same time completely refusing to discuss, disclose, his own: I found it rather touching that he blushes whenever speaking of his life with Marguerite. So perhaps in this sense it is very apt to speak of it in terms of love; and the secret that is in each love: that even though it is a relationality between, there are parts of it that remain hidden, not just from everyone else, but even those in that relation itself. What the editors intend to ^do^ to impart this conceptualization is to provide a framework through the choice of a theme and by minimal standardization of form and content guidelines. As initial instigator, each editor will send their contribution to the issue to a fellow colleague, thinker, artist, friend with the invitation to send (via post) the accruing materials to another possible contributor. In this, we hope to engage with many individuals on ideas surrounding a specific theme determined but not limited by the editors of the drift . The end result will take the form of whatever is at hand (as materials can only stay with each contributor for two weeks) and whomever is at hand (the availability of interested and capable parties) through a course of five months. We are curious. What are the ways in which thought can emerge between individuals and places? What occurs when our fundamental mode of inquiry is between each other? How are ethical, social, spacious, political, aesthetic practices created between a chain of contributors. BSH: To introduce what to look forward to in June with the publication of drift isn't quite possible yet. It is in the stages of preparation, barely started, but already begun. I have been thinking about drift as an insect that goes through life cycles, chrysalises, pupas, larva. Each moment of the production and publication of this issue of continent. is its own life. A bug under a pin is not as interesting as one in flight or crawling up your leg. JF: Though the one crawling up your leg is also more likely to bite you. There is always already a danger in letting be, thinking …. Then again, there is also a potential rupture in attempting to seize, pin down, capture. BSH: I think a word we haven't thought about enough yet is capture. I think we are perhaps trying to capture something, or to allow for the moments of this capture along the way, the resulting material being the ripples left in the sand when the water waves away. AV: This question comes to mind when speaking about captures, waves, ripples: How can we activate a ripple? What I find interesting about a wave is the difference in frequencies, movements, forms, style that are activated in between intervals. What is interesting about a wave is that it is activated in relation to what came before. What remains in the sand is a ripple that forms in relation between multiple intervals of stylistic waves. As Deleuze and Parnet have taught us, "We were only two, but what was important for us was less our working together than this strange fact of working between the two of us. We stopped being 'author'. And these 'between-the-twos' referred back to other people, who were different on one side from the other. The desert expanded, but in so doing became more populous." 1 Drift is activation for thinking-with and possibly much more—who knows? There is the intent to subvert the relational qualities between people in journal publishing, but also important to the editors is the subversion of materials. The editors do not shy away from use of contemporary technology and, in fact, have relied and will continue to rely on the wonders of internet connectivity to midwife the drift. The connective infrastructure chosen to relay the developing issue is simply one of bodies, of postal workers and the varying postal systems. Some may find it to be merely be a call of an already dying form, but the editors believe that the conversation exchanged from hand to hand is of explicit difference in quality of engagement due to the complexity of peripheral information transported by physical matter. Different hospitalities and responsibilities are at play in keeping hold of one-of-a-kind materials for a time and entrusting various postal systems to bear the message forward. To have work physically transported through space and time through this kind of infrastructure that is reliant on individuals to literally carry a message is crucial in incorporating traces of bodily presence. AV: Thought is contingent and emergent process that folds, twists, pulls, shifts in multiple directions and we are interested in these multiple directions. JF: And even as thought is contingent on, hinged around, its place, time, venue—on its continents, as it were (we still tend to speak of gestures of thinking as Continental, British, American, European, Asian, etc.)—we might also attempt to respond to the landscape within each thought: its folds, unfoldings, rolls, manoeuvres, geography. BSH: How different is this than Morelli's screw that Julio Cortazar or Horacio Oliveira recounts in Hopscotch? The fable recalls a man who regarded a screw everyday on his stoop. When he perishes, the screw disappears, perhaps into a fellow neighbor's pocket for secret contemplation. Whoever is writing the passage remarks that "Morelli thought that the screw must have been something else, a god or something like that. Too easy a solution. Perhaps the error was in accepting the fact that the object was a screw simply because it was shaped like a screw." JF: Perhaps even more intriguing is the notion that we do not quite know who is inscribing these remarks on Morelli. That even as someone says that it is a screw, perhaps because it is shaped like a screw, the