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  1. Knowledge and the Flow of Information.Fred I. Dretske - 1981 - MIT Press.
    This book presents an attempt to develop a theory of knowledge and a philosophy of mind using ideas derived from the mathematical theory of communication developed by Claude Shannon. Information is seen as an objective commodity defined by the dependency relations between distinct events. Knowledge is then analyzed as information caused belief. Perception is the delivery of information in analog form for conceptual utilization by cognitive mechanisms. The final chapters attempt to develop a theory of meaning by viewing meaning as (...)
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  2. Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes.Fred I. Dretske - 1988 - MIT Press.
    In this lucid portrayal of human behavior, Fred Dretske provides an original account of the way reasons function in the causal explanation of behavior.
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  3. Epistemic Operators.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
  4. Laws of Nature.Fred I. Dretske - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (2):248-268.
    It is a traditional empiricist doctrine that natural laws are universal truths. In order to overcome the obvious difficulties with this equation most empiricists qualify it by proposing to equate laws with universal truths that play a certain role, or have a certain function, within the larger scientific enterprise. This view is examined in detail and rejected; it fails to account for a variety of features that laws are acknowledged to have. An alternative view is advanced in which laws are (...)
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  5. Misrepresentation.Fred I. Dretske - 1986 - In Radu Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function. Oxford University Press. pp. 17--36.
  6. Conclusive Reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-22.
  7. ``The Case Against Closure".Fred I. Dretske - 2005 - In M. Steup & Earnest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Malden, Ma: Blackwell. pp. 13--25.
     
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  8. Precis of Knowledge and the Flow of Information.Fred I. Dretske - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):55-90.
    A theory of information is developed in which the informational content of a signal (structure, event) can be specified. This content is expressed by a sentence describing the condition at a source on which the properties of a signal depend in some lawful way. Information, as so defined, though perfectly objective, has the kind of semantic property (intentionality) that seems to be needed for an analysis of cognition. Perceptual knowledge is an information-dependent internal state with a content corresponding to the (...)
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  9. Contrastive Statements.Fred I. Dretske - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (4):411-437.
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  10. Seeing and Knowing.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 21 (1):121-124.
     
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  11. Reasons and causes.Fred I. Dretske - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:1-15.
  12. The Intentionality of Cognitive States.Fred I. Dretske - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):281-294.
  13. Perception and Other Minds.Fred I. Dretske - 1973 - Noûs 7 (1):34-44.
    We ordinarily speak of being able to see that there are people on the bus, Students in the class, And children playing in the street. If human beings are understood to be conscious entities, Then one of our ways of knowing that there are other conscious entities in the world besides ourselves is by seeing that there are. We also speak of seeing that he is angry, She is depressed, And so on. It is argued that this is, Indeed, One (...)
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  14. If You Can’T Make One, You Don’T Know How It Works.Fred I. Dretske - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):468-482.
  15.  96
    Referring to Events.Fred I. Dretske - 1977 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1):90-99.
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  16.  73
    Simple Seeing.Fred I. Dretske - 1979 - In Donald F. Gustafson & Bangs L. Tapscott (eds.), Body, Mind, and Method. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 1--15.
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  17. The Epistemology of Belief.Fred I. Dretske - 1983 - Synthese 55 (1):3 - 19.
    By examining the general conditions in which a structure could come to represent another state of affairs, it is argued that beliefs, a special class of representations, have their contents limited by the sort of information the system in which they occur can pick up and process. If a system — measuring instrument, animal or human being — cannot process information to the effect that something is Q, it cannot represent something as Q. From this it follows (for simple, ostensively (...)
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  18. Machines, Plants and Animals: The Origins of Agency. [REVIEW]Fred I. Dretske - 1999 - Erkenntnis 51 (1):523-535.
  19. Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology.Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.) - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
    In this anthology, distinguished editors Sven Bernecker and Fred Dretske offer the most comprehensive review available of contemporary epistemology. They bring together the most important and influential writings in the field, including selections that cover frequently neglected topics such as dominant responses to skepticism, introspection, memory, and testimony. Knowledge is divided into fifteen subject areas and includes forty-one readings by eminent contributors. An accessible introduction to each subject area outlines the problems discussed in the essays that follow so that students (...)
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  20.  50
    Causal Irregularity.Fred I. Dretske & Aaron Snyder - 1972 - Philosophy of Science 39 (1):69-71.
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  21.  58
    A Cognitive Cul-de-Sac.Fred I. Dretske - 1982 - Mind 91 (361):109-111.
  22.  40
    Perception.Fred I. Dretske - 1978 - International Studies in Philosophy 10:199-201.
  23. Information-Theoretic Semantics.Fred I. Dretske - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
     
