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Fiery Cushman [47]Fiery A. Cushman [5]
  1. Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non‐Philosophers.Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (2):135-153.
    We examined the effects of order of presentation on the moral judgments of professional philosophers and two comparison groups. All groups showed similar‐sized order effects on their judgments about hypothetical moral scenarios targeting the doctrine of the double effect, the action‐omission distinction, and the principle of moral luck. Philosophers' endorsements of related general moral principles were also substantially influenced by the order in which the hypothetical scenarios had previously been presented. Thus, philosophical expertise does not appear to enhance the stability (...)
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  2. Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex Increases Utilitarian Moral Judgements.Michael Koenigs, Liane Young, Ralph Adolphs, Daniel Tranel, Fiery Cushman, Marc Hauser & Antonio Damasio - 2007 - Nature 446 (7138):908-911.
    The psychological and neurobiological processes underlying moral judgement have been the focus of many recent empirical studies1–11. Of central interest is whether emotions play a causal role in moral judgement, and, in parallel, how emotion-related areas of the brain contribute to moral judgement. Here we show that six patients with focal bilateral damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC), a brain region necessary for the normal generation of emotions and, in particular, social emotions12–14, produce an abnor- mally ‘utilitarian’ pattern of (...)
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  3. The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment.Fiery Cushman, Liane Young & Marc Hauser - 2006 - Psychological Science 17 (12):1082-1089.
    ��Is moral judgment accomplished by intuition or conscious reasoning? An answer demands a detailed account of the moral principles in question. We investigated three principles that guide moral judgments: (a) Harm caused by action is worse than harm caused by omission, (b) harm intended as the means to a goal is worse than harm foreseen as the side effect of a goal, and (c) harm involving physical contact with the victim is worse than harm involving no physical contact. Asking whether (...)
     
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  4. Pushing Moral Buttons: The Interaction Between Personal Force and Intention in Moral Judgment.Joshua D. Greene, Fiery A. Cushman, Lisa E. Stewart, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom & Jonathan D. Cohen - 2009 - Cognition 111 (3):364-371.
  5. Crime and Punishment: Distinguishing the Roles of Causal and Intentional Analyses in Moral Judgment.Fiery Cushman - 2008 - Cognition 108 (2):353-380.
    Recent research in moral psychology has attempted to characterize patterns of moral judgments of actions in terms of the causal and intentional properties of those actions. The present study directly compares the roles of consequence, causation, belief and desire in determining moral judgments. Judgments of the wrongness or permissibility of action were found to rely principally on the mental states of an agent, while judgments of blame and punishment are found to rely jointly on mental states and the causal connection (...)
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  6. Philosophers’ Biased Judgments Persist Despite Training, Expertise and Reflection.Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman - 2015 - Cognition 141:127-137.
    We examined the effects of framing and order of presentation on professional philosophers’ judgments about a moral puzzle case (the “trolley problem”) and a version of the Tversky & Kahneman “Asian disease” scenario. Professional philosophers exhibited substantial framing effects and order effects, and were no less subject to such effects than was a comparison group of non-philosopher academic participants. Framing and order effects were not reduced by a forced delay during which participants were encouraged to consider “different variants of the (...)
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  7.  90
    Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy.Florian Cova, Brent Strickland, Angela Abatista, Aurélien Allard, James Andow, Mario Attie, James Beebe, Renatas Berniūnas, Jordane Boudesseul, Matteo Colombo, Fiery Cushman, Rodrigo Diaz, Noah N’Djaye Nikolai van Dongen, Vilius Dranseika, Brian D. Earp, Antonio Gaitán Torres, Ivar Hannikainen, José V. Hernández-Conde, Wenjia Hu, François Jaquet, Kareem Khalifa, Hanna Kim, Markus Kneer, Joshua Knobe, Miklos Kurthy, Anthony Lantian, Shen-yi Liao, Edouard Machery, Tania Moerenhout, Christian Mott, Mark Phelan, Jonathan Phillips, Navin Rambharose, Kevin Reuter, Felipe Romero, Paulo Sousa, Jan Sprenger, Emile Thalabard, Kevin Tobia, Hugo Viciana, Daniel Wilkenfeld & Xiang Zhou - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-36.
