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Frederick Adams [37]Frederick R. Adams [20]Frederick Adams [1]Frederick Ray Adams [1]
  1. The Bounds of Cognition.Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 2008 - Wiley-Blackwell.
  2. Defending the Bounds of Cognition.Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press.
    That about sums up what is wrong with Clark.
     
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  3. Intention and Intentional Action: The Simple View.Frederick Adams - 1986 - Mind and Language 1 (4):281-301.
  4. Defending Non-Derived Content.Kenneth Aizawa & Frederick R. Adams - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669.
    In ‘‘The Myth of Original Intentionality,’’ Daniel Dennett appears to want to argue for four claims involving the familiar distinction between original (or underived) and derived intentionality.
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  5. The Informational Turn in Philosophy.Frederick Adams - 2003 - Minds and Machines 13 (4):471-501.
    This paper traces the application of information theory to philosophical problems of mind and meaning from the earliest days of the creation of the mathematical theory of communication. The use of information theory to understand purposive behavior, learning, pattern recognition, and more marked the beginning of the naturalization of mind and meaning. From the inception of information theory, Wiener, Turing, and others began trying to show how to make a mind from informational and computational materials. Over the last 50 years, (...)
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  6. Folk Concepts, Surveys and Intentional Action.Annie Steadman & Frederick Adams - 2007 - In C. Lumer & S. Nannini (eds.), Intentionality, Deliberation, and Autonomy: The Action-Theoretic Basis of Practical Philosophy. Ashgate Publishers.
    In a recent paper, Al Mele (2003) suggests that the Simple View of intentional action is “fiction” because it is “wholly unconstrained” by a widely shared (folk) concept of intentional action. The Simple View (Adams, 1986, McCann, 1986) states that an action is intentional only if intended. As evidence that the Simple View is not in accord with the folk notion of intentional action, Mele appeals to recent surveys of folk judgments by Joshua Knobe (2003, 2004a, 2004b). Knobe’s surveys appear (...)
     
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  7. The Intention/Volition Debate.Frederick Adams & Alfred R. Mele - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):323-337.
    People intend to do things, try to do things, and do things. Do they also will to do things? More precisely, if people will to do things and their willing bears upon what they do, is willing, or volition, something distinct from intending and trying? This question is central to the intention/volition debate, a debate about the ingredients of the best theory of the nature and explanation of human action. A variety of competing conceptions of volition, intention, and trying have (...)
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  8. Andy Clark on Intrinsic Content and Extended Cognition.Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - manuscript
    This is a plausible reading of what Clark and Chalmers had in mind at the time, but it is not the radical claim at stake in the extended cognition debate.[1] It is a familiar functionalist view of cognition and the mind that it can be realized in a wide range of distinct material bases. Thus, for many species of functionalism about cognition and the mind, it follows that they can be realized in extracranial substrates.[2] And, in truth, even some non-functionalist (...)
     
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  9. The Role of Intention in Intentional Action.Frederick Adams & Alfred Mele - 1989 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):511 - 531.
    A great deal of attention has been paid in recent years to the function- al roles of intentions in intentional action. In this paper we sketch and defend a position on this issue while attacking a provocative alternative. Our position has its roots in a cybernetic theory of purposive behavior and is only part of the larger task of understanding all goal-directed behavior. Indeed, a unified model of goal-directed behavior, with appropriate modifications for different types of systems, is a long-range (...)
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  10. Challenges to Active Externalism.Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - forthcoming - In P. Robbins & Murat Aydede (eds.), Cambridge Handbook on Situated Cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
     
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  11. The Semantics of Thought.Frederick R. Adams, Robert A. Stecker & Gary Fuller - 1992 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):375-389.
  12. Empathy, Neural Imaging and the Theory Versus Simulation Debate.Frederick R. Adams - 2001 - Mind and Language 16 (4):368-392.
  13. Fodorian Semantics. Adams, Frederick & Kenneth Aizawa - 1994 - In Steven Stich & Ted Warfield (eds.), Mental Representation. Blackwell.
  14. Swampman's Revenge: Squabbles Among the Representationalists.Frederick R. Adams & Laura A. Dietrich - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (3):323-40.
    There are both externalist and internalist theories of the phenomenal content of conscious experiences. Externalists like Dretske and Tye treat the phenomenal content of conscious states as representations of external properties. Internalists think that phenomenal conscious states are reducible to electrochemical states of the brain in the style of the type-type identity theory. In this paper, we side with the representationalists and visit a dispute between them over the test case of Swampman. Does Swampman have conscious phenomenal states or not? (...)
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  15.  94
    'X' Means X: Semantics Fodor-Style. [REVIEW]Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1992 - Minds and Machines 2 (2):175-83.
