Results for 'Frankfurt cases'

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  1.  99
    Frankfurt Cases and the (in)Significance of Timing: A Defense of the Buffering Strategy.David Hunt & Seth Shabo - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):599-622.
    Frankfurt cases are purported counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, which implies that we are not morally responsible for unavoidable actions. A major permutation of the counterexample strategy features buffered alternatives; this permutation is designed to overcome an influential defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Here we defend the buffering strategy against two recent objections, both of which stress the timing of an agent’s decision. We argue that attributions of moral responsibility aren’t time-sensitive in the way (...)
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  2. The State of the Free Will Debate: From Frankfurt Cases to the Consequence Argument.Eddy Nahmias - manuscript
    In this paper I tie together the reasoning used in the Consequence Argument with the intuitions that drive Frankfurt cases in a way that illuminates some of the underlying differences between compatibilists and incompatibilists. I begin by explaining the ‘basic mechanism’ at work in Frankfurt cases: the existence of sufficient conditions for an outcome that do not actually bring about that outcome. I suggest that other potential threats to free will, such as God’s foreknowledge, can be (...)
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  3.  65
    Deterministic Frankfurt Cases.David Palmer - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3847-3864.
    According to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), people are morally responsible for what they do only if they could have done otherwise. Over the last few decades, this principle has dominated discussions of free will and moral responsibility. One important strand of this discussion concerns the Frankfurt-type cases or Frankfurt cases, originally developed by Frankfurt (J Philos 66:829–839, 1969), which are alleged counterexamples to PAP. One way in which proponents of PAP have responded to (...)
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  4.  4
    Veronique Munoz-darde.Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (1).
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  5.  14
    Frankfurtian Reflections: A Critical Discussion of Robert Lockie’s “Three Recent Frankfurt Cases”.Carlos J. Moya - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-21.
    In a recent article, Robert Lockie brings about a critical examination of three Frankfurtstyle cases designed by David Widerker and Derk Pereboom. His conclusion is that these cases do not refute either the Principle of Alternative Possibilities or some cognate leeway principle for moral responsibility. Though I take the conclusion to be true, I contend that Lockie's arguments do not succeed in showing it. I concentrate on Pereboom's Tax Evasion 2. After presenting Pereboom's example and analyzing its structure, (...)
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  6. Frankfurt-Style Cases User Manual: Why Frankfurt-Style Enabling Cases Do Not Necessitate Tech Support.Florian Cova - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (3):505-521.
    Frankfurt-style cases’ (FSCs) are widely considered as having refuted the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) by presenting cases in which an agent is morally responsible even if he could not have done otherwise. However, Neil Levy (J Philos 105:223–239, 2008) has recently argued that FSCs fail because we are not entitled to suppose that the agent is morally responsible, given that the mere presence of a counterfactual intervener is enough to make an agent lose responsibility-grounding abilities. Here, (...)
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  7.  36
    ‘Brain-Malfunction’ Cases and the Dispositionalist Reply to Frankfurt's Attack on PAP.Greg Janzen - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):646-657.
    Harry Frankfurt has famously argued against the principle of alternate possibilities by presenting a case in which, apparently, a person is morally responsible for what he has done even though he could not have done otherwise. A number of commentators have proposed dispositionalist responses to Frankfurt, arguing that he has not produced a counterexample to PAP because, contrary to appearances, the ability to do otherwise is indeed present but is a disposition that has been ‘masked’ or ‘finked’ by (...)
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  8.  8
    Crossing the Line: New Intuitions Behind Frankfurt-Type Cases.Aleksandr Mishura - 2017 - Axiomathes 27 (4):393-402.
    Frankfurt-type cases with covered manipulation received a great attention in the debates about freedom of will and moral responsibility. They pretend to give the refutation of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities and to show that we can intuitively blame or praise an agent who was not able to do otherwise. In this paper, I will try to make explicit some basic intuitions underlying the agent’s responsibility in Frankfurt-type cases, which were surprisingly ignored in the contemporary debates. (...)
