Classic introduction provides readers with insightful, accessible survey of major philosophical trends and thinkers of the Middle Ages--from the thought of Thomas Aquinas and the Averroists to Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. "A better conspectus of medieval philosophy than this would be difficult to conceive ... a notable achievement." The Tablet (London).
In the preface to his Philosophy of Right Hegel maintains that a philosophy is its own time apprehended in thought. It is not the philosopher's business to create an imaginary world of his own. His task is to understand the present and actual as subsuming the past in itself, as the culmination of a process of development.
The claim that philosophy and its history are two distinct, though interrelated, things would probably seem allmost people who have any idea of what philosophy is, to be so obviously true that it would be foolish or perverse to call it in question. Do we not assume, and rightly, that there is a real distinction between art and the history of art, between science and the history of science? Is there not also a real distinction between philosophy and history of (...) philosophy? Artistic creation and telling the story of the development of the arts through the centuries are clearly not the same thing, though there is an obvious relationship between them. Similarly, the actual process of scientific inquiry and formulating scientific hypotheses and theories is not the same thing as recounting the genesis of such hypotheses and theories. Again, it hardly needs saying that there is a difference between Kant's original creative development of his philosophy and the activity of providing even a sympathetic and illuminating interpretative account of Kant's thought. (shrink)
As we all know, in Freddie Ayer's famous book Language, Truth and Logic metaphysics received short shrift. Metaphysical assertions were dismissed as being all nonsensical . In the work in question Ayer clearly tended to equate metaphysics with what Professor W. H. Walsh was to describe as ‘transcendent’ metaphysics . This tendency is also discernible, I think, in the 1949 debate between Ayer and myself on logical positivism. After all, my defence of metaphysics was largely prompted and certainly strengthened by (...) what I believed to be the religious relevance of metaphysical philosophy. A lot of what Aristotle would have described as ‘first philosophy’ and what some later philosophers would have classified as ‘ontology’ Ayer would have called ‘philosophical analysis’. What he was primarily concerned with undermining was any claim by metaphysicians to be able to extend our knowledge of what exists, of the Absolute or God for example, by metaphysical arguments. (shrink)
The author, using bertrand russell's "human knowledge": "it's scope and limits", makes a point of departure where russell distinguishes between "meaning" and "significance." the author contends that in using these distinctions in a metaphysical argument, his purpose is not to show whether or not the argument is possible, but to show the problem of validity of metaphysical arguments as the remaining fundamental problem in regards to metaphysics. (staff).
Originally written in 1956 and revised in 1972, this book explores the work of many of the most important thinkers of the 20th century, including Ayer, ...
IT HAS OFTEN BEEN STATED that Nietzsche's predominantly aphoristic style of writing militated against the construction of any system analogous to those of Spinoza and Hegel. The statement is doubtless true. But it is essential to add that Nietzsche had no wish to construct such a system. Spinoza was convinced that the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things; and Hegel believed that the rational is the real and the real the rational. (...) Nietzsche, however, had no such conviction or belief. Hence it would be rather misleading to say that he "failed" to construct a system comparable to those of Spinoza or Hegel. (shrink)
Many people who have never read the works of Nietzsche possess some vague notion of what he taught. For them the philosophy of Nietzsche is represented by a few floating ideas—“Superman,” “Will to Power,” and even perhaps “blond beast.” Others again have learnt a little more about Nietzsche and perhaps read something of what he actually said; yet the net result is an impression of a passionate and destructive thinker, who launched his attacks on this side and on that, without (...) any regard for consistency. For them there can be no philosophy of Nietzsche: they know that he often wrote in the form of aphorism and they picture his thought in general as a series of detached utterances, many of which are mutually exclusive. It may then be of use to some, if we attempt to set forth the guiding inspiration and leading ideas of Nietzsche, for when these have been grasped, it will be seen that it is by no means absurd to speak of a philosophy of Nietzsche. It may well be impossible to reconcile all his utterances, at least so far as the words are concerned—though Nietzsche is of course not the only philosopher who betrays inconsistency in his thought—but it should be remembered that Nietzsche was not given to standing still: his thought developed. Moreover, he often spoke in an exaggerated form, so that some of the apparent inconsistencies may be ascribed to over-emphasis. In any case, even granting the presence of irreconcilable inconsistencies in his thought, Nietzsche's various theories not only may, but must, be seen as a whole, if they are seen in the light of his guiding ideas and inspiration. (shrink)
In the preface to his Philosophy of Right Hegel maintains that a philosophy is its own time apprehended in thought. It is not the philosopher's business to create an imaginary world of his own. His task is to understand the present and actual as subsuming the past in itself, as the culmination of a process of development.