    Responding to recent concerns about the reliability of the published literature in psychology and other disciplines, we formed the X-Phi Replicability Project to estimate the reproducibility of experimental philosophy. Drawing on a representative sample of 40 x-phi studies published between 2003 and 2015, we enlisted 20 research teams across 8 countries to conduct a high-quality replication of each study in order to compare the results to the original published findings. We found that x-phi studies – as represented in our sample (...)
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  8. A Dissociation Between Moral Judgments and Justifications.Marc Hauser, Fiery Cushman, Liane Young, J. I. N. Kang-Xing & John Mikhail - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (1):1–21.
    To what extent do moral judgments depend on conscious reasoning from explicitly understood principles? We address this question by investigating one particular moral principle, the principle of the double effect. Using web-based technology, we collected a large data set on individuals' responses to a series of moral dilemmas, asking when harm to innocent others is permissible. Each moral dilemma presented a choice between action and inaction, both resulting in lives saved and lives lost. Results showed that: (1) patterns of moral (...)
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  9.  34
    A Dissociation Between Moral Judgments and Justifications.Marc Hauser, Fiery Cushman, Liane Young, R. Kang-Xing Jin & John Mikhail - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (1):1-21.
    : To what extent do moral judgments depend on conscious reasoning from explicitly understood principles? We address this question by investigating one particular moral principle, the principle of the double effect. Using web-based technology, we collected a large data set on individuals’ responses to a series of moral dilemmas, asking when harm to innocent others is permissible. Each moral dilemma presented a choice between action and inaction, both resulting in lives saved and lives lost. Results showed that: patterns of moral (...)
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  10.  82
    Intentional Action : Two-and-a-Half Folk Concepts?Fiery Cushman & Alfred Mele - 2008 - In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 171.
    What are the criteria people use when they judge that other people did something intentionally? This question has motivated a large and growing literature both in philosophy and in psychology. It has become a topic of particular concern to the nascent field of experimental philosophy, which uses empirical techniques to understand folk concepts. We present new data that hint at some of the underly- ing psychological complexities of folk ascriptions of intentional action and at dis- tinctions both between diverse concepts (...)
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  11.  26
    The Development of Intent-Based Moral Judgment.Fiery Cushman, Rachel Sheketoff, Sophie Wharton & Susan Carey - 2013 - Cognition 127 (1):6.
  12. The Neural Basis of the Interaction Between Theory of Mind and Moral Judgment.Liane Young, Fiery Cushman, Marc Hauser & Rebecca Saxe - 2007 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104 (20):8235-8240.
     
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  13. Moral Appraisals Affect Doing/Allowing Judgments.Fiery Cushman, Joshua Knobe & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Cognition 108 (2):353-380.
    An extensive body of research suggests that the distinction between doing and allowing plays a critical role in shaping moral appraisals. Here, we report evidence from a pair of experiments suggesting that the converse is also true: moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments. Specifically, morally bad behavior is more likely to be construed as actively ‘doing’ than as passively ‘allowing’. This finding adds to a growing list of folk concepts influenced by moral appraisal, including causation and intentional action. We therefore suggest (...)
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  14. Patterns of Moral Judgment Derive From Nonmoral Psychological Representations.Fiery Cushman & Liane Young - 2011 - Cognitive Science 35 (6):1052-1075.
    Ordinary people often make moral judgments that are consistent with philosophical principles and legal distinctions. For example, they judge killing as worse than letting die, and harm caused as a necessary means to a greater good as worse than harm caused as a side-effect (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006). Are these patterns of judgment produced by mechanisms specific to the moral domain, or do they derive from other psychological domains? We show that the action/omission and means/side-effect distinctions affect nonmoral representations (...)
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  15.  86
    Does Emotion Mediate the Relationship Between an Action's Moral Status and its Intentional Status? Neuropsychological Evidence.Liane Young, Daniel Tranel, Ralph Adolphs, Marc Hauser & Fiery Cushman - 2006 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):291-304.
    Studies of normal individuals reveal an asymmetry in the folk concept of intentional action: an action is more likely to be thought of as intentional when it is morally bad than when it is morally good. One interpretation of these results comes from the hypothesis that emotion plays a critical mediating role in the relationship between an action’s moral status and its intentional status. According to this hypothesis, the negative emotional response triggered by a morally bad action drives the attribution (...)
