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Fiery Cushman [35]Fiery A. Cushman [5]
  1. Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers.Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (2):135-153.
    We examined the effects of order of presentation on the moral judgments of professional philosophers and two comparison groups. All groups showed similar-sized order effects on their judgments about hypothetical moral scenarios targeting the doctrine of the double effect, the action-omission distinction, and the principle of moral luck. Philosophers' endorsements of related general moral principles were also substantially influenced by the order in which the hypothetical scenarios had previously been presented. Thus, philosophical expertise does not appear to enhance the stability (...)
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  2. The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment.Fiery Cushman, Liane Young & Marc Hauser - 2006 - Psychological Science 17 (12):1082-1089.
    ��Is moral judgment accomplished by intuition or conscious reasoning? An answer demands a detailed account of the moral principles in question. We investigated three principles that guide moral judgments: (a) Harm caused by action is worse than harm caused by omission, (b) harm intended as the means to a goal is worse than harm foreseen as the side effect of a goal, and (c) harm involving physical contact with the victim is worse than harm involving no physical contact. Asking whether (...)
     
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  3. Pushing Moral Buttons: The Interaction Between Personal Force and Intention in Moral Judgment.Joshua D. Greene, Fiery A. Cushman, Lisa E. Stewart, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom & Jonathan D. Cohen - 2009 - Cognition 111 (3):364-371.
  4. Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex Increases Utilitarian Moral Judgements.Michael Koenigs, Liane Young, Ralph Adolphs, Daniel Tranel, Fiery Cushman, Marc Hauser & Antonio Damasio - 2007 - Nature 446 (7138):908-911.
     
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  5.  72
    Philosophers’ Biased Judgments Persist Despite Training, Expertise and Reflection.Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman - 2015 - Cognition 141:127-137.
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  6. Crime and Punishment: Distinguishing the Roles of Causal and Intentional Analyses in Moral Judgment.Fiery Cushman - 2008 - Cognition 108 (2):353-380.
    Recent research in moral psychology has attempted to characterize patterns of moral judgments of actions in terms of the causal and intentional properties of those actions. The present study directly compares the roles of consequence, causation, belief and desire in determining moral judgments. Judgments of the wrongness or permissibility of action were found to rely principally on the mental states of an agent, while judgments of blame and punishment are found to rely jointly on mental states and the causal connection (...)
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  7. A Dissociation Between Moral Judgments and Justifications.Marc Hauser, Fiery Cushman, Liane Young, J. I. N. Kang-Xing & John Mikhail - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (1):1–21.
    To what extent do moral judgments depend on conscious reasoning from explicitly understood principles? We address this question by investigating one particular moral principle, the principle of the double effect. Using web-based technology, we collected a large data set on individuals' responses to a series of moral dilemmas, asking when harm to innocent others is permissible. Each moral dilemma presented a choice between action and inaction, both resulting in lives saved and lives lost. Results showed that: (1) patterns of moral (...)
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  8.  24
    A Dissociation Between Moral Judgments and Justifications.Marc Hauser, Fiery Cushman, Liane Young, R. Kang‐Xing Jin & John Mikhail - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (1):1-21.
    : To what extent do moral judgments depend on conscious reasoning from explicitly understood principles? We address this question by investigating one particular moral principle, the principle of the double effect. Using web-based technology, we collected a large data set on individuals’ responses to a series of moral dilemmas, asking when harm to innocent others is permissible. Each moral dilemma presented a choice between action and inaction, both resulting in lives saved and lives lost. Results showed that: patterns of moral (...)
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  9.  59
    Intentional Action : Two-and-a-Half Folk Concepts?Fiery Cushman & Alfred Mele - 2008 - In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 171.
  10. Moral Appraisals Affect Doing/Allowing Judgments.Fiery Cushman, Joshua Knobe & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Cognition 108 (2):353-380.
    An extensive body of research suggests that the distinction between doing and allowing plays a critical role in shaping moral appraisals. Here, we report evidence from a pair of experiments suggesting that the converse is also true: moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments. Specifically, morally bad behavior is more likely to be construed as actively ‘doing’ than as passively ‘allowing’. This finding adds to a growing list of folk concepts influenced by moral appraisal, including causation and intentional action. We therefore suggest (...)
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  11. Patterns of Moral Judgment Derive From Nonmoral Psychological Representations.Fiery Cushman & Liane Young - 2011 - Cognitive Science 35 (6):1052-1075.
    Ordinary people often make moral judgments that are consistent with philosophical principles and legal distinctions. For example, they judge killing as worse than letting die, and harm caused as a necessary means to a greater good as worse than harm caused as a side-effect (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006). Are these patterns of judgment produced by mechanisms specific to the moral domain, or do they derive from other psychological domains? We show that the action/omission and means/side-effect distinctions affect nonmoral representations (...)
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  12.  10
    The Development of Intent-Based Moral Judgment.Fiery Cushman, Rachel Sheketoff, Sophie Wharton & Susan Carey - 2013 - Cognition 127 (1):6.
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  13. The Neural Basis of the Interaction Between Theory of Mind and Moral Judgment.Liane Young, Fiery Cushman, Marc Hauser & and Rebecca Saxe - 2007 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104 (20):8235-8240.
    Is the basis of criminality an act that causes harm, or an act undertaken with the belief that one will cause harm? The present study takes a cognitive neuroscience approach to investigating how information about an agent’s beliefs and an action’s conse- quences contribute to moral judgment. We build on prior devel- opmental evidence showing that these factors contribute differ- entially to the young child’s moral judgments coupled with neurobiological evidence suggesting a role for the right tem- poroparietal junction (RTPJ) (...)
     