one who names it “screw”—the one whom we are in a relation with in relation to the screw—remains veiled from us. But even as this is so, the notion of the object as “screw” is marked, etched, onto us. BSH: A periodical, marking a period of time, but where? An issue, a magazine, a storehouse of information. To show the remainders of thinkers connecting and surfing. With all this stated, we, as editors of the drift are aware of the active fault, quaking potential, and ethical catastrophe of such a proposed project — the inheritance or the gifting of a project without consent. We are certain that there may be possible oversight on the process of such a project. If such is the case, we hope that oversight and misdirection will not leave this project dormant but rather open up promising new directions, questions, and potential considerations. We are very excited about the accidental propositions that can occur in between. In sum, we'll see what happens. JF: Perhaps, all we can know of the screw is that we are screwed ... NOTE Gilles Deleuze & Claire Parnet. Dialogues II . Revised edition. (New York: Columbia University Press). 2007: 17. (shrink)
This piece, included in the drift special issue of continent. , was created as one step in a thread of inquiry. While each of the contributions to drift stand on their own, the project was an attempt to follow a line of theoretical inquiry as it passed through time and the postal service(s) from October 2012 until May 2013. This issue hosts two threads: between space & place and between intention & attention . The editors recommend that to experience the (...) drifiting thought that attention be paid to the contributions as they entered into conversation one after another. This particular piece is from the BETWEEN INTENTION & ATTENTION thread: Jeremy Fernando, Sitting in the Dock of the bay, watching... * R.H. Jackson, Reading Eyes * Gina Rae Foster, Nyctoleptic Nomadism: The Drift/Swerve of Knowing * Bronwyn Lay, Driftwood * Patricia Reed, Sentences on Drifitng * David Prater, drift: a way * * * * "… to sleep perchance to dream " 1 To dream: to be not quite asleep, yet not particularly awake. Or, rather: to be awake but not quite know it. For, it is only when we dream, when we are dreaming, that we know that we are not in that final sleep. But we can only know that we are dreaming, that we have dreamt, when we are awake, when we have awoken; after it is too late. When all we know is that the sleep beyond finitude, the sleep that is the step beyond, is not yet upon us, is only to come. To die to sleep … To dream: a sleep that refuses sleep. Perchance to dream: to drift—between sleep and sleep. Aye there's the rub For, can we even know if we have been sleeping? Or, if death has claimed us?—even if a little death. α Ω α Ω α Ω To drift: but from, to, what? For, to drift implies a certain direction that one was headed from, heading to, headed for; without these indications, markers, points in relation with each other, one would just be moving. Can one know—intend—one's drift? Certainly a stunt driver would say so. But even as (s)he is starting her slide, all that (s)he can know is that she is setting the car, herself, the car with herself in it, in motion: after which the drift itself takes over. After which, all (s)he can do is attend to it. At the point of the drift: both (s)he and the car are drifting—here, one might not even be able to separate the movement from those involved in it. Without either of them, there would not be a drift; there is no drifting without the drifter. Both the drifter and the drifting are in a relationality; in which, all that they can know is that they are in relation with each other. Hence, the drift itself is a relationality. A non-essence. But, it is not as if we cannot speak of it. Perhaps though: we can only speak of it as if we can speak of it. Always already an imaginary gesture; where what is being imagined is the relationality between the drift and the ones drifting. Thus, we have a situation where the drifter and drifting are in a relationality; where relationality itself is what is being imagined. Perhaps then, what are we drifting from, to? , is a moot question. As is, what is drifting? Perhaps then, all we can say is drift? To speak of drift is an attempt to speak of the unspeakable. Not that what is speakable and what is unspeakable are antonyms: if that were so, speaking the unspeakable would make no sense, be a contradiction. But that in every act of speaking, something unspeakable is potentially said: something that opens, ruptures, wounds even. And not just that—at the point where it punctures, speaking itself moves out of the way for the unspeakable; speaking itself disappears. "… the whole art is to know how to disappear before dying, and instead of dying. " 2 To disappear; or, to drift out of sight. Where the words themselves slip away. After all: "in the Beginning was the Word. It was only afterwards that Silence came." Perhaps the wish, the hope, is that "the end itself has disappeared …" (Baudrillard, 70) Remaining hidden from us. Perhaps only glimpsed when we dream. Secret. α Ω α Ω α Ω " Bury all your secrets in my skin " (Corey Taylor) Which is the problem: words cling. And they remain. Perhaps not ontologically; but they certainly remain to haunt us. And here, we should not forget Lucretius' lesson that communication occurs in the skin between the parties in communion with each other. Which is not to say that the encounter is determined by atoms—and more precisely atoms that move in straight lines until they collide with each other—that communication is pre-determined. For, one must not forget that will