This contribution unfolds an existential-ontological response to the question of sexual difference in the context of Heidegger’s formally indicative concept of “Dasein.” The question of Dasein’s “neutrality” concerns how formal indication formalizes, empties, and neutralizes the givenness of factical human existence. Ostensibly “given” biological and anthropological facts, such as sexual difference, are interpreted from an emptied and neutralized perspective that appears abstract and fictional to Heidegger’s critics. How, then, is the “neutrality” of formalizing emptying related to the “facticity” (...) of in each case factically existing as a sexual and gendered being? The answer lies in Heidegger’s elucidation of the existential-ontological structure of Dasein: Dasein is always relationally instituted in its factical entangled life through “being-with.” The sexual difference of human existence is not merely biologically or anthropologically given, but disclosed and enacted according to one’s relations with others, the environment, and oneself. The formally indicating concept “Dasein” indicates, accordingly, the concrete diversity and plurality of individuated sexual and gendered ways of being. (shrink)

This paper examines Heidegger’s account of the proper relation between philosophy and theology, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s critique thereof. Part I outlines Heidegger’s proposal for this relationship in his lecture “Phenomenology and Theology,” where he suggests that philosophy might aid theology by means of ‘formal indication.’ In that context Heidegger never articulates what formal indication is, so Part II exposits this obscure notion by looking at its treatment in Heidegger’s early lecture courses, as well as its roots (...) in Husserl. Part III presents Bonhoeffer’s theological response, which challenges Heidegger’s attempt to maintain a neutral ontology that remains unaffected by both sin and faith. (shrink)

RESUMEN: El presente artículo se centra en algunos de los aspectos centrales de la concepción heideggeriana de la indicación formal. Como es sabido, el filósofo toma como punto de partida en una de las más tempranas exposiciones de este metaconcepto, una explicación delimitativa frente a otras operaciones conceptuales. Se revisará críticamente la explicación que Heidegger hace de la generalización a diferencia de la formalización, destacando especialmente que no se trata aquí de una mera distinción entre generalización y formalización, sino (...) de una estructura de fundamentación. En segundo lugar se argumenta que la crítica de Heidegger no se dirige directamente contra la formalización, sino contra el contexto metódico al cual sirve. Por último, a modo de conclusión, se intenta mostrar que para Heidegger concebir la indicación formal como principio de la investigación fenomenológica, supone que ella es, por vía negativa, una radicalización de la tendencia a lo formal. ABSTRACT: The aim of this article is to focus on central aspects of Heidegger's conception of the formal indication. An early Heideggerian exposition of this meta-concept take as starting point a differentiation from others conceptual operations. First, it will be critical discuss the exposition of the generalization. The main point is that the distinction of generalization and formalization is rather a foundational structure than a simple difference. This premise leads to the view that the Heidegger's critical attempt is not addressed to the formalization as such, but rather to the methodological context to which the formalization serves. Finally, based on this, it will be claimed that is a necessary condition for the determination of the formal indication as a methodological principle of the phenomenological investigation, that this meta-concept is a radical tendency toward the formal. (shrink)

Against the background of a recent exchange between Cristina Lafont and Hubert Dreyfus, I argue that Heidegger's method of ?formal indication? is at the heart of his attempt in Sein und Zeit to answer ?the ontological question of the being of the ?sum?? (SZ, p. 46). This method works reflexively, by picking out certain essential features of one's first-person singular being at the outset of its investigation that are implicit in the question ?what is it to be the (...) entity I am?? On the basis of these features, various further a priori, ontological structures (care and temporality) that constitute one as a first-person singular entity then become accessible. Formal indication is thus formal in two senses: it officially designates or signals certain first-person singular phenomena as the topic of investigation, and it picks out features which define the ontological form of the entity in question. It is thereby the method by which a legitimately transcendental account of our being may be begun to be generated by each of us from out of our factical, immanent existence. (shrink)

The paper seeks to show how Heidegger recasts the problem of reification in Being and Time, so as to address the methodological procedure of formal indication, outlined in his early writings, in order to carry out a deconstruction of ancient ontology. By revisiting Marx's and Lukács's critique of objectification in social relations, especially the former's critique of alienation, in light of Honneth's critical theory of recognition, it is shown how a Heideggerian-inspired phenomenology of sociality could be reconstructed out (...) of the semantic correlation between reification and formal indication. (shrink)

