Este artículo reseña: Massimo La Torre. Nostra Legge è la Libertà. Anarchismo dei Moderni. Roma : Derive Approdi, 2017.

En este trabajo intento exponer las tesis de Sen sobre las características que demandamos a una teoría satisfactoria de la justicia, y sus críticas al modelo «trascendental» de teoría, que según él es lo que Rawls persigue. Según Sen, este modelo es inaceptable por ser inalcanzable e innecesario; lo que en nuestra práctica argumentativa intentamos lograr son juicios comparativos entre situaciones reales, y no sistemas completos de proposiciones acerca de ideales de la sociedad justa. Intentaré argumentar que el enfoque metaético (...) de Sen es débil por dos razones: no ofrece una reconstrucción adecuada de la teoría de Rawls, equivocándose sobre su carácter «completo», y no explica de qué manera los juicios comparativos de valor entre dos situaciones sociales no sean el resultado de una teoría «trascendental» de la justicia. Me propongo, entonces, solucionar el problema, presentando una mirada trascendental de las cuestiones de justicia, pero, al mismo tiempo, pluralista e incompleta. (shrink)

This paper puts under scrutiny Martha Nussbaum’s turn to political liberalism. In this paper, I intend to shed light on two problems that Nussbaum must face when she try to follow Rawls’ idea of political liberalism. First of all, I would like to show the limits of application of the technique of “overlapping consensus”. I try to argue that Nussbaum fails to prove that we can attain a universal list of political values (such as a list of primary goods) through (...) an “overlapping consensus”. By contrast she cannot avoid Rawls’ limitation of “overlapping consensus” to communities already ruled by liberal institutions. Secondly, I question Nussbaum’s “political liberal attitude” when she faces difficult issues such as non-discrimination inside religious institutions. I try to show that in this case Nussbaum’s arguments are weak because they are based on a clear-cut distinction between public and private realms. Yet, such a clear-cut distinction is practically impossible in liberal political communities. We cannot but argue about the boundaries between public spheres and private domains. (shrink)

This paper examines the distinction drawn by Amartya Sen between transcendental and comparative theories of justice, and its application to Rawls' doctrine. It then puts forward three arguments. First, it is argued that Sen offers a limited portrayal of Rawls' doctrine. This is the result of a rhetorical strategy that depicts Rawlsian doctrine as more “transcendental” than it really is. Although Sen deploys numerous quotations in support of his interpretation, it is possible to offer a less transcendental interpretation of Rawls. (...) Second, the dichotomy between transcendental and comparative approaches to questions of justice is partly misleading, insofar as any plausible moral doctrine has both transcendental and comparative elements. Transcendental elements are necessary to avoid the confusion between the general acceptance of a norm, value or principle and its justification. A comparative view highlights the conditions of application of the doctrine to the real world, taking into account the possibility of moral dilemmas, evaluative disagreements and limited resources, while proposing possible provisos and caveats to the risk of the doctrine being self‐defeating. Third, although the transcendental approach is useful, it is argued that in elaborating this dichotomy Sen overlooks the merits of the third way between comparative and transcendental doctrines, what he calls “conglomerate theory,” and also the possibility that his doctrine (the capability approach) might be considered as an example of such a theory. The paper concludes with the argument that conglomerate theory does not aim to produce complete moral orderings, but rather a comparative approach with transcendental elements, as a form of weak transcendentalism. (shrink)