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  14. Does Emotion Mediate the Effect of an Action's Moral Status on its Intentional Status? Neuropsychological Evidence.Liane Young, Fiery Cushman, Ralph Adolphs, Daniel Tranel & Marc Hauser - 2006 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 6:291-304.
    Studies of normal individuals reveal an asymmetry in the folk concept of intentional action: an action is more likely to be thought of as intentional when it is morally bad than when it is morally good. One interpretation of these results comes from the hypothesis that emotion plays a critical mediating role in the relationship between an action’s moral status and its intentional status. According to this hypothesis, the negative emotional response triggered by a morally bad action drives the attribution (...)
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  15.  77
    Intentional Action, Folk Judgments, and Stories: Sorting Things Out.Alfred R. Mele & Fiery Cushman - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):184–201.
    How are our actions sorted into those that are intentional and those that are not? The philosophical and psychological literature on this topic is livelier now than ever, and we seek to make a contribution to it here. Our guiding question in this article is easy to state and hard to answer: How do various factors— specifically, features of vignettes—that contribute to majority folk judgments that an action is or is not intentional interact in producing the judgment? In pursuing this (...)
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  16. Multi-System Moral Psychology.Fiery Cushman, Liane Young & Joshua D. Greene - 2010 - In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press.
  17.  21
    Morality Constrains the Default Representation of What is Possible.Jonathan Phillips & Fiery Cushman - 2017 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 114 (18):4649-4654.
    The capacity for representing and reasoning over sets of possibilities, or modal cognition, supports diverse kinds of high-level judgments: causal reasoning, moral judgment, language comprehension, and more. Prior research on modal cognition asks how humans explicitly and deliberatively reason about what is possible but has not investigated whether or how people have a default, implicit representation of which events are possible. We present three studies that characterize the role of implicit representations of possibility in cognition. Collectively, these studies differentiate explicit (...)
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  18.  14
    Why We Forgive What Can’T Be Controlled.Justin W. Martin & Fiery Cushman - 2016 - Cognition 147:133-143.
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  19.  60
    Moral Intuitions.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Liane Young & Fiery Cushman - 2010 - In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press. pp. 246--272.
    Moral intuitions are strong, stable, immediate moral beliefs. Moral philosophers ask when they are justified. This question cannot be answered separately from a psychological question: How do moral intuitions arise? Their reliability depends upon their source. This chapter develops and argues for a new theory of how moral intuitions arise—that they arise through heuristic processes best understood as unconscious attribute substitutions. That is, when asked whether something has the attribute of moral wrongness, people unconsciously substitute a different question about a (...)
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  20. The Psychology of Dilemmas and the Philosophy of Morality.Fiery Cushman & Liane Young - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):9-24.
    We review several instances where cognitive research has identified distinct psychological mechanisms for moral judgment that yield conflicting answers to moral dilemmas. In each of these cases, the conflict between psychological mechanisms is paralleled by prominent philosophical debates between different moral theories. A parsimonious account of this data is that key claims supporting different moral theories ultimately derive from the psychological mechanisms that give rise to moral judgments. If this view is correct, it has some important implications for the practice (...)
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  21.  9