Of all the methodological terms used by Heidegger in the early Freiburg period, few have attracted less consensus than Formal Indication. With its relation to the earliest lecture series, critical debate has tended to focus on the extent to which this concept defines the difference between Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology. The argument of this paper is that Formal Indication is best understood in its relation to Heidegger’s other key methodological term from this period, Phenomenological Destruction. Not (...) only do both concepts grow out of the same problem set, but they act in a limited sense as counter-movements to one another. Considered together, I argue, they make up Heidegger’s response to the problem of language as expressed by Paul Natorp, and first dealt with in the Kriegsnotsemester in 1919. (shrink)

In the present paper I attempt an interpretation of Martin Heidegger’s analysis of animality, developed in winter semester 1929/1930. My general purpose is to examine Heidegger’s analysis in the wider context of formal-indicative phenomenology as such. Thus I show that in order to develop a phenomenology of animality, Heidegger must tacitly renounce the re-enactment of animal experience in which the formal-indicative concepts of his analysis could gain concreteness, and he resorts instead to scientific concepts and concrete experiments in (...) biology or zoology. This is due to the fact that what I call the a-logical bursts into the field of the phenomenological regard when it is oriented toward animality. I therefore argue that the phenomenology of animality presents us with a paradigmatic case of a tension that is at work in any phenomenon, one between logos and a-logos, between hiddenness and unhiddenness—constituting a basic problem of future research in phenomenology and its approach to intersubjectivity and alterity. (shrink)

For Heidegger, phenomenological investigation is carried out by formal indication, the name given to the methodical approach he assumes in Being and Time. This paper attempts to draw attention to the nature of formal indication in light of the fact that it has been largely lost upon American scholarship (mainly due to its inconsistent translation). The roots of the concept of formal indication are shown in two ways. First, its thematic treatment in Heidegger's 1921/22 (...) Winter Semester course, Phenomenological Investigations into Aristotle, is examined to make clear what Heidegger silently assumes in Being and Time. Second, Heidegger's adaptation of Husserl's use of the term, indication, is outlined to clarify the concept even more. The enhanced understanding of formal indication granted by these two points leads to a better grasp of Heidegger's concept of truth, for formal indication and truth are mutually implied for Heidegger. Finally, it is suggested that the reader of Being and Time, on the basis of what formal indication demands, approach the work not as a doctrine to be learned but as a task always requiring further completion. (shrink)

: This article contributes to the contemporary debate regarding the young Heidegger’s method of formal indication. Theodore Kisiel argues that this method constitutes a radical break with Husserl---a rejection of phenomenological reflection that paves the way to the non-reflective approach of the Beiträge. Against this view, Steven Crowell argues that formal indication is continuous with Husserlian phenomenology---a refinement of phenomenological reflection that reveals its existential sources. I evaluate this debate and adduce further considerations in favor of (...) Crowell’s view. To do so, I analyze the young Heidegger’s account of phenomenological communication and argue that it further reflects the continuity that Crowell identifies: as he does with reflection, Heidegger refines Husserl’s account of phenomenological communication and sheds light on its existential sources. (shrink)

In 1929, after rejecting the suggestion that contemporary Christians may be expected to feel "threatened" by Kierkegaard's criticisms, the Protestant theologian Gerhardt Kuhlmann remarks.

Conditionals are sentences of the form 'If A, then B', and they play a central role in scientific, logical, and everyday reasoning. They have been in the philosophical limelight for centuries, and more recently, they have been receiving attention from psychologists, linguists, and computer scientists. In spite of this, many key questions concerning conditionals remain unanswered. While most of the work on conditionals has addressed semantical questions - questions about the truth conditions of conditionals - this book focuses on the (...) main epistemological questions that conditionals give rise to, such as: what are the probabilities of conditionals? When is a conditional acceptable or assertable? What do we learn when we receive new conditional information? In answering these questions, this book combines the formal tools of logic and probability theory with the experimental approach of cognitive psychology. It will be of interest to students and researchers in logic, epistemology, and psychology of reasoning. (shrink)

Conditional structures lie at the heart of the sciences, humanities, and everyday reasoning. It is hence not surprising that conditional logics – logics specifically designed to account for natural language conditionals – are an active and interdisciplinary area. The present book gives a formal and a philosophical account of indicative and counterfactual conditionals in terms of Chellas-Segerberg semantics. For that purpose a range of topics are discussed such as Bennett’s arguments against truth value based semantics for indicative conditionals.

Zunächst wird dargelegt, wie Heidegger bei seinem Anschluß an Husserls Projekt einer radikalen Phänomenologie ein deutlicheres Verständnis für die methodologische Rolle von Voraussetzungen entwickelt. Die Idee der formalen Anzeige, die Heideggers Schriften um 1920 durchzieht, wird als ein nichtsetzender, schematischer Modus des Zeichengebrauchs expliziert, der auf wiederholte phänomenologische Auslegung abgestimmt ist. Abschließend wird dargelegt, wie diese Idee auf eine Umdeutung des Wesens von „Voraussetzungen“ hinausläuft, und erwogen, was dies für das ambivalente Verhältnis von Heidegger zu Husserl zeigt. / -/- It (...) is first argued that, impressed by Husserl’s project of radical phenomenology, Heidegger is more aware of the methodological significance of presupposition to that project. The idea of formal indication, prominent in Heidegger’s writings around 1920, is then expounded as a nonpositing, schematic mode of sign use attuned to ongoing phenomenological interpretation. Finally, I set out how this idea implies a reinterpretation of the nature of „presuppositions“ and consider what this reveals about Heidegger’s ambivalent relationship to Husserl. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:U.S. Organizational Sentencing Guidelines provide firms with incentives to develop formal ethics programs to promote ethical organizational cultures and thereby decrease corporate offenses. Yet critics argue such programs are cosmetic. Here we studied bank employees before and after the introduction of formal ethics training—an important component of formal ethics programs—to examine the effects of training on ethical organizational culture. Two years after a single training session, we find sustained, positive effects on indicators of an ethical organizational culture (...) (observed unethical behavior, intentions to behave ethically, perceptions of organizational efficacy in managing ethics, and the firm’s normative structure). While espoused organizational values also rose in importance post-training, the boost dissipated after the second year which suggests perceptions of values are not driving sustained behavioral improvements. This finding conflicts with past theory which asserts that enduring behavioral improvements arise from the inculcation of organizational values. Implications for future research are discussed. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:U.S. Organizational Sentencing Guidelines provide firms with incentives to develop formal ethics programs to promote ethical organizational cultures and thereby decrease corporate offenses. Yet critics argue such programs are cosmetic. Here we studied bank employees before and after the introduction of formal ethics training—an important component of formal ethics programs—to examine the effects of training on ethical organizational culture. Two years after a single training session, we find sustained, positive effects on indicators of an ethical organizational culture (...) (observed unethical behavior, intentions to behave ethically, perceptions of organizational efficacy in managing ethics, and the firm’s normative structure). While espoused organizational values also rose in importance post-training, the boost dissipated after the second year which suggests perceptions of values are not driving sustained behavioral improvements. This finding conflicts with past theory which asserts that enduring behavioral improvements arise from the inculcation of organizational values. Implications for future research are discussed. (shrink)

A conversation can be conceived as aiming to circumscribe a set of possibilities that are relevant to the goals of the conversation. This set of possibilities may be conceived as determined by the goals and objective circumstances of the interlocutors and not by their propositional attitudes. An indicative conditional can be conceived as circumscribing a set of possibilities that have a certain property: If the set of relevant possibilities is subsequently restricted to one in which the antecedent holds, then it (...) will be restricted as well to one in which the consequent holds. We will identify a number of desiderata concerning the validity of arguments; we will develop a formally precise semantics for conditionals conceived in this way that satisfies the desiderata, and we will present a deductive calculus that is sound and complete with respect to the semantics. Finally, we will argue that the semantics compares well, both formally and foundationally, with two other semantic theories of indicative conditionals that satisfy the desiderata, namely, those of Gillies and Bledin. (shrink)

This paper presents a new theory of the truth conditions for indicative conditionals. The theory allows us to give a fairly unified account of the semantics for indicative and subjunctive conditionals, though there remains a distinction between the two classes. Put simply, the idea behind the theory is that the distinction between the indicative and the subjunctive parallels the distinction between the necessary and the a priori. Since that distinction is best understood formally using the resources of two-dimensional modal logic, (...) those resources will be brought to bear on the logic of conditionals. (shrink)