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  16. The Neural Basis of the Interaction Between Theory of Mind and Moral Judgment.Liane Young, Fiery Cushman, Marc Hauser & and Rebecca Saxe - 2007 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104 (20):8235-8240.
    Is the basis of criminality an act that causes harm, or an act undertaken with the belief that one will cause harm? The present study takes a cognitive neuroscience approach to investigating how information about an agent’s beliefs and an action’s conse- quences contribute to moral judgment. We build on prior devel- opmental evidence showing that these factors contribute differ- entially to the young child’s moral judgments coupled with neurobiological evidence suggesting a role for the right tem- poroparietal junction (RTPJ) (...)
     
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  17. Multi-System Moral Psychology.Fiery Cushman, Liane Young & Joshua D. Greene - 2010 - In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press.
  18.  87
    Intentional Action, Folk Judgments, and Stories: Sorting Things Out.Alfred R. Mele & Fiery Cushman - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):184–201.
    How are our actions sorted into those that are intentional and those that are not? The philosophical and psychological literature on this topic is livelier now than ever, and we seek to make a contribution to it here. Our guiding question in this article is easy to state and hard to answer: How do various factors— specifically, features of vignettes—that contribute to majority folk judgments that an action is or is not intentional interact in producing the judgment? In pursuing this (...)
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  19.  15
    Moral Appraisals Affect Doing/Allowing Judgments.Fiery Cushman, Joshua Knobe & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Cognition 108 (1):281-289.
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  20.  6
    Model-Free RL or Action Sequences?Adam Morris & Fiery Cushman - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
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  21. On the Instrumental Value of Hypothetical and Counterfactual Thought.Thomas Icard, Fiery Cushman & Joshua Knobe - 2018 - Proceedings of the 40th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.
  22.  16
    How We Know What Not To Think.Jonathan Phillips, Adam Morris & Fiery Cushman - 2019 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 23 (12):1026-1040.
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  23.  28
    When Do We Punish People Who Don’T?Justin W. Martin, Jillian J. Jordan, David G. Rand & Fiery Cushman - 2019 - Cognition 193:104040.
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  24. The Psychology of Dilemmas and the Philosophy of Morality.Fiery Cushman & Liane Young - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):9-24.
    We review several instances where cognitive research has identified distinct psychological mechanisms for moral judgment that yield conflicting answers to moral dilemmas. In each of these cases, the conflict between psychological mechanisms is paralleled by prominent philosophical debates between different moral theories. A parsimonious account of this data is that key claims supporting different moral theories ultimately derive from the psychological mechanisms that give rise to moral judgments. If this view is correct, it has some important implications for the practice (...)
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  25.  67
    The Psychological Origins of the Doctrine of Double Effect.Fiery Cushman - 2016 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (4):763-776.
    The doctrine of double effect is a moral principle that distinguishes between harm we cause as a means to an end and harm that we cause as a side-effect. As a purely descriptive matter, the DDE is well established that it describes a consistent feature of human moral judgment. There are, however, several rival theories of its psychological cause. I review these theories and consider their advantages and disadvantages. Critically, most extant psychological theories of the DDE regard it as an (...)
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  26.  37
    Is Utilitarian Sacrifice Becoming More Morally Permissible?Ivar R. Hannikainen, Edouard Machery & Fiery A. Cushman - 2018 - Cognition 170:95-101.
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  27.  78
    Moral Intuitions.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Liane Young & Fiery Cushman - 2010 - In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press. pp. 246--272.
    Moral intuitions are strong, stable, immediate moral beliefs. Moral philosophers ask when they are justified. This question cannot be answered separately from a psychological question: How do moral intuitions arise? Their reliability depends upon their source. This chapter develops and argues for a new theory of how moral intuitions arise—that they arise through heuristic processes best understood as unconscious attribute substitutions. That is, when asked whether something has the attribute of moral wrongness, people unconsciously substitute a different question about a (...)
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  28.  43
    Morality Constrains the Default Representation of What is Possible.Jonathan Phillips & Fiery Cushman - 2017 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 114 (18):4649-4654.
    The capacity for representing and reasoning over sets of possibilities, or modal cognition, supports diverse kinds of high-level judgments: causal reasoning, moral judgment, language comprehension, and more. Prior research on modal cognition asks how humans explicitly and deliberatively reason about what is possible but has not investigated whether or how people have a default, implicit representation of which events are possible. We present three studies that characterize the role of implicit representations of possibility in cognition. Collectively, these studies differentiate explicit (...)
