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Jerry A. Fodor [118]Jerry Fodor [84]
  1. The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
  2. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press. Edited by Margaret A. Boden.
    Preface 1 Introduction: The Persistence of the Attitudes 2 Individualism and Supervenience 3 Meaning Holism 4 Meaning and the World Order Epilogue Creation Myth Appendix Why There Still Has to be a Language of Thought Notes References Author Index.
  3.  84
    The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
    This study synthesizes current information from the various fields of cognitive science in support of a new and exciting theory of mind. Most psychologists study horizontal processes like memory and information flow; Fodor postulates a vertical and modular psychological organization underlying biologically coherent behaviors. This view of mental architecture is consistent with the historical tradition of faculty psychology while integrating a computational approach to mental processes. One of the most notable aspects of Fodor's work is that it articulates features not (...)
  4. Representations: philosophical essays on the foundations of cognitive science.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - Cambridge: MIT Press.
    Introduction: Something on the State of the Art 1 I. Functionalism and Realism 1. Operationalism and Ordinary Language 35 2. The Appeal to Tacit Knowledge in Psychological Explanations 63 3. What Psychological States are Not 79 4. Three Cheers for Propositional Attitudes 100 II. Reduction and Unity of Science 5. Special Sciences 127 6. Computation and Reduction 146 III. Intensionality and Mental Representation 7. Propositional Attitudes 177 8. Tom Swift and His Procedural Grandmother 204 9. Methodological Solipsism Considered as a (...)
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  5. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory on the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of rival theories, and (...)
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  6. The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - MIT Press.
    One of the most notable aspects of Fodor's work is that it articulates features not only of speculative cognitive architectures but also of current research in ...
  7. Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis.Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1988 - Cognition 28 (1-2):3-71.
    This paper explores the difference between Connectionist proposals for cognitive a r c h i t e c t u r e a n d t h e s o r t s o f m o d e l s t hat have traditionally been assum e d i n c o g n i t i v e s c i e n c e . W e c l a i m t h a t t h (...)
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  8. A Theory of Content and Other Essays.Jerry A. Fodor - 1990 - MIT Press.
    Preface and Acknowledgments Introduction PART I Intentionality Chapter 1 Fodor’ Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Auntie’s Vade-Mecum Chapter 2 Semantics, Wisconsin Style Chapter 3 A Theory of Content, I: The Problem Chapter 4 A Theory of Content, II: The Theory Chapter 5 Making Mind Matter More Chapter 6 Substitution Arguments and the Individuation of Beliefs Chapter 7 Stephen Schiffer’s Dark Night of The Soul: A Review of Remnants of Meaning PART II Modularity Chapter 8 Précis of The Modularity of (...)
  9.  98
    The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1983 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.
  10. The Psychology of Language: An Introduction to Psycholinguistics and Generative Grammar.Jerry Fodor, Bever A., Garrett T. G. & F. M. - 1974 - Mcgraw-Hill.
  11. Psychological Explanation: An Introduction To The Philosophy Of Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1968 - Ny: Random House.
  12. The Mind Doesn’T Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 2000 - MIT Press.
    Jerry Fodor argues against the widely held view that mental processes are largely computations, that the architecture of cognition is massively modular, and...
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  13. Holism: A Shopper's Guide.Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell. Edited by Ernest LePore.
  14. Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited.Jerry A. Fodor - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Jerry A. Fodor.
    Jerry Fodor presents a new development of his famous Language of Thought hypothesis, which has since the 1970s been at the centre of interdisciplinary debate about how the mind works. Fodor defends and extends the groundbreaking idea that thinking is couched in a symbolic system realized in the brain. This idea is central to the representational theory of mind which Fodor has established as a key reference point in modern philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. The foundation stone of our present (...)
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  15. Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):63-73.
