8 found
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  1. Pushing moral buttons: The interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment.Joshua D. Greene, Fiery A. Cushman, Lisa E. Stewart, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom & Jonathan D. Cohen - 2009 - Cognition 111 (3):364-371.
    In some cases people judge it morally acceptable to sacrifice one person’s life in order to save several other lives, while in other similar cases they make the opposite judgment. Researchers have identified two general factors that may explain this phenomenon at the stimulus level: (1) the agent’s intention (i.e. whether the harmful event is intended as a means or merely foreseen as a side-effect) and (2) whether the agent harms the victim in a manner that is relatively “direct” or (...)
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  2.  7
    Punishment is Organized around Principles of Communicative Inference.Arunima Sarin, Mark K. Ho, Justin W. Martin & Fiery A. Cushman - 2021 - Cognition 208 (C):104544.
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  3.  53
    Is utilitarian sacrifice becoming more morally permissible?Ivar R. Hannikainen, Edouard Machery & Fiery A. Cushman - 2018 - Cognition 170 (C):95-101.
  4.  26
    Act Versus Impact: Conservatives and Liberals Exhibit Different Structural Emphases in Moral Judgment.Ivar R. Hannikainen, Ryan M. Miller & Fiery A. Cushman - 2017 - Ratio 30 (4):462-493.
    Conservatives and liberals disagree sharply on matters of morality and public policy. We propose a novel account of the psychological basis of these differences. Specifically, we find that conservatives tend to emphasize the intrinsic value of actions during moral judgment, in part by mentally simulating themselves performing those actions, while liberals instead emphasize the value of the expected outcomes of the action. We then demonstrate that a structural emphasis on actions is linked to the condemnation of victimless crimes, a distinctive (...)
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    Moral Emotions from the Frog’s Eye View.Fiery A. Cushman - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (3):261-263.
    To understand the structure of moral emotions poses a difficult challenge. For instance, why do liberals and conservatives see some moral issues similarly, but others starkly differently? Or, why does punishment depend on accidental variation in the severity of a harmful outcome, while judgments of wrongfulness or character do not? To resolve the complex design of morality, it helps to think in functional terms. Whether through learning, cultural evolution or natural selection, moral emotions will tend to guide behavior adaptively in (...)
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  6.  59
    Cognitive constraints on reciprocity and tolerated scrounging.Jeffrey R. Stevens & Fiery A. Cushman - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (4):569-570.
    Each of the food-sharing models that Gurven considers demands unique cognitive capacities. Reciprocal altruism, in particular, requires a suite of complex abilities not required by alternatives such as tolerated scrounging. Integrating cognitive constraints with comparative data from other species can illuminate the adaptive benefits of food sharing in humans.
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    The role of causal structure in implicit evaluation.Benedek Kurdi, Adam Morris & Fiery A. Cushman - 2022 - Cognition 225 (C):105116.
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  8. Representational exchange in social learning: Blurring the lines between the ritual and instrumental.Natalia Vélez, Charley M. Wu & Fiery A. Cushman - 2022 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 45:e271.
    We propose that human social learning is subject to a trade-off between the cost of performing a computation and the flexibility of its outputs. Viewing social learning through this lens sheds light on cases that seem to violate bifocal stance theory (BST) – such as high-fidelity imitation in instrumental action – and provides a mechanism by which causal insight can be bootstrapped from imitation of cultural practices.
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