is found, discovered, enacted even, at the moment the atoms swerve. Clinamen . Drift. But even in their movement—drifting—they trace themselves into the skin between; a tangential touching. Perhaps only briefly. But even then, enough … "… there's always texture that betrays the place." (May Ee Wong) Here though, one must not forget that betrayal cannot happen in the absence of love. In fact, betrayal is the very excess of love: where one loves the other so much that one can no longer bear to see the other drift from what (s)he could have been. Whether that idealised other exists or is only in one's head is another question altogether. Perhaps, a fetishised other: keeping in mind that "fetishes are hinged around simulation." After all, "when one is supposed to show up as an oil rig diver no one is expecting actual crude oil" (Amanda Sordes); in fact, actualisation is the perfect way to destroy the fantasy. Perhaps then, the only way to maintain love for another is to maintain a proper distance, as it were, from love: allow the love to constantly alter, change. And here, one must not forget that if love is a relationality between one and another who remains wholly other (otherwise just a mere manifestation of the self), love is a relationality that knows nothing except for the fact that it is in a relation. For, to love one has to attend to—without subsuming another, some other, under oneself. Which means that to love, one has to be willing to risk, to open oneself, to allow oneself to be wounded, torn apart. In new ways, ways that we have yet to understand, come across, ways we do not yet have a name for. Thus, this movement in love is one that occurs in utter blindness; to not only the other, but to what love is. This is love as pure drifting. Perhaps always searching for love itself, without ever knowing what it is that it is looking for. Love: only at the very moment when the word love itself disappears. Perhaps all we can do is sit, and attend: watching the tides flowing away—as if they were having their "last swim of the summer." (Hendrik Speck) Like a butterfly. α Ω α Ω α Ω Isn't it quite amazing how the appearance of a butterfly can inject a stutter or pause into any conversation? Words and words pour out of the animals in assembly, before they are all of a sudden arrested by the passing flight. Heads turn to trace a lilting poetics, attempting to close the distance with this seemingly awkward beauty. There are no straight lines here, only a relative arrival and departure to bracket a brilliant and bewildering trajectory, surging and lurching in a vibrating and nomadic line avant la lettre. (Sean Smith, 'I Seek You: Countdown to Stereoscopic Tear') Before the letter. Before the possibility of naming. Before being sayable. Quite possibly also before language. And yet, a "surging and lurching," a movement with an effect—"vibrating and nomadic"—tracing itself before there is even anything to trace. Leaving something, even if that thing remains unknowable, for us to attend to. Drifting into us. I had some dreams they were clouds in my coffee, clouds in my coffee..." (Carly Simon) NOTES William Shakespeare, Hamlet , Act 3 Scene 1. Jean Baudrillard, Why hasn't everything already disappeared? , 25.  . (shrink)
An argument is epistemically self-defeating when either the truth of an argument’s conclusion or belief in an argument’s conclusion defeats one’s justification to believe at least one of that argument’s premises. Some extant defenses of the evidentiary value of intuition have invoked considerations of epistemic self-defeat in their defense. I argue that there is one kind of argument against intuition, an unreliability argument, which, even if epistemically self-defeating, can still imply that we are not justified in thinking intuition has evidentiary (...) value. (shrink)
Conservatism about perceptual justification tells us that we cannot have perceptual justification to believe p unless we also have justification to believe that perceptual experiences are reliable. There are many ways to maintain this thesis, ways that have not been sufficiently appreciated. Most of these ways lead to at least one of two problems. The first is an over-intellectualization problem, whereas the second problem concerns the satisfaction of the epistemic basing requirement on justified belief. I argue that there is at (...) least one Conservative view that survives both difficulties, a view which has the further ability to undercut a crucial consideration that has supported Dogmatist views about perceptual justification. The final section explores a tension between Conservatism and the prospects of having a completely general account of propositional justification. Ironically, the problem is that Conservatives seem committed to making the acquisition of propositional justification too easy. My partial defense of Conservatism concludes by suggesting possible solutions to this problem. (shrink)
The special composition question asks, roughly, under what conditions composition occurs. The common sense view is that composition only occurs among some things and that all and only ‘ordinary objects’ exist. Peter van Inwagen has marshaled a devastating argument against this view. The common sense view appears to commit one to giving what van Inwagen calls a ‘series-style answer’ to the special composition question, but van Inwagen argues that series-style answers are impossible because they are inconsistent with the transitivity of (...) parthood. In what follows I answer this objection in addition to other, less troubling objections raised by van Inwagen. (shrink)
