8 found
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  1. Referir-se-ão as categorias psicológicas ordinárias a causas internas do comportamento?Filipe Lazzeri - 2013 - Philósophos - Revista de Filosofia 18 (1):41-73.
    A abordagem de Armstrong e Lewis sobre os conceitos psicológicos ordinários pretende-se uma síntese entre behaviorismo e cartesianismo. Ela sustenta, fundamentalmente, duas teses: (a) a de que esses conceitos, em geral, explicam e predizem comportamentos pela designação de entidades internas (isto é, próprias do interior do corpo) que são os ocupantes de papéis de causar os respectivos comportamentos; e (b) a tese de que os ocupantes desses papéis causais identificam-se com entidades cerebrais e, eventualmente, substratos internos de outras constituições físicas, (...)
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  2.  14
    Dynamic Interactions With the Environment Make Up Our Psychological Phenomena: A Review of Noë’s Out of Our Heads. [REVIEW]Filipe Lazzeri - 2015 - The Psychological Record 65 (1):215-222.
    The traditional, and still standard, view of psychological phenomena in some empirical sciences holds that they take place inside the organism’s body and can be individuated independently of external factors. The organism’s behaviors are, according to this view, mere effects, rather then constituents, of psychological phenomena. And the fact that, for example, an organism is desiring something instead of something else is taken to be a matter entirely of what is inside the organism. The current versions of the view are (...)
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  3.  22
    On Some Common Objections to a Behavioral Approach to Psychological Categories.Filipe Lazzeri - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (3):405-418.
    This paper addresses several objections that have been leveled against a behavioral approach to psychological categories. It reconstructs and critically assesses the so-called causal objection; alleged counterexamples whereby one can exhibit the typical behaviors associated with a psychological phenomenon without exhibiting the latter, including Lewis’ “perfect actor” case and Kirk’s “zombie”; alleged counterexamples whereby organisms can exemplify psychological phenomena without exhibiting any behavior associated with them, including Armstrong’s imagined brain in a vat, Putnam’s “super-super-spartans” scenario, and related cases; and the (...)
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  4.  11
    Um Exame de Objeções a Ryle Sobre o Funcionamento Dos Termos Psicológicos Intencionais.Filipe Lazzeri & Jorge Oliveira-Castro - 2010 - Abstracta 6 (1):42-64.
    This paper briefly presents an account, partially based upon Ryle’s approach, of the functions of intentional psychological terms as they are used in ordinary language. According to this account, intentional psychological terms describe known patterns of behavior that are determined by selective mechanisms of causation. That is, these terms describe relations between certain responses, selected on the basis of the consequences they produce in the environment, and contexts of their occurrence, to which they become associated. Intentional psychological terms do not (...)
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  5.  8
    Acerca da Taxonomia Do Mental Para Contextos Que Requerem Neutralidade.Filipe Lazzeri - 2013 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (3):365-392.
    Ordinary psychological predicates, and the phenomena we report to by means of them, can be grouped together into different categories. For instance, it is usual to group together phenomena such as belief and expectancy in a category of ‘propositional attitudes’, whereas sensations, like pain and itch, in a distinct one. Which taxonomy of the mental would be plausible to be adopted in contexts such as those of introductory books to the philosophy of mind, i.e., when we need to set out (...)
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  6.  2
    O Que É Behaviorismo Sobre a Mente?Filipe Lazzeri - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (2):249-277.
    It is common to find depictions of behaviorist approaches to the mind as approaches according to which mental events are “dispositions for behavior.” Moreover, it is sometimes said that for these approaches the dispositions are for publicly observable behaviors, or even “purely physical movements,” thereby excluding from being constitutive of mental events any internal bodily happening, besides any movement not taken as “purely physical.” In this paper I aim to pinpoint problems in such widespread depictions of behaviorism about the mind, (...)
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  7. Termos psicológicos disposicionais.Filipe Lazzeri & Jorge M. Oliveira-Castro - 2010 - Princípios 17 (28):155-183.
    Este artigo tem como objetivo principal apresentar uma reconstruçáo lógico-conceitual e avaliaçáo de três argumentos de Skinner para a tese de que os termos psicológicos comuns sáo, em geral, inadmissíveis em análise do comportamento (a tese da inadmissibilidade). Começamos fazendo uma revisáo da abordagem de tais termos sustentada por Skinner, particularmente sua abordagem das categoriais de termos psicológicos disposicionais. Muito dela é aqui aceito, mas adotamos, como hipótese de trabalho, um desacordo com a premissa de Skinner de que eles sejam (...)
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  8.  8
    Sobre a condição ontológica e moral do ser humano.Filipe Lazzeri - 2009 - Critica.
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