F. Brencio (2023), Embodied Attention. A phenomenological hypothesis, in D. Stoyanov (Ed.), Contemporary Neuropsychiatry: Implications from Cognitive Neuroscience, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Cambridge, pp. 26-42.

_Abstract_: The overarching aim of this paper is to provide a comprehensive account of melancholic depression from the perspective of hermeneutic phenomenology. More specifically, we propose that this condition should be interpreted as an alteration in the intentional arc that affects corporeality, temporality, and spatiality, rather than as a mood disorder. In fact, classifying melancholic depression as a mood disorder seems a particularly poor choice; the mood disorder is not a cause but a consequence of a primary disturbance in operative (...) intentionality. Our paper comprises four sections: (1) We provide a methodological and conceptual framework for our theoretical work, adopting a hermeneutic phenomenological perspective on melancholic depression, and underlining the main differences between melancholia and depression. (2) We offer a detailed reconstruction of the different interpretations of melancholic depression and their relationships to the issue of temporality. (3) We analyze the disruption of intentionality in melancholic depression and how it affects corporeality and directionality. (4) We focus on the disruption of moods and affects in melancholic depression, observing how they shape subjective experience. The goal of this theoretical contribution is to underscore the role of operative intentionality and its disruptions in melancholic depression. We argue that taking elements such as intentionality, embodiment, and spatiality into consideration could help to direct therapies along more promising paths. _Keywords_: Melancholic Depression; Operative Intentionality; Corporeality; Directionality; Temporality; Mood Disorders _La depressione melancolica. Un’interpretazione fenomenologico-ermeneutica_ _Riassunto_: L’intento generale di questo contributo è di fornire un’interpretazione della depressione melancolica attraverso la fenomenologia ermeneutica. Più specificatamente, la nostra ipotesi è che questa condizione potrebbe essere interpretata come un’alterazione dell’arco intenzionale la quale impatta la corporeità, la temporalità e la spazialità, e non come un disordine dell’umore. Infatti, classificare la depressione melancolica come un disordine dell’umore ci sembra una scelta particolarmente limitata; il disordine dell’umore non è la causa ma la conseguenza di un disturbo a livello primario dell’intenzionalità operativa. Il nostro contributo si articola in quattro sezioni: nella prima, forniamo una cornice metodologica e concettuale finalizzata a chiarificare le fondamenta teoretiche del nostro lavoro, ad illustrare l’utilizzo della fenomenologia ermeneutica in riferimento alla depressione melancolica, e a sottolineare le differenze principali tra melancolia e depressione. Nella seconda sezione, ricostruiamo in modo dettagliato le diverse interpretazioni della depressione melancolica e la loro relazione con la temporalità. Nella terza sezione, analizziamo l’alterazione dell’intenzionalità nella depressione melancolica e come essa impatti sia la corporeità che la direzionalità. Infine, nell’ultima sezione ci concentriamo sull’alterazione degli stati umorali e della componente affettiva, osservando come questi elementi vadano a caratterizzare l’esperienza soggettiva. Il fine di questo contributo teoretico è di evidenziare il ruolo dell’intenzionalità operativa e delle sue alterazioni nella depressione melancolica. La nostra tesi è che prendere in considerazione alcuni elementi, come l’intenzionalità, l’embodiment e la spazialità, possa contribuire a delineare interventi terapeutici in modo più promettente. _Parole chiave_: Depressione melancolica; Intenzionalità operativa; Corporeità; Direzionalità; Temporalità; Disturbi dell’umore. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger has been one of the most influential but also criticized philosophers of the XX century. With Being and Time (1927) he sets apart his existential analytic from psychology as well as from anthropology and from the other human sciences that deny the ontological foundation, overcoming the Cartesian dualism in search of the ontological unit of an articulated multiplicity, as human being is. Heidegger’s Dasein Analytic defines the fundamental structures of Dasein such as being-in-the-world, a unitary structure that discloses (...) the worldhood of the world; the modes of being (Seinsweisen), such as fear (Furcht) and anxiety (Angst); and the relationship between existence and time. In his existential analytic, anxiety is one of the fundamental moods (Grundbefindlichkeit) and it plays a pivotal role in the relationship of Dasein with time and world. The paper firstly focuses on the modes of being, underling the importance of anxiety for the constitution of human being; secondly, it is shown the relationship between anxiety and world, and anxiety and time: rejecting both the Aristotelian description of time, as a sequence of moments that informs our common understanding of time, and the Augustine’s mental account of inner time, Heidegger considers temporality under a transcendental point of view. Temporality is ek-static, it is a process through which human being comes toward and back to itself, letting itself encounter the world and the entities. The transcendental interpretation of time provided by Heidegger may give its important contribution in psychopathology. (shrink)

