Der Band verzeichnet erstmals sämtliche Werke und Noten aus Nietzsches persönlicher Bibliothek (BN) bis Anfang Januar 1889. Er listet sowohl die Bestände der Herzogin Anna Amalia Bibliothek als auch die des Goethe- und Schiller-Archivs in Weimar auf. Die kritische Analyse anderer Bestandslisten ermittelte zudem zahlreiche heute nicht mehr vorhandene Titel. Ferner wurden sämtliche Bücherrechnungen und -quittungen von Buchhändlern und Buchbindern ausgewertet, die im Goethe- und Schiller-Archiv aufbewahrt werden. Neben den ca. 2.200 Titeln aus Nietzsches rekonstruierter Bibliothek enthält der Band auch (...) ein Verzeichnis sämtlicher 'Lesespuren' Nietzsches (ca. 20.000), z.B. Anmerkungen, Unterstreichungen und Eselsohren. Ergänzt durch zahlreiche Faksimile-Reproduktionen sowie durch philosophische, historische und bibliographische Einführungen, stellt der Band ein unverzichtbares Arbeitsinstrument jeder zukünftigen Nietzsche-Forschung dar. (shrink)

In this paper I propose a reconstruction of the onto-cosmological perspective of Plato’s Timaeus and suggest an interpretation of it in the light of some contemporary approaches to ontology and logic, i.e. “ontological sequentialism” and “fuzzy logic”, attempting to use the categories and language of present-day ontology and logic to examine from a different point of view some aspects of the Timaeus onto-cosmology and of its logical scaffolding.

The purpose of this paper is to examine heraclitean fragments evoking the metaphor of rivers and waters flowing, usually associated by tradition to the image of reality in becoming and the conception of nature as a more or less disordered streaming. These fragments are certainly among the most celebrated and lucky fragments of the philosopher of Ephesus, which can be explained by the fact that they have been used since Plato and Aristotle, to represent in an exemplary way the philosophical (...) perspective of Heraclitus. These are the three fragments which appear in the collection of Diels and Kranz under the numbers 12, 49a and 91, and correspond, in the edition of Marcovich to the numbers 40, 40c2 and 40c3. This mere indication brings out the problem that should be given priority review with regard to the three mentioned fragments, this is the one of their authenticity. Admitted by Diels and Kranz and by a certain number of scholars, among which stands out Mouraviev, it is rejected, with respect fragments 49a and 91 DK [40c2 and 40c3 Marcovich] by other commentators, and primarily by Marcovich for whom, as suggested by the numbering that adopted itself, should be considered as mere reminiscences of the fragments 12 DK [40 Marcovich], the only authentic. (shrink)

Cet article propose une reconstruction du débat sur la nature du plaisir qui eut lieu dans l’ancienne Académie à partir du témoignage d’Aristote dans l’ Éthique à Nicomaque. Ce sont notamment les positions attribuées à Eudoxe et Speusippe qu’Aristote discute et critique dans la perspective da sa propre conception du plaisir. La présentation d’Aristote est ensuite mise en relation avec le Philèbe, qui rapporte vraisemblablement le point de vue de Platon sur ce débat et sa version des différents arguments que (...) les protagonistes développèrent. (shrink)

In this paper I examine G. R. Carone's interpretation of the mind-body problem in late Plato, published in a recent issue of this review. Against Carone's attempt to attribute Plato with a reductionist thesis, whereby the soul can be reduced to the body, I argue that a careful reading of the Timaeus confirms that Plato held a dualist thesis, the soul consisting of an incorporeal substance which cannot be reduced to the corporeal substance the body consists of.

In this paper I discuss the problem of the meanings of the verb ‘be’ in Plato’s Timaeus. My claim is that, at least in that dialogue, existence emerges as the main and autonomous meaning of the verb ‘be’, contrary to the widespread view first defended in a series of studies by Charles Kahn according to which, in the Greek language and in Plato’s philosophy, the verb ‘be’ basically has a copulative-predicative and, more specifically, a truth-related meaning. I consider and examine (...) some passages from the Timaeus (27d5–28a4, 29b3–c3, 37e3–38b3, 51b7–52a7) where the concept of existence seems to be expressed in a clear and definite way by the use of the verb ‘be.’ I conclude by making some remarks on how we should understand the notion of existence, not least with reference to the problem of truth, within Plato’s philosophy and the Timaeus in particular. (shrink)

Dans cet article je propose un examen de la lecture traditionnelle du fr. B3 de Parménide (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι), qui suppose une « identité » forte entre penser et être, pour lui préférer l’hypothèse d’une « correspondance » de ce qui est pensable et de ce qui est. Ces considérations me conduisent a défendre une traduction du fr. B3, qui me paraît la moins anachronique: « c’est en effet une seule et même chose que l’on (...) pense et qui est ». Je m’interroge ensuite sur le sens du verbe νοεῖν et des termes apparentés dans le Poème de Parménide (particulièrement dans le fr. B4). Je présente trois options d’interprétation du νοεῖν : 1. comme connaissance purement intellectuelle de l’être vrai (c’est à dire de l’intelligible) ; 2. comme connaissance discursive ou « véritative » qui concerne donc la vérité ou la fausseté d’une proposition ; 3. comme capacité de « réaliser une situation », de « reconnaître » quelque chose ou quelqu’un, en supposant un sens d’« être » qui vise la simple constatation de l’être des choses et du monde sensible. (shrink)

