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Frederick Adams [36]Frederick R. Adams [26]Frederick Ray Adams [1]Frederick Adams [1]
  1. The Bounds of Cognition.Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 2008 - Wiley-Blackwell.
  2. Defending the Bounds of Cognition.Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press.
    That about sums up what is wrong with Clark.
     
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  3. The Bounds of Cognition.Fred Adams, Ken Aizawa & Frederick R. Adams - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (1):43-64.
    An alarming number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that mind extends beyond the brain and body. This book evaluates these arguments and suggests that, typically, it does not. A timely and relevant study that exposes the need to develop a more sophisticated theory of cognition, while pointing to a bold new direction in exploring the nature of cognition Articulates and defends the “mark of the cognitive”, a common sense theory used to distinguish between cognitive and non-cognitive processes Challenges (...)
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  4. Defending Non-Derived Content.Kenneth Aizawa & Frederick R. Adams - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669.
    In ‘‘The Myth of Original Intentionality,’’ Daniel Dennett appears to want to argue for four claims involving the familiar distinction between original (or underived) and derived intentionality.
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  5. The Informational Turn in Philosophy.Frederick R. Adams - 2003 - Minds and Machines 13 (4):471-501.
    This paper traces the application of information theory to philosophical problems of mind and meaning from the earliest days of the creation of the mathematical theory of communication. The use of information theory to understand purposive behavior, learning, pattern recognition, and more marked the beginning of the naturalization of mind and meaning. From the inception of information theory, Wiener, Turing, and others began trying to show how to make a mind from informational and computational materials. Over the last 50 years, (...)
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  6.  2
    The Bounds of Cognition. [REVIEW]Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):385-386.
    Tools and technologies expand our capacities, including our cognitive capacities. Microscopes extend our perceptual capacities. Notebooks extend the natural limits of memory. These facts are important, for all that they are obvious. The extended cognition hypothesis wants more. Some external devices and processes are literal parts of cognitive processes themselves. When there is fast and reliable access to external data or processes, then the cognitive processes that occur uncontroversially inside the brain literally and controversially extend out into the world to (...)
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  7.  89
    Intention and Intentional Action: The Simple View.Frederick Adams - 1986 - Mind and Language 1 (4):281-301.
  8. Andy Clark on Intrinsic Content and Extended Cognition.Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - manuscript
    This is a plausible reading of what Clark and Chalmers had in mind at the time, but it is not the radical claim at stake in the extended cognition debate.[1] It is a familiar functionalist view of cognition and the mind that it can be realized in a wide range of distinct material bases. Thus, for many species of functionalism about cognition and the mind, it follows that they can be realized in extracranial substrates.[2] And, in truth, even some non-functionalist (...)
     
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  9. Folk Concepts, Surveys and Intentional Action.Annie Steadman & Frederick Adams - 2007 - In C. Lumer & S. Nannini (eds.), Intentionality, Deliberation, and Autonomy: The Action-Theoretic Basis of Practical Philosophy. Ashgate Publishers.
    In a recent paper, Al Mele (2003) suggests that the Simple View of intentional action is “fiction” because it is “wholly unconstrained” by a widely shared (folk) concept of intentional action. The Simple View (Adams, 1986, McCann, 1986) states that an action is intentional only if intended. As evidence that the Simple View is not in accord with the folk notion of intentional action, Mele appeals to recent surveys of folk judgments by Joshua Knobe (2003, 2004a, 2004b). Knobe’s surveys appear (...)
     
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  10. The Intention/Volition Debate.Frederick Adams & Alfred R. Mele - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):323-337.
  11. Challenges to Active Externalism.Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - forthcoming - In P. Robbins & Murat Aydede (eds.), Cambridge Handbook on Situated Cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
     
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  12. The Semantics of Thought.Frederick R. Adams, Robert A. Stecker & Gary Fuller - 1992 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):375-389.
  13. Empathy, Neural Imaging and the Theory Versus Simulation Debate.Frederick R. Adams - 2001 - Mind and Language 16 (4):368-392.
  14. Reviews-Dynamics in Action: Intentional Behavior as a Complex System.Alicia Juarrero & Frederick Adams - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3):635-640.
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  15.  84
    The Role of Intention in Intentional Action.Frederick Adams & Alfred Mele - 1989 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):511 - 531.