I offer a phenomenological analysis of the syntagm ‘glory of Yhwh’ which appears in relatively few but significant places in the Hebrew Bible. I discuss the biblical sense of this syntagm and make the argument for understanding it as a ‘formally indicative’ concept, in Heidegger’s sense of ‘formale Anzeige’. I thereby make the case for understanding the anthropomorphic, amoral and numinous qualities of the biblical syntagm in a way that illuminates contemporary phenomenological senses of being, including contingency, unforeseeability, respect, dignity, (...) sublimity and saturation. The biblical syntagm is thus shown to contravene and outstrip metaphysical theology while illuminating contemporary experience, both sacred and secular. (shrink)

This paper is intended to show that, at least in a considerably wide class of cases, indicative conditionals are adequately formalized as strict conditionals. The first part of the paper outlines three arguments that support the strict conditional view, that is, three reasons for thinking that an indicative conditional is true just in case it is impossible that its antecedent is true and its consequent is false. The second part of the paper develops the strict conditional view and defends it (...) from some foreseeable objections. (shrink)

It is argued that indicative conditionals are best viewed as having truth conditions (and so they are in part factual) but that these truth conditions are ‘gappy’ which leaves an explanatory gap that can only be filled by epistemic considerations (and so indicative conditionals are in part epistemic). This dual nature of indicative conditionals gives reason to rethink the relationship between logic viewed as a descriptive discipline (focusing on semantics) and logic viewed as a discipline with a normative import (focusing (...) on epistemic notions such as ‘reasoning’, ‘beliefs’ and ‘assumptions’). In particular, it is argued that the development of formal models for epistemic states can serve as a starting point for exploring logic when viewed as a normative discipline. (shrink)

This paper formalizes part of the cognitive architecture that Kant develops in the Critique of Pure Reason. The central Kantian notion that we formalize is the rule. As we interpret Kant, a rule is not a declarative conditional stating what would be true if such and such conditions hold. Rather, a Kantian rule is a general procedure, represented by a conditional imperative or permissive, indicating which acts must or may be performed, given certain acts that are already being performed. These (...) acts are not propositions; they do not have truth-values. Our formalization is related to the input/ output logics, a family of logics designed to capture relations between elements that need not have truth-values. In this paper, we introduce KL3 as a formalization of Kant’s conception of rules as conditional imperatives and permissives. We explain how it differs from standard input/output logics, geometric logic, and first-order logic, as well as how it translates natural language sentences not well captured by first-order logic. Finally, we show how the various distinctions in Kant’s much-maligned Table of Judgements emerge as the most natural way of dividing up the various types and sub-types of rule in KL3. Our analysis sheds new light on the way in which normative notions play a fundamental role in the conception of logic at the heart of Kant’s theoretical philosophy. (shrink)

Semantics is the discipline that studies linguistic meaning generally, and the qualification ‘formal’ indicates something about the sorts of techniques used in investigating linguistic meaning. More specifically, formal semantics is the discipline that employs techniques from symbolic logic, mathematics, and mathematical logic to produce precisely characterized theories of meaning for natural languages or artificial languages. Formal semantics as we know it first arose in the twentieth century. It was made possible by certain developments in logic during that (...) period. This article chronicles those developments and how they led to the development of formal semantics. (shrink)

Throughout the 1920s Heidegger's answer to the question of how to conceive of the phenomenon as a phenomenon has been the “formal indication,” that is a non-subsuming, non-generalizing type of discourse. Through a detailed interpretation of the sporadic explanations he gives on the matter, I try to point out some of the inconsistencies in his conception, and then work them out. I try to show in particular how Heidegger's emphasis on the method of phenomenology, which expresses his unrelenting (...) desire to let the phenomenon be seen in itself, led him to overlook the essential role of language in phenomenological analysis. (shrink)

Throughout the 1920s Heidegger's answer to the question of how to conceive of the phenomenon as a phenomenon has been the “formal indication,” that is a non-subsuming, non-generalizing type of discourse. Through a detailed interpretation of the sporadic explanations he gives on the matter, I try to point out some of the inconsistencies in his conception, and then work them out. I try to show in particular how Heidegger's emphasis on the method of phenomenology, which expresses his unrelenting (...) desire to let the phenomenon be seen in itself, led him to overlook the essential role of language in phenomenological analysis. (shrink)