    The paper explores the distinction between two doctrines, both of which inform theory construction in much of modern cognitive psychology: the representational theory of mind and the computational theory of mind. According to the former, propositional attitudes are to be construed as relations that organisms bear to mental representations. According to the latter, mental processes have access only to formal (nonsemantic) properties of the mental representations over which they are defined.The following claims are defended: (1) That the traditional dispute between (...)
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  16. Special sciences.Jerry A. Fodor - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):97-115.
  17. The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and Its Semantics.Jerry A. Fodor - 1994 - MIT Press.
    This book is largely a reconsideration of the arguments that are supposed to ground this consensus.
  18. Special Sciences, or Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis.Jerry Fodor - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):97--115.
  19. What psychological states are not.Ned Block & Jerry A. Fodor - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (April):159-81.
  20.  19
    The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and its Semantics.Jerry A. Fodor - 1995 - MIT Press.
    Written in a highly readable, irreverent style, The Elm and the Expert provides a lively discussion of semantic issues about mental representation, with special attention to issues raised by Frege's problem, Twin cases, and the putative indeterminacy of reference. Bound to be widely read and much discussed, The Elm and the Expert, written in Jerry Fodor's usual highly readable, irreverent style, provides a lively discussion of semantic issues about mental representation, with special attention to issues raised by Frege's problem, Twin (...)
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  21. Precis of the modularity of mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):1-42.
    The Modularity of Mind proposes an alternative to the or view of cognitive architecture that has dominated several decades of cognitive science. Whereas interactionism stresses the continuity of perceptual and cognitive processes, modularity theory argues for their distinctness. It is argued, in particular, that the apparent plausibility of New Look theorizing derives from the failure to distinguish between the (correct) claim that perceptual processes are inferential and the (dubious) claim that they are unencapsidated, that is, that they are arbitrarily sensitive (...)
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  22. How direct is visual perception? Some reflections on Gibson's 'ecological approach'.Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1981 - Cognition 9 (2):139-96.
    Examines the theses that the postulation of mental processing is unnecessary to account for our perceptual relationship with the world, see turvey etal. for a criticque.
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  23. Observation reconsidered.Jerry Fodor - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (March):23-43.
    Several arguments are considered which purport to demonstrate the impossibility of theory-neutral observation. The most important of these infers the continuity of observation with theory from the presumed continuity of perception with cognition, a doctrine widely espoused in recent cognitive psychology. An alternative psychological account of the relation between cognition and perception is proposed and its epistemological consequences for the observation/theory distinction are then explored.
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  24. The mind-body problem.Jerry Fodor - 1981 - Scientific American 244 (1):114-25.
  25. The appeal to tacit knowledge in psychological explanation.Jerry A. Fodor - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):627-40.
  26. The Compositionality Papers.Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest LePore (eds.) - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
    Ernie Lepore and Jerry Fodor have published a series of original and controversial essays on issues relating to compositionality in language and mind; they have...
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  27. Fodor’s Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Auntie’s Vade-Mecum.Jerry A. Fodor - 1985 - Mind 94 (373):76-100.
  28. The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology.Jerry Fodor - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):549-552.
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  29.  18
    What Darwin got wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 2010 - New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Edited by Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini.
    This book dares to challenge natural selection--not in the name of religion but in the name of good science. Most scientists are so terrified of religious attacks on the theory of evolution that it is never examined critically. There are significant scientific and philosophical problems with the theory of natural selection. Darwin claimed the factors that determine the course of evolution are very largely environmental. Empirical results in biology are increasingly calling this thesis into question. The authors show that Darwinism (...)
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  30. The present status of the innateness controversy.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - In Representations: philosophical essays on the foundations of cognitive science. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 257-316.
  31. Making mind matter more.Jerry A. Fodor - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (11):59-79.
  32. Propositional attitudes.Jerry Fodor - 1978 - The Monist 61 (October):501-23.
    Some philosophers hold that philosophy is what you do to a problem until it’s clear enough to solve it by doing science. Others hold that if a philosophical problem succumbs to empirical methods, that shows it wasn’t really philosophical to begin with. Either way, the facts seem clear enough: questions first mooted by philosophers are sometimes coopted by people who do experiments. This seems to be happening now to the question: “what are propositional attitudes?” and cognitive psychology is the science (...)