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  9.  35
    The Limits of Limited-Blockage Frankfurt-Style Cases.Michael Robinson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):429-446.
    Philosophers employing Frankfurt-style cases to challenge the principle of alternative possibilities have mostly sought to construct scenarios that eliminate as many of an agent’s alternatives as possible—and all alternatives at the moment of action, within the agent’s control—without causally determining the agent’s actions. One of the chief difficulties for this traditional approach is that the closer one gets to ruling out absolutely all alternative possibilities the more it appears that agents’ actions in these cases are causally determined. (...)
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  10.  78
    Do Intuitions About Frankfurt-Style Cases Rest on an Internalist Prejudice?Florian Cova & Hichem Naar - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (3):290-305.
    Frankfurt-style cases” are widely considered as having refuted the Principle of Alternate Possibilities by presenting cases in which an agent is morally responsible even if he could not have done otherwise. However, Neil Levy has recently argued that FSCs fail because our intuitions about cases involving counterfactual interveners are inconsistent, and this inconsistency is best explained by the fact that our intuitions about such cases are grounded in an internalist prejudice about the location of mental (...)
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  11. Three Recent Frankfurt Cases.Robert Lockie - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (4):1005-1032.
    Three recent ‘state of the art’ Frankfurt cases are responded to: Widerker’s Brain-Malfunction-W case and Pereboom’s Tax Evasion cases (2 & 3). These cases are intended by their authors to resurrect the neo-Frankfurt project of overturning the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) in the teeth of the widespread acceptance of some combination of the WKG (Widerker-Kane-Ginet) dilemma, the Flicker of Freedom strategy and the revised PAP response (‘Principle of Alternative Blame’, ‘Principle of Alternative Expectations’). The (...)
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  12.  59
    Leeway Compatibilism and Frankfurt‐Style Cases.Yishai Cohen - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):89-98.
    The new dispositionalists defend the position that an agent in a deterministic Frankfurt-style case has the ability to do otherwise, where that ability is the one at issue in the principle of alternative possibilities. Focusing specifically on Kadri Vihvelin's proposal, I argue against this position by showing that it is incompatible with the existence of structurally similar cases to FSCs in which a preemptive intervener bestows an agent with an ability.
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  13.  19
    Vihvelin on Frankfurt-Style Cases and the Actual-Sequence View.Carolina Sartorio - 2016 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (4):875-888.
    This is a critical discussion of Vihvelin’s recent book Causes, Laws, and Free Will. I discuss Vihvelin’s ideas on Frankfurt-style cases and the actual-sequence view of freedom that is inspired by them.
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  14. Pereboom on the Frankfurt Cases.David Palmer - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):261 - 272.
    According to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. In what follows, I want to defend this principle against an apparent counterexample offered recently by Derk Pereboom (Living without free will, 2001; Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 29: 228-247, 2005). Pereboom's case, a variant of what are known as Trankfurt cases,' is important for it attempts to overcome a dilemma posed for earlier alleged counterexamples (...)
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  15. The Frankfurt Cases: The Moral of the Stories.John Martin Fischer - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (3):315-336.
    The Frankfurt cases have been thought by some philosophers to show that moral responsibility does not require genuine metaphysical access to alternative possibilities. But various philosophers have rejected this putative "lesson" of the cases, and they have put forward a powerful "Dilemma Defense." In the last decade or so, many philosophers have been persuaded by the Dilemma Defense that the Frankfurt cases do not show what Frankfurt (and others) thought they show. This essay presents (...)
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  16.  2
    Epistemic Frankfurt Cases Revisited.C. Kelp - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53:27-37.
    In Kelp, it is argued that there are epistemic Frankfurt cases that serve to show that knowledge does not require safety from error. In this paper, these Frankfurt cases are revisited. It is first argued that a recent response to the earlier argument by Duncan Pritchard remains unsatisfactory. Then it is shown that Frankfurt cases impact a much wider range of accounts. Specifically, it is argued in some detail that, in conjunction with the infamous (...)