Dialectic, as commonly approached, is not an analytic study, as the notion is defined in the paper. Where it is analytically approached (as, for example, by Grice and Hamblin), the result is pragmatic in nature, as well as syntactic and semantic. This paper lays the foundations of a purely formal (nonpragmatic) analysis of conversations. This study is accordingly called "Conversation Theory". The key notions of "conversation", "dialogue", "conversation game", "rules of response", "epistemic community" and "channel of informations" are defined (...) precisely, and an analysis of how these notions fit together is given. Particular attention is given to distinguishing conversation theory from standard logic. The paper concludes by analysing a few sample conversation-games, indicating areas needing further research, by pointing out the simplification inherent in the sample games. (shrink)

When we ask ourselves about the meaning of life, two analyses are possible in principle: 1. that we are asking something about the purpose or the reason of being of life or of a life, or 2. that we are asking something the value of life or of a life. At the present article, I do not approach 1 neither the life as a whole, but I take the individual lives in the context of 2. I briefly explain what would (...) be to someone to have an objectivist conception of the meaning of life and what would be to someone to have a subjectivist one; and, then, I try to show how we can think in formulas that can capture the intuitions of those conceptions, without acquiring commitment with none of them. My way is to show that both objectivist and subjectivist conceptions think the meaning of life as related to projects or realizations that fulfill principles of value (the value can be objective or subjective according to the adopted conception), and ten I try to indicate that the projects or realizations from a person’s life come together through a simple sum to make the meaning of life of such a person’s life. The way I suggested for us to find the value of one of those realizations does not seem to present none theoretical problem. But the simple sum of realizations (and/or projects) to represent the value of the meaning of a person’s life simply did not work. That’s because it seems to lack some kind of index that is able to formalize the relations between realizations. Thus, although we couldn’t properly formalize the relation between the realizations that achieve the meaning of someone’s life at a certain moment, we get a good intuitive formalization of the value of a realization and we hope to have started an interesting investigation for future logicians, metaphysicians, mathematicians and theorists of value. (shrink)

Recent ideas about epistemic modals and indicative conditionals in formal semantics have significant overlap with ideas in modal logic and dynamic epistemic logic. The purpose of this paper is to show how greater interaction between formal semantics and dynamic epistemic logic in this area can be of mutual benefit. In one direction, we show how concepts and tools from modal logic and dynamic epistemic logic can be used to give a simple, complete axiomatization of Yalcin's [16] semantic consequence (...) relation for a language with epistemic modals and indicative conditionals. In the other direction, the formal semantics for indicative conditionals due to Kolodny and MacFarlane [9] gives rise to a new dynamic operator that is very natural from the point of view of dynamic epistemic logic, allowing succinct expression of dependence (as in dependence logic) or supervenience statements. We prove decidability for the logic with epistemic modals and Kolodny and MacFarlane's indicative conditional via a full and faithful computable translation from their logic to the modal logic K45. (shrink)

The knowledge representation and reasoning of both humans and artificial systems often involves conditionals. A conditional connects a consequence which holds given a precondition. It can be easily recognized in natural languages with certain key words, like “if” in English. A vast amount of literature in both fields, both artificial intelligence and psychology, deals with the questions of how such conditionals can be best represented and how these conditionals can model human reasoning. On the other hand, findings in the psychology (...) of reasoning, such as those in the Suppression Task, have led to a paradigm shift from the monotonicity assumptions in human inferences towards nonmonotonic reasoning. Nonmonotonic reasoning is sensitive for information change, that is, inferences are drawn cautiously such that retraction of previous information is not required with the addition of new information. While many formalisms of nonmonotonic reasoning have been proposed in the field of Artificial Intelligence, their capability to model properties of human reasoning has not yet been extensively investigated. In this paper, we analyzed systematically from both a formal and an empirical perspective the power of formal nonmonotonic systems to model possible explicit defeaters, as in the Suppression Task, and more implicit conditional rules that trigger nonmonotonic reasoning by the keywords in such rules. The results indicated that the classical evaluation for the correctness of inferences has to be extended in the three major aspects regarding the inference system, the knowledge base, and possible assumed exceptions for the rule. (shrink)

The wider topic to which the content of this paper belongs is that of the relationship between formal logic and real argumentation. Of particular potential interest in this connection are held to be substantive arguments constructed by philosophers reputed equally as authorities in logical theory. A number of characteristics are tentatively indicated by the author as likely to be encountered in such arguments. The discussion centers afterwards, by way of specification, on a remarkable piece of argument quoted in Cicero’s (...) dialog On Divination and ascribed to Stoic thinkers. The Stoics’ formal theory of inference is summarily referred to in this context, with special emphasis on their basic deductive schemata (‘indemonstrables’), some of them recognizable as links in the overall structure of the quoted argument. The main lines of Cicero’s criticism of the Stoic argument are next commented upon, with emphasis on his implied view as to the requirements of a good argument. Towards the end of the paper, a few considerations are added on the changes in the prevailing style of argumentation conspicuous in the three famous Roman Stoics. (shrink)

