Karl Popper champions an open society in which all institutions, principles and values are open to criticism. Anthony O’Hear contends that Popper’s vision is utopian because an open society can survive only if some non-liberal values are assumed, including the prohibition of criticism of fundamental liberal principles and values. I correct O’Hear’s interpretation of Popper and I rebut most of his criticisms, arguing that an open society is stronger if it permits criticism of all views. However, I accept and strengthen (...) O’Hear’s rejection of Popper’s assimilation of an open society to a scientific community. I also suggest that the survival of open societies may require limits on immigration from societies permeated by Islamic fundamentalism or similar ideologies. (shrink)
This collection of recent articles by leading scholars is designed to illuminate one of the greatest and most influential philosophical books of all time. It includes incisive commentary on every major theme and argument in the Meditations, and will be valuable not only to philosophers but to historians, theologians, literary scholars, and interested general readers.
There is a virtual consensus among commentators on Descartes that the causal principle by which he relates the objective reality of his ideas to the formal reality of their causes isindefensible. In particular, Descartes’ claim that this principle follows from the general principle which states that the cause must contain at least as much reality as the effect has been examined and rejected as logically implausible. I challenge this view by showing that there is a logically plausible derivation of the (...) causal principle of ideas from the general causal principle. This result has important implications due to the crucial role the causal principle of ideas plays in Descartes’ first a posteriori argument for the existence of God. (shrink)
The essays in this volume explore current work in central areas of philosophy, work unified by attention to salient questions of human action and human agency. They ask what it is for humans to act knowledgeably, to use language, to be friends, to act heroically, to be mortally fortunate, and to produce as well as to appreciate art. The volume is dedicated to J. O. Urmson, in recognition of his inspirational contributions to these areas. All the essays but one have (...) been specially written for this volume. (shrink)
Discussion of J. Kevin O’Regan’s “Why Red Doesn’t Sound Like a Bell: Understanding the Feel of Consciousness” Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-20 DOI 10.1007/s13164-012-0090-7 Authors J. Kevin O’Regan, Laboratoire Psychologie de la Perception, CNRS - Université Paris Descartes, Centre Biomédical des Saints Pères, 45 rue des Sts Pères, 75270 Paris cedex 06, France Ned Block, Departments of Philosophy, Psychology and Center for Neural Science, New York University, 5 Washington Place, New York, NY 10003, USA Journal Review of Philosophy and (...) Psychology Online ISSN 1878-5166 Print ISSN 1878-5158. (shrink)
J. J. OʼDonnell is one those scholars whose learning is assumed rather than displayed. As a result, his brief approach to the long-terms effects of the computer revolution onreading and higher education feels like a bracing, sophisticated exchange of ideas. Like conversation, O'Donnellʼs thesis is not terribly unified or orderly. He often makessidetracks from his focus on high technology and literacy into explaining such interestingthings as how we choose our cultural ancestry instead of merely evolving out of it, the errors (...) of current education, and perhaps more than you ever wanted to know aboutother avatars of the word such as St. Jerome, St. Augustine, and Cassiodorus. Greatcover too. (shrink)
It might seem that there are two separate questions about universals, the question of what they are and the question why we should believe that there are such things, and that the former question should be taken first; it might seem that until you know what they are it cannot be sensible to ask whether one should believe in them. How, for example, could one know whether it was sensible or even possible to believe in Father Christmas until one knew (...) who or what he was supposed to be? But appearances could be deceptive. In the case of universals the position is different. What happened was that philosophers found themselves faced with certain problems of which they were inclined to say: this problem is insoluble unless there are some entities which have certain characteristics, the characteristics which would enable the problem to be solved. The things which, if they existed, would solve their problems they called forms or universals. So universals are things which have whatever properties they need to have to solve certain problems. This being so, it is clearly sensible to approach the theory of universals from the problems which led to philosophers postulating their existence. (shrink)
The attempt to study religion objectively has been part of the academic scene in the West for a century. Such men as F. Max Mueller, Edward Tylor, W. Brede Kristenson, Raffaele Peettazzoni, and Joachim Wach worked to develop such a truly scientific study of religion. They held that a study of religious data could reveal what religious life means for people who participate in it if methods are used which prevent a superimposition of the investigator's personal value judgments. At the (...) same time, there has been the recognition by some scholars, including some of the above, that there is something about religious life that cannot be investigated by normal empirical methods. This sense of the uniqueness of religion is symbolised in Rudolf Otto's book The Idea of the Holy , where he maintains that in order to understand religion in its innermost core, an investigator must recognise ‘a unique “numinous” category of value and of a definitely “numinous” state of mind’. Our concern here is to examine one problem arising from the claim that religious life must be studied in terms of its own intention, or category of value; and yet studied through an inductive method which allows for the distinctive character of different historical expressions of religion. (shrink)
A Satisfactory discussion in depth of all the philosophical problems that could be raised concerning musical representation would require much more space as well as more ability than I have at my disposal. Nobody should believe, or believe that I believe, that what follows is more than a rather sketchy examination of a few central issues.