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  17.  35
    Frankfurt Cases: The Fine-Grained Response Revisited.Justin A. Capes & Philip Swenson - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):967-981.
    Frankfurt cases are supposed to provide us with counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities. Among the most well known responses to these cases is what John Fischer has dubbed the flicker of freedom strategy. Here we revisit a version of this strategy, which we refer to as the fine-grained response. Although a number of philosophers, including some who are otherwise unsympathetic to Frankfurt’s argument, have dismissed the fine grained response, we believe there is a good (...)
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  18. Frankfurt Cases and Overdetermination.Eric Funkhouser - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 341-369.
    In traditional Frankfurt cases some conditions that make an outcome unavoidable fail to bring about that outcome. These are cases of causal preemption. I defend this interpretation of traditional Frankfurt cases, and its application to free will, against a dilemma raised by various libertarians. But I go on to argue that Frankfurt cases involving gen- uine causal overdetermination are even more effective at achieving the compatibilist’s purposes. Such cases avoid the “flicker of (...)
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  19.  61
    The Timing Objection to the Frankfurt Cases.David Palmer - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (5):1011-1023.
    According to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. Pereboom (Living without free will, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29:228–247, 2005) has developed an influential version of a Frankfurt case, known as “Tax Evasion,” which he believes is a counterexample to PAP. Ginet (Journal of Ethics 6:305–309, 2002) raises a key objection against Pereboom’s case, known as “the timing objection.” (...)
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  20.  50
    Harry Frankfurt Interview.Harry Frankfurt & Julian Baggini - 2013 - The Philosophers' Magazine 63:54-62.
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  21.  1
    Harry Frankfurt Interview.Harry Frankfurt & Julian Baggini - 2013 - The Philosophers' Magazine 63:54-62.
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  22.  49
    Frankfurt Cases, Alternate Possibilities, and Prior Signs.Greg Janzen - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (5):1037-1049.
    In his seminal paper ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’, Harry Frankfurt argues against the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP)—the principle that persons are morally responsible for what they have done only if they could have done otherwise—by presenting a case in which, apparently, a person is morally responsible for what he has done even though, due to the presence of a counterfactual intervener, he could not have done otherwise. According to a compelling (yet relatively under-discussed) response to Frankfurt’s (...)
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  23.  47
    Robustness Revised: Frankfurt Cases and the Right Kind of Power to Do Otherwise.Seth Shabo - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (1):89-106.
    Frankfurt’s famous counterexample strategy challenges the traditional association between moral responsibility and alternative possibilities. While this strategy remains controversial, it is now widely agreed that an adequate response to it must preserve an agent’s ability to do otherwise, and not the mere possibility, for only then is her alternative possibility sufficiently robust to ground her responsibility. Here, I defend a more stringent requirement for robustness. To have a robust alternative, I argue, the agent must have the right kind of (...)
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  24.  46
    Flickers of Freedom and Frankfurt-Style Cases in the Light of the New Incompatibilism of the Stit Theory.Katarzyna Paprzycka - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 27:553-565.
    Frankfurt-style examples aim to undermine the principle that moral responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise, which in turn requires the availability of alternate possibilities.1 They are thus considered a reason for refuting incompatibilism. One lesson drawn from Frankfurt-style examples is exemplified by the compatibilist account of Fischer and Ravizza.2 They accept the impact of Frankfurt-style cases and hold that the incompatibilist requirement of regulative control, which involves the agent’s ability to perform the action and her (...)
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  25.  36
    The Frankfurt Cases and Responsibility for Omissions.Philip Swenson - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264):579-595.
  26.  21
    Safety and Epistemic Frankfurt Cases.Juan Comesaña - 2013 - In John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa. Springer. pp. 165--178.
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  27.  51
    Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities and Determinism: Begging the Question in the Frankfurt Cases.David Palmer - 2006 - Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (1):79-86.
  28.  1
    A New Timing Objection to Frankfurt Cases.Erik Krag - 2017 - Southwest Philosophy Review 33 (1):143-150.
