52 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Frederick F. Schmitt [53]Frederick Francis Schmitt [1]
  1. Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge.Frederick F. Schmitt (ed.) - 1994 - Rowman & Littlefield.
    Socializing Epistemology: An Introduction through Two Sample Issues Frederick F. Schmitt Social epistemology is the conceptual and normative study of the ...
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   61 citations  
  2.  27
    Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology.Frederick F. Schmitt & Ernest Sosa - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (3):421.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   92 citations  
  3.  98
    Knowledge and belief.Frederick F. Schmitt - 1992 - New York: Routledge.
    In Knowledge and Belief, Frederick Schmitt explores the nature and value of knowledge and justified belief through an examination of the dispute between epistemological internalism and externalism. Knowledge and justified belief are naturally viewed as belief of a sort likely to be true--an externalist view. It is also intuitive, however, to view them as an internal matter; justification must be accessible to the subject or constituted by the subject's epistemic perspective. The author argues against the view that internalism is the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  4. Socializing Metaphysics : the Nature of Social Reality.Frederick F. Schmitt (ed.) - 2003 - Rowman & Littlefield, 65-91.
    Socializing Metaphysics supplies diverse answers to the basic questions of social metaphysics, from a broad array of voices.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  5.  53
    Hume’s Epistemology in the Treatise: A Veritistic Interpretation.Frederick F. Schmitt - 2014 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Frederick F. Schmitt offers a new account of Hume's epistemology in A Treatise of Human Nature, which alternately manifests scepticism, empiricism, and naturalism. Critics have emphasised one of these positions over the others, but Schmitt argues that they can be reconciled by tracing them to an underlying epistemology of knowledge and probability.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  6. Knowledge and Belief.Frederick F. Schmitt - 1992 - New York: Routledge.
    Knowledge, from Plato onwards, has been considered in relation to justified belief. Current debate has centred around the nature of the justification and whether justified belief can be considered an internal or extenal matter. Epistemological internalists argue that the subject must be able to reflect upon a belief to complete the process of justification. The externalists, on the other hand, claim that it is only necessary to consider whether the belief is reliably formed, and argue that the ability to know (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  7.  22
    Truth: A Primer.Frederick F. Schmitt - 1995 - Westview Press.
    The concept of truth lies at the heart of philosophy; whether one approaches it from epistemology or metaphysics, from the philosophy of language or the philosophy of science or religion, one must come to terms with the nature of truth.In this brisk introduction, Frederick Schmitt covers all the most important historical and contemporary theories of truth. Along the way he also sheds considerable light on such closely related issues as realism and idealism, absolutism and relativism, and the nature of contemporary (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  8.  13
    Knowledge and Belief.Frederick F. Schmitt - 1992 - New York: Routledge.
    Knowledge, from Plato onwards, has been considered in relation to justified belief. Current debate has centred around the nature of the justification and whether justified belief can be considered an internal or extenal matter. Epistemological internalists argue that the subject must be able to reflect upon a belief to complete the process of justification. The externalists, on the other hand, claim that it is only necessary to consider whether the belief is reliably formed, and argue that the ability to know (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  9. The Assurance View of Testimony.Frederick F. Schmitt - 2008 - In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 216--242.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  10. Testimonial Justification and Transindividual Reasons.Frederick F. Schmitt - 2006 - In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press. pp. 193--224.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  11. Justification, sociality, and autonomy.Frederick F. Schmitt - 1987 - Synthese 73 (1):43 - 85.
    Theories of epistemically justified belief have long assumed individualism. In its extreme, or Lockean, form individualism rules out justified belief on testimony by insisting that a subject is justified in believing a proposition only if he or she possesses first-hand justification for it. The skeptical consequences of extreme individualism have led many to adopt a milder version, attributable to Hume, on which a subject is justified in believing a proposition only if he or she is justified in believing that there (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  12.  43
    A Realist Conception of Truth.Frederick F. Schmitt - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (4):617.
    Alston begins his exposition of the realist conception of truth in chapter 1 with a roughly Aristotelian formulation: “A statement is true if and only if what the statement says to be the case actually is the case”. This condition has the drawback that it defines truth via illocutionary acts; yet, as Alston argues, propositions are the most basic truth-bearers. Alston therefore turns to the universalized T-schema for a condition that characterizes the truth of propositions without mentioning illocutionary acts: “ (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  13.  37
    Veritistic value.Frederick F. Schmitt - 2000 - Social Epistemology 14 (4):259 – 280.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  14.  26
    Truth: A Primer.Marian David & Frederick F. Schmitt - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (3):441.
    Schmitt allots a chapter to each of the main types of theories about truth: pragmatism, coherentism, deflationism, and the correspondence theory. He discusses various arguments for these positions and concludes that only the arguments supporting the correspondence theory are successful. Schmitt's positive case for correspondence makes up the least original part of the book. He explicitly credits Field and remarks that he is mainly concerned with making Field's difficult account more accessible —a task that he discharges honorably..) Schmitt also offers (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  15.  15
    Reasons and Knowledge.Frederick F. Schmitt - 1983 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (1):139-142.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  16.  32
    Reliability, objectivity and the background of justification.Frederick F. Schmitt - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1):1 – 15.
  17.  51
    Consensus, respect, and weighted averaging.Frederick F. Schmitt - 1985 - Synthese 62 (1):25 - 46.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  18.  69
    Knowledge, justification, and reliability.Frederick F. Schmitt - 1983 - Synthese 55 (2):209 - 229.
    Recent epistemology divides theories of knowledge according to their diagnoses of cases of failed knowledge, Gettier cases. Two rival camps have emerged: naturalism and justificationism. Naturalism attributes the failure of knowledge in these cases to the cognizer's failure to stand in a strong natural position vis-à-vis the proposition believed. Justificationism traces the failure to the cognizer's failure to be strongly justified in his belief. My aim is to reconcile these camps by offering a version of naturalism, a reliability theory of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  19.  93
    What is wrong with epistemic circularity?Frederick F. Schmitt - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):379–402.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  20.  20
    8. Epistemic Dimensions of Self-Deception.Frederick F. Schmitt - 1988 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. pp. 183-204.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  21.  50
    Justification as reliable indication or reliable process?Frederick F. Schmitt - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 40 (3):409 - 417.
  22.  72
    Stability and Justification in Hume’s Treatise, Another Look- A Response to Erin Kelly, Frederick Schmitt, and Michael Williams.Frederick F. Schmitt - 2004 - Hume Studies 30 (2):339-404.
    In Stability and Justification in Hume’s Treatise, Louis Loeb ascribes to Hume a naturalistic account of justified belief, one on which Hume is fundamentally concerned with the question whether stable belief can be achieved. Loeb’s interpretation is systematic, richly explanatory, and powerfully argued. He makes a compelling case that stability plays a central role in Hume’s epistemology. Loeb’s case is so compelling indeed that anyone who wants to defend an alternative interpretation will now have to assimilate or deflect the massive (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  23. Theories of Truth.Frederick F. Schmitt (ed.) - 2008 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    The classic and contemporary readings in this collection represent the four most influential theories of truth – correspondence, pragmatist, coherence, and deflationary theories. A collection of classic and contemporary philosophical reflections on the nature of truth. Opens with an introduction to theories of truth, designed for readers with little or no prior knowledge of the subject. Divided into four sections on the most important theories of truth - correspondence, pragmatist, coherence, and deflationary theories. Brings together articles in the recent debate (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  24. Socializing Metaphysics: The Nature of Social Reality.Frederick F. Schmitt, Gary Ebbs, Margaret Gilbert, Sally Haslanger, Kevin Kimble, Ron Mallon, Seumas Miller, Philip Pettit, Abraham Sesshu Roth, John Searle, Raimo Tuomela & Edward Witherspoon - 2003 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    Socializing Metaphysics supplies diverse answers to the basic questions of social metaphysics, from a broad array of voices. It will interest all philosophers and social scientists concerned with mind, action, or the foundations of social theory.
  25. A symposium on Louis E. Loeb, Stability and justification in Hume's treatise.Michael Williams, Frederick F. Schmitt, Erin I. Kelly & Louis E. Loeb - 2004 - Hume Studies 30 (2):265-404.
  26. Theories of Truth.Frederick F. Schmitt (ed.) - 2003 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    The classic and contemporary readings in this collection represent the four most influential theories of truth – correspondence, pragmatist, coherence, and deflationary theories. A collection of classic and contemporary philosophical reflections on the nature of truth. Opens with an introduction to theories of truth, designed for readers with little or no prior knowledge of the subject. Divided into four sections on the most important theories of truth - correspondence, pragmatist, coherence, and deflationary theories. Brings together articles in the recent debate (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  27.  13
    Loeb on Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise.Frederick F. Schmitt - 2004 - Hume Studies 30 (2):297-327.
    In Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise, Louis Loeb ascribes to Hume a naturalistic account of justified belief, one on which Hume is fundamentally concerned with the question whether stable belief can be achieved. Loeb's interpretation is systematic, richly explanatory, and powerfully argued. He makes a compelling case that stability plays a central role in Hume's epistemology. Loeb's case is so compelling indeed that anyone who wants to defend an alternative interpretation will now have to assimilate or deflect the massive (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  28.  74
    Comment on John Greco's Putting Skeptics in Their Place.Reza Lahroodi & Frederick F. Schmitt - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):457-465.
    In this comment, we will focus on Greco’s brief for agent reliabilism in preference to simple reliabilism. Agent reliabilism differs from simple reliabilism primarily in requiring, not merely belief that results from a reliable process, but belief grounded in stable dispositions that make up the subject’s character.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  29.  51
    Introduction.Frederick F. Schmitt - 2004 - Episteme 1 (2):91-94.
  30.  84
    Introduction: Epistemic relativism.Frederick F. Schmitt - 2007 - Episteme 4 (1):91-94.
  31.  30
    Introduction: Epistemic Relativism.Frederick F. Schmitt - 2007 - Episteme 4 (1):1-9.
  32.  83
    Events.Frederick F. Schmitt - 1983 - Erkenntnis 20 (3):281 - 293.
    Despite important similarities, events differ from states of affairs. Recent theories of events (Davidson's, Kim's) have ignored the distinction, preferring to focus on relations of composition between events and states, indifferently conceived, and properties, objects, and times. It might be proposed, however, that events and states can be distinguished by their composition. I argue against a compositional approach, in favor of a modal approach, on which events are distinguished from states in virtue of being essentially dynamic. This view locates the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  33.  45
    Realism, antirealism and epistemic truth.Frederick F. Schmitt - 1998 - Social Epistemology 12 (3):267 – 287.
  34.  19
    Skeptical Essays.Frederick F. Schmitt - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (3):466.
  35.  18
    21. Why Was Descartes a Foundationalist?Frederick F. Schmitt - 1986 - In Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), Essays on Descartes’ Meditations. University of California Press. pp. 491-512.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36.  58
    Against epistemic indolence.Frederick F. Schmitt - 1983 - Mind 92 (367):424-429.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37.  36
    Change.Frederick F. Schmitt - 1978 - Philosophical Studies 34 (4):401 - 416.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  38.  30
    Epistemology and Cognitive Science.Frederick F. Schmitt - 2004 - In M. Sintonen, J. Wolenski & I. Niiniluoto (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 841--918.
  39.  16
    Intelligence.Frederick F. Schmitt - 2001 - Philosophical Topics 29 (1-2):345-382.
  40.  18
    Justification and Consensus: The Peircean Approach.Frederick F. Schmitt - 2002 - ProtoSociology 16:241-283.
    It is commonly recognized that the justified beliefs of an individual subject can be supported or undermined by a consensus on the proposition in the subject’s community. A more controversial view is that justified belief turns on consensus in a deeper respect: justified beliefs are correlated with consensual beliefs in a way to which we must attend when we evaluate or theoretically describe justified belief. Call this a consensus account of justified belief. C. S. Peirce proposed such an account, deriving (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41.  51
    Knowledge as tracking?Frederick F. Schmitt - 1985 - Topoi 4 (1):73-80.
  42.  12
    Remarks on Conversation and Negotiated Collective Belief.Frederick F. Schmitt - 2018 - ProtoSociology 35:74-98.
    Gilbert (1989) and Gilbert and Priest (2013) have argued that paradigmatic conversations involve a collectivity of the conversers who participate in the conversation, in the sense that the conversers put forth and negotiate proposals of propositions to be collectively believed by them. Here I explore the plausibility of this Negotiated Collective Belief (NCB) thesis. I begin by supporting a more basic claim, that the nature of conversation itself entails that a conversation always involves a collectivity of the conversers. I then (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Recent Publications.Frederick F. Schmitt - 1983 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (1):143.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44.  16
    Scepticism and Reasonable Doubt: The British Naturalist Tradition in Wilkins, Hume, Reid, and Newman.Frederick F. Schmitt & M. Jamie Ferreira - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (2):269.
  45.  51
    Testimonial justification: the parity argument.Frederick F. Schmitt - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (2):385-406.
    On an individualist view of testimonial justification, a subject’s belief based on testimony is justified ultimately on the basis of nontestimonial beliefs alone. The prevailing version of individualism has been inductive individualism, according to which the nontestimonial basis for a testimonial belief is an inductively based belief in the reliability of the testifier. Here I consider an alternative to inductive individualism, which I call the parity account. This is the view, endorsed in various forms by Allan Gibbard, Richard Foley and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  46.  43
    Veritas: The correspondence theory and its critics.Frederick F. Schmitt - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):232–234.
  47.  44
    Book reviews. [REVIEW]Frederick F. Schmitt - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):555-559.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  48.  41
    Comment on John Greco’s Putting Skeptics in Their Place. [REVIEW]Reza Lahroodi & Frederick F. Schmitt - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):457 - 465.
    In this comment, we will focus on Greco’s brief for agent reliabilism in preference to simple reliabilism. Agent reliabilism differs from simple reliabilism primarily in requiring, not merely belief that results from a reliable process, but belief grounded in stable dispositions that make up the subject’s character.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  49.  5
    Reasons and Knowledge" by Marshall Swain. [REVIEW]Frederick F. Schmitt - 1983 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (1):139.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50.  29
    Review of Ernest Sosa, Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume Ii[REVIEW]Frederick F. Schmitt - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (8).
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 52