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  24. Reasons, Knowledge, and Probability.Fred I. Dretske - 1971 - Philosophy of Science 38 (2):216-220.
    Though one believes that P is true, one can have reasons for thinking it false. Yet, it seems that one cannot know that P is true and (still) have reasons for thinking it false. Why is this so? What feature of knowledge (or of reasons) precludes having reasons or evidence to believe (true) what you know to be false? If the connection between reasons (evidence) and what one believes is expressible as a probability relation, it would seem that the only (...)
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  25.  39
    Causality and Sufficiency: Reply to Beauchamp.Fred I. Dretske & Aaron Snyder - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 40 (2):288-291.
  26.  95
    Perception From an Epistemological Point of View.Fred I. Dretske - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (19):584-591.
  27.  32
    Belief, Truth and Knowledge.Fred I. Dretske - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (21):793-802.
  28.  97
    Reasons and Consequences.Fred I. Dretske - 1968 - Analysis 28 (5):166 - 168.
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  29.  66
    Observational Terms.Fred I. Dretske - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (January):25-42.
  30.  13
    Action.Fred I. Dretske & Malcolm Knox - 1971 - Philosophical Review 80 (2):251.
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  31.  29
    Reply to Niiniluoto.Fred I. Dretske - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (3):440-444.
  32. Ziring Ziderata.Fred I. Dretske - 1966 - Mind 75 (April):211-223.
  33.  31
    Counting to Infinity.Fred I. Dretske - 1965 - Analysis 25:99.
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  34.  77
    Particulars and the Relational Theory of Time.Fred I. Dretske - 1961 - Philosophical Review 70 (4):447-469.
  35.  67
    Moving Backward in Time.Fred I. Dretske - 1962 - Philosophical Review 71 (1):94-98.
  36.  46
    Scepticism: A Critical Appraisal.Fred I. Dretske - 1981 - Philosophical Topics 12 (2):299-303.
  37.  21
    Chisholm on Perceptual Knowledge.Fred I. Dretske - 1979 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 8 (1):253-269.
    Two general approaches to the analysis of knowledge are distinguished: a liberal view that takes the truth of what is known as a condition independent of the justificatory condition, and a conservative view that regards the truth of what is known as implied by the level of justification required for knowledge. Chisholm is classified as a liberal on perceptual knowledge, and his analysis is criticized from a conservative standpoint.
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  38.  9
    Chisholm on Perceptual Knowledge.Fred I. Dretske - 1979 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 7 (1):253-269.
    Two general approaches to the analysis of knowledge are distinguished: a liberal view that takes the truth of what is known as a condition independent of the justificatory condition, and a conservative view that regards the truth of what is known as implied by the level of justification required for knowledge. Chisholm is classified as a liberal on perceptual knowledge, and his analysis is criticized from a conservative standpoint.
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  39.  13
    Comments on Shapere and Hesse.Fred I. Dretske - 1976 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1976:299 - 303.
  40. Conclusive Reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
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  41. Causal Theories of Reference.Fred I. Dretske - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (10):621-625.
  42. Knowledge and the Flow of Information.Fred I. Dretske - 1981 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 175 (1):69-70.
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  43.  7
    Perception: A Representative Theory. [REVIEW]Fred I. Dretske - 1978 - International Studies in Philosophy 10:199-201.
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  44. Precis of 'Knowledge and the Flow of Information'.Fred I. Dretske - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
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  45. Particular Reidentification.Fred I. Dretske - 1964 - Philosophy of Science 31 (2):133-142.
    A certain dilemma is inherent in relational accounts of space and time. If any objects endure through change, then temporal elements other than relations are required to describe them. If, on the other hand, no objects endure through change, no permanent reference system is available in terms of which to define the "same place" at different times. An argument which, by exploiting this latter difficulty, attempts to show that "objects with some endurance through time" must be accepted as fundamental is (...)
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  46.  11
    Reviews. [REVIEW]Fred I. Dretske - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (1):79-81.
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  47. Reasons and consequences.Fred I. Dretske - 1968 - Analysis 28 (5):166.
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  48.  29
    Reasons and Falsification.Fred I. Dretske - 1965 - Philosophical Quarterly 15 (58):20-34.
  49. RMSTRONG, D. M.: "What is a Law of Nature"? [REVIEW]Fred I. Dretske - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36:79.
  50. Scepticism: A Critical Appraisal. [REVIEW]Fred I. Dretske - 1981 - Philosophical Topics 12 (2):299-303.
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