The author presents a relatively formal theory of the rule of law which includes three basic components: conceptual, institutional and axiological. He then emphasizes the differences between a formal and a substantive theory of the rule of law and highlights the advantages and limits of the former. Finally, the author indicates the importance of this type of theory, namely the values it implies such as predictability, justified reliance, autonomous choice, minimization of disputes and legitimacy.**.

This thesis consists of a collection of five papers on naturalized formal epistemology of uncertain reasoning. In all papers I apply coherence based probability logic to make fundamental epistemological questions precise and propose new solutions to old problems. I investigate the rational evaluation of uncertain arguments, develop a new measure of argument strength, and explore the semantics of uncertain indicative conditionals. Specifically, I study formally and empirically the semantics of negated apparently selfcontradictory conditionals (Aristotle’s theses), resolve a number of (...) paradoxes of the material conditional in a purely semantical way without employing pragmatics and investigate the psychological plausibility of the proposed semantics. Moreover, I defend the formalization of defeasible inferences within a probabilistic framework of nonmonotonic reasoning and empirically justify the formalizations by a series of psychological experiments. I investigate general properties of uncertain argument forms and the interrelations among logical validity, Adams’ p-validity and probabilistic informativeness. (shrink)

John Norton’s argument that all formal theories of induction fail raises substantive questions about the philosophical analysis of scientific reasoning. What are the criteria of adequacy for philosophical theories of induction, explanation, or theory structure? Is more than one adequate theory possible? Using a generalized version of Norton’s argument, I demonstrate that the competition between formal and material theories in philosophy of science results from adhering to different criteria of adequacy. This situation encourages an interpretation of “formal” (...) and “material” as indicators of divergent criteria that accompany different philosophical methodologies. I characterize another criterion of adequacy associated with material theories, the avoidance of imported problems, and conclude that one way to negotiate between conflicting criteria is to adopt a pluralist stance toward philosophical theories of scientific reasoning. (shrink)

Ontologies are some of the most central constructs in today's large plethora of knowledge technologies, namely in the context of the semantic web. As their coinage indicates, they are direct heirs to the ontological investigations in the long Western philosophical tradition, but it is not easy to make bridges between them. Contemporary ontological commitments often take causality as a central aspect for the ur-segregation of entities, especially in scientific upper ontologies; theories of causality and philosophical ontological investigations often go hand-in-hand, (...) and were essentially inseparable in medieval thought. This constitutes the foundation for a bridge, and this article analyzes the causality-based ontology of the late medieval philosopher Dietrich of Freiberg from the viewpoint of today's upper-ontology engineering. In this bridging attempt, it offers a translation into English of the first part of Dietrich's De origine (abbreviated title) that is a compromise between traditional scholarly translations of medieval Latin philosophical texts and contemporary ontology. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Why ‘Formal’ Semantics A Simple Fragment Categorial Languages Tense and Aspect Indices or Variables? Prepositional Attitudes and Situation Semantics.

"Logic", one of the central words in Western intellectual history, compre hends in its meaning such diverse things as the Aristotelian syllogistic, the scholastic art of disputation, the transcendental logic of the Kantian critique, the dialectical logic of Hegel, and the mathematical logic of the Principia Mathematica of Whitehead and Russell. The term "Formal Logic", following Kant is generally used to distinguish formal logical reasonings, precisely as formal, from the remaining universal truths based on reason. (Cf. SCHOLZ, (...) 1931). A text-book example of a formal-logical inference which from "Some men are philosophers" and "All philosophers are wise" concludes that "Some men are wise" is called formal, because the validity of this inference depends only on the form ofthe given sentences -in particular it does not depend on the truth or falsity of these sentences. (On the dependence of logic on natural language, English, for example, compare Section 1 and 8). The form of a sentence like "Some men are philosophers", is that which remains preserved when the given predicates, here "men" and "philosophers" are replaced by arbitrary ones. The form itself can thus be represented by replacing the given predicates by variables. Variables are signs devoid of meaning, which may serve merely to indicate the place where meaningful constants (here the predicates) are to be inserted. As variables we shall use - as did Aristotle - letters, say P, Q and R, as variables for predicates. (shrink)