  16. Swampman's Revenge: Squabbles Among the Representationalists.Frederick R. Adams & Laura A. Dietrich - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (3):323-40.
    There are both externalist and internalist theories of the phenomenal content of conscious experiences. Externalists like Dretske and Tye treat the phenomenal content of conscious states as representations of external properties. Internalists think that phenomenal conscious states are reducible to electrochemical states of the brain in the style of the type-type identity theory. In this paper, we side with the representationalists and visit a dispute between them over the test case of Swampman. Does Swampman have conscious phenomenal states or not? (...)
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  17. Mental Representation.Frederick R. Adams - 2002 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
  18.  63
    'X' Means X: Semantics Fodor-Style. [REVIEW]Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1992 - Minds and Machines 2 (2):175-83.
    InPsychosemantics Jerry Fodor offered a list of sufficient conditions for a symbol “X” to mean something X. The conditions are designed to reduce meaning to purely non-intentional natural relations. They are also designed to solve what Fodor has dubbed the “disjunction problem”. More recently, inA Theory of Content and Other Essays, Fodor has modified his list of sufficient conditions for naturalized meaning in light of objections to his earlier list. We look at his new set of conditions and give his (...)
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  19.  75
    Narrow Content: Fodor's Folly.Frederick R. Adams, David Drebushenko, Gary Fuller & Robert A. Stecker - 1990 - Mind and Language 5 (3):213-29.
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  20.  83
    He Doesn't Really Want to Try.Frederick Adams - 1991 - Analysis 51 (2):109 - 112.
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  21. Intentions Confer Intentionality Upon Actions: A Reply to Knobe and Burra.Frederick Adams - 2006 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):255-268.
    Is intentionally doing A linked to the intention to do A? Knobe and Burra believe that the link between the English words ‘intention’ and ‘intentional’ may mislead philosophers and cognitive scientists to falsely believe that intentionally doing an action A requires one to have the intention to do A. Knobe and Burra believe that data from other languages..
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  22.  43
    Thoughts Without Objects.Frederick R. Adams, Gary Fuller & Robert A. Stecker - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (1):90-104.
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  23.  61
    Fodor's Asymmetric Causal Dependency Theory and Proximal Projections.Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1997 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):433-437.
  24. Fodorian Semantics. Adams, Frederick & Kenneth Aizawa - 1994 - In Steven Stich & Ted Warfield (eds.), Mental Representation. Blackwell.
  25.  43
    Fodor's Modal Argument.Frederick R. Adams - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):41-56.
    What we do, intentionally, depends upon the intentional contents of our thoughts. For about ten years Fodor has argued that intentional behavior causally depends upon the narrow intentional content of thoughts (not broad). His main reason is a causal powers argument—brains of individuals A and B may differ in broad content, but, if A and B are neurophysically identical, their thoughts cannot differ in causal power, despite differences in broad content. Recently Fodor (Fodor, 1991) presents a new 'modal' version of (...)
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  26.  72
    'X' Means X: Fodor/Warfield Semantics. [REVIEW]Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (2):215-31.
    In an earlier paper, we argued that Fodorian Semantics has serious difficulties. However, we suggested possible ways that one might attempt to fix this. Ted Warfield suggests that our arguments can be deflected and he does this by making the very moves that we suggested. In our current paper, we respond to Warfield's attempts to revise and defend Fodorian Semantics against our arguments that such a semantic theory is both too strong and too weak. To get around our objections, Warfield (...)
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  27.  59
    Rock Beats Scissors: Historicalism Fights Back.Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1997 - Analysis 57 (4):273-81.
  28.  38
    A Goal-State Theory of Function Attributions.Frederick R. Adams - 1979 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):493 - 518.
  29.  22
    Feedback About Feedback: Reply to Ehring.Frederick Adams - 1986 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):123-131.
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  30.  70
    Fodorian Semantics, Pathologies, and "Block's Problem".Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1993 - Minds and Machines 3 (1):97-104.
    In two recent books, Jerry Fodor has developed a set of sufficient conditions for an object “X” to non-naturally and non-derivatively mean X. In an earlier paper we presented three reasons for thinking Fodor's theory to be inadequate. One of these problems we have dubbed the “Pathologies Problem”. In response to queries concerning the relationship between the Pathologies Problem and what Fodor calls “Block's Problem”, we argue that, while Block's Problem does not threatenFodor's view, the Pathologies Problem does.
