56 found
Order:
  1.  11
    Is Evidence Normative?Frank Hofmann - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (2):1-18.
    This paper defends the view that in a certain sense evidence is normative. Neither a bit of evidence nor the fact that it is evidence for a certain proposition is a normative fact, but it is still the case that evidence provides normative reason for belief. An argument for the main thesis will be presented. It will rely on evidentialist norms of belief and a Broomean conception of normative reasons. Two important objections will be discussed, one from A. Steglich-Petersen on (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2.  76
    Three Kinds of Reliabilism.Frank Hofmann - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):59 - 80.
    I distinguish between three kinds of reliabilism for epistemic justification, namely, pure reliabilism, evidential reliabilism, and reasons reliabilism, and I argue for reasons reliabilism. Pure reliabilism and evidential reliabilism are plagued, most importantly, by the generality problem, and they cannot deal adequately with defeater phenomena. One can avoid these problems only by jettisoning the idea of process reliability. The truth connection ? which is essential for any kind of reliabilism ? has to be provided in an altogether different way, namely, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  3.  44
    Norm Reasons and Evidentialism.Frank Hofmann & Christian Piller - 2019 - Analysis 79 (2):202-206.
    It has been argued by Clayton Littlejohn that cases of insufficient evidence provide an argument against evidentialism. He distinguishes between evidential reasons and norm-reasons, but this distinction can be accepted by evidentialists, as we argue. Furthermore, evidentialists can acknowledge the existence of norm-reasons stemming from an epistemic norm, like the norm that one should not believe a proposition if one has only insufficient evidence for it. An alternative interpretation of evidentialism according to which it rejects the existence of norm-reasons is (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4.  65
    Gettier For Justification.Frank Hofmann - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3):305-318.
    I will present a problem for any externalist evidentialism that allows for accidental possession of evidence. There are Gettier cases for justification. I will describe two such cases – cases involving veridical hallucination. An analysis of the cases is given, along the lines of virtue epistemology . The cases show that certain externalist evidentialist accounts of justification do not provide sufficient conditions. The reason lies in the fact that one can be luckily in possession of evidence, and then one will (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  5. In Defence of Metaphysical Analyticity.Frank Hofmann & Joachim Horvath - 2008 - Ratio 21 (3):300-313.
    According to the so-called metaphysical conception of analyticity, analytic truths are true in virtue of meaning (or content) alone and independently of (extralinguistic) facts. Quine and Boghossian have tried to present a conclusive argument against the metaphysical conception of analyticity. In effect, they tried to show that the metaphysical conception inevitably leads into a highly implausible view about the truthmakers of analytic truths. We would like to show that their argument fails, since it relies on an ambiguity of the notion (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  6. Intuitions, Concepts, and Imagination.Frank Hofmann - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):529-546.
    Recently, a new movement of philosophers, called 'experimental philosophy', has suggested that the philosophers' favored armchair is in flames. In order to assess some of their claims, it is helpful to provide a theoretical background against which we can discuss whether certain facts are, or could be, evidence for or against a certain view about how philosophical intuitions work and how good they are. In this paper, I will be mostly concerned with providing such a theoretical background, and I will (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  7.  95
    Truthmaking, Recombination, and Facts Ontology.Frank Hofmann - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (2):409-440.
    The idea of truthmakers is important for doing serious metaphysics, since a truthmaker principle can give us important guidance in finding out what we would like to include into our ontology. Recently, David Lewis has argued against Armstrong’s argument that a plausible truthmaker principle requires us to accept facts. I would like to take a close look at the argument. I will argue in detail that the Humean principle of recombination on which Lewis relies is not plausible (independently of the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  8. Introspective Self-Knowledge of Experience and Evidence.Frank Hofmann - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (1):19-34.
    The paper attempts to give an account of the introspective self-knowledge of our own experiences which is in line with representationalism about phenomenal consciousness and the transparency of experience. A two-step model is presented. First, a demonstrative thought of the form ‚I am experiencing this’ is formed which refers to what one experiences, by means of attention. Plausibly, this thought is knowledge, since safe. Second, a non-demonstrative thought of the form ‚I am experiencing a pain’ occurs. This second self-ascription is (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  9.  14
    E = K and Non-Epistemic Perception.Frank Hofmann - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (3):307-331.