The essays in this collection are the outgrowth of a workshop, held in June 1976, on formal approaches to the semantics and pragmatics of natural languages. They document in an astoundingly uniform way the develop ments in the formal analysis of natural languages since the late sixties. The avowed aim of the' workshop was in fact to assess the progress made in the application of formal methods to semantics, to confront different approaches to essentially the same problems (...) on the one hand, and, on the other, to show the way in relating semantic and pragmatic explanations of linguistic phenomena. Several of these papers can in fact be regarded as attempts to close the 'semiotic circle' by bringing together the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic properties of certain constructions in an explanatory framework thereby making it more than obvious that these three components of an integrated linguistic theory cannot be as neatly separated as one would have liked to believe. In other words, not only can we not elaborate a syntactic description of (a fragment of) a language and then proceed to the semantics (as Montague pointed out already forcefully in 1968), we cannot hope to achieve an adequate integrated syntax and semantics without paying heed to the pragmatic aspects of the constructions involved. The behavior of polarity items, 'quantifiers' like any, conditionals or even logical particles like and and or in non-indicative sentences is clear-cut evidence for the need to let each component of the grammar inform the other. (shrink)

Some recent scholars have argued that Spinoza's conception of causation should be understood in terms of the Aristotelian notion of a formal cause. I argue that while they are right to identify causation in Spinoza as a relation of entailment from an essence, they are mistaken about its philosophical pedigree. I examine three suggested lines of influence: (a) the late scholastic conception of emanation; (b) early modern philosophy of mathematics; and (c) Descartes's notion of the causa sui. In each (...) case, the evidence indicates that causation in Spinoza should be categorized in Aristotelian terms as efficient and not formal. (shrink)

Traditionally, logic has been the dominant formal method within philosophy. Are logical methods still dominant today, or have the types of formal methods used in philosophy changed in recent times? To address this question, we coded a sample of philosophy papers from the late 2000s and from the late 2010s for the formal methods they used. The results indicate that the proportion of papers using logical methods remained more or less constant over that time period but the (...) proportion of papers using probabilistic methods was approximately three times higher in the late 2010s than it was in the late 2000s. Further analyses explored this change by looking more closely at specific methods, specific levels of technical engagement, and specific subdisciplines within philosophy. These analyses indicate that the increasing proportion of papers using probabilistic methods was pervasive, not confined to particular probabilistic methods, levels of sophistication, or subdisciplines. (shrink)

From the hermeneutics of facticity to phenomenological destruction, Heidegger’s constant effort has been to achieve a non-metaphysical, pre-theoretical methodology of philosophy. His ideas finally lead to the development of the method of formal indication. In this essay, I will consider first the methodological function of historical things, in order to illustrate the method of destruction. Then, I will explain the definition of philosophy from the point of view of formal indication, thereby showing how different this method (...) is from traditional philosophical methods. Finally, I will analyse the importance of this transformation of methodology, in order to reveal in which sense a concrete universality is possible and how it contributes to the foundation of the ontology of life. (shrink)

No presente artigo são examinadas duas noções centrais da fenomenologia-hermenêutica apresentadas em Ser e tempo de Martin Heidegger: os conceitos de indicação formal e de possibilidade existencial. Ambas as noções são postas em conexão com a problemática da filosofia moral, ou seja, sustenta-se a tese de que um conceito existencial de moral contém problemas e uma metodologia específica, originados da indicação formal da estrutura ontológica do Dasein enquanto possibilidade existencial. O autor também afirma que a modificação existencial da (...) inautenticidade para o modo de ser autêntico não deve ser vista como sendo em si mesma de significação moral ou normativa, mas representa o desenvolvimento da individualidade no interior de um domínio de entes que não são instâncias de tipos.In this paper are examinated two central notions of hermeneutic phenomenology, exposed in Heidegger's Being and Time: the concepts of formal indication and existential possibility. Both notions are connected with the problematic of moral philosophy, that is, the author mantains that a existential concept of moral entails both a set of problems and a specific methodology, that arise from the formal indication of Dasein's ontological structure as existencial possibility. The author also asserts that the existential modification from inautenticity to the autentic way of being should not be viewed as bearing a moral or normativ meaning by it self, but represents the development of individuality within a realm of beings that are not instances of a type. (shrink)