Plato's Republic continues to arouse intense controversy among commentators, both for its ethical and political project and for its psychological, epistemological, and ontological implications for the knowledge of philosophers, who, says Plato, should be set as guides for such a project. Considering just a few examples from recent years, we might recall that a new critical edition of the dialogue has been published 1 that contains significant innovations both in the text and in the attribution of lines to speakers. Moreover, (...) this new edition has been accompanied by a volume of philological commentary edited by the same author. 2 Numerous translations in the main modern languages have also been published with a more or less detailed apparatus of notes. 3 An equally significant quantity of works of commentary, individual or miscellaneous, of extremely varied origin and composition has appeared, from the monumental work coordinated by M. Vegetti , to the volumes of O. Höffe , E. N. Ostenfeld , S. Sayers , R. Gutiérrez , B. Mitchell and J. R. Lucas , S. Rosen , M. Dixsaut , G. Santas , and G. R. F. Ferrari . Just this brief indication of the mass of philological, historical, and philosophical studies suggests the constant—and constantly renewed—appeal of a dialogue that is rightly considered as one of the most influential and representative of Plato's thought. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Plato’s onto-cosmological conception in the Timaeus, trying to find out how many principles or set of principles are established in Timaeus’ description of the constitution of kosmos. The intelligible model, the sensible copy, the receptacle and the demiurge: these are the different kinds of the things that are and the agents of their relations. But it is not clear at all if this perspective can be represented as a form of monism, dualism or anything else.

Questo articolo discute un aspetto specifico della teoria causale di Plotino, ossia la critica che egli rivolge alla funzione della causa finale nella sua spiegazione della struttura e della generazione della realtà a partire dal principio primo situato al suo culmine. A tale fine, sono esaminati i capitoli 1-3 e 25 del trattato VI 7 delle Enneadi, in cui la questione della causa finale è posta con chiarezza, innanzitutto nel quadro di una lettura e di un’interpretazione del racconto cosmologico del (...) Timeo di Platone e del ruolo che assume il demiurgo in questo racconto, quindi nel quadro di una critica della concezione aristotelica del primo motore immobile come fine ultimo di tutte le cose. (shrink)

This paper suggests a new proposal of translation and interpretation of Heraclitus’ fragment 41 D.-K., with reference to his conception of σοφία, which is aimed to an explanation of everything.

A dare avvio all’esame condotto nel Sofista è la richiesta di Socrate di apprendere dallo straniero di Elea come giudicare e come chiamare il sofista, il politico e il filosofo, se vadano considerati come un’unica figura, come due oppure tre diverse, in modo da distinguere tante figure quanti sono i nomi loro attribuiti. Ciò che dunque Socrate chiede allo straniero è, almeno in senso generale, una definizione del sofista, del politico e del filosofo, con l’illustrazione delle loro rispettive competenze.

In this article, I wish to present and discuss some Heideggerian theses concerning the notions of “being,” “presence” and “truth” in Plato’s dialogues, taking as a point of departure Heidegger’s course on Plato’s Sophist given in Marburg in 1924–1925. My aim is to show that the fundamental philosophical link that unites them makes it possible to better understand seemingly obscure aspects of the Platonic conception of being and knowledge as it is presented in particular in the concluding pages of Republic (...) V, to which this article is therefore essentially devoted. (shrink)

This article examines the problem of the status of the different degrees of being that Plato, in the Timaeus, seems to attribute to the different kinds of reality that he distinguishes. In what sense and under what conditions is it possible to state that the intelligible forms, the sensible things and the spatial and material substratum of the chora “are” and “exist”?

Je propose dans cet article un examen des fragments 31, 90 et 64+65+66 DK (53ab, 54 et 79+55+82 Marcovich) d’Héraclite, pour en tirer une présentation et une interprétation d’ensemble du rôle et de la fonction du feu par rapport aux autres éléments naturels dans la constitution d’une « cosmologie » dans la pensée héraclitéenne.

Francesco Fronterotta | : La psychologie platonicienne de la République semble être affectée par une contradiction en relation avec la thèse de la tripartition de l’âme. Celle-ci est esquissée dans le livre IV et est toujours présente dans les livres VIII et IX ; Socrate semble pourtant l’abandonner lorsque, dans le livre X, il introduit la thèse selon laquelle l’âme est une réalité double, et peu après parvient, dans la suite du livre X, à démontrer son immortalité, en la décrivant (...) comme une réalité simple, unique et unitaire. J’essaierai de montrer que ces changements de perspective dépendent du point de vue assumé par Platon dans son traitement de la nature et de la fonction de l’âme, dans les contextes que j’appellerai « génétiques », c’est-à-dire là où l’analyse touche à la question du statut ontologique de l’âme, et dans les contextes que j’appellerai « opérationnels », c’est-à-dire lorsque ce sont les fonctions, les compétences et les motivations de l’âme dans sa direction du corps qui font l’objet de l’analyse. | : There is a seeming contradiction in the Republic in Plato’s psychology of the tripartite soul, which is dealt with in Book IV and which recurs in Books VIII and IX. Socrates seems to retract this view when in Book X he introduces the theory that the soul is actually dual, and then later in the same Book demonstrates its immortality, presenting it in this case as something simple, single and unitary. I shall try to show how this see-sawing depends on the different point of view that Plato takes when he deals with the nature and the function of the soul, respectively in the “genetic” contexts, where his examination touches directly on the question of the soul’s ontological status, and the “operative” contexts, when what is being analysed are the functions, scope and motivations of the soul that intervene in its action of controlling the body. (shrink)