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Florian Steinberger
Birkbeck College
  1. Explosion and the Normativity of Logic.Florian Steinberger - 2016 - Mind 125 (498):385-419.
    Logic has traditionally been construed as a normative discipline; it sets forth standards of correct reasoning. Explosion is a valid principle of classical logic. It states that an inconsistent set of propositions entails any proposition whatsoever. However, ordinary agents presumably do — occasionally, at least — have inconsistent belief sets. Yet it is false that such agents may, let alone ought to, believe any proposition they please. Therefore, our logic should not recognize explosion as a logical law. Call this the (...)
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  2. Accuracy and Epistemic Conservatism.Florian Steinberger - 2018 - Analysis:any094.
    Epistemic utility theory (EUT) is generally coupled with \emph{veritism}. Veritism is the view that truth is the sole fundamental epistemic value. Veritism, when paired with EUT, entails a methodological commitment: Norms of epistemic rationality are justified only if they can be derived from considerations of accuracy alone. According to EUT, then, believing truly has epistemic value, while believing falsely has epistemic disvalue. This raises the question as to how the rational believer should balance the prospect of true belief against the (...)
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  3. Three Ways in Which Logic Might Be Normative.Florian Steinberger - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (1):5-31.
    According to tradition, logic is normative for reasoning. Gilbert Harman challenged the view that there is any straightforward connection between logical consequence and norms of reasoning. Authors including John MacFarlane and Hartry Field have sought to rehabilitate the traditional view. I argue that the debate is marred by a failure to distinguish three types of normative assessment, and hence three ways to understand the question of the normativity of logic. Logical principles might be thought to provide the reasoning agent with (...)
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  4.  36
    Consequence and Normative Guidance.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):306-328.
    Logic, the tradition has it, is normative for reasoning. But is that really so? And if so, in what sense is logic normative for reasoning? As Gilbert Harman has reminded us, devising a logic and devising a theory of reasoning are two separate enterprises. Hence, logic's normative authority cannot reside in the fact that principles of logic just are norms of reasoning. Once we cease to identify the two, we are left with a gap. To bridge the gap one would (...)
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  5.  76
    Logical Pluralism and Logical Normativity.Florian Steinberger - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19 (12).
    This paper explores an apparent tension between two widely held views about logic: that logic is normative and that there are multiple equally legitimate logics. The tension is this. If logic is normative, it tells us something about how we ought to reason. If, as the pluralist would have it, there are several correct logics, those logics make incompatible recommendations as to how we ought to reason. But then which of these logics should we look to for normative guidance? I (...)
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  6. What Harmony Could and Could Not Be.Florian Steinberger - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):617 - 639.
    The notion of harmony has played a pivotal role in a number of debates in the philosophy of logic. Yet there is little agreement as to how the requirement of harmony should be spelled out in detail or even what purpose it is to serve. Most, if not all, conceptions of harmony can already be found in Michael Dummett's seminal discussion of the matter in The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. Hence, if we wish to gain a better understanding of the (...)
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  7. Inferentialism.Florian Steinberger & Julien Murzi - 2017 - In Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of Language. Wiley Blackwell. pp. 197-224.
    This article offers an overview of inferential role semantics. We aim to provide a map of the terrain as well as challenging some of the inferentialist’s standard commitments. We begin by introducing inferentialism and placing it into the wider context of contemporary philosophy of language. §2 focuses on what is standardly considered both the most important test case for and the most natural application of inferential role semantics: the case of the logical constants. We discuss some of the (alleged) benefits (...)
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  8.  46
    Why Conclusions Should Remain Single.Florian Steinberger - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (3):333-355.
    This paper argues that logical inferentialists should reject multiple-conclusion logics. Logical inferentialism is the position that the meanings of the logical constants are determined by the rules of inference they obey. As such, logical inferentialism requires a proof-theoretic framework within which to operate. However, in order to fulfil its semantic duties, a deductive system has to be suitably connected to our inferential practices. I argue that, contrary to an established tradition, multiple-conclusion systems are ill-suited for this purpose because they fail (...)
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  9. Frege and Carnap on the Normativity of Logic.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Synthese 194 (1):143-162.
    In this paper I examine the question of logic’s normative status in the light of Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance. I begin by contrasting Carnap’s conception of the normativity of logic with that of his teacher, Frege. I identify two core features of Frege’s position: first, the normative force of the logical laws is grounded in their descriptive adequacy; second, norms implied by logic are constitutive for thinking as such. While Carnap breaks with Frege’s absolutism about logic and hence with the (...)
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  10.  67
    How Tolerant Can You Be? Carnap on Rationality.Florian Steinberger - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):645-668.
    In this paper I examine a neglected question concerning the centerpiece of Carnap's philosophy: the principle of tolerance. The principle of tolerance states that we are free to devise and adopt any well-defined form of language or linguistic framework we please. A linguistic framework defines framework-internal standards of correct reasoning that guide us in our first-order scientific pursuits. The choice of a linguistic framework, on the other hand, is an ‘external’ question to be settled on pragmatic grounds and so not (...)
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  11. Not so Stable.Florian Steinberger - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):655-661.
    According to Michael Dummett, we may think of the meaning of an expression as given by the principles governing the use we make of it. The principles regulating our linguistic practices can then be grouped into two broad categories (Dummett 1973: 396, 1991: 211). We might state them as follows: I-principles: state the circumstances under which an assertion of a sentence containing the expression in question is warranted. E-principles: state the consequences of asserting a sentence containing the expression. In the (...)
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  12.  88
    Consequence and Normative Guidance.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1).
    Logic, the tradition has it, is normative for reasoning. But is that really so? And if so, in what sense is logic normative for reasoning? As Gilbert Harman has reminded us, devising a logic and devising a theory of reasoning are two separate enterprises. Hence, logic's normative authority cannot reside in the fact that principles of logic just are norms of reasoning. Once we cease to identify the two, we are left with a gap. To bridge the gap one would (...)
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  13.  45
    On the Equivalence Conjecture for Proof-Theoretic Harmony.Florian Steinberger - 2013 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 54 (1):79-86.
    The requirement of proof-theoretic harmony has played a pivotal role in a number of debates in the philosophy of logic. Different authors have attempted to precisify the notion in different ways. Among these, three proposals have been prominent in the literature: harmony–as–conservative extension, harmony–as–leveling procedure, and Tennant’s harmony–as–deductive equilibrium. In this paper I propose to clarify the logical relationships between these accounts. In particular, I demonstrate that what I call the equivalence conjecture —that these three notions essentially come to the (...)
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  14. Tennant on Multiple Conclusions.Florian Steinberger - 2008 - Logique Et Analyse 51 (201):49.
     
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  15.  77
    Is Logical Knowledge Dispositional?Julien Murzi & Florian Steinberger - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):165-183.
    In a series of recent papers, Corine Besson argues that dispositionalist accounts of logical knowledge conflict with ordinary reasoning. She cites cases in which, rather than applying a logical principle to deduce certain implications of our antecedent beliefs, we revise some of those beliefs in the light of their unpalatable consequences. She argues that such instances of, in Gilbert Harman’s phrase, ‘reasoned change in view’ cannot be accommodated by the dispositionalist approach, and that we would do well to conceive of (...)
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  16.  27
    The Normative Status of Logic.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Stanford Enyclopedia of Philosophy.
  17.  42
    Note of the Editors.Vincenzo Crupi, Branden Fitelson, Ole Hjortland & Florian Steinberger - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S6):1-1.
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