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  29. Reviving Rawls's Linguistic Analogy: Operative Principles and the Causal Structure of Moral Actions.Marc D. Hauser, Liane Young & Fiery Cushman - 2007 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 2. MIT Press.
    The thesis we develop in this essay is that all humans are endowed with a moral faculty. The moral faculty enables us to produce moral judgments on the basis of the causes and consequences of actions. As an empirical research program, we follow the framework of modern linguistics.1 The spirit of the argument dates back at least to the economist Adam Smith (1759/1976) who argued for something akin to a moral grammar, and more recently, to the political philosopher John Rawls (...)
     
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  30.  24
    Why We Forgive What Can’T Be Controlled.Justin W. Martin & Fiery Cushman - 2016 - Cognition 147:133-143.
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  31.  18
    Grammatical Pattern Learning by Human Infants and Cotton-Top Tamarin Monkeys.Jenny Saffran, Marc Hauser, Rebecca Seibel, Joshua Kapfhamer, Fritz Tsao & Fiery Cushman - 2008 - Cognition 107 (2):479-500.
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  32.  67
    Correction To: Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy.Florian Cova, Brent Strickland, Angela Abatista, Aurélien Allard, James Andow, Mario Attie, James Beebe, Renatas Berniūnas, Jordane Boudesseul, Matteo Colombo, Fiery Cushman, Rodrigo Diaz, Noah N’Djaye Nikolai van Dongen, Vilius Dranseika, Brian D. Earp, Antonio Gaitán Torres, Ivar Hannikainen, José V. Hernández-Conde, Wenjia Hu, François Jaquet, Kareem Khalifa, Hanna Kim, Markus Kneer, Joshua Knobe, Miklos Kurthy, Anthony Lantian, Shen-yi Liao, Edouard Machery, Tania Moerenhout, Christian Mott, Mark Phelan, Jonathan Phillips, Navin Rambharose, Kevin Reuter, Felipe Romero, Paulo Sousa, Jan Sprenger, Emile Thalabard, Kevin Tobia, Hugo Viciana, Daniel Wilkenfeld & Xiang Zhou - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-4.
    Appendix 1 was incomplete in the initial online publication. The original article has been corrected.
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  33.  31
    What Comes to Mind?Adam Bear, Samantha Bensinger, Julian Jara-Ettinger, Joshua Knobe & Fiery Cushman - 2020 - Cognition 194:104057.
    When solving problems, like making predictions or choices, people often “sample” possibilities into mind. Here, we consider whether there is structure to the kinds of thoughts people sample by default—that is, without an explicit goal. Across three experiments we found that what comes to mind by default are samples from a probability distribution that combines what people think is likely and what they think is good. Experiment 1 found that the first quantities that come to mind for everyday behaviors and (...)
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  34.  23
    Act Versus Impact: Conservatives and Liberals Exhibit Different Structural Emphases in Moral Judgment.Ivar R. Hannikainen, Ryan M. Miller & Fiery A. Cushman - 2017 - Ratio 30 (4):462-493.
    Conservatives and liberals disagree sharply on matters of morality and public policy. We propose a novel account of the psychological basis of these differences. Specifically, we find that conservatives tend to emphasize the intrinsic value of actions during moral judgment, in part by mentally simulating themselves performing those actions, while liberals instead emphasize the value of the expected outcomes of the action. We then demonstrate that a structural emphasis on actions is linked to the condemnation of victimless crimes, a distinctive (...)
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  35.  8
    Social is Special: A Normative Framework for Teaching with and Learning From Evaluative Feedback.Mark K. Ho, James MacGlashan, Michael L. Littman & Fiery Cushman - 2017 - Cognition 167:91-106.
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  36.  10
    A Common Framework for Theories of Norm Compliance.Adam Morris & Fiery Cushman - 2018 - Social Philosophy and Policy 35 (1):101-127.
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  37.  27
    Punishment in Humans: From Intuitions to Institutions.Fiery Cushman - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (2):117-133.
    Humans have a strong sense of who should be punished, when, and how. Many features of these intuitions are consistent with a simple adaptive model: Punishment evolved as a mechanism to teach social partners how to behave in future interactions. Yet, it is clear that punishment as practiced in modern contexts transcends any biologically evolved mechanism; it also depends on cultural institutions including the criminal justice system and many smaller analogs in churches, corporations, clubs, classrooms, and so on. These institutions (...)
