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Fiona Macpherson
University of Glasgow
  1. Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism.Fiona MacPherson - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):24-62.
    Can the phenomenal character of perceptual experience be altered by the states of one's cognitive system, for example, one's thoughts or beliefs? If one thinks that this can happen then one thinks that there can be cognitive penetration of perceptual experience; otherwise, one thinks that perceptual experience is cognitively impenetrable. I claim that there is one alleged case of cognitive penetration that cannot be explained away by the standard strategies one can typically use to explain away alleged cases. The case (...)
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  2. Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge.Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.) - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
  3. Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism.Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Inspired by the writings of J. M. Hinton (1967a, 1967b, 1973), but ushered into the mainstream by Paul Snowdon (1980–1, 1990–1), John McDowell (1982, 1986), and M. G. F. Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), disjunctivism is currently discussed, advocated, and opposed in the philosophy of perception, the theory of knowledge, the theory of practical reason, and the philosophy of action. But what is disjunctivism?
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  4. The Admissible Contents of Experience.Fiona Macpherson (ed.) - 2011 - Wiley-Blackwell.
  5.  99
    The Relationship Between Cognitive Penetration and Predictive Coding.Fiona Macpherson - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 47:6-16.
  6.  50
    The Senses.Keith A. Wilson & Fiona Macpherson - 2018 - Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy.
    Philosophers and scientists have studied sensory perception and, in particular, vision for many years. Increasingly, however, they have become interested in the nonvisual senses in greater detail and the problem of individuating the senses in a more general way. The Aristotelian view is that there are only five external senses—smell, taste, hearing, touch, and vision. This has, by many counts, been extended to include internal senses, such as balance, proprioception, and kinesthesis; pain; and potentially other human and nonhuman senses. This (...)
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  7. The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives.Fiona Macpherson (ed.) - 2011 - Oxford University Press USA.
    The senses, or sensory modalities, constitute the different ways we have of perceiving the world, such as seeing, hearing, touching, tasting and smelling. But how many senses are there? How many could there be? What makes the senses different? What interaction takes place between the senses? This book is a guide to thinking about these questions. Together with an extensive introduction to the topic, the book contains the key classic papers on this subject together with nine newly commissioned essays.One reason (...)
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  8. Ambiguous Figures and the Content of Experience.Fiona Macpherson - 2006 - Noûs 40 (1):82-117.
    Representationalism is the position that the phenomenal character of an experience is either identical with, or supervenes on, the content of that experience. Many representationalists hold that the relevant content of experience is nonconceptual. I propose a counterexample to this form of representationalism that arises from the phenomenon of Gestalt switching, which occurs when viewing ambiguous figures. First, I argue that one does not need to appeal to the conceptual content of experience or to judgements to account for Gestalt switching. (...)
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  9. XV—Cross‐Modal Experiences.Fiona Macpherson - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):429-468.
    This paper provides a categorization of cross-modal experiences. There are myriad forms. Doing so allows us to think clearly about the nature of different cross-modal experiences and allows us to clearly formulate competing hypotheses about the kind of experiences involved in different cross-modal phenomena.
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  10. The Philosophy and Psychology of Hallucination: An Introduction.Fiona Macpherson - 2013 - In Fiona Macpherson Dimitris Platchias (ed.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. MIT Press.
  11. Individuating the Senses.Fiona Macpherson - 2011 - In The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
  12. Cognitive Penetration and Predictive Coding: A Commentary on Lupyan.Fiona Macpherson - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):571-584.
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    The Structure of Experience, the Nature of the Visual, and Type 2 Blindsight‌.Fiona Macpherson - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 32:104 - 128.
    Unlike those with type 1 blindsight, people who have type 2 blindsight have some sort of consciousness of the stimuli in their blind field. What is the nature of that consciousness? Is it visual experience? I address these questions by considering whether we can establish the existence of any structural—necessary—features of visual experience. I argue that it is very difficult to establish the existence of any such features. In particular, I investigate whether it is possible to visually, or more generally (...)
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  14. Taxonomising the Senses.Fiona Macpherson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):123-142.
    I argue that we should reject the sparse view that there are or could be only a small number of rather distinct senses. When one appreciates this then one can see that there is no need to choose between the standard criteria that have been proposed as ways of individuating the senses—representation, phenomenal character, proximal stimulus and sense organ—or any other criteria that one may deem important. Rather, one can use these criteria in conjunction to form a fine-grained taxonomy of (...)
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  15. Colour Inversion Problems for Representationalism.Fiona MacPherson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):127-152.
    In this paper I examine whether representationalism can account for various thought experiments about colour inversions. Representationalism is, at minimum, the view that, necessarily, if two experiences have the same representational content then they have the same phenomenal character. I argue that representationalism ought to be rejected if one holds externalist views about experiential content and one holds traditional exter- nalist views about the nature of the content of propositional attitudes. Thus, colour inver- sion scenarios are more damaging to externalist (...)
