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  1.  20
    John Anderson’s Development of (Situational) Realism and its Bearing on Psychology Today.Fiona J. Hibberd - 2009 - History of the Human Sciences 22 (4):63-92.
    In 1927, the Scottish philosopher John Anderson arrived in Australia to take up the chair of Philosophy at the University of Sydney. By the late 1930s, the ‘macrostructure’ of his realist system was in place. It includes a theory of process and a substantial metaphysics, one that opposes positivism, linguistic philosophy and all forms of idealism. However, beyond Australia it remains largely unknown, despite its bearing on a number of current issues in psychology and the social sciences generally. This article (...)
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  2.  2
    A Juggernaut in the Philosophy of Psychology: Reply to Martin, Gergen, and Held.Fiona J. Hibberd - 2014 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 34 (3):205-210.
  3. Relativism Versus Realism - All but a Specious Dichotomy.Fiona J. Hibberd - 2001 - History of the Human Sciences 14 (3):102-107.
  4.  84
    Situational Realism, Critical Realism, Causation and the Charge of Positivism.Fiona J. Hibberd - 2010 - History of the Human Sciences 23 (4):37-51.
    The system of realist philosophy developed by John Anderson — situational realism — has recently been dismissed as ‘positivist’ by a prominent critical realist. The reason for this dismissal appears not to be the usual list of ideas deemed positivist, but the conviction that situational realism mistakenly defends a form of actualism, i.e. that to conceive of causal laws as constant conjunctions reduces the domain of the real to the domain of the actual. This is, in part, a misreading of (...)
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  5.  32
    Sham Reasoning, Humpty Dumpty, and the Burden of Proof.Fiona J. Hibberd - 2009 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):91-96.
    Slife and Reber ask of psychologists that they recognize their prejudice against theism and the incompatibility between theistic and naturalistic worldviews. Yet, the subtext of their article is that theism and naturalism are equally valid and that psychology’s secularism is a mistake. Given that theism is not beyond reason, the only sufficient ground for charging psychologists with prejudice is if theism has survived serious attempts at conceptual and empirical test, and psychology ignores or disguises this fact. So, the grounds for (...)
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  6.  5
    The Metaphysical Basis of a Process Psychology.Fiona J. Hibberd - 2014 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 34 (3):161-186.