Considering everything from Nike ads, emaciated models, and surgically altered breasts to the culture wars and the O.J. Simpson trial, Susan Bordo deciphers the hidden life of cultural images and the impact they have on our lives. She builds on the provocative themes introduced in her acclaimed work _Unbearable Weight_—which explores the social and political underpinnings of women's obsession with bodily image—to offer a singularly readable and perceptive interpretation of our image-saturated culture. As it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between (...) appearance and reality, she argues, we need to rehabilitate the notion that not all versions of reality are equally trustworthy. Bordo writes with deep compassion, unnerving honesty, and bracing intelligence. Looking to the body and bodily practices as a concrete arena where cultural fantasies and anxieties are played out, she examines the mystique and the reality of empowerment through cosmetic surgery. Her brilliant discussion of sexual harassment reflects on the Clarence Thomas/Anita Hill controversy as well as the film _Disclosure_. She suggests that sexuality, although one of the mediums of harassment, is not its essence, and she calls for the recasting of harassers as bullies rather than sex fiends. Bordo also challenges the continuing marginalization of feminist thought, in particular the failure to read feminist work as cultural criticism. Finally, in a powerful and moving essay called "Missing Kitchens"—written in collaboration with her two sisters—Bordo explores notions of bodies, place, and space through a recreation of the topographies of her childhood. Throughout these essays, Bordo avoids dogma and easy caricature. Consistently, and on many levels, she demonstrates the profound relationship between our lives and our theories, our feelings and our thoughts. (shrink)
Há muito tempo o progresso científico provoca nossas convicções e ameaça deixar o discurso moral para trás. Mais recentemente, a polêmica em torno da permissão ou proibição da eugenia negativa e positiva questiona nossa autocompreensão de natureza, moralidade e liberdade. O presente texto tem por objeto uma série de artigos de J. Habermas, convertidos posteriormente em livro, onde são expostos argumentos fortemente plausíveis em favor da tese da indisponibilidade da natureza humana no âmbito da eugenia positiva. Após contextuar o problema (...) e mapeá-lo no horizonte filosófico, o trabalho apresenta a posição metafísica habermasiana, com destaque para a distinção entre eugenia negativa e positiva, e a confronta com os argumentos liberais dworkinianos acerca do tema. O artigo pleiteia a favor da tese de que a naturalidade humana consiste, desde os primórdios da espécie, em autocriação natural, de modo que cabe à moralidade e ao direito preencherem o vácuo do destino criado pela biotecnologia. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Natureza humana. Habermas. Eugenia negativa e positive. Ética. Filosofia do direito. ABSTRACT For a long time scientific progress has been challeging our moral convictions, bringing the threat of making moral discourse totally surpassed. More recently the controversy around the permission or prohibition of negative and positive eugeny questions our selfunderstanding of nature, morality and freedom. The text has as its object several articles of J. Habermas, which turned afterwards into a volume, where the author exposes strongly plausible arguments for the thesis of the unavailability of human nature in the field of positive eugeny. After contextualising the problem and mapping it in the scientific horizon, the study presents Habermas’s metaphysical account, putting emphasis on the distinction between negative and positive eugeny, and confronts that same account of Habermas with Dworkin’s liberal arguments about the topic. The article pleads for the thesis that human naturality consists since the beginning of humanity in natural self-creation, so that it is a task of morality and science of law to fulfill the empty space of the destiny built up by biotechnology. KEY WORDS – Human nature. Negative and positive eugeny. Philosophy of law. (shrink)
O. Renn, P.-J. Schweizer, M. Dreyer, A. Klinke: Risiko. Über den gesellschaftlichen Umgang mit Unsicherheit Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s10202-009-0071-9 Authors Stephan Lingner, Europäische Akademie zur Erforschung von Folgen wissenschaftlich-technischer Entwicklungen Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler GmbH Wilhelmstr. 56 53474 Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler Germany Journal Poiesis & Praxis: International Journal of Technology Assessment and Ethics of Science Online ISSN 1615-6617 Print ISSN 1615-6609 Journal Volume Volume 6 Journal Issue Volume 6, Numbers 3-4.