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  16. Perfect Pitch and the Content of Experience.Fiona Macpherson - 1999 - Anthropology and Philosophy 3 (2):89-101.
    This paper examines the representationalist view of experiences in the light of the phenomena of perfect and relative pitch. Two main kinds of representationalism are identified - environment-based and cognitive role-based. It is argued that to explain the relationship between the two theories a distinction should be drawn between various types of implicit and explicit content. When investigated, this distinction sheds some light on the difference between the phenomenology of perfect and relative pitch experiences and may be usefully applied to (...)
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  17. Novel Colours and the Content of Experience.Fiona Macpherson - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):43-66.
    I propose a counterexample to naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. The counterexample is generated by experiences of novel colours reported by Crane and Piantanida. I consider various replies that a representationalist might make, including whether novel colours could be possible colours of objects and whether one can account for novel colours as one would account for binary colours or colour mixtures. I argue that none of these strategies is successful and therefore that one cannot fully explain the nature of (...)
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  18. Cognitive Penetration and Nonconceptual Content.Fiona Macpherson - 2015 - In J. Zeimbekis & A. Raftopoulos (eds.), The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
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    Redefining Illusion and Hallucination in Light of New Cases.Fiona Macpherson & Clare Batty - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):263-296.
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  20.  52
    Introduction: The Admissible Contents of Experience.Fiona Macpherson - 2011 - In The Admissible Contents of Experience. Wiley-Blackwell.
  21. Perception, Philosophical Perspectives.Fiona Macpherson - 2009 - In Tim Bayne, Axel Cleeremans & P. Wilken (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    This paper provides an introduction to, and overview of, the Philosophy of Perception.
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  22. Impossible Figures.Fiona Macpherson - 2010 - In E. B. Goldstein (ed.), SAGE Encyclopedia of Perception. Sage Publications.
  23. Synaesthesia.Fiona Macpherson - 2007 - In Mario de Caro, Francesco Ferretti & Massimo Marraffa (eds.), Cartography of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection. Kleuwer.
    Synaesthesia is most often characterised as a union or mixing of the senses. i Richard Cytowic describes it thus: “It denotes the rare capacity to hear colours, taste shapes or experience other equally startling sensory blendings whose quality seems difficult for most of us to imagine” ([1995] 1997, 7). One famous example is of a man who “tasted shapes”. When he experienced flavours he also experienced shapes rubbing against his face or hands. ii Such popular characterisations are rough and ready. (...)
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  24. The Space of Sensory Modalities.Fiona Macpherson - 2014 - In Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities. Oxford University Press.
    Is there a space of the sensory modalities? Such a space would be one in which we can represent all the actual, and at least some of the possible, sensory modalities. The relative position of the senses in this space would indicate how similar and how different the senses were from each other. The construction of such a space might reveal unconsidered features of the actual and possible senses, help us to define what a sense is, and provide grounds that (...)
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  25. A Disjunctive Theory of Introspection: A Reflection on Zombies and Anton's Syndrome.Fiona Macpherson - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):226-265.
    Reflection on skeptical scenarios in the philosophy of perception, made vivid in the arguments from illusion and hallucination, have led to the formulation of theories of the metaphysical and epistemological nature of perceptual experience. In recent times, the locus of the debate concerning the nature of perceptual experience has been the dispute between disjunctivists and common-kind theorists. Disjunctivists have held that there are substantial dissimilarities (either metaphysical or epistemological or both) between veridical perceptual experiences occurring when one perceives and perceptual (...)
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  26.  71
    Hallucination.Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.) - 2013 - MIT Press.
    Scientific and philosophical perspectives on hallucination: essays that draw on empirical evidence from psychology, neuroscience, and cutting-edge philosophical theory.
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  27.  66
    Is Perception Cognitively Penetrable? A Philosophically Satisfying and Empirically Testable Reframing.Gary Lupyan, Dustin Stokes, Fiona Macpherson, Rasha Abdel Rahman & Robert Goldstone - 2013 - Proceedings of the 35th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society 1:91-2.
    The question of whether perception can be penetrated by cognition is in the limelight again. The reason this question keeps coming up is that there is so much at stake: Is it possible to have theory-neutral observation? Is it possible to study perception without recourse to expectations, context, and beliefs? What are the boundaries between perception, memory, and inference (and do they even exist)? Are findings from neuroscience that paint a picture of perception as an inherently bidirectional and interactive process (...)
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  28. The Power of Natural Selection.Fiona Macpherson - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (8):30-35.