    InPsychosemantics Jerry Fodor offered a list of sufficient conditions for a symbol “X” to mean something X. The conditions are designed to reduce meaning to purely non-intentional natural relations. They are also designed to solve what Fodor has dubbed the “disjunction problem”. More recently, inA Theory of Content and Other Essays, Fodor has modified his list of sufficient conditions for naturalized meaning in light of objections to his earlier list. We look at his new set of conditions and give his (...)
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  16. Mental Representation.Frederick R. Adams - 2002 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
  17. Intentions Confer Intentionality Upon Actions: A Reply to Knobe and Burra.Frederick Adams - 2006 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):255-268.
    Is intentionally doing A linked to the intention to do A? Knobe and Burra believe that the link between the English words ‘intention’ and ‘intentional’ may mislead philosophers and cognitive scientists to falsely believe that intentionally doing an action A requires one to have the intention to do A. Knobe and Burra believe that data from other languages..
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  18.  91
    Narrow Content: Fodor's Folly.Frederick R. Adams, David Drebushenko, Gary Fuller & Robert A. Stecker - 1990 - Mind and Language 5 (3):213-29.
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  19. Reviews-Dynamics in Action: Intentional Behavior as a Complex System.Alicia Juarrero & Frederick Adams - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3):635-640.
  20.  23
    Tertiary Waywardness Tamed.Frederick Adams - 1989 - Critica 21 (61):117-125.
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  21.  56
    A Goal-State Theory of Function Attributions.Frederick R. Adams - 1979 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):493 - 518.
    The analysis of function-ascribing statements, such as “the function of x is y”, is proving to be a difficult matter. It is difficult because we are only beginning to see the complexity which is involved in ascribing functions. The process of discovery has been slow and tedious, with each newly constructed analysis of the meaning of functional ascriptions yielding insights into the structure of functional analysis and functional explanation. However, as each analysis is, in turn, dismantled, we seem to see (...)
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  22.  59
    Names, Contents, and Causes.Frederick R. Adams & Gary Fuller - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (3):205-21.
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  23.  80
    Fodor’s Asymmetric Causal Dependency Theory and Proximal Projections.Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1997 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):433-437.
    In “A Theory of Content, 11: The Theory,” Jerry Fodor presents two reasons why his asymmetric causal dependency theory does not lead to the conclusion that syntactic items “X” mean proximal sensory stimulations, rather than distal environmental objects. Here we challenge Fodor’s reasoning.
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  24. Causal Contents.Frederick R. Adams - 1991 - In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Blackwell.
  25.  65
    The Function of Epistemic Justification.Frederick Adams - 1986 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):465 - 492.
    Assume that epistemic justification has a cognitive function and that a belief's being justified is not just its being caused by the appropriate information (for this property of the belief may be cognitively impenetrable). What is the function of epistemic justification? it cannot be to actualize knowledge-The belief's being caused by appropriate information alone does that! so what is its function? I suggest it is to cause us to believe and/or take action.
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  26.  77
    Rock Beats Scissors: Historicalism Fights Back.Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1997 - Analysis 57 (4):273-81.
    Jerry Fodor (1994) thinks that content is not historically determined. In this paper we will consider Fodor's reasons.
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  27.  92
    'X' Means X: Fodor/Warfield Semantics. [REVIEW]Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (2):215-31.
    In an earlier paper, we argued that Fodorian Semantics has serious difficulties. However, we suggested possible ways that one might attempt to fix this. Ted Warfield suggests that our arguments can be deflected and he does this by making the very moves that we suggested. In our current paper, we respond to Warfield's attempts to revise and defend Fodorian Semantics against our arguments that such a semantic theory is both too strong and too weak. To get around our objections, Warfield (...)
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  28.  39
    Feedback About Feedback: Reply to Ehring.Frederick Adams - 1986 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):123-131.
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  29.  88
    He Doesn't Really Want to Try.Frederick Adams - 1991 - Analysis 51 (2):109 - 112.
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  30.  55
    Fodor's Modal Argument.Frederick Adams - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):41-56.
    What we do, intentionally, depends upon the intentional contents of our thoughts. For about ten years Fodor has argued that intentional behavior causally depends upon the narrow intentional content of thoughts (not broad). His main reason is a causal powers argument—brains of individuals A and B may differ in broad content, but, if A and B are neurophysically identical, their thoughts cannot differ in causal power, despite differences in broad content. Recently Fodor (Fodor, 1991) presents a new 'modal' version of (...)
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  31.  54
    Trying, Desire, and Desiring to Try.Frederick Adams - 1994 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (4):613 - 626.
    What is the relationship between trying, desire, and desiring to try? Is it necessary to desire to do something in order to try to do it? Must Dave desire to quit smoking in order to try to quit? I shall defend the view that desiring to do A is necessary for trying to do A. First, Dave needs motivation to quit smoking and motivation comes in the form of desire. So it seems straightforward that when one tries to do something (...)