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  29. Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases.Alfred R. Mele & David Robb - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (1):97-112.
    Almost thirty years ago, in an attempt to undermine what he termed "the principle of alternate possibilities" (the thesis that people are morally responsible for what they have done only if they could have done otherwise), Harry Frankfurt offered an ingenious thought-experiment that has played a major role in subsequent work on moral responsibility and free will. Several philosophers, including David Widerker and Robert Kane, argued recently that this thought-experiment and others like it are fundamentally flawed. This paper develops (...)
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  30.  31
    Re-Examining Frankfurt Cases.Robert Allen - 1999 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):363-376.
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  31.  1
    Comments on David Palmer's "Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Determinism: Begging the Question in the Frankfurt Cases".Eric Funkhouser - 2006 - Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (2):91-93.
  32.  47
    Countering Cova: Frankfurt-Style Cases Are Still Broken.Neil Levy - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (3):523-527.
    In his “Frankfurt-style cases user manual”, Florian Cova (2013) distinguishes two kinds of Frankfurt-style arguments against the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), and argues that my attack on the soundness of Frankfurt-style cases succeeds, at most, only against one kind. Since either kind of argument can be used to undermine PAP, Cova suggests, the fact that my attack fails against at least one means that it does not succeed in rescuing PAP from the clutches of (...)
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  33.  10
    Frankfurt-Style Cases and the Explanation Condition for Moral Responsibility: A Reply to Swenson.Cova Florian - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-20.
    Frankfurt-style cases are supposed to constitute counter-examples to the principle of alternate possibilities, for they are cases in which we have the intuition that an agent is morally responsible for his action, even though he could not have done otherwise. In a recent paper, Swenson rejects this conclusion, on the basis of a comparison between standard FSCs, which typically feature actions, and similar cases involving omissions. Because the absence of alternate possibilities seems to preclude moral responsibility (...)
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  34. Why Frankfurt-Style Cases Don't Help (Much).Neil Levy - manuscript
    Frankfurt-style cases are widely taken to show that agents do not need alternative possibilities to be morally responsible for their actions. Many philosophers take these cases to constitute a powerful argument for compatibilism: if we do not need alternative possibilities for moral responsibility, it is hard to see what the attraction of indeterminism might be. I defend the claim that even though Frankfurt-style cases establish that agents can be responsible for their actions despite lacking alternatives, (...)
     
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  35.  6
    On the Signpost Principle of Alternate Possibilities: Why Contemporary Frankfurt-Style Cases Are Irrelevant to the Free Will Debate.Simkulet William - 2015 - Filosofiska Notiser 2 (3):107-120.
    This article contends that recent attempts to construct Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs) are irrelevant to the debate over free will. The principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) states that moral responsibility requires indeterminism, or multiple possible futures. Frankfurt's original case purported to demonstrate PAP false by showing an agent can be blameworthy despite not having the ability to choose otherwise; however he admits the agent can come to that choice freely or by force, and thus has alternate possibilities. Neo-FSCs (...)
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  36. Flickers of Freedom and Frankfurt-Style Cases in the Light of the New Compatibalism of the Stit Theory.Katarzyna Paprzycka - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 27:553-565.
    It is widely assumed that Frankfurt-style cases provide a reason for rejecting incompatibilism because they provide a reason for rejecting the requirement that the agent be able to do otherwise. One compatibilist strategy for dealing with the cases, pursued by Fischer and Ravizza, is to weaken the mentioned requirement. An analogous strategy on the part of the incompatibilist, which appears to be unexplored in the literature on moral responsibility, is exemplified in Belnap and Perloff ’s logic of (...)
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  37. Responsibility and Freedom: The Challenge of Frankfurt-Style-Cases.Alfred R. Mele - 2000 - In M. Betzler & B. Guckes (eds.), Autonomes Handeln: Beitrage Zur Philosophie von Harry G. Frankfurt. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
     
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  38. Libertarianism and Frankfurt-Style Cases.Laura W. Ekstrom - 2002 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 1st edition. Oxford University Press.
  39.  75
    Disenabling Levy's Frankfurt-Style Enabling Cases.Ishtiyaque Haji & Michael Mckenna - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):400-414.
    Recently, Neil Levy has proposed that an agent can acquire freedom-relevant agential abilities by virtue of the conditions in which she finds herself, and in this way, can be thought of as partially constituted by those conditions. This can be so even if the agent is completely ignorant of the relevant environmental conditions, and even if these conditions play no causal role in what the agent does. Drawing upon these resources, Levy argues that Frankfurt-style examples are not cogent. In (...)
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  40.  46
    Frankfurt-Style Cases and Improbable Alternative Possibilities.Gerald K. Harrison - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):399-406.
    It has been argued that a successful counterexample to the principle of alternative possibilities must rule out any possibility of the agent making an alternative decision right up to the moment of choice. This paper challenges that assumption. Distinguishing between an ability and an opportunity, this paper presents a Frankfurt-style case in which there is an alternative possibility, but one it is highly improbable that the agent will access. In such a case the agent has only the opportunity, not (...)
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  41.  12
    Frankfurt-Style Cases and the Significance of the First Impression.Gerald K. Harrison - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (3):213-223.
    The claim that moral responsibility requires relevant alternative possibilities is encapsulated by the following principle: PAP: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. In 1969 Harry Frankfurt devised what purported to be a counterexample to PAP: Suppose someone, Black, let us say, wants Jones to perform a certain action. Black is prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his way, but he prefers to avoid showing his hand unnecessarily. (...)
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  42.  3
    Disenabling Levy's Frankfurt‐Style Enabling Cases.Michael Mckenna Ishtiyaque Haji - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):400-414.
    Recently, Neil Levy has proposed that an agent can acquire freedom‐relevant agential abilities by virtue of the conditions in which she finds herself, and in this way, can be thought of as partially constituted by those conditions. This can be so even if the agent is completely ignorant of the relevant environmental conditions, and even if these conditions play no causal role in what the agent does. Drawing upon these resources, Levy argues that Frankfurt‐style examples are not cogent. In (...)
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  43.  13
    Frankfurt and the Folk: An Experimental Investigation of Frankfurt-Style Cases.Jason S. Miller & Adam Feltz - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):401-414.
    An important disagreement in contemporary debates about free will hinges on whether an agent must have alternative possibilities to be morally responsible. Many assume that notions of alternative possibilities are ubiquitous and reflected in everyday intuitions about moral responsibility: if one lacks alternatives, then one cannot be morally responsible. We explore this issue empirically. In two studies, we find evidence that folk judgments about moral responsibility call into question two popular principles that require some form of alternative possibilities for moral (...)
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  44.  16
    Bbs, Magnets and Seesaws: The Metaphysics of Frankfurt-Style Cases.Alfred R. Mele & David Robb - 2003 - In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. pp. 107--126.
  45. Frankfurt-Style Cases and the Question Begging Charge.Gerald K. Harrison - 2005 - Facta Philosophica 7 (2):273-282.
  46.  27
    Responsibility, Indeterminism and Frankfurt-Style Cases: A Reply to Mele and Robb.Robert Kane - 2003 - In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. pp. 91--105.
  47.  26
    Frankfurt-Type Cases and the Necessary Conditions for Moral Responsibility.P. A. Woodward - 2007 - Journal of Value Inquiry 41 (2-4):325-332.
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  48.  3
    Countering Cova : Frankfurt-Style Cases Are Still Broken.Neil Levy - unknown
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  49. Free Action, Moral Responsibility, and Alternative Possibilities: Frankfurt-Style Cases Revisited.Alfred Mele - 2007 - In F. Castellani & J. Quitterer (eds.), Agency and Causation in the Human Sciences. Mentis Verlag.
  50. Comments on Neil Levy's “Why Frankfurt-Style Cases Don't Help (Much)”.Kevin Timpe - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):1.
     
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