Ludwig Binswanger has been one of the first psychiatrists who used in his medical approach the Daseinsanalyse of Martin Heidegger in order to understand the mental disorders of his patients. However, as it is well-known, one of the most critical interlocutor of Binswanger was Heidegger himself. Rebuilding the controversial case of Ellen West and the relationship between Heidegger and Binswanger on the ground of analysis of human being, the aim of this paper is to verify if Heidegger’s approach can give (...) to psychoanalysis and psychiatry its most radical re-orientation by providing a new paradigm for understanding human being and the pathologies of existence. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper aims to rebuild the relationship between the Seinsfrage and Catholicism in Heidegger’s meditation and to shed light on his critique to Christianity as a philosophical necessity rooted in his broader critique of modernity in the context of the Black Notebooks. In order to reach these purposes, this contribution will be articulated in two parts: in the first one, I will rebuild Heidegger’s relationship to Catholicism and in the second one, I will focus on Black Notebooks as important tools (...) in understanding Heidegger’s critique to Catholicism, a critique that is built on three levels: historical, speculative and political. The essay will show how the Schwarze Hefte illuminate Heidegger’s attempts to answer the question of Being in an incessant tension with the coeval seven major treatises on the Seinsgeschichte, in which Christianity, metaphysics and nihilism are inextricably tied together. (shrink)

Through this contribution I aim to explore the horizons and limits of digital medicine in light of an embodied approach to the issue of care. I will sketch the historical background of digital medicine and show the contemporary status of this interdisciplinary field, as well as its applications and outcomes. Then, I will address a critique of the computational theory of mind (CTM) upon which many contemporary mental health apps are designed. This approach to the mind is inscribed into the (...) modern trend of neuromania, which conceives the embodied, living human being as a mere series of data analyses and algorithms, with the brain as the seat of the person. Drawing on continental philosophy and classical phenomenology I will develop a notion of health conceived as a moral enterprise, showing how wellbeing and vitality are not reducible to a product made by technologies or doctors, but rather they are the results of an embodied encounter. As such, empathy and person-centered care cannot be achieved by digital medicine. They are the result of a journey into the regions of recognition, embodied presence and the aliveness constituting the person. Finally, I will show how the issue of care cannot be separated from an embodied encounter between people, especially in case of dementia. (shrink)

F. Brencio (2023), Quel che resta delle cose. Riccardo de Biase lettore di Heidegger, in G. Giannini, P. Marangolo, M. Papa (eds.), Segni. Studi in memoria di Riccardo De Biase, TAB Edizioni, Roma 2023, pp. 171-182, ISBN: 978-88-9295-769-5.

F. Brencio (2022), «…this phenomenon, which is none too happily designated as ‘empathy’». Martin Heidegger’s critique of empathy, in “Bollettino Filosofico”, 37, 243-251, ISSN: 1593 – 7178, E-ISSN 2035 - 2670.

This paper defends the idea that alterations in social perception of people with epilepsy may be crucial in the development of co-morbidities, involving a circular and mutual relationship between the person and her/his social environment, between the self and the world. We aim at exploring the role of these processes in psychopathological phenomena in people with epilepsy. Through a phenomenological and enactive account of intersubjectivity and the model of circular causality, enriched with interviews conducted with people with epilepsy, we develop (...) the hypothesis that the originary domain of a person’s experience with epilepsy expands and modifies the fundamental interrogation of the sense of self. Furthermore, we observe how disturbances in the dynamical coupling and coordination among agents may contribute to psychopathological phenomena, and to changes in intersubjectivity and social perception. (shrink)

F. Brencio (2021) [in Italian and English] (ed.), Dal corpo oggetto alla mente incarnata - From the object body to the embodied mind, in “InCircolo – Rivista di Filosofia e Culture”, 11, ISSN 2531-4092.

As a fundamental feature of our existence, melancholy is an inescapable characteristic of our ontological constitution. However, there is a distance between the clinical condition of melancholia and the human feeling, the capacity to feel sorrow and nostalgia. In this sense, melancholy and melancholia are similar but different. During the XIX century just few among philosophers have tried to described melancholy in terms of disorder, using philosophical tools rather than clinical definitions, drifting the accent from melancholy to melancholia. Hegel has (...) been one of them, one that has seen inside the depth of human being in order to understand and describe what is the “the nocturnal point of the contraction”: melancholia, in terms of clinical condition. The philosophical exploration of madness and its parameters is essentially an ontological project: this is how Hegel addresses “the Concept of derangement in general” and melancholia in particular, anticipating most of Freud’s consideration on this topic. (shrink)

The problem of names of illnesses is both a problem of words and values that should address not only the classification of disorders, but also a fundamental question both for medical sciences and humanities: can psychiatric nosology and classifications fit with the ontological constitution of human beings? This paper aims to discuss the so-called “psychiatric object” and its language and it intends to provide a hermeneutical-phenomenological account to mental health. In doing so, the paper will firstly examine the “psychiatric object” (...) and its language; secondly, it will show the difference between taxonomy and ontology, both of interest for the psychiatric object; third, it will insist on the critique of the epistemological status of psychiatry conceived from a natural point of view following three main paths: a metaphysical one (Heidegger, Jaspers), a social one (Szasz, Foucault, Basaglia), and an ethical one (Laing). Finally, it will clarify why phenomenology and in particular hermeneutical-phenomenology can illuminate the understanding of the psychiatric object and its implications in a cultural context, in order to achieve a more humanistic psychiatry. (shrink)

Thomas Fuchs’ most recent work is a book of questioning and resistance. It questions the image of humankind in our age, asking whether or not we are going to surrender to an image of the human as c...

Philosophy is one of the disciplines that can more adequately provide a contribution to the definition of the focus and limits of psychiatry in the definition of human being. Substantial, comprehensive contributions to this field come from Martin Heidegger, one of the most prominent and seminal philosophers of the 20th century. During the 50's the Italian psychiatrist Franco Basaglia comes up with the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and he gains the concept of human being as’Being-in-the- world’, central point in every (...) relationship with the others.’Being-in-the-world’ is not a merely spatial relation with ourselves and the others, but is the fundamental meaning of human existence and of the Care. The Care is not only a medical concept but also an ontological and ethical one: overcrossing the concept of empathy, Heidegger argues that all objectifying representations of a capsule-like psyche, subject, person, ego or consciousness in psychology and psychopathology must be abandoned in favor of a new understanding of human being, starting from its ontological characters:’Being-in-the-world’,’Being-with-the-others’ and’Being-toward-death’. (shrink)

Around 1930, Martin Heidegger approached Hölderlin’s poetry, welcoming his solicitations and hints in order to redeem the experience of the usage of language after the linguistic interruption of Being and Time that showed him the poverty of metaphysical language. Linguistic poverty is closely linked to metaphysical poverty and to the historical and destiny-related impossibility to grasp Being. From the 1930s onwards, the issue concerning the sense of Being becomes for Heidegger an issue concerning the sense of language. Heidegger appears to (...) be “employing” Hölderlin, subordinating his philosophical intuitions to the gears of ontology. Thus, in Heidegger’s meditations, Hölderlin’s merit is outlined as the intuition of the outcome of Western metaphysics in terms of the extreme oblivion of Being and the rambling of thinking, foreseeing the end of an era and introducing the dawn of a second beginning: the one of poetizing thinking. (shrink)

Conceptually, recognition claims a cardinal role in many prominent philosophical theories. Kant, in the Critique of Pure Reason, uses the German word Rekognition—a term that in many ways has no antecedent in prior tradition—to signify the identification, the grasping of, a unified meaning through thought. However, it is through Hegel that a substantial step in practical philosophy is taken, and recognition is put into dialogue with self-consciousness and freedom. Hegel uses the German word Anerkennung, in the period of Jena Realphilosophie, (...) to mean the "real" actualization of freedom through a struggle which leads to two different levels of recognition: legal and moral—their forms constituted by love... (shrink)

This paper aims to pursue two goals: first, it will explore the encounter and dialogue between Martin Heidegger’s thinking toward medicine, and in particular, psychiatry. Second, it will look toward understanding how this encounter can illuminate clinical practices and provide significant contributions within the fields of medical education and healthcare. The broader horizon of this paper is to underline how embracing a different approach to health can be of interest to both a medical and philosophical audience, inviting the former to (...) progress in their scientific skills and de-personalize texts toward a more genuine and humanistic encounter with patients, while also engendering the latter to leave the dark and dusty halls of metaphysical thinking to move into the greener pastures of the social dimension. (shrink)

The aim of my paper is to show that the issue of death is central in Hegel’s philosophy and it has a strong relationship with the notion of negativity, which is not intended as a “trick” of the system, but as a moment of life, that is a central concept in his meditation. At a later stage, I will shed light on the inner teleology into every organic nature, understanding that this allows Hegel to preserve the notion of negativity through (...) the concept of “lacking” being (die Tätigkeit des Mangels). In this sense, the strive to connect Philosophy of Nature and Logic shows that in the Hegelian system there is no place for the “long night of nothingness”, but only for the Life that becomes Spirit: the promise of philosophy is the path the lead from the deepest desperation to the strongest Hope. (shrink)