46 found
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  1. In Defence of Metaphysical Analyticity.Frank Hofmann & Joachim Horvath - 2008 - Ratio 21 (3):300-313.
    According to the so-called metaphysical conception of analyticity, analytic truths are true in virtue of meaning (or content) alone and independently of (extralinguistic) facts. Quine and Boghossian have tried to present a conclusive argument against the metaphysical conception of analyticity. In effect, they tried to show that the metaphysical conception inevitably leads into a highly implausible view about the truthmakers of analytic truths. We would like to show that their argument fails, since it relies on an ambiguity of the notion (...)
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  2. Intuitions, Concepts, and Imagination.Frank Hofmann - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):529-546.
    Recently, a new movement of philosophers, called 'experimental philosophy', has suggested that the philosophers' favored armchair is in flames. In order to assess some of their claims, it is helpful to provide a theoretical background against which we can discuss whether certain facts are, or could be, evidence for or against a certain view about how philosophical intuitions work and how good they are. In this paper, I will be mostly concerned with providing such a theoretical background, and I will (...)
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  3.  97
    Introspective Self-Knowledge of Experience and Evidence.Frank Hofmann - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (1):19-34.
    The paper attempts to give an account of the introspective self-knowledge of our own experiences which is in line with representationalism about phenomenal consciousness and the transparency of experience. A two-step model is presented. First, a demonstrative thought of the form ‚I am experiencing this’ is formed which refers to what one experiences, by means of attention. Plausibly, this thought is knowledge, since safe. Second, a non-demonstrative thought of the form ‚I am experiencing a pain’ occurs. This second self-ascription is (...)
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  4.  50
    Three Kinds of Reliabilism.Frank Hofmann - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):59 - 80.
    I distinguish between three kinds of reliabilism for epistemic justification, namely, pure reliabilism, evidential reliabilism, and reasons reliabilism, and I argue for reasons reliabilism. Pure reliabilism and evidential reliabilism are plagued, most importantly, by the generality problem, and they cannot deal adequately with defeater phenomena. One can avoid these problems only by jettisoning the idea of process reliability. The truth connection ? which is essential for any kind of reliabilism ? has to be provided in an altogether different way, namely, (...)
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  5.  84
    Causal Powers, Realization, and Mental Causation.Frank Hofmann - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):173 - 182.
    Sydney Shoemaker has attempted to save mental causation by a new account of realization. As Brian McLaughlin argues convincingly, the account has to face two major problems. First, realization does not guarantee entailment. So even if mental properties are realized by physical properties, they need not be entailed by them. This is the first, rather general metaphysical problem. A second problem, which relates more directly to mental causation is that Shoemaker must appeal to some kind of proportionality as a constraint (...)
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  6.  9