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  38.  56
    Moral Learning: Psychological and Philosophical Perspectives.Fiery Cushman, Victor Kumar & Peter Railton - 2017 - Cognition 167:1-10.
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  39.  4
    Rationalization as Representational Exchange: Scope and Mechanism.Fiery Cushman - 2020 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43.
    The commentaries suggest many important improvements to the target article. They clearly distinguish two varieties of rationalization – the traditional “motivated reasoning” model, and the proposed representational exchange model – and show that they have distinct functions and consequences. They describe how representational exchange occurs not only by post hoc rationalization but also by ex ante rationalization and other more dynamic processes. They argue that the social benefits of representational exchange are at least as important as its direct personal benefits. (...)
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  40. The Role of Learning in Punishment, Prosociality, and Human Uniqueness.Fiery Cushman - 2013 - In Kim Sterelny, Richard Joyce, Brett Calcott & Ben Fraser (eds.), Cooperation and its Evolution. MIT Press.
  41.  36
    Moral Emotions From the Frog’s Eye View.Fiery A. Cushman - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (3):261-263.
    To understand the structure of moral emotions poses a difficult challenge. For instance, why do liberals and conservatives see some moral issues similarly, but others starkly differently? Or, why does punishment depend on accidental variation in the severity of a harmful outcome, while judgments of wrongfulness or character do not? To resolve the complex design of morality, it helps to think in functional terms. Whether through learning, cultural evolution or natural selection, moral emotions will tend to guide behavior adaptively in (...)
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  42.  21
    Rationalization is Rational.Fiery Cushman - 2020 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43:1-69.
    Rationalization occurs when a person has performed an action and then concocts the beliefs and desires that would have made it rational. Then, people often adjust their own beliefs and desires to match the concocted ones. While many studies demonstrate rationalization, and a few theories describe its underlying cognitive mechanisms, we have little understanding of its function. Why is the mind designed to construct post hoc rationalizations of its behavior, and then to adopt them? This may accomplish an important task: (...)
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  43.  13
    Editors' Introduction: Computational Approaches to Social Cognition.Fiery Cushman & Samuel Gershman - 2019 - Topics in Cognitive Science 11 (2):281-298.
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  44.  11
    People Teach with Rewards and Punishments as Communication, Not Reinforcements.Mark K. Ho, Fiery Cushman, Michael L. Littman & Joseph L. Austerweil - 2019 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 148 (3):520-549.
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  45.  70
    The Psychology of Justice.Fiery Cushman, Liane Young & Marc Hauser - 2006 - Analyse & Kritik 28 (1):95-98.
    In Natural Justice Binmore offers a game-theoretic map to the landscape of human morality. Following a long tradition of such accounts, Binmore’s argument concerns the forces of biological and cultural evolution that have shaped our judgments about the appropriate distribution of resources. In this sense, Binmore focuses on the morality of outcomes. This is a valuable perspective to which we add a friendly amendment from our own research: moral judgments appear to depend on process just as much as outcome. What (...)
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  46.  43
    Cognitive Constraints on Reciprocity and Tolerated Scrounging.Jeffrey R. Stevens & Fiery A. Cushman - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (4):569-570.
    Each of the food-sharing models that Gurven considers demands unique cognitive capacities. Reciprocal altruism, in particular, requires a suite of complex abilities not required by alternatives such as tolerated scrounging. Integrating cognitive constraints with comparative data from other species can illuminate the adaptive benefits of food sharing in humans.
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  47.  13
    Infants’ Representations of Others’ Goals: Representing Approach Over Avoidance.Roman Feiman, Susan Carey & Fiery Cushman - 2015 - Cognition 136:204-214.
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  48.  7
    18 The Role of Learning in Punishment, Prosociality, and Human.Fiery Cushman - 2013 - In Kim Sterelny, Richard Joyce, Brett Calcott & Ben Fraser (eds.), Cooperation and its Evolution. MIT Press. pp. 333.
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  49. Distinguishing the Roles of Causal and Intentional Analyses in Moral Judgment.Fiery Cushman - manuscript
  50. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.Fiery Cushman & L. Young - manuscript
     
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