This powerfully iconoclastic book reconsiders the influential nativist position toward the mind. Nativists assert that some concepts, beliefs, or capacities are innate or inborn: "native" to the mind rather than acquired. Fiona Cowie argues that this view is mistaken, demonstrating that nativism is an unstable amalgam of two quite different--and probably inconsistent--theses about the mind. Unlike empiricists, who postulate domain-neutral learning strategies, nativists insist that some learning tasks require special kinds of skills, and that these skills are hard-wired into our (...) brains at birth. This "faculties hypothesis" finds its modern expression in the views of Noam Chomsky. Cowie, marshaling recent empirical evidence from developmental psychology, psycholinguistics, computer science, and linguistics, provides a crisp and timely critique of Chomsky's nativism and defends in its place a moderately nativist approach to language acquisition. Also in contrast to empiricists, who view the mind as simply another natural phenomenon susceptible of scientific explanation, nativists suspect that the mental is inelectably mysterious. Cowie addresses this second strand in nativist thought, taking on the view articulated by Jerry Fodor and other nativists that learning, particularly concept acquisition, is a fundamentally inexplicable process. Cowie challenges this explanatory pessimism, and argues convincingly that concept acquisition is psychologically explicable. What's Within? is a clear and provocative achievement in the study of the human mind. (shrink)

The Architecture of Mind is an ambitious and informative work, surveying an impressive range of empirical literature and arguing that the mind is massively modular. However, it suffers from two major theoretical flaws. First, Carruthers’ concept of a module is weak, so much so that it robs his thesis of massive modularity of any real substance. Second, his conception of how the mind’s modules evolved ignores the role of niche construction and cultural evolution to its detriment.

Arguments from the Logical Problem of Language Acquisition suggest that since linguistic experience provides few negative data that would falsify overgeneral grammatical hypotheses, innate knowledge of the principles of Universal Grammar must constrain learners hypothesis formulation. Although this argument indicates a need for domain-specific constraints, it does not support their innateness. Learning from mostly positive data proceeds unproblematically in virtually all domains. Since not every domain can plausibly be accorded its own special faculty, the probative value of the argument in (...) the linguistic case is dubious. In ignoring the holistic and probablistic nature of theory construction, the argument underestimates the extent to which positive data can supply negative evidence and hence overestimates the intractability of language learning in the absence of a dedicated faculty. While nativism about language remains compelling, the alleged Logical Problem contributes nothing to its plausibility and the emphasis on the Problem in the recent acquisition literature has been a mistake. (shrink)

In his recent book, Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong, Jerry Fodor retracts the radical concept-nativism he once defended. Yet that postion stood, virtually unchallenged, for more than twenty years. This neglect is puzzling, as Fodor's arguments against concepts being learnable from experience remain unanswered, and nativism has historically been taken very seriously as a response to empiricism's perceived shortcomings. In this paper, I urge that Fodorean nativism should indeed be rejected. I argue, however, that its deficiencies are not so (...) obvious that they can simply be taken for granted. Fodor can counter extant objections by stressing two distinctions: between historicist and counterfactual semantic theories and between explaining reference and explaining concept-acquisition. But, I argue, this victory is pyrrhic. Reformulated as objections to his account qua theory of concept-acquisition, and not qua theory of reference, analogous difficulties are fatal to the Fodorean position. (shrink)

Why We Talk is a complex, ambitious, original, thought-provoking, and sometimes frustrating book. In it, Jean-Louis Dessalles argues that the critical spur to the development of human language—language’s true biological function—was political. It wasn’t political in any of the senses hitherto floated in the literature, though: language didn’t evolve because it fostered group cohesion or cooperation, or facilitated mind-reading or manipulation. Instead, language originally served more or less the same function as ritualized displays of aggression and submission in many social (...) animals: among early Homo (maybe erectus, maybe only sapiens—p. 333), one’s gifts in the area of gab conferred status (recall Socrates’ gripes about the Sophists) and with higher status came, basically, more and better kids, both for the loquacious themselves and for anyone smart enough to ally himself with them. (shrink)

This book has been able to provide a thorough examination of certain aspects of nativism about the mind, such as its development throughout history and the modern advances in psychology and other fields that can be attributed to such. Part I was able to investigate historical debates regarding innateness, misconceptions and clarifications about this, and how we have been able to develop a novel explanation as to what nativism is. It explores the several nativist claims that involve psychological processes, as (...) well as certain general views that some nativists may adopt. While Parts II and III accounted for innate ideas set in this context, and the author still asserts that we should still consider and examine empiricists' accounts of learning and not automatically embrace the promises attributed to nativism. (shrink)

Hurford's discussion also vindicates the classical empiricist program in semantics. The idea that PREDICATE(x) is the logical form of the sensory representations encoded via the dorsal and ventral streams validates empiricists' insistence on the psychological primacy of sense data, which have the same form. In addition to knowing the logical form of our primitive representations, however, we need accounts of (1) their contents and (2) how more complex thoughts are derived from them. Ideally, our semantic vocabulary would both reflect the (...) psychological “primitiveness” of these representations and make clear how more complex representations derive from them. (shrink)

Recent years have seen a renewal of the perennial debate concerning innate ideas: Noam Chomsky has argued that much of our knowledge of natural languages is innate; Jerry Fodor has defended the innateness of most concepts. ;Part One concerns the historical controversy over nativism. On the interpretation there developed, nativists have defended two distinct theses. One, based on arguments from the poverty of the stimulus, is a psychological theory postulating special-purpose learning mechanisms. The other, deriving from arguments entailing that learning (...) from experience is impossible, is the meta-psychological view that we can hope for no real explanation of how learning occurs. ;In Part Two, the views of contemporary nativists are discussed against this background. Fodor's claim that our concepts are 'triggered' rather than 'learned' provides no account of concept-acquisition. Instead, it expresses his view that concept-acquisition resists any psychological explanation. But while 'brute-causal' interaction with the world may be necessary to the fixation of reference--and hence to the attainment of concepts--it is insufficient. Mind-world interaction is 'cognitively mediated' and it is in explaining the nature of this mediation that psychology will play a role. ;Chomsky holds that we have a special-purpose faculty for learning language. His 'a posteriori' arguments from the poverty of the stimulus, being based on unsubstantiated empirical claims about the pld and the course of learning, are rejected. Another 'a priori' argument exists, however, involving only the general observation that since the pld contain little information about what is not a sentence, a special mechanism is required to prevent overgeneration. But negative data are lacking in every learning domain. So since it is implausible that all learning requires special faculties, there must be a general-purpose strategy that can skirt the 'negative evidence' problem. Whether it is used for language-learning remains moot. But what really motivates the Chomskian is his awe at what children achieve, namely, 'cognizance' of a grammar. Grammars prove, however, to be 'psychologically real' in such a weak sense that the phenomena of language mastery provides little grist to the nativist's mill. (shrink)

In contrast to the empiricist view, which states how all learning involves general strategies that can be applied in various fields and learning from experience, the nativist view explains how the acquisition of some knowledge cannot be associated with the domain-neutral empiricist model. In 1960, Noam Chomsky made his claims regarding how human beings are innately bestowed of knowledge of natural languages. This chapter attempts to provide an overview of Chomsky's explanation of language acquisition and how this has once again (...) gained the attention of both American Structuralist linguistics and psychological behaviorism. Looking into such would allow the establishment of a taxonomic framework for a better examination of linguistic nativism. (shrink)

Fodor gained a certain amount of embarrassment in 1981 after realizing that the intentional integrity of the link between the concept and the cause may be questioned. While the older Fodor, the one in 1998, is able to acknowledge that his earlier conceptions had to be modified, Fodor emphasizes that acquiring a concept is not to be recognized as a psychological process. In this chapter, however, we look into how psychological processing plays, in fact, no small part in the acquisition (...) of concepts and that cognitive psychology is capable of providing and should provide a theory regarding such. The author attempts to prove how Fodor's argument about how concepts are “brute-causally” attained and cannot be interminable, as well as to show how cognitive mediation can be obtained, and to defend the notion of acquisition from some of Fodor's criticisms on the subject of nonclassical theories about content and verificationism. (shrink)

Examining impossibility arguments has allowed us to observe certain flaws in the empiricist construal of nativism, since such arguments point out that the empiricist views may entail some degree of self-contradiction and confusion. As the author makes use of Fodor's works such as The Language of Thought as reference, this chapter looks into Fodor's explanation regarding the empiricist view and how this relates to acquiring a concept of hypothesis-testing or learning and to its content or meaning. Since there are concepts, (...) however, that cannot be mentally represented and are “internally unstructured,” these concepts, by the empiricist premise, cannot be learned. This chapter provides a thorough examination about the errors encountered in making use of the empiricist view. (shrink)

As the empiricist view relies much on the notion that concept acquisition involves coming up with and testing hypotheses about a concept's meaning or content, Fodor asserts that such is not possible and is self-defeating, since concepts do not possess the kinds of meanings that would allow the derivation of hypotheses. Looking into Fodor's writings, we see how he was able to conclude without having to deny the significance of experience in acquiring a concept, that most concepts must be innate (...) and that they are not learned. Experience is indeed necessary, and from this we are able to identify two acquisition models. According to the author, the more reliable model looks into how experience sets off an inner mechanism that allows us to become “wired up” in acquiring concepts through gaining experience. This chapter discusses Fodor's “Constitution Hypothesis” to address the doorknob/DOORKNOB problem. (shrink)

Chomsky had been able to look into how various theses—representationalism, biological boundedness, domain specificity, innateness and universal grammar—may be used in explaining the acquisition and mastery of language. Chomsky was able to not only establish the inaccuracy of behaviorism through defending representationalism, but also initiate the development of a more mentalistic conception of both the learning of language and linguistic competence. Because other aspects of Chomsky's nativism are independent of each other, the falsity of behaviorism may be associated with the (...) truth of several other theories. To address this and other issues regarding Chomskyan nativism, the author presents three nonbehaviorist alternatives: 1) Weak nativism which merges innateness with domain specificity; 2) Enlightened empiricism which rejects innateness and accepts domain specificity; and 3) Putnamian empiricism which accepts innateness and rejects domain specificity. (shrink)

In contrast to what others may commonly believe, reflecting on the poverty of the stimulus does not sustain or reinforce the notion of learning a language within nativism. Also, although initially opposed, there are a lot more explanatory resources to empiricism than it is given credit for, particularly on issues regarding the domain-neutral mechanism for learning. While the enlightened empiricist would believe that the mechanism for language learning is general in purpose and that the theory choices of learners would be (...) attributed to the knowledge about language that they have already obtained through experience, enlightened empiricism supports the nativist view that learning is restricted by task-specific knowledge and the constraints involved are not fixed. This chapter focuses on linguistics and examines how universal grammar is important in the processes involved in learning a language. (shrink)

It can be observed that the doctrine of innate ideas may be as old as philosophy itself, as it may be one of the most basic conceptions. The notion that the character of our mental faculties is determined internally or innately is evident in works as early as that of Plato, which was revived between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by significant rationalist philosophers, and which underwent further examination in the twentieth century by mentalists such as Jerry Fodor and Noam (...) Chomsky. There is, however, no definite statement about what exactly nativism is all about. While some may believe that what is in our minds was already innate, such a hypothesis is enough to raise several different problems, as such innateness may be of various types of cognitive equipment: ideas, beliefs and faculties. This chapter attempts to clarify certain misconceptions about the notion of nativism. (shrink)

The internalist construal of nativism appears to explain how nativism may be related to rationalism in epistemology, since nativism may be able to explain the link between an a priori belief and what such a belief may justify. According to Plato, a priori beliefs are justified by a benevolent God, since such beliefs are pre-set in our minds. Also, this interpretation, in a way, clarifies ideas regarding certain nonepistemological aspects of the debate regarding empiricist-rationalist ideals. As nativism is believed to (...) entail the denial of empiricist psychology or at least part of it, there are two aspects of empiricism that nativists may consider. However, while empiricists look into the generality of our mechanisms for innate learning, nativists would assert the poverty of the stimulus notion that the mind should have, aside from those allowed by empiricism, certain task-specific mechanisms. This chapter examines one of nativism's major features: the hypothesis of special faculties. (shrink)

While we realize that the empiricist interpretation of nativism may in fact be able to explain some of the central cases of both belief and concept acquisition, arguments from the poverty of the stimulus still assert how some acquisitions may not be obtained through merely making use of the general-purpose learning mechanisms brought on by empiricist thinking, and that we have to realize that the mind should contain other task-specific faculties for learning. This chapter looks into another form of argument, (...) what the author refers to as the “impossibility arguments,” to further establish the falsity of the empiricist approach. Such arguments rely greatly on the notion of self-undermining or disjointed mind–world interactions that would only support the notion of how everything in our minds is indeed innate. (shrink)

Regardless of whether Chomsky's grammar constraints may be learned from experience of not, the author argues that there is no “back door” to nativism. In relation to finding out whether there exists a special faculty for language learning, the author presents how she, on a more personal note and in terms of language acquisition, is more inclined to going with a weak nativist position since she believes that learning a language would probably entail one or more faculties of mind as (...) a basis. Although the open question remains about how nativism may be associated with the acquisition of language, examining the available evidence would lean towards a faculties hypothesis. (shrink)

This symposium discusses J.-L. Dessalles's account of the evolution of language, which was presented in Why we Talk (OUP 2007).