1.  95
    A Uniform Tableau Method for Intuitionistic Modal Logics I.Giambattista Amati & Fiora Pirri - 1994 - Studia Logica 53 (1):29 - 60.
  2.  6
    A Structural Property On Modal Frames Characterizing Default Logic.Gianni Amati, Luigia Aiello, Dov Gabbay & Fiora Pirri - 1996 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 4 (1):7-22.
    We show that modal logics characterized by a class of frames satisfying the insertion property are suitable for Reiter's default logic. We refine the canonical fix point construction defined by Marek, Schwarz and Truszczyński for Reiter's default logic and thus we addrress a new paradigm for nonmonotonic logic. In fact, differently from the construction defined by these authors. we show that suitable modal logics for such a construction must indeed contain K D4. When reflexivity is added to the modal logic (...)
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  3. Intuitionistic Autoepistemic Logic.Luigia Aiello, Giambattista Amati, Fiora Pirri & Fondazione Ugo Bordoni - 1997 - Studia Logica 59.
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  4.  44
    Intuitionistic Autoepistemic Logic.Giambattista Amati, Luigia Carlucci-Aiello & Fiora Pirri - 1997 - Studia Logica 59 (1):103-120.
    In this paper we address the problem of combining a logic with nonmonotonic modal logic. In particular we study the intuitionistic case. We start from a formal analysis of the notion of intuitionistic consistency via the sequent calculus. The epistemic operator M is interpreted as the consistency operator of intuitionistic logic by introducing intuitionistic stable sets. On the basis of a bimodal structure we also provide a semantics for intuitionistic stable sets.
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    Defaults as Restrictions on Classical Hilbert-Style Proofs.Gianni Amati, Luigia Carlucci Aiello & Fiora Pirri - 1994 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 3 (4):303-326.
    Since the earliest formalisation of default logic by Reiter many contributions to this appealing approach to nonmonotonic reasoning have been given. The different formalisations are here presented in a general framework that gathers the basic notions, concepts and constructions underlying default logic. Our view is to interpret defaults as special rules that impose a restriction on the juxtaposition of monotonic Hubert-style proofs of a given logicL. We propose to describe default logic as a logic where the juxtaposition of default proofs (...)
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