    Quite plausibly, epistemic justification and rationality is tied to possession of evidence. According to Williamson, one’s evidence is what one knows. This is not compatible with non-epistemic perception, however, since non-epistemic perception does not require belief in what one perceives and, thus, does not require knowledge of the evidence – and, standardly, knowledge does require belief. If one non-epistemically perceives a piece of evidence, this can be sufficient for possessing it as evidence. Williamson’s arguments for the necessity of belief will (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10.  59
    The Structuring Causes of Behavior: Has Dretske Saved Mental Causation?Frank Hofmann & Peter Schulte - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (3):267-284.
    Fred Dretske’s account of mental causation, developed in Explaining Behavior and defended in numerous articles, is generally regarded as one of the most interesting and most ambitious approaches in the field. According to Dretske, meaning facts, construed historically as facts about the indicator functions of internal states, are the structuring causes of behavior. In this article, we argue that Dretske’s view is untenable: On closer examination, the real structuring causes of behavior turn out to be markedly different from Dretske’s meaning (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  11.  34
    Could Robots Be Phenomenally Conscious?Frank Hofmann - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3):1-12.
    In a recent book, Michael Tye argues that we have reason to attribute phenomenal consciousness to functionally similar robots like commander Data of Star Trek. He relies on a kind of inference to the best explanation – ‘Newton’s Rule’, as he calls it. I will argue that Tye’s liberal view of consciousness attribution fails for two reasons. First, it leads into an inconsistency in consciousness attributions. Second, and even more importantly, it fails because ceteris is not paribus. The big, categorical (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12.  54
    Epistemic Means and Ends: In Defense of Some Sartwellian Insights.Frank Hofmann - 2005 - Synthese 146 (3):357-369.
    The question of what means-and-ends structure our epistemic endeavors have is an important issue in recent epistemology, and is fundamental for understanding epistemic matters in principle. Crispin Sartwell has proposed arguments for the view that knowledge is our only ultimate goal, and justification is no part of it. An important argument is his instrumentality argument which is concerned with the conditions under which something could belong to our ultimate epistemic goal. Recently, this argument has been reconstructed and criticized by Pierre (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  13.  2
    Could Robots Be Phenomenally Conscious?Frank Hofmann - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3):579-590.
    In a recent book, Michael Tye argues that we have reason to attribute phenomenal consciousness to functionally similar robots like commander Data of Star Trek. He relies on a kind of inference to the best explanation – ‘Newton’s Rule’, as he calls it. I will argue that Tye’s liberal view of consciousness attribution fails for two reasons. First, it leads into an inconsistency in consciousness attributions. Second, and even more importantly, it fails because ceteris is not paribus. The big, categorical (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14. Causal Powers, Realization, and Mental Causation.Frank Hofmann - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):173 - 182.
    Sydney Shoemaker has attempted to save mental causation by a new account of realization. As Brian McLaughlin argues convincingly, the account has to face two major problems. First, realization does not guarantee entailment. So even if mental properties are realized by physical properties, they need not be entailed by them. This is the first, rather general metaphysical problem. A second problem, which relates more directly to mental causation is that Shoemaker must appeal to some kind of proportionality as a constraint (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  15.  70
    Non‐Conceptual Knowledge.Frank Hofmann - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):184-208.
    The paper is an investigation into the prospects of an epistemology of non-conceptual knowledge. According to the orthodox view, knowledge requires concepts and belief. I present several arguments to the effect that there is non-conceptual, non-doxastic knowledge, the obvious candidate for such knowledge being non-conceptual perception. Non-conceptual perception seems to be allowed for by cognitive scientists and it exhibits the central role features of knowledge—it plays the knowledge role: it respects an anti-luck condition, it is an achievement, it enables one (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16.  24
    Die Rolle des Wissens und des Wissensbegriffs in der Erkenntnistheorie.Frank Hofmann - 2002 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 56 (1):125 - 131.