    Act Versus Impact: Conservatives and Liberals Exhibit Different Structural Emphases in Moral Judgment.Ivar R. Hannikainen, Ryan M. Miller & Fiery A. Cushman - 2017 - Ratio 30 (4):462-493.
    Conservatives and liberals disagree sharply on matters of morality and public policy. We propose a novel account of the psychological basis of these differences. Specifically, we find that conservatives tend to emphasize the intrinsic value of actions during moral judgment, in part by mentally simulating themselves performing those actions, while liberals instead emphasize the value of the expected outcomes of the action. We then demonstrate that a structural emphasis on actions is linked to the condemnation of victimless crimes, a distinctive (...)
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  22.  14
    Grammatical Pattern Learning by Human Infants and Cotton-Top Tamarin Monkeys.Jenny Saffran, Marc Hauser, Rebecca Seibel, Joshua Kapfhamer, Fritz Tsao & Fiery Cushman - 2008 - Cognition 107 (2):479-500.
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  23.  43
    The Psychological Origins of the Doctrine of Double Effect.Fiery Cushman - 2016 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (4):763-776.
    The doctrine of double effect is a moral principle that distinguishes between harm we cause as a means to an end and harm that we cause as a side-effect. As a purely descriptive matter, the DDE is well established that it describes a consistent feature of human moral judgment. There are, however, several rival theories of its psychological cause. I review these theories and consider their advantages and disadvantages. Critically, most extant psychological theories of the DDE regard it as an (...)
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  24.  21
    Moral Emotions From the Frog’s Eye View.Fiery A. Cushman - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (3):261-263.
    To understand the structure of moral emotions poses a difficult challenge. For instance, why do liberals and conservatives see some moral issues similarly, but others starkly differently? Or, why does punishment depend on accidental variation in the severity of a harmful outcome, while judgments of wrongfulness or character do not? To resolve the complex design of morality, it helps to think in functional terms. Whether through learning, cultural evolution or natural selection, moral emotions will tend to guide behavior adaptively in (...)
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  25.  14
    Moral Learning: Psychological and Philosophical Perspectives.Fiery Cushman, Victor Kumar & Peter Railton - 2017 - Cognition 167:1-10.
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  26. The Role of Learning in Punishment, Prosociality, and Human Uniqueness.Fiery Cushman - 2013 - In Kim Sterelny, Richard Joyce, Brett Calcott & Ben Fraser (eds.), Cooperation and its Evolution. MIT Press.
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  27.  20
    Punishment in Humans: From Intuitions to Institutions.Fiery Cushman - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (2):117-133.
    Humans have a strong sense of who should be punished, when, and how. Many features of these intuitions are consistent with a simple adaptive model: Punishment evolved as a mechanism to teach social partners how to behave in future interactions. Yet, it is clear that punishment as practiced in modern contexts transcends any biologically evolved mechanism; it also depends on cultural institutions including the criminal justice system and many smaller analogs in churches, corporations, clubs, classrooms, and so on. These institutions (...)
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  28. Reviving Rawls's Linguistic Analogy: Operative Principles and the Causal Structure of Moral Actions.Marc D. Hauser, Liane Young & Fiery Cushman - 2007 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 2. MIT Press.
    The thesis we develop in this essay is that all humans are endowed with a moral faculty. The moral faculty enables us to produce moral judgments on the basis of the causes and consequences of actions. As an empirical research program, we follow the framework of modern linguistics.1 The spirit of the argument dates back at least to the economist Adam Smith (1759/1976) who argued for something akin to a moral grammar, and more recently, to the political philosopher John Rawls (...)
     
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  29. The Neural Basis of the Interaction Between Theory of Mind and Moral Judgment.Liane Young, Fiery Cushman, Marc Hauser & Rebecca Saxe - 2007 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104 (20):8235-8240.
     
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  30.  10
    Moral Learning: Psychological and Philosophical Perspectives.Fiery Cushman, Victor Kumar & Peter Railton - 2017 - Cognition 167:1-10.
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  31.  8
    Is Utilitarian Sacrifice Becoming More Morally Permissible?Ivar R. Hannikainen, Edouard Machery & Fiery A. Cushman - 2018 - Cognition 170:95-101.
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  32.  63
    The Psychology of Justice.Fiery Cushman, Liane Young & Marc Hauser - 2006 - Analyse & Kritik 28 (1):95-98.
    In Natural Justice Binmore offers a game-theoretic map to the landscape of human morality. Following a long tradition of such accounts, Binmore’s argument concerns the forces of biological and cultural evolution that have shaped our judgments about the appropriate distribution of resources. In this sense, Binmore focuses on the morality of outcomes. This is a valuable perspective to which we add a friendly amendment from our own research: moral judgments appear to depend on process just as much as outcome. What (...)
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  33.  3
    Social is Special: A Normative Framework for Teaching with and Learning From Evaluative Feedback.Mark K. Ho, James MacGlashan, Michael L. Littman & Fiery Cushman - 2017 - Cognition 167:91-106.
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  34.  7
    Infants’ Representations of Others’ Goals: Representing Approach Over Avoidance.Roman Feiman, Susan Carey & Fiery Cushman - 2015 - Cognition 136:204-214.
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  35.  12
    Cognitive Constraints on Reciprocity and Tolerated Scrounging.Jeffrey R. Stevens & Fiery A. Cushman - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (4):569-570.
    Each of the food-sharing models that Gurven considers demands unique cognitive capacities. Reciprocal altruism, in particular, requires a suite of complex abilities not required by alternatives such as tolerated scrounging. Integrating cognitive constraints with comparative data from other species can illuminate the adaptive benefits of food sharing in humans.
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  36.  4
    18 The Role of Learning in Punishment, Prosociality, and Human.Fiery Cushman - 2013 - In Kim Sterelny, Richard Joyce, Brett Calcott & Ben Fraser (eds.), Cooperation and its Evolution. MIT Press. pp. 333.
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  37. Distinguishing the Roles of Causal and Intentional Analyses in Moral Judgment.Fiery Cushman - manuscript
     
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  38. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.Fiery Cushman & L. Young - manuscript
     
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  39. 1.1 Introduction.Fiery Cushman - manuscript
    The thesis we develop in this essay is that all humans are endowed with a moral faculty. The moral faculty enables us to produce moral judgments on the basis of the causes and consequences of actions. As an empirical research program, we follow the framework of modern linguistics.1 The spirit of the argument dates back at least to the economist Adam Smith (1759/1976) who argued for something akin to a moral grammar, and more recently, to the political philosopher John Rawls (...)
     
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  40. Manuscript 1/29/08.Fiery Cushman - unknown
    In the archetypical action thriller, the plot turns on a critical moment of insight. A car with out-of-state license plates, the gold tooth of the man behind the counter— something tips us off, and loose strands of evidence are woven into a meaningful pattern. Substituting a runaway trolley for suspicious vehicles and dental anomalies, we suggest that a similar denouement is at hand in the field of moral psychology. A number of theoretical proposals that were at one time regarded as (...)
     
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