A survey was conducted to investigate the relationship of Australian consumers’ lived (experienced) spiritual well-being and materialism with the various dimensions of consumer ethics. Spiritual well-being is composed of four domains—personal, communal, transcendental and environmental well-being. All four domains were examined in relation to the various dimensions of consumers’ ethical beliefs (active/illegal dimension, passive dimension, active/legal dimension, ‘no harm, no foul’ dimension and ‘doing good’/recycling dimension). The results indicated that lived communal well-being was negatively related to perceptions of the active/illegal (...) dimension and the passive dimension and was positively related to perceptions of the ‘no harm, no foul’ dimension and the ‘doing good’/recycling dimension. Lived personal well-being was negatively related to perceptions of the active/illegal dimension and was positively related to perceptions of the ‘no harm, no foul’ dimension and the ‘doing good’/recycling dimension. Lived transcendental well-being was negatively related to perceptions of the passive dimension, the active/legal dimension and the ‘no harm, no foul’ dimension. Lived environmental well-being was negatively related to perceptions of the active/legal dimension and the ‘no harm, no foul’ dimension. The findings also indicated that materialism was positively associated with perceptions of actively benefiting from illegal actions, passively benefiting at the expense of the seller, actively benefiting from questionable but legal actions and benefiting from ‘no harm, no foul’ actions. Public policy implications of the findings and opportunities for future research are discussed. (shrink)
The relationship between spiritual wellbeing and ethical orientations in decision making is examined through a survey of executives in organizations listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. The four domains of spiritual well-being, personal, communal, environmental and transcendental (Fisher, Spiritual health: its nature and place in the school curriculum, PhD thesis, University of Melbourne, 1998; Gomez and Fisher, Pers Individ Differ 35:1975–1991, 2003) are examined in relation to idealism and relativism (Forsyth, J Pers Soc Psychol 39(1): 175–184, 1980). Results reveal that (...) spiritual well-being, in particular the communal domain of spiritual well-being, is correlated with and predictive of idealism. However, the relationship between spiritual well-being and relativism is weak. Implications of the study are discussed in terms of developing managerial programs that enhance communal well-being which should lead to greater idealism in decision making. Limitations of the study and future research opportunities are outlined. (shrink)
Making research data readily accessible during a public health emergency can have profound effects on our response capabilities. The moral milieu of this data sharing has not yet been adequately explored. This article explores the foundation and nature of a duty, if any, that researchers have to share data, specifically in the context of public health emergencies. There are three notable reasons that stand in opposition to a duty to share one’s data, relating to: (i) data property and ownership, (ii) (...) just distribution of benefits and burdens and (iii) the contemporary ethos of science. We argue each reason can be successfully met with corresponding rationale in favour of data sharing. Further support for data sharing has been echoed in policies of health agencies, funding bodies and academic institutions; in documents on the ethical conduct of biomedical research; and in discussions on the nature of public health. From this, we ascertain that sharing data is the morally sound default position. This article then highlights the key roles reciprocity and solidarity play in supporting the practice of data sharing. We conclude with recommendations to regard public health research data as a common-pool resource in order to build a framework for stable data sharing management. (shrink)
Powers and Faden argue that social justice ‘is concerned with securing and maintaining the social conditions necessary for a sufficient level of well-being in all of its essential dimensions for everyone’ (2006: 50). Moreover, social justice is concerned with the ‘achievement of well-being, not the freedom or capability to achieve well-being’ (p. 40). Although Powers and Faden note that an agent alone cannot achieve well-being without the necessary social conditions of life (e.g. equal civil liberties and basic material resources, such (...) as food and shelter), it seems that achievement requires that an agent actually pursue the six dimensions of well-being. In this article, I question the extent to which an individual has an obligation to achieve well-being, even if he or she would choose to do otherwise. For example, can an agent choose to forgo being healthy even if all the social conditions are met in her life, thereby choosing to not achieve well-being? It remains unclear how the dimension of self-determination coheres with the remaining five dimensions of well-being and the extent of society’s obligations toward an individual’s achievement of well-being, even in those instances when society’s actions may go against an individual’s right to self-determination. (shrink)
As it is known, there is no rule satisfying Additivity in the complete domain of bankruptcy problems. This paper proposes a notion of partial Additivity in this context, to be called µ-additivity. We find that µ-additivity, together with two quite compelling axioms, anonymity and continuity, identify the Minimal Overlap rule, introduced by Neill (1982).
