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  1.  29
    Establishments as Material rather than Immaterial Objects.Frank A. Hindriks - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (4):835-840.
    ABSTARCT When people go shopping, they enter a building. But the shop cannot be identified with the building, because it would remain the same shop if it moved to another building or if it became an e-store. Daniel Korman [2019] uses these two observations to argue that establishments are immaterial objects. However, all that follows is that establishments are not buildings. I argue that establishments are organisations or corporate agents that are constituted by people. This entails that they are material (...)
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  2.  37
    Establishments as Material rather than Immaterial Objects.Frank A. Hindriks - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (4):835-840.
    ABSTARCT When people go shopping, they enter a building. But the shop cannot be identified with the building, because it would remain the same shop if it moved to another building or if it became an e-store. Daniel Korman [2019] uses these two observations to argue that establishments are immaterial objects. However, all that follows is that establishments are not buildings. I argue that establishments are organisations or corporate agents that are constituted by people. This entails that they are material (...)
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  3. A modest solution to the problem of rule-following.Frank A. Hindriks - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (1):65-98.
    A modest solution to the problem(s) of rule-following is defended against Kripkensteinian scepticism about meaning. Even though parts of it generalise to other concepts, the theory as a whole applies to response-dependent concepts only. It is argued that the finiteness problem is not nearly as pressing for such concepts as it may be for some other kinds of concepts. Furthermore, the modest theory uses a notion of justification as sensitivity to countervailing conditions in order to solve the justification problem. Finally, (...)
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  4.  82
    Acceptance-dependence: A social kind of response-dependence.Frank A. Hindriks - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):481–498.
    Neither Johnston's nor Wright's account of response-dependence offers a complete picture of response-dependence, as they do not apply to all concepts that are intrinsically related to our mental responses. In order to (begin to) remedy this situation, a new conception of response-dependence is introduced that I call "acceptance-dependence". This account applies to concepts such as goal, constitutional, and money, the first two of which have mistakenly been taken to be response-dependent in another sense. Whereas on Johnston's and Wright's accounts response-dependent (...)
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  5.  35
    Institutional Facts and the Naturalistic Fallacy.Frank A. Hindriks - 2002 - ProtoSociology 16:170-192.
    In 1964 Searle argued against the naturalistic fallacy thesis that an ought-statement can in fact be derived from is-statements. From an analysis of this argument and of Searle’s social ontology of 1995 – which includes a full-blown theory of institutional facts – I conclude that this argument is unsound on his own (later) terms. The conclusion that can now be drawn from Searle’s argument is that social or institutional obligations are epistemically objective even though they are observer-dependent. I go on (...)
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