    How to Know One’s Experiences Transparently.Frank Hofmann - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    I would like to propose a demonstrative transparency model of our immediate, introspective self-knowledge of experiences. It is a model entirely in line with transparency. It rests on three elements: mental demonstration, the capacity to apply concepts to what is given in experience, and ordinary inference. The model avoids inner sense, acquaintance, and any special kind of normativity or rationality. The crucial and new ingredient is mental demonstration. By mental demonstration we can refer indexically to the contents of our own (...)
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  7.  73
    Truthmaking, Recombination, and Facts Ontology.Frank Hofmann - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (2):409-440.
    The idea of truthmakers is important for doing serious metaphysics, since a truthmaker principle can give us important guidance in finding out what we would like to include into our ontology. Recently, David Lewis has argued against Armstrong’s argument that a plausible truthmaker principle requires us to accept facts. I would like to take a close look at the argument. I will argue in detail that the Humean principle of recombination on which Lewis relies is not plausible (independently of the (...)
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  8.  39
    Epistemic Means and Ends: In Defense of Some Sartwellian Insights.Frank Hofmann - 2005 - Synthese 146 (3):357-369.
    The question of what means-and-ends structure our epistemic endeavors have is an important issue in recent epistemology, and is fundamental for understanding epistemic matters in principle. Crispin Sartwell has proposed arguments for the view that knowledge is our only ultimate goal, and justification is no part of it. An important argument is his instrumentality argument which is concerned with the conditions under which something could belong to our ultimate epistemic goal. Recently, this argument has been reconstructed and criticized by Pierre (...)
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  9.  48
    Why Epistemic Contextualism Does Not Provide an Adequate Account of Knowledge: Comments on Barke.Frank Hofmann - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):375-382.
    According to Antonia Barkes version of contextualism, epistemic contextualism, a context is defined by a method and its associated assumptions. The subject has to make the assumption that the method is adequate or reliable and that good working conditions hold in order to arrive at knowledge by employing the method. I will criticize Barkes claim that epistemic contextualism can provide a more satisfactory explanation or motivation for context shifts than conversational contextualism (in particular, David Lewiss contextualism). Two more points of (...)
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  10.  3
    Could Robots Be Phenomenally Conscious?Frank Hofmann - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3):579-590.
    In a recent book, Michael Tye argues that we have reason to attribute phenomenal consciousness to functionally similar robots like commander Data of Star Trek. He relies on a kind of inference to the best explanation – ‘Newton’s Rule’, as he calls it. I will argue that Tye’s liberal view of consciousness attribution fails for two reasons. First, it leads into an inconsistency in consciousness attributions. Second, and even more importantly, it fails because ceteris is not paribus. The big, categorical (...)
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  11. The Correspondence Theory of Truth.Frank Hofmann - manuscript
    Ever since the works of Alfred Tarski and Frank Ramsey, two views on truth have seemed very attractive to many people. On the one hand, the correspondence theory of truth seemed to be quite promising, mostly, perhaps, for its ability to accomodate a realistic attitude towards truth. On the other hand, a minimalist conception seemed appropriate since it made things so simple and unmysterious. So even though there are many more theories of truth around - the identity theory, the prosentential (...)
     