Events employed in natural language semantics are characterized in terms of regular languages, each string in which can be regarded as a motion picture. The relevant ﬁnite automata then amount to movie cameras/projectors, or more formally, to ﬁnite Kripke structures with par- tial valuations. The usual regular constructs (concatena- tion, choice, etc) are supplemented with superposition of strings/automata/languages, realized model-theoretically as conjunction.
Conservativity in generalized quantifiers is linked to presupposition filtering, under a propositions-as-types analysis extended with dependent quantifiers. That analysis is underpinned by modeltheoretically interpretable proofs which inhabit propositions they prove, thereby providing objects for quantification and hooks for anaphora.
Background: Demand for organisational ethics capacity is growing in health organisations, particularly among managers. The role of clinical ethicists in, and perspective on, organisational ethics has not been well described or documented in the literature. Objective: To describe clinical ethicists’ perspectives on organisational ethics issues in their hospitals, their institutional role in relation to organisational ethics, and their perceived effectiveness in helping to address organisational ethics issues. Design and Setting: Qualitative case study involving semi-structured interviews with 18 clinical ethicists across (...) 13 health organisations in Toronto, Canada. Results: From the clinical ethicists’ perspective, the most pressing organisational ethics issues in their organisations are: resource allocation, staff moral distress linked to the organisation’s moral climate, conflicts of interest, and clinical issues with a significant organisational dimension. Clinical ethicists were consulted in particular on issues related to staff moral distress and clinical issues with an organisational dimension. Some ethicists described being increasingly consulted on resource allocation, conflicts of interest, and other corporate decisions. Many clinical ethicists felt they lacked sufficient knowledge and understanding of organisational decision-making processes, training in organisational ethics, and access to organisational ethics tools to deal effectively with the increasing demand for organisational ethics support. Conclusion: Growing demand for organisational ethics expertise in healthcare institutions is reshaping the role of clinical ethicists. Effectiveness in organisational ethics entails a re-evaluation of clinical ethics training to include capacity building in organisational ethics and organisational decision-making processes as a complement to traditional clinical ethics education. (shrink)
Inertia is enshrined in Newton’s ﬁrst law of motion, a body at rest or in uniform motion remains in that state unless a force is applied to it. Now, consider (1). (1) Pat stopped the car before it hit the tree. Can we conclude from (1) that the car struck the tree? Not without further information such as that supplied in (2). (2) But the bus behind kept going. A post-condition for Pat stopping the car is that the car be (...) at rest. To satisfy a pre-condition for the car hitting the tree (namely, that the car not be at rest), inertia requires that some intervening force act on the car (as hinted, for example, by (2)). In the absence of such a force, (1) would appear to suggest that Pat prevented a collision between car and tree. Exactly what bit of physics are we importing into natural language interpretation here? Oversimpliﬁed, Newton’s ﬁrst law of motion says: no change without force. Identifying force with cause, we come to the slogan no temporality without cause, capturing in a phrase the proposal from Steedman 2000 that.. (shrink)
Relations computed by ﬁnite-state transducers are applied to interpret temporal propositions in terms of strings representing ﬁnite contexts or situations. Carnap–Montague intensions mapping indices to extensions are reformulated as relations between strings that can serve as indices and extensions alike. Strings are related according to information content, temporal span and granularity, the bounds on which reﬂect the partiality of natural language statements. That partiality shapes not only strings-as-extensions (indicating what statements are about) but also strings-as-indices (underlying truth conditions).
Finite-state methods are applied to determine the consequences of events, represented as strings of sets of fluents. Developed to flesh out events used in natural language semantics, the approach supports reasoning about action in AI, including the frame problem and inertia. Representational and inferential aspects of the approach are explored, centering on conciseness of language, context update and constraint application with bias.
Situations serving as partial worlds as well as events in natural language semantics are constructed from a type-theoretic interpretation of firstorder formulae and (after a type reduction) temporal formulae. Limitations of the Russell-Wiener-Kamp derivation of time from events are discussed and overcome to give a more widely applicable account of temporal granularity. Finite situations are formulated as strings of observations, conceptualized to persist inertially (in the absence of forces).
Various authors within the contemporary debate on divine action in nature and contemporary science argue both for and against a Thomistic account of divine action through the notions of primary and secondary causes. In this paper I argue that those who support a Thomistic account of divine action often fail to explain Aquinas' doctrine in full, while those who argue against it base their objections on an incomplete knowledge of this doctrine, or identify it with Austin Farrer's doctrine of double (...) agency – again failing to do Aquinas justice. I analyse these objections, indicating how they do not address Aquinas' doctrine by offering a brief but full account of the latter. (shrink)