Suppose a person blushes iff what she says is false and she says: ‘I am blushing’. If she blushes, she doesn’t, and if she doesn’t, she does. This Blushing Liar is a new paradox, similar in some respects to the Pinocchio Paradox : Pinocchio’s nose grows iff he says some falsity, and he says: ‘my nose is growing’. Both paradoxes involve physical properties, and both, supposedly, confirm the existence of metaphysical dialetheias. In the paper, we note first that while PP (...) relies on the rather implausible scenario of a wooden puppet whose nose grows iff he is lying, so it is debunked by the objection of fictionality, BL is more plausible. Many people in our world blush, and it is not difficult to imagine someone whose saying is causally related to blushing in a similar way. A second question is whether blushing can be directly connected to falsity, without deliberate conscience, on the part of the speaker, of saying a false statement. So we explore the consequences of intending ‘I am blushing’ as a ‘lie’, in the strict meaning of the term, and we claim there is no substantial difference, but for the fact that the paradoxical effect is even more plausible. Third, we check whether BL and PP do really release metaphysical dialetheias, and we argue they do not: they lack the fundamental requisite of Liar-like contradictions, i.e. the stratification of properties. (shrink)
My discussion addresses the differences between analytic and continental philosophy concerning the use of logic and exact reasoning in philosophical practice. These differences are mainly examined in the light of the controversial dominance of Hegel's concept of logic in twentieth-century continental philosophy. The inquiry is developed in two parts. In the first, I indicate some aspects of the analytic -continental divide, pointing to the role that the topic 'logic and philosophy' plays in it. In the second part, I give a (...) short account of the views of logic which are typical of the three main trends of continental philosophy. I also suggest how, with the aid of some typical analytical devices, some continental 'anti-logical' attitudes may be corrected, on their own terms. (shrink)
Over the course of his career, Gianni Vattimo has assumed a number of public and private identities and has pursued multiple intellectual paths. He seems to embody several contradictions, at once defending and questioning religion and critiquing and serving the state. Yet the diversity of his life and thought form the very essence of, as he sees it, the vocation and responsibility of the philosopher. In a world that desires quantifiable results and ideological expediency, the philosopher becomes the vital interpreter (...) of the endlessly complex. As he outlines his ideas about the philosopher's role, Vattimo builds an important companion to his life's work. He confronts questions of science, religion, logic, literature, and truth, and passionately defends the power of hermeneutics to engage with life's conundrums. Vattimo conjures a clear vision of philosophy as something separate from the sciences and the humanities but also intimately connected to their processes, and he explicates a conception of truth that emphasizes fidelity and participation through dialogue. (shrink)
Over the course of his career, Gianni Vattimo has assumed a number of public and private identities and has pursued multiple intellectual paths. He seems to embody several contradictions, at once defending and questioning religion and critiquing and serving the state. Yet the diversity of his life and thought form the very essence of, as he sees it, the vocation and responsibility of the philosopher. In a world that desires quantifiable results and ideological expediency, the philosopher becomes the vital interpreter (...) of the endlessly complex. As he outlines his ideas about the philosopher's role, Vattimo builds an important companion to his life's work. He confronts questions of science, religion, logic, literature, and truth, and passionately defends the power of hermeneutics to engage with life's conundrums. Vattimo conjures a clear vision of philosophy as something separate from the sciences and the humanities but also intimately connected to their processes, and he explicates a conception of truth that emphasizes fidelity and participation through dialogue. (shrink)
Contrariamente a quanto si dice, non esistono oggi “molte filosofie”, ma un unico benché multiforme orientamento scettico, che definisce - con gradi di maggiore o minore radicalità - la “razionalità minimale” all'opera in qualsiasi discorso filosofico. Al centro (o al cuore) di questa grande koiné scettica agisce profondamente, ma con effetti avvertibili, l'idea che sia difficile o impossibile afferrare, o riconoscere, o definire la verità. Ma è davvero così? In quale senso può essere vero che la verità non esiste, o (...) è indefinibile, ineffabile, inafferrabile? Il libro ricostruisce la storia di un solo enunciato, “la verità non esiste”, e delle sue traduzioni e parafrasi: dai sofisti e dagli antichi scettici fino a Nietzsche e alle teorie contemporanee sulla scomparsa della verità. È una storia controversa, fin da principio segnata dalla consapevolezza che a normali condizioni logiche non si può negare la verità: perché se è vero che la verità non esiste, allora almeno una verità esiste. La ricostruzione storica aiuta a capire che la verità è “innegabile” come altri concetti fondamentali della tradizione filosofica: come l'essere, il pensiero, il linguaggio. Cosí come non può essere vero che la verità non esiste, non si può pensare l'assenza di pensiero, e dire l'assenza di linguaggio. Ma esistono, essere, pensiero, verità, linguaggio? La tesi del libro è che non ci si può disfare della verità (esattamente come non ci si può disfare di altri concetti-fondamenti) se e in quanto si intende rimanere all'interno della filosofia, ossia di un discorso preliminare e generale (e in una certa misura libero e neutrale) su teorie, visioni della realtà, modi di dare conto della realtà. (shrink)
Abstract – In this paper I reconstruct the nature, origins and survivals of the divide between ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ tradition—the famous dualism which affected the development of philosophy in the second half of the XX century. I also present a theory of it, stressing that its intra-philosophical causes are to be found in the mutual resistance between critical (transcendental) and semantic (logical) approaches in philosophy. I conclude by noting that good philosophers (more or less knowingly) are and have always been (...) sensitive to the transcendental and logical aspects of the philosophical work. (shrink)