Rauprich O, Marckmann G, Vollmann J: Gleichheit und Gerechtigkeit in der modernen Medizin Content Type Journal Article Pages 71-75 DOI 10.1007/s10202-007-0032-0 Authors Elisabeth Weisser-Lohmann, Institut für Philosophie FernUniversität Hagen 58084 Hagen Germany Journal Poiesis & Praxis: International Journal of Technology Assessment and Ethics of Science Online ISSN 1615-6617 Print ISSN 1615-6609 Journal Volume Volume 5 Journal Issue Volume 5, Number 1.
W tych badaniach logiczno-filozoficznych, w których używał logiki modalnej, Jerzy Perzanowski szczególną uwagę zwracał na miejsce danej logiki modalnej w kracie logik modalnych: ważne dla niego były logiki otaczające daną logikę. Cenił rozważania nad kratą logik modalnych i poświecił jej sporo miejsca w swej naukowej twórczości. Natrafił w szczególności na tzw. logiki anty-monotoniczne; badania nad nimi rozpoczął, ale ich nie ukończył (por. Perzanowski [1989, 1989’], Makinson ). Podał podstawowe fakty syntaktyczne dotyczące tych logik, lecz nie opisał semantyki dla takich logik: (...) ani relacyjnej, ani algebraicznej. Logiki te są o tyle ciekawe, że wyniki badań nad nimi uzupełniają obraz całej kraty logik modalnych. Poniżej uzupełniam rozważania J. Perzanowskiego: podaję semantykę relacyjną i algebraiczną dla takich logik i opisuję strukturę całej kraty logik modalnych. (shrink)
The need to address our question arises from two sources, one in Kant and the other in a certain type of response to so-called Reformed epistemology. The first source consists in a tendency to distinguish theoretical beliefs from practical beliefs , and to treat theistic belief as mere practical belief. We trace this tendency in Kant's corpus, and compare and contrast it with Aquinas's view and a more conservative Kantian view. We reject the theistic-belief-as-mere-practical-belief view: it is bad descriptive anthropology, (...) it embraces a misguided ideal of a fragmented self unattainable by human beings, and it will deter people from the most desirable sort of faith. The second source consists in the idea that since theistic beliefs function as answers to why-questions, their epistemic status hangs on whether they meet certain distinctively explanatory standards, whatever support they might receive from other sources. We argue that this is a non-sequitur and suggest questions for further research. (shrink)
In the present state of philosophy in the English-speaking world, to choose to talk about sense data may seem perverse. What could be more boring for one's audience than to attempt variations on so threadbare a theme? And worse, what could be more unfashionable in the aftermath of Wittgenstein and Austin? My reasons for selecting this unpromising topic are twofold. First, the general theme of this series of lectures is empiricism. And whatever meanings we put upon that ambiguous word, it (...) is clear that as a matter of history the problems of perception have been important problems for nearly all those philosophers who would consider themselves to be empiricists. And however unsatisfactory sense datum theories of perception may now be held to be, such theories have been central to the empiricist tradition. Secondly, it is important not to be too much impressed by the fact that a particular philosophical opinion is fashionable or unfashionable. The former certainly does not guarantee its truth nor the latter its falsity. It has often been remarked that philosophical opinions are very rarely refuted. Instead they fall out of vogue only to return some years later in another guise. It is perhaps time to take another look at the notion of sense data. The most ingenious and persistent attacks on analyses of perception in terms of sense data have been at best indecisive, as Professor Ayer showed in his reply to Austin's Sense and Sensibilia. (shrink)