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  31.  39
    Names, Contents, and Causes.Frederick R. Adams & Gary Fuller - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (3):205-21.
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  32.  35
    The Function of Epistemic Justification.Frederick Adams - 1986 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):465 - 492.
    Assume that epistemic justification has a cognitive function and that a belief's being justified is not just its being caused by the appropriate information (for this property of the belief may be cognitively impenetrable). What is the function of epistemic justification? it cannot be to actualize knowledge-The belief's being caused by appropriate information alone does that! so what is its function? I suggest it is to cause us to believe and/or take action.
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  33. Fodor's Asymmetrical Causal Dependency Theory of Meaning.Frederick R. Adams - unknown
  34. Causal Contents.Frederick R. Adams - 1991 - In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Blackwell.
  35.  36
    Trying, Desire, and Desiring to Try.Frederick Adams - 1994 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (4):613 - 626.
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  36.  63
    Trying.Frederick Adams - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:549-561.
    Sue knows that, unaided, she cannot lift the 1,000 pound weight, but surely she can try. Can she not? For even if she believes it is impossible to succeed in lifting the weight, trying to lift the weight need not involve success. So surely, it would seem that nothing could be easier than for Sue to give lifting the weight a try. In this paper, I agrue that, appearances aside, it is not possible for someone to try to do what (...)
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  37.  68
    Mind-Body Identity Theories.Frederick Adams - 1991 - Teaching Philosophy 14 (4):433-436.
  38.  84
    Names That Name Nothing.Frederick Adams - unknown
    This paper defends a direct reference view of empty names, saying that empty names literally have no meaning and cannot be used to express truths. However, all names, including empty names, are associated with accompanying descriptions that are implicated in pragmatically imparted truths. A sentence such as “Vulcan doesn’t exist” pragmatically imparts that there is no tenth planet. This view is defended against objections.
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  39.  12
    Tertiary Waywardness Tamed.Frederick Adams - 1989 - Critica 21 (61):117 - 125.
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  40.  1
    Fodor’s Asymmetric Causal Dependency Theory and Proximal Projections.Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1997 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):433-437.
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  41.  32
    Machine Persons.Frederick Adams - 1992 - The Personalist Forum 8 (Supplement):47-55.
  42.  21
    Introduction.Frederick Adams - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32 (Supplement):1-5.
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  43.  44
    Book Review:Intention, Plans and Practical Reason. Michael E. Bratman. [REVIEW]Frederick Adams - 1989 - Ethics 100 (1):198-.
  44.  23
    The Future of Folk Psychology.Frederick Adams - 1992 - Teaching Philosophy 15 (4):385-388.
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  45.  19
    Reply to Russow.Frederick Adams - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):63 – 65.
    In 'Fodor's Modal Argument' I claim that Fodor's latest defence of narrow content does not work. I claim that Fodor's modal argument is an unsuccessful resurrection of the Logical Connection Argument. Russow claims that my arguments fail because I confuse cause properties with causal powers, focus on events rather than properties, and overlook the fact that Fodor is trying only to explain narrow behavior. In this paper, I plead 'not guilty' to all of Fodor's charges. Narrow content still does not (...)
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  46.  22
    Audi on Structural Justification.Frederick Adams - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:493-498.
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  47.  1
    Feedback About Feedback: Reply To Ehring.Frederick Adams - 1986 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):123-131.
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  48.  39
    Nomic Reliabilism: Weak Reliability is Not Enough.Frederick Adams & David Kline - 1987 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):433-443.
    Reliabilism has received its share of bad press of late both as a theory of knowledge and as a theory of epistemic justification. We believe its credibility as a theory of knowledge may have been unjustly tarnished and we plan to defend it. However, we hasten to add that we shall defend reliabilism from attack only upon its credentials as a basis for a theory of knowledge. We shall not defend it as a theory of epistemic justification, although we do (...)
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  49.  20
    Of Epicycles and Elegance.Frederick Adams - 1994 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (4):637 - 641.
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  50. Rules in Programming Languages and Networks.Frederick R. Adams, Kenneth Aizawa & Gary Fuller - 1992 - In J. Dinsmore (ed.), The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap. Lawrence Erlbaum.
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