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  12.  46
    Gettier For Justification.Frank Hofmann - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3):305-318.
    I will present a problem for any externalist evidentialism that allows for accidental possession of evidence. There are Gettier cases for justification. I will describe two such cases – cases involving veridical hallucination. An analysis of the cases is given, along the lines of virtue epistemology . The cases show that certain externalist evidentialist accounts of justification do not provide sufficient conditions. The reason lies in the fact that one can be luckily in possession of evidence, and then one will (...)
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  13.  50
    An Alternative to Endurantism and Perdurantism: Doing Without Occupants.Frank Hofmann - 2009 - In Ludger Honnefelder, Benedikt Schick & Edmund Runggaldier (eds.), Unity and Time in Metaphysics. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 134.
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  14.  9
    Could Robots Be Phenomenally Conscious?Frank Hofmann - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-12.
    In a recent book, Michael Tye argues that we have reason to attribute phenomenal consciousness to functionally similar robots like commander Data of Star Trek. He relies on a kind of inference to the best explanation – ‘Newton’s Rule’, as he calls it. I will argue that Tye’s liberal view of consciousness attribution fails for two reasons. First, it leads into an inconsistency in consciousness attributions. Second, and even more importantly, it fails because ceteris is not paribus. The big, categorical (...)
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  15.  40
    Wahrheit und Wissen. Einige Überlegungen zur epistemischen Normativität.Frank Hofmann - 2007 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 61 (2):147 - 174.
    Eine der neueren Herausforderungen in der Erkenntnistheorie, die die Frage nach der Struktur epistemischer Werte aufwirft, stellt die so genannte Mehrwert-Intuition dar: Wissen scheint mehr Wert zu haben als bloß wahre Meinung. Ein Wahrheitsmonist vertritt die Auffassung, dass wahre Meinung der einzige intrinsische epistemische Wert ist. Es soll gezeigt werden, dass und wie sich im Rahmen des Wahrheitsmonismus die Mehrwert-Intuition einfangen lässt. Wir können, wie Frege, BonJour, Beckermann und viele andere, an der Wahrheit als einzigem intrinsischem Wert in der Epistemologie (...)
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  16.  37
    Non‐Conceptual Knowledge.Frank Hofmann - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):184-208.
    The paper is an investigation into the prospects of an epistemology of non-conceptual knowledge. According to the orthodox view, knowledge requires concepts and belief. I present several arguments to the effect that there is non-conceptual, non-doxastic knowledge, the obvious candidate for such knowledge being non-conceptual perception. Non-conceptual perception seems to be allowed for by cognitive scientists and it exhibits the central role features of knowledge—it plays the knowledge role: it respects an anti-luck condition, it is an achievement, it enables one (...)
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  17.  38
    The Structuring Causes of Behavior: Has Dretske Saved Mental Causation?Frank Hofmann & Peter Schulte - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (3):267-284.
    Fred Dretske’s account of mental causation, developed in Explaining Behavior and defended in numerous articles, is generally regarded as one of the most interesting and most ambitious approaches in the field. According to Dretske, meaning facts, construed historically as facts about the indicator functions of internal states, are the structuring causes of behavior. In this article, we argue that Dretske’s view is untenable: On closer examination, the real structuring causes of behavior turn out to be markedly different from Dretske’s meaning (...)
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  18.  39
    Seeing Oneself Through the Eyes of Others. Beckermann on Self-Consciousness.Frank Hofmann & Ferdinand Pöhlmann - 2013 - Philosophia Naturalis 50 (1):25-43.
    Ansgar Beckermann's account of self-consciousness can be seen as an attempt to locate the origin of self-conscious states in social cognition. It is assumed that in order to acquire self-consciousness, a cognitive system has to 'see itself through the eyes of the others'. This account, however, is doomed to failure, for principled reasons. It cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of the special, identification-free reference of first-person thoughts and, thus, fails to explain crucial features of attitudes. In addition, Beckermann's account exhibits (...)
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  19.  69
    Truth - From the Ashes.Frank Hofmann & T. E. Zimmermann - manuscript
    David Lewis has complained about the truthmaker theory as a version of the correspondence theory of truth (Lewis 2001a; Lewis 2001b). His main criticism is that the truthmaker theory, if combined with the redundancy theory, is not a theory about truth, but only »about the existential grounding of all manner of other things: the flying of pigs, or what-have-you« (Lewis 2001a: 279; Lewis 2001b: 603-4). In his view, to call such a truthmaker theory a theory of truth is a »misnomer« (...)
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  20.  19
    The Role of Consciousness For Epistemic Agency.Frank Hofmann - unknown
    In this presentation, I argue for a conception of rational capacities that makes us epistemic agents without essential reference or appeal to self-consciousness/self-knowledge, contrary to McDowell, Moran, and others. At the same time, his conception of rational capacities as powers at the personal level saves our epistemic agency against worries that Hilary Kornblith has put forward.
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  21.  55
    Besires and the Weakness of Will Argument.Frank Hofmann - manuscript
    Can there be a state which is both a belief and a desire? More exactly, a state which is a belief that p and a desire that q, where p and q may be the same proposition or a different one? Such a state would be a ‘besire’. So a first question is the general question whether besires are possible. Normative attitudes would be good candidates for besires. For example, if Sandra has the normative attitude that it would be best (...)
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  22. Immediate Self-Knowledge and Avowal.Frank Hofmann - 2006 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1):193-213.
     
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  23. The Epistemological Role of Consciousness for Introspective Self-Knowledge.Frank Hofmann - manuscript
    Recently, some philosophers have claimed that consciousness has an important epistemological role to play in the introspective self-ascription of one’s own mental states. This is the thesis of the epistemological role of consciousness for introspective self-knowledge. I will criticize BonJour’s account of the role of consciousness for introspection. He does not provide any reason for believing that conscious states are epistemically better off than non-conscious states. Then I will sketch a representationalist account of how the thesis could be true. Conscious (...)
     
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  24. The Reference of de Re Representations.Frank Hofmann - 2001 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):83-101.
    Full understanding ofrepresentation requires both an accountofrepresentational content and of reference. Fred Dretske has proposed a powerful theory of representational content, the teleological theory of indicator functions. And he has indicated that he thinks an informational account of reference is basically correct. According to this account, reference is determined by a certain informational relation, the relation of carrying primary information about an object. However, a closer examination will show that the informational account cannot adequately deal with our intuitions about certain (...)
     
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  25.  10
    Virtue and Knowledge.Frank Hofmann - unknown
    The presentation defends a fullblooded, 'thick' virtue-theoretic account of epistemic normativity. If we think of beliefs as under the control of rational agents, by means of their rational capacities, the norm of excellence applies to doxastic action as well as any other rational action. An argument is presented to the effect that the knowledge norm is the right norm of belief.
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  26.  8
    Intentionalism and Disjunctivism About Perception.Frank Hofmann - unknown
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  27.  7
    Perceptual Justification and Non-Conceptual Perception.Frank Hofmann - unknown
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  28.  7
    Epistemic Virtues and Values.Frank Hofmann - unknown
    Plato’s Meno problem is the problem of why knowledge is better than true belief which is not knowledge. The paper studies the account of this surplus value of knowledge that recent reliabilist virtue epistemologists like John Greco and Ernest Sosa have proposed: knowledge is true belief from epistemic virtue. I reconstruct the master argument which subsumes the epistemic case under the general case of success from virtue. Five accounts of virtue are presented and discussed critically. The result is that only (...)
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  29.  17
    Die Rolle des Wissens und des Wissensbegriffs in der Erkenntnistheorie.Frank Hofmann - 2002 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 56 (1):125 - 131.
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  30.  20
    Temporally Localised Facts and the Problem of Intrinsic Change.Frank Hofmann - 2005 - Ratio 18 (1):39–47.
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  31. Perception: Perspectival Content and Perceptual Achievement.Frank Hofmann - manuscript
    According to a classical causal account of perception, to perceive that object x is F is to fulfill the following conditions: (i) one has an experience as of x's being F, (ii) x is F, and (iii) one's experience of x's being F depends causally on x's being F. This is the core of Grice's causal theory of perception, and it is initially quite plausible (Grice 1961).
     
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  32.  4
    The Epistemic Role of Experience.Frank Hofmann - unknown
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  33.  2
    Singular Representation and Teleosemantics.Frank Hofmann - unknown
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  34.  2
    The Generality Constraint - Vertical, Not Horizontal.Frank Hofmann - unknown
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  35. Über die Natur von Tatsachen.Frank Hofmann - 2005 - Philosophia Naturalis 42 (2):313-340.
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  36. Concepts. [REVIEW]Frank Hofmann - 2001 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 55 (1).
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  37. Consciousness Revisited. Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts. [REVIEW]Frank Hofmann - 2011 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 65 (1).
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  38. Die Rolle von Wissen in der Erkenntnistheorie - Ein Kommentar zu Ansgar Beckermann.Frank Hofmann - 2002 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 56 (1).
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  39. E = K and Non-Epistemic Perception.Frank Hofmann - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (3):307-331.
    Quite plausibly, epistemic justification and rationality is tied to possession of evidence. According to Williamson, one’s evidence is what one knows. This is not compatible with non-epistemic perception, however, since non-epistemic perception does not require belief in what one perceives and, thus, does not require knowledge of the evidence – and, standardly, knowledge does require belief. If one non-epistemically perceives a piece of evidence, this can be sufficient for possessing it as evidence. Williamson’s arguments for the necessity of belief will (...)
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  40. Egozentrizität und Mystik. [REVIEW]Frank Hofmann - 2007 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 61 (1).
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  41. In Defense of Strong Virtue Epistemology: How to Explain Success by Ability.Frank Hofmann - unknown
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  42. Kripkes und Chalmers' Argumente gegen den Materialismus.Frank Hofmann - 2003 - Philosophia Naturalis 40 (1):55-81.
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  43. Substrate.Frank Hofmann - 2004 - Metaphysica 5 (2):35-62.
     
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  44. Teil 1. Kriterien des Primär Seienden. Substance and Identity / Jonathan Lowe. Substanz Und Unabhängigkeit / Benjamin Schnieder. Substrate, Substanzen Und Individualiẗat. [REVIEW]Frank Hofmann - 2005 - In Käthe Trettin (ed.), Substanz: Neue Überlegungen Zu Einer Klassischen Kategorie des Seienden. Vittorio Klostermann.
     
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  45. Ten Problems of Consciousness. [REVIEW]Frank Hofmann - 1999 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 53 (1).
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  46. Ten Problems of Consciousness. [REVIEW]Frank Hofmann - 1998 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 52 (4).
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