Robert Kane’s libertarian theory of freedom is frequently attacked in the free will literature by the “luck objection”. Alfred Mele’s articulation of the objection is a very influential formulation as it captures the spirit of Kane’s critics and their complaint with Kane’s view. Mele argues that without a contrastive explanation that highlights aspects of the agent their free choices are reducible to luck. I argue that the lack of a contrastive explanation does not establish that there is no explanation for (...) self-forming actions. Building on the explanation that Kane offers in his rebuttal, I claim that there are neglected dimensions to Kane’s view that, when put together, mitigate the force of the objection. These elements are value experiments, teleological intelligibility and liberum arbitrium voluntatis. I claim that through adopting a narrative view of the self, we can place value experiments in a broader teleological framework that allows us to see self-forming choices are not just a matter of luck. (shrink)

Robert Kane’s libertarian theory of freedom is frequently attacked in the free will literature by the “luck objection”. Alfred Mele’s articulation of the objection is a very influential formulation as it captures the spirit of Kane’s critics and their complaint with Kane’s view. Mele argues that without a contrastive explanation that highlights aspects of the agent their free choices are reducible to luck. I argue that the lack of a contrastive explanation does not establish that there is no explanation for (...) self-forming actions. Building on the explanation that Kane offers in his rebuttal, I claim that there are neglected dimensions to Kane’s view that, when put together, mitigate the force of the objection. These elements are value experiments, teleological intelligibility and liberium arbitrium voluntatis. I claim that through adopting a narrative view of the self, we can place value experiments in a broader teleological framework that allows us to see self-forming choices are not just a matter of luck. (shrink)

Since it appeared as one of the supreme ideals of 1789, fraternity was a troublesome, disturbing presence. Revolutionaries and their ideological heirs condemned it to obliteration. The contemporary crisis of the ideals of freedom and equality has recently brought fraternity into focus again. A deeper analysis of Fraternity as a political concept reveals a whole world of analogical concepts that political Modernity has ignored.

Since it appeared during the French Revolution and for about two centuries, the left/right distinction has been one of the most extended and significant forms of political identity. This pair of synthetic and complex concepts have been a real challenge to political science. The left is the original term of the pair, the one that gives birth to political opposition. Carl Schmitt’s concept of the political can be an interesting and provoking theoretical framework to improve our understanding of the left (...) as a political identity. (shrink)