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  17.  33
    Temporally Localised Facts and the Problem of Intrinsic Change.Frank Hofmann - 2005 - Ratio 18 (1):39–47.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18. Anatomie der Subejktivität.Thomas Grundmann, Catrin Misselhorn, Frank Hofmann & Veronique Zanetti (eds.) - 2005 - suhrkamp.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19.  58
    An Alternative to Endurantism and Perdurantism: Doing Without Occupants.Frank Hofmann - 2009 - In Ludger Honnefelder, Benedikt Schick & Edmund Runggaldier (eds.), Unity and Time in Metaphysics. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 134.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20.  67
    Besires and the Weakness of Will Argument.Frank Hofmann - manuscript
    Can there be a state which is both a belief and a desire? More exactly, a state which is a belief that p and a desire that q, where p and q may be the same proposition or a different one? Such a state would be a ‘besire’. So a first question is the general question whether besires are possible. Normative attitudes would be good candidates for besires. For example, if Sandra has the normative attitude that it would be best (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Über die Natur von Tatsachen.Frank Hofmann - 2005 - Philosophia Naturalis 42 (2):313-340.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Concepts. [REVIEW]Frank Hofmann - 2001 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 55 (1).
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Consciousness Revisited. Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts. [REVIEW]Frank Hofmann - 2011 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 65 (1).
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24.  16
    Discussion Note on The Rationality of Perception.Frank Hofmann & Andy Orlando - 2019 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 96 (2):265-272.
    In The Rationality of Perception, Susanna Siegel defends the claim that beliefs can influence our perceptions. Faulty beliefs make our experiences irrational. This explains why the biases some people hold are so tenacious. The authors point out weaknesses in Siegel’s argument.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Die Rolle von Wissen in der Erkenntnistheorie - Ein Kommentar zu Ansgar Beckermann.Frank Hofmann - 2002 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 56 (1).
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26.  5
    Evolution and Ethics: No Streetian Debunking of Moral Realism.Frank Hofmann - 2018 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):417-432.
    This paper is concerned with the reconstruction of a core argument that can be extracted from Street’s ‘Darwinian Dilemma’ and that is intended to ‘debunk’ moral realism by appeal to evolution. The argument, which is best taken to have the form of an undermining defeater argument, fails, I argue. A simple, first formulation is rejected as a non sequitur, due to not distinguishing between the evolutionary process that influences moral attitudes and the cognitive system generating moral attitudes. Reformulations that respect (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. Egozentrizität und Mystik. [REVIEW]Frank Hofmann - 2007 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 61 (1).
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28.  21
    Epistemic Virtues and Values.Frank Hofmann - unknown
    Plato’s Meno problem is the problem of why knowledge is better than true belief which is not knowledge. The paper studies the account of this surplus value of knowledge that recent reliabilist virtue epistemologists like John Greco and Ernest Sosa have proposed: knowledge is true belief from epistemic virtue. I reconstruct the master argument which subsumes the epistemic case under the general case of success from virtue. Five accounts of virtue are presented and discussed critically. The result is that only (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29.  31
    How to Know One’s Experiences Transparently.Frank Hofmann - 2018 - Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    I would like to propose a demonstrative transparency model of our immediate, introspective self-knowledge of experiences. It is a model entirely in line with transparency. It rests on three elements: mental demonstration, the capacity to apply concepts to what is given in experience, and ordinary inference. The model avoids inner sense, acquaintance, and any special kind of normativity or rationality. The crucial and new ingredient is mental demonstration. By mental demonstration we can refer indexically to the contents of our own (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30.  24
    How to Know One’s Experiences Transparently.Frank Hofmann - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1305-1324.
    I would like to propose a demonstrative transparency model of our immediate, introspective self-knowledge of experiences. It is a model entirely in line with transparency. It rests on three elements: mental demonstration, the capacity to apply concepts to what is given in experience, and ordinary inference. The model avoids inner sense, acquaintance, and any special kind of normativity or rationality. The crucial and new ingredient is mental demonstration. By mental demonstration we can refer indexically to the contents of our own (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31.  16
    Intentionalism and Disjunctivism About Perception.Frank Hofmann - unknown
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32.  13
    In Defense of Strong Virtue Epistemology: How to Explain Success by Ability.Frank Hofmann - unknown
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Is Evidence Normative?Frank Hofmann - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (2):667-684.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34.  54
    Immediate Self-Knowledge and Avowal.Frank Hofmann - 2006 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1):193-213.
  35. Kripkes und Chalmers' Argumente gegen den Materialismus.Frank Hofmann - 2003 - Philosophia Naturalis 40 (1):55-81.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36.  17
    Perceptual Justification and Non-Conceptual Perception.Frank Hofmann - unknown
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37.  2
    Problems of Epistemic and Practical Consequentialism.Frank Hofmann - unknown
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Perception: Perspectival Content and Perceptual Achievement.Frank Hofmann - manuscript
    According to a classical causal account of perception, to perceive that object x is F is to fulfill the following conditions: (i) one has an experience as of x's being F, (ii) x is F, and (iii) one's experience of x's being F depends causally on x's being F. This is the core of Grice's causal theory of perception, and it is initially quite plausible (Grice 1961).
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Substrate.Frank Hofmann - 2004 - Metaphysica 5 (2):35-62.
  40.  57
    Seeing Oneself Through the Eyes of Others. Beckermann on Self-Consciousness.Frank Hofmann & Ferdinand Pöhlmann - 2013 - Philosophia Naturalis 50 (1):25-43.
    Ansgar Beckermann's account of self-consciousness can be seen as an attempt to locate the origin of self-conscious states in social cognition. It is assumed that in order to acquire self-consciousness, a cognitive system has to 'see itself through the eyes of the others'. This account, however, is doomed to failure, for principled reasons. It cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of the special, identification-free reference of first-person thoughts and, thus, fails to explain crucial features of attitudes. In addition, Beckermann's account exhibits (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41.  5
    Singular Representation and Teleosemantics.Frank Hofmann - unknown
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42.  4
    Some Reflections on the Flow of Knowledge in Digital History.Frank Hofmann - unknown
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. The Correspondence Theory of Truth.Frank Hofmann - manuscript
    Ever since the works of Alfred Tarski and Frank Ramsey, two views on truth have seemed very attractive to many people. On the one hand, the correspondence theory of truth seemed to be quite promising, mostly, perhaps, for its ability to accomodate a realistic attitude towards truth. On the other hand, a minimalist conception seemed appropriate since it made things so simple and unmysterious. So even though there are many more theories of truth around - the identity theory, the prosentential (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. The Epistemological Role of Consciousness for Introspective Self-Knowledge.Frank Hofmann - manuscript
    Recently, some philosophers have claimed that consciousness has an important epistemological role to play in the introspective self-ascription of one’s own mental states. This is the thesis of the epistemological role of consciousness for introspective self-knowledge. I will criticize BonJour’s account of the role of consciousness for introspection. He does not provide any reason for believing that conscious states are epistemically better off than non-conscious states. Then I will sketch a representationalist account of how the thesis could be true. Conscious (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45.  11
    The Epistemic Role of Experience.Frank Hofmann - unknown
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46.  85
    Truth - From the Ashes.Frank Hofmann & T. E. Zimmermann - manuscript
    David Lewis has complained about the truthmaker theory as a version of the correspondence theory of truth (Lewis 2001a; Lewis 2001b). His main criticism is that the truthmaker theory, if combined with the redundancy theory, is not a theory about truth, but only »about the existential grounding of all manner of other things: the flying of pigs, or what-have-you« (Lewis 2001a: 279; Lewis 2001b: 603-4). In his view, to call such a truthmaker theory a theory of truth is a »misnomer« (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47.  6
    The Generality Constraint - Vertical, Not Horizontal.Frank Hofmann - unknown
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Teil 1. Kriterien des Primär Seienden. Substance and Identity / Jonathan Lowe. Substanz Und Unabhängigkeit / Benjamin Schnieder. Substrate, Substanzen Und Individualiẗat. [REVIEW]Frank Hofmann - 2005 - In Käthe Trettin (ed.), Substanz: Neue Überlegungen Zu Einer Klassischen Kategorie des Seienden. Vittorio Klostermann.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49.  5
    Two Norms of Intention: A Vindication of Williamson’s Knowledge-Action Analogy.Frank Hofmann - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-10.
    According to an important analogy between knowledge and action, as proposed by Timothy Williamson, intention aims at action just as belief aims at knowledge. This paper investigates the analogy and discusses three difficulties that it has to face. The key is to distinguish between two different norms of intention and to see that the knowledge-action analogy is concerned with one of them only, namely, the realization norm: one ought to intentionally act if one intends to act in a certain way. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. Ten Problems of Consciousness. [REVIEW]Frank Hofmann - 1999 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 53 (1).
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 56