    Some naturalistic theories of consciousness give an essential role to teleology.1 This teleology is said to arise due to natural selection. Thus it is claimed that only certain states, namely, those that have been selected for by evolutionary pro- cesses because they contribute to (or once contributed to) an organism’s fitness, are conscious states. These theories look as if they are assigning a creative role to natural selection. If a state is conscious only if it has been selected for, then (...)
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  29.  21
    On Picturing a Candle: The Prehistory of Imagery Science.Matthew MacKisack, Susan Aldworth, Fiona Macpherson, John Onians, Crawford Winlove & Adam Zeman - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  30. Nonconceptual Content and the Nature of Perceptual Experience.Jose Luis Bermudez & Fiona Macpherson - 1998 - Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6.
    [1] Recent philosophy of mind and epistemology has seen an important and influential trend towards accounting for at least some features of experiences in content-involving terms. It is a contested point whether ascribing content to experiences can account for all the intrinsic properties of experiences, but on many theories of experiences there are close links between the ascription of content and the ways in which experiences are ascribed and typed. The issues here have both epistemological and psychological dimensions. On the (...)
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  31. Property Dualism and the Merits of Solutions to the Mind-Body Problem: A Reply to Strawson.Fiona Macpherson - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):72-89.
    This paper is divided into two main sections. The first articulates what I believe Strawson's position to be. I contrast Strawson's usage of 'physicalism' with the mainstream use. I then explain why I think that Strawson's position is one of property dualism and substance monism. In doing this, I outline his view and Locke's view on the nature of substance. I argue that they are similar in many respects and thus it is no surprise that Strawson actually holds a view (...)
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  32. Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory.Fiona Macpherson & Fabian Dorsch (eds.) - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This volume presents ten new essays on the nature of perceptual imagination and perceptual memory. The central questions are: How do perceptual imagination and memory resemble and differ from each other and from other kinds of sensory experience? And what role does each play in perception and in the acquisition of knowledge?
     
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  33. Representational Theories of Phenomenal Character.Fiona Macpherson - 2000 - Dissertation, University of Stirling
    This thesis is an examination and critique of naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. Phenomenal character refers to the distinctive quality that perceptual and sensational experiences seem to have; it is identified with 'what it is like' to undergo experiences. The central claims of representationalism are that phenomenal character is identical with the content of experience and that all representational states, bearing appropriate relations to the cognitive system, are conscious experiences. These claims are taken to explain both how conscious experiential (...)
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  34.  90
    Symposium on Louise Richardson’s “Flavour, Taste and Smell”.Louise Richardson, Fiona Macpherson, Mohan Matthen & Matthew Nudds - 2013 - Mind and Language Symposia at the Brains Blog.
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    The Neural Correlates of Visual Imagery: A Co-Ordinate-Based Meta-Analysis.C. Winlove, F. Milton, J. Ranson, J. Fulford, M. MacKisack, Fiona Macpherson & A. Zeman - forthcoming - Cortex.
  36.  62
    Is the Sense‐Data Theory a Representationalist Theory?Fiona Macpherson - 2014 - Ratio 27 (4):369-392.
    Is the sense-data theory, otherwise known as indirect realism, a form of representationalism? This question has been underexplored in the extant literature, and to the extent that there is discussion, contemporary authors disagree. There are many different variants of representationalism, and differences between these variants that some people have taken to be inconsequential turn out to be key factors in whether the sense-data theory is a form of representationalism. Chief among these are whether a representationalist takes the phenomenal character of (...)
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  37. Review of The Problem of Perception By A.D. Smith. [REVIEW]Fiona Macpherson - 2004 - Philosophical Books 45 (3):255-257.
  38.  32
    Review of M. Tye Consciousness, Color and Content. [REVIEW]Fiona Macpherson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):619-621.
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  39.  35
    Review of P. Jacob What Minds Can Do: Intentionality in a Non-Intentional World. [REVIEW]Fiona Macpherson - 1999 - Philosophical Books 40 (3):184-185.
  40.  10
    Philosophy of Mind.Fiona Macpherson - 2004 - Philosophical Books 45 (3):255-257.
  41. Phenomenal Presence.Fiona Macpherson & Fabian Dorsch (eds.) - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    What kinds of features of the world figure consciously in our perceptual experience? Colours and shapes are uncontroversial; but what about volumes, natural kinds, reasons for belief, existences, relations? Eleven new essays investigate different kinds of phenomenal presence.
     
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  42. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour.Derek Brown & Fiona Macpherson (eds.) - forthcoming - Routledge.
  43. Sensory Substitution and Augmentation.Fiona Macpherson (ed.) - 2018 - Oxford: Proceedings of the British Academy, Oxford University Press.
    Sensory substitution and augmentation devices are used to replace or enhance one sense by using another. Fiona Macpherson brings together neuroscientists, psychologists and philosophers to focus on the nature of the perceptual experiences, the sensory interactions, and the changes that occur in the mind and brain while using these technologies.
     
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