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Fred Dretske [139]Fred I. Dretske [44]Frederick Irwin Dretske [1]
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Profile: Fred Dretske (Duke University)
  1. Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes.Fred Dretske - 1988 - MIT Press.
    In this lucid portrayal of human behavior, Fred Dretske provides an original account of the way reasons function in the causal explanation of behavior.
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  2. Knowledge and the Flow of Information.Fred Dretske - 1981 - MIT Press.
    This book presents an attempt to develop a theory of knowledge and a philosophy of mind using ideas derived from the mathematical theory of communication developed by Claude Shannon. Information is seen as an objective commodity defined by the dependency relations between distinct events. Knowledge is then analyzed as information caused belief. Perception is the delivery of information in analog form for conceptual utilization by cognitive mechanisms. The final chapters attempt to develop a theory of meaning by viewing meaning as (...)
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  3. Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - MIT Press.
    In this provocative book, Fred Dretske argues that to achieve an understanding of the mind it is not enough to understand the biological machinery by means of...
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  4. Epistemic Operators.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
  5. Seeing And Knowing.Fred Dretske - 1969 - Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
  6. Laws of Nature.Fred I. Dretske - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (2):248-268.
    It is a traditional empiricist doctrine that natural laws are universal truths. In order to overcome the obvious difficulties with this equation most empiricists qualify it by proposing to equate laws with universal truths that play a certain role, or have a certain function, within the larger scientific enterprise. This view is examined in detail and rejected; it fails to account for a variety of features that laws are acknowledged to have. An alternative view is advanced in which laws are (...)
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  7. Conscious Experience.Fred Dretske - 1993 - Mind 102 (406):263-283.
  8. Misrepresentation.Fred Dretske - 1986 - In R. Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function. Oxford University Press. pp. 17--36.
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  9. Is Knowledge Closed Under Known Entailment? The Case Against Closure.Fred Dretske - 2005 - In Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 13-26.
     
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  10. Conclusive Reasons.Fred Dretske - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-22.
  11. ``The Case Against Closure".Fred I. Dretske - 2005 - In M. Steup & Earnest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Malden, Ma: Blackwell. pp. 13--25.
     
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  12. Experience as Representation.Fred Dretske - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):67-82.
  13. A Recipe for Thought.Fred Dretske - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Minds and Machines. Oup Usa.
     
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  14. Perception Without Awareness.Fred Dretske - 2006 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 147--180.
  15. Entitlement: Epistemic Rights Without Epistemic Duties?Fred Dretske - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):591-606.
  16. Precis of Knowledge and the Flow of Information.Fred Dretske - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):55-90.
    A theory of information is developed in which the informational content of a signal (structure, event) can be specified. This content is expressed by a sentence describing the condition at a source on which the properties of a signal depend in some lawful way. Information, as so defined, though perfectly objective, has the kind of semantic property (intentionality) that seems to be needed for an analysis of cognition. Perceptual knowledge is an information-dependent internal state with a content corresponding to the (...)
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  17. Information and Closure.Fred Dretske - 2006 - Erkenntnis 64 (3):409-413.
    Peter Baumann and Nicholas Shackel defend me against a serious criticism by Christoph Jäger. They argue that my account of information is consistent with my denial of closure for knowledge. Information isn’t closed under known entailment either. I think that, technically speaking, they are right. But the way they are right doesn’t help me much in my effort to answer the skeptic. I describe a way in which information, like knowledge, fails to be closed in a way that makes an (...)
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  18. The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge.Fred Dretske - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 40 (3):363--378.
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  19.  9
    Reply to Hawthorne.Fred Dretske - 2005 - In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 43--46.
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  20. What Change Blindness Teaches About Consciousness.Fred Dretske - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):215–220.
  21.  25
    ``Epistemic Operators".Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
  22. Contrastive Statements.Fred I. Dretske - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (4):411-437.
  23. Externalism and Modest Contextualism.Fred Dretske - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):173-186.
    Externalism about knowledge commits one to a modest form of contextualism: whether one knows depends (or may depend) on circumstances (context) of which one has no knowledge. Such modest contextualism requires the rejection of the KK Principle (If S knows that P, then S knows that S knows that P) - something most people would want to reject anyway - but it does not require (though it is compatible with) a rejection of closure. Radical contextualism, on the other hand, goes (...)
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  24. Phenomenal Externalism, or If Meanings Ain't in the Head, Where Are Qualia?Fred Dretske - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:143-158.
  25. How Do You Know You Are Not a Zombie?Fred Dretske - 2003 - In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate. pp. 1--14.
  26. Reasons and Causes.Fred Dretske - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:1-15.
  27. Are Experiences Conscious?Fred Dretske - 1995 - In Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press.
  28. Change Blindness.Fred Dretske - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):1-18.
  29. The Intentionality of Cognitive States.Fred Dretske - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):281-294.
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  30. If You Can't Make One, You Don't Know How It Works.Fred Dretske - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):468-482.
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  31. What We See : The Texture of Conscious Experience.Fred Dretske - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press.
  32.  50
    Mental Causation.Fred Dretske - 1999 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1999 (7):81-88.
    Materialist explanations of cause and effect tend to embrace epiphenomenalism. Those who try to avoid epiphenomenalism tend to deny either the extrinsicness of meaning or the intrinsicness of causality. I argue that to deny one or the other is equally implausible. Rather, I prefer a different strategy: accept both premises, but deny that epiphenomenalism is necessarily the conclusion. This strategy is available because the premises do not imply the conclusion without the help of an additional premise—namely, that behavior explained by (...)
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  33.  99
    Introspection.Fred Dretske - 1993 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94:263-278.
  34. The Mind's Awareness of Itself.Fred Dretske - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):103-24.
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  35. Chris Hill's Consciousness. [REVIEW]Fred Dretske - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (3):497-502.
    Chris Hill’s consciousness Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-6 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9812-4 Authors Fred Dretske, 212 Selkirk, Durham, NC 27707, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  36. The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays.Fred Dretske - 2003 - Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.
     
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  37.  92
    Machines and the Mental.Fred Dretske - 1985 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 59 (1):23-33.
  38. Dretske and His Critics.Fred Dretske - 1991 - Cambridge: Blackwell.
     
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  39.  13
    The Informational Character of Representations.Fred Dretske - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (3):376.
  40. Mental Causation.Fred Dretske - 1999 - In Kevin A. Stoehr (ed.), The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Bowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr. pp. 81-88.
    Materialist explanations of cause and effect tend to embrace epiphenomenalism. Those who try to avoid epiphenomenalism tend to deny either the extrinsicness of meaning or the intrinsicness of causality. I argue that to deny one or the other is equally implausible. Rather, I prefer a different strategy: accept both premises, but deny that epiphenomenalism is necessarily the conclusion. This strategy is available because the premises do not imply the conclusion without the help of an additional premise—namely, that behavior explained by (...)
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    Reply to Reviewers.Fred Dretske - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):819 - 839.
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  42. Machines, Plants and Animals: The Origins of Agency. [REVIEW]Fred I. Dretske - 1999 - Erkenntnis 51 (1):523-535.
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  43.  15
    Naturalizing the Mind.David Sosa & Fred Dretske - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (3):429.
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  44. Perception and Other Minds.Fred Dretske - 1973 - Noûs 7 (March):34-44.
    We ordinarily speak of being able to see that there are people on the bus, Students in the class, And children playing in the street. If human beings are understood to be conscious entities, Then one of our ways of knowing that there are other conscious entities in the world besides ourselves is by seeing that there are. We also speak of seeing that he is angry, She is depressed, And so on. It is argued that this is, Indeed, One (...)
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  45. Knowing What You Think Vs. Knowing That You Think It.Fred Dretske - 2004 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.
  46. The Epistemology of Belief.Fred I. Dretske - 1983 - Synthese 55 (1):3 - 19.
    By examining the general conditions in which a structure could come to represent another state of affairs, it is argued that beliefs, a special class of representations, have their contents limited by the sort of information the system in which they occur can pick up and process. If a system — measuring instrument, animal or human being — cannot process information to the effect that something is Q, it cannot represent something as Q. From this it follows (for simple, ostensively (...)
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  47. What Good is Consciousness?Fred Dretske - 1997 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):1-15.
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  48. ``Conclusive Reasons&Quot.Fred I. Dretske - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49:1-22.
  49. Minimal Rationality.Fred Dretske - 2006 - In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.
     
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  50. Psychological Vs. Biological Explanations of Behavior.Fred Dretske - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (1):167-177.
    Causal explanations of behavior must distinguish two kinds of cause. There are triggering causes, the events or conditions that come before the effect and are followed regularly by the effect, and structuring causes, events that cause a triggering cause to produce its effect. Moving the mouse is the triggering cause of cursor movement; hardware and programming conditions are the structuring causes of cursor movement. I use this distinction to show how representational facts can be structuring causes of behavior even though (...)
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