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  33. The structure of a semantic theory.Jerrold Katz & Jerry Fodor - 1963 - Language 39:170-210.
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  34. Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (2):175-182.
     
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  35. Special sciences: Still autonomous after all these years.Jerry Fodor - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11:149-63.
  36. Connectionism and the problem of systematicity: Why Smolensky's solution doesn't work.Jerry Fodor & Brian P. McLaughlin - 1990 - Cognition 35 (2):183-205.
  37. The specificity of language skills.Jerry A. Fodor, Thomas G. Bever & Mary Garrett - 1974 - In The Psychology of Language. Mcgraw-Hill.
     
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  38.  30
    Hume Variations.Jerry A. Fodor - 2003 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Hume? Yes, David Hume, that's who Jerry Fodor looks to for help in advancing our understanding of the mind. Fodor claims his Treatise of Human Nature as the foundational document of cognitive science: it launched the project of constructing an empirical psychology on the basis of a representational theory of mind. Going back to this work after more than 250 years we find that Hume is remarkably perceptive about the components and structure that a theory of mind requires. Careful study (...)
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  39. A Reply to Churchland’s “Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality‘.Jerry A. Fodor - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (June):188-98.
    Churchland's paper "Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality" offers empirical, semantical and epistemological arguments intended to show that the cognitive impenetrability of perception "does not establish a theory-neutral foundation for knowledge" and that the psychological account of perceptual encapsulation that I set forth in The Modularity of Mind "[is] almost certainly false". The present paper considers these arguments in detail and dismisses them.
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  40. The revenge of the given.Jerry A. Fodor - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 105--116.
  41. You can fool some of the people all of the time, everything else being equal: Hedged laws and psychological explanation.Jerry A. Fodor - 1991 - Mind 100 (397):19-34.
  42. Semantics, wisconsin style.Jerry A. Fodor - 1984 - Synthese 59 (3):231-50.
  43.  12
    In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - MIT Press.
    PREFACE PART I METAPHYSICS Review of John McDowell’s Mind and World Special Sciences: Still Autonomous after All These Years Conclusion Acknowledgment Notes PART II CONCEPTS Review of Christopher Peacocke’s A Study of Concepts Notes There Are No Recognitional Concepts--Not Even RED Introduction Compositionality Why Premise P is Plausible Objections Conclusion Afterword Acknowledgment Notes There Are No Recognitional Concepts--Not Even RED, Part 2: The Plot Thickens Introduction: The Story ’til Now Compositonality and Learnability Notes Do We Think in Mentalese? Remarks on (...)
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  44. A Theory of the Child’s Theory of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1992 - Cognition 44 (3):283-296.
  45. A theory of content I.Jerry A. Fodor - 1990 - In A Theory of Content. MIT Press.
  46. Imagistic representation.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - In The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press. pp. 135-149.
  47. Making mind matter more.Jerry Fodor - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (11):642.
  48.  26
    Special Sciences.Jerry A. Fodor - 1995 - In Paul K. Moser & J. D. Trout (eds.), Contemporary Materialism: A Reader. London: Routledge. pp. 51-64.
  49.  57
    Making Mind Matter More.Jerry A. Fodor - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):59-79.
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  50. Having concepts: A brief refutation of the twentieth century.Jerry Fodor - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (1):29-47.
    A certain ‘pragmatist’ view of concept possession has defined the mainstream of Anglophone philosophy of language/mind for decades: namely, that to have the concept C is to be able to distinguish Cs from non‐Cs, and/or to recognize the validity of certain C‐involving inferences. The present paper offers three arguments why no such account could be viable. An alternative ‘Cartesian’ view is outlined, according to which having C is being able to think about Cs ‘as such’. Some consequences of the proposed (...)
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