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  32.  85
    Trying.Frederick Adams - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:549-561.
    Sue knows that, unaided, she cannot lift the 1,000 pound weight, but surely she can try. Can she not? For even if she believes it is impossible to succeed in lifting the weight, trying to lift the weight need not involve success. So surely, it would seem that nothing could be easier than for Sue to give lifting the weight a try. In this paper, I agrue that, appearances aside, it is not possible for someone to try to do what (...)
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  33. Fodor's Asymmetrical Causal Dependency Theory of Meaning.Frederick R. Adams - unknown
  34.  32
    Introduction.Frederick Adams - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32 (Supplement):1-5.
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  35.  85
    Mind-Body Identity Theories.Frederick Adams - 1991 - Teaching Philosophy 14 (4):433-436.
  36.  97
    Names That Name Nothing.Frederick Adams - unknown
    This paper defends a direct reference view of empty names, saying that empty names literally have no meaning and cannot be used to express truths. However, all names, including empty names, are associated with accompanying descriptions that are implicated in pragmatically imparted truths. A sentence such as “Vulcan doesn’t exist” pragmatically imparts that there is no tenth planet. This view is defended against objections.
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  37.  10
    Fodor’s Asymmetric Causal Dependency Theory and Proximal Projections.Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1997 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):433-437.
    In “A Theory of Content, 11: The Theory,” Jerry Fodor presents two reasons why his asymmetric causal dependency theory does not lead to the conclusion that syntactic items “X” mean proximal sensory stimulations, rather than distal environmental objects. Here we challenge Fodor’s reasoning.
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  38.  5
    Feedback About Feedback: Reply To Ehring.Frederick Adams - 1986 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):123-131.
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  39.  43
    Machine Persons.Frederick Adams - 1992 - The Personalist Forum 8 (Supplement):47-55.
  40. Rules in Programming Languages and Networks.Frederick R. Adams, Kenneth Aizawa & Gary Fuller - 1992 - In J. Dinsmore (ed.), The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap. Lawrence Erlbaum.
  41.  40
    Audi on Structural Justification.Frederick Adams - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:493-498.
  42.  5
    Intention, Plans and Practical Reason.Frederick Adams - 1989 - Ethics 100 (1):198-199.
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  43.  61
    Book Review:Intention, Plans and Practical Reason. Michael E. Bratman. [REVIEW]Frederick Adams - 1989 - Ethics 100 (1):198-.
  44.  32
    Reply to Russow.Frederick Adams - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):63 – 65.
    In 'Fodor's Modal Argument' I claim that Fodor's latest defence of narrow content does not work. I claim that Fodor's modal argument is an unsuccessful resurrection of the Logical Connection Argument. Russow claims that my arguments fail because I confuse cause properties with causal powers, focus on events rather than properties, and overlook the fact that Fodor is trying only to explain narrow behavior. In this paper, I plead 'not guilty' to all of Fodor's charges. Narrow content still does not (...)
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  45.  58
    Nomic Reliabilism: Weak Reliability is Not Enough.Frederick Adams & David Kline - 1987 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):433-443.
    Reliabilism has received its share of bad press of late both as a theory of knowledge and as a theory of epistemic justification. We believe its credibility as a theory of knowledge may have been unjustly tarnished and we plan to defend it. However, we hasten to add that we shall defend reliabilism from attack only upon its credentials as a basis for a theory of knowledge. We shall not defend it as a theory of epistemic justification, although we do (...)
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  46. Properties, Functionalism, and the Identity Theory.Frederick R. Adams - unknown
  47.  33
    Of Epicycles and Elegance.Frederick Adams - 1994 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (4):637 - 641.
    I am pleased to be able to respond to Al Mele’s reply to my paper on trying and desire. My remarks will bebriet.First, it is not thesis T that I find objectionable. It may be possible for me to want TO TRY to quit smoking, while currently not wanting TO QUIT smoking. I may want to try because I want to ACQUIRE the desire to quit, since people persist in nagging me to quit. So I accept thesis T because it (...)
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  48.  27
    The Future of Folk Psychology.Frederick Adams - 1992 - Teaching Philosophy 15 (4):385-388.
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  49.  14
    Trying: You’Ve Got to Believe.Frederick Adams - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:549-561.
    Sue knows that, unaided, she cannot lift the 1,000 pound weight, but surely she can try. Can she not? For even if she believes it is impossible to succeed in lifting the weight, trying to lift the weight need not involve success. So surely, it would seem that nothing could be easier than for Sue to give lifting the weight a try. In this paper, I agrue that, appearances aside, it is not possible for someone to try to do what (...)
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  50.  18
    Preface.Frederick Adams - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30 (Supplement):1-1.
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