Order:
See also
Franz Mang
Oxford University (DPhil)
  1. Liberal Neutrality and Moderate Perfectionism.Franz Mang - 2013 - Res Publica 19 (4):297-315.
    (Winner of The Res Publica Essay Prize) This article defends a moderate version of state perfectionism by using Gerald Gaus’s argument for liberal neutrality as a starting point of discussion. Many liberal neutralists reject perfectionism on the grounds of respect for persons, but Gaus has explained more clearly than most neutralists how respect for persons justifies neutrality. Against neutralists, I first argue that the state may promote the good life by appealing to what can be called “the qualified judgments about (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2.  23
    Confucianism, Perfectionism, and Liberal Society.Franz Mang - 2018 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 17 (1):29-49.
    Confucian scholars should satisfy two conditions insofar as they think their theories enable Confucianism to make contributions to liberal politics and social policy. The liberal accommodation condition stipulates that the theory in question should accommodate as many reasonable conceptions of the good and religious doctrines as possible while the intelligibility condition stipulates that the theory must have a recognizable Confucian character. By and large, Joseph Chan’s Confucian perfectionism is able to satisfy the above two conditions. However, contrary to Chan and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Public Reason Can Be Reasonably Rejected.Franz Mang - 2017 - Social Theory and Practice 43 (2):343-367.
    Public reason as a political ideal aims to reconcile reasonable disagreement; however, is public reason itself the object of reasonable disagreement? Jonathan Quong, David Estlund, Andrew Lister, and some other philosophers maintain that public reason is beyond reasonable disagreement. I argue this view is untenable. In addition, I consider briefly whether or not two main versions of the public reason principle, namely, the consensus version and the convergence version, need to satisfy their